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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study’s purpose is to investigate the expansion of social control efforts in 
American elementary and secondary school settings, particularly the use of zero-
tolerance policies. These policies entail automatic punishments, such as suspensions, 
expulsions, and referrals to the juvenile and criminal justice systems for a host of school-
based infractions. The widespread implementation of zero-tolerance policies and the 
application of harsh, exclusionary sanctions have intensified over the past decade. 
Numerous studies have documented this rise; however, there has been little effort to 
explore the explanation of the expansion of school-based social controls.  
 A potential explanation is found in the application of political economic theories 
in relation to the increased use and evolving nature of social control in the neoliberal era 
of capitalism. As such, the current study employs a new theoretical approach, which 
utilizes neoliberal theory combined with theoretical components from existing 
metanarratives in the literature. By using this new approach in regard to school-based 
social control, the connection between the expansion of social control of the working 
class and marginal populations in the criminal justice process, and the retraction of the 
social safety nets that characterized neoliberal capitalism is extended to the explanation 
of trends in the social control of school-based infractions.  
vii 
 
 This investigation incorporates a qualitative, empirical exploration of how these 
school criminalization efforts have been implemented and legitimized by the state, 
specifically through the authority of the courts. By engaging in textual analysis, the 
jurisprudential intent that informs both the relevant state appellate and Supreme Court 
decisions was subjected to legal exegeses to determine how and if the judicial system 
legitimizes the practice of zero tolerance in schools, which are consistent with neoliberal 
ideals. In addition, a quantitative component, to this overall study, examined nationally 
representative School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) data across three academic 
years to determine if school security measures and disciplinary actions were increasingly 
applied to marginal populations in elementary and secondary schools over time.  
 Results from the qualitative inquiry revealed that in the overwhelming majority of 
court cases evaluated, the courts decided in a fashion that reinforces zero-tolerance 
policies as legitimate neoliberal social controls in schools. Several theoretically relevant 
themes emerged from the jurisprudential intent, which are transferable for further theory 
development and future research. Quantitative findings reveal that, over time, the total 
disciplinary actions and removals from school without continued educational services are 
disproportionately applied to schools with the highest percentages of minority students 
and students who reside in high-crime areas compared to schools with the lowest 
percentages of minority students and students who reside in high-crime areas. 
Conversely, the results also reveal that the average use of school security measures (e.g., 
metal detectors, access controls, security guards, etc.) are more likely to be used in 
schools with the lowest percentages of minority students than schools with the highest 
percentages of minorities over time. 
viii 
 
 These results are discussed in detail, and recommendations for changes in school 
policies and practices are offered, while being mindful of evidence-based best practices 
that may serve as viable alternatives to the zero-tolerance policies currently being used. 
Avenues for future research and theory development are also outlined. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The use of school-based sanctions has increased dramatically over the past 
decade.  While studies have documented this increase, there has been little effort to 
explore the explanation of the expansion of school-based social control.  A potential 
explanation is found in the application of political economic theories concerning the 
expansion and nature of social control in the neoliberal era of capitalism.  By employing 
this argument in relation to school-based social control, the connection between the 
expansion of social control of the working class and marginal populations in the criminal 
justice process, and the retraction of social safety nets that characterized neoliberal 
capitalism is extended to the explanation of trends in the social control of school-based 
infractions. Thus, the purpose of this study is to examine the expansion of social control 
in American school settings in relation to the use of infractions, such as suspensions and 
expulsions for school age children.   
 Current trends reveal that suspension and expulsion rates in American elementary 
and secondary schools are increasing annually. In 2006, over 3 million students were 
suspended and over 100,000 were expelled (National Center for Education Statistics 
[NCES], 2009). Recent data collected from the United States Department of Education 
(USDOE) found that African-American students comprised 35% of students suspended 
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once, 46% of students suspended more than once, and 39% of students expelled from 
school (USDOE, 2012). Compared to their White counterparts, African-American 
students are over three and a half times more likely to be suspended or expelled, 
especially due to enhanced use of zero-tolerance policies (USDOE, 2012).  
 Zero tolerance is a widely implemented school disciplinary policy in the US that 
designates predetermined punishments for school-based infractions, regardless of 
circumstance or context (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). These exclusionary punishments 
may include automatic suspensions, expulsions with some continued educational 
services, expulsions without any continued educational services, mandated referrals to 
law enforcement, automatic exclusion from extracurricular or co-curricular activities, and 
referrals to and/or placement in alternative educational settings (Giroux, 2003; 
Hirschfield, 2008). Under these policies, 56% of students who are expelled are either 
Hispanic or African-American (USDOE, 2012). Moreover, Hispanic and African-
American students make up 70% of students involved in school-related arrests or 
referrals to law enforcement (USDOE, 2012).  
 Additionally, empirical studies have consistently found that zero-tolerance 
policies are disproportionately applied to minorities (Lawrence, 2007; Reyes, 2006; Skiba 
& Knesting, 2001; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2002; Sughrue, 2003)1. Interviews 
conducted by Dunbar and Villaruel (2002) of 36 principals working in urban Michigan 
schools suggests that the perception of African American and Latino students puts them 
at a disadvantage of receiving harsher disciplinary actions.  Although African American 
                                                          
1 Previous research provides a clear implication that, like other forms of social control and criminal justice 
(CJ) processes, school suspensions/expulsions exhibit racial and ethnic biases, and this study extends the 
scope of research on racial bias.  As a result, it is possible that other explanations for this process, which 
draw on explanations of the production of racial biases in the CJ system, may be applicable. 
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students receive school disciplinary action much more often than their White 
counterparts, research has also shown that minority students are expelled typically for 
nonviolent infractions, while White students tend to receive punishment primarily for 
only serious violations (Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003; Skiba et al, 2002).  Some 
researchers (Christle, Nelson, & Jolivette, 2004; Skiba et al., 2002) argue that students 
from low-income backgrounds are disproportionately targeted for disciplinary action; 
however, disproportional school punishment for those of minority status continues to 
exist even after controlling for socioeconomic status (Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 
2003; Skiba et al., 2002). 
 In theory, zero tolerance is expected to deter students from violent, illegal, or 
disruptive behavior because the subsequent punishment is harsh and certain, which serves 
to incapacitate the students who are perceived to be most dangerous (Chen, 2008; Fries & 
DeMitchell, 2007; Hirschfield, 2008; Morrison & Skiba, 2001; Noguera, 2003). 
Normally, zero-tolerance policies have been widely accepted for their crime suppression 
effect, and much literature has been written to support the connection between zero 
tolerance policies and the long-term reduction in crime that has occurred in the US over 
the past two decades (Burke & Herbert, 1996; Chen, 2008; Devine, 1996; Ewing, 2000; 
Hyman & Snook, 1999; Jones, 1997; Larson & Ovando, 2001).  As a result, zero-
tolerance efforts are often referred to as the “school-to-prison pipeline,” (Fenning & 
Rose, 2007, p. 548; Kim, Losen, & Hewitt, 2010; Sullivan, 2010, p. 189) where schools 
punish the troubled students who need the most academic, social, economic, and 
emotional help rather than apply more restorative sanctions that do not deny them access 
to educational services (Fries & DeMitchell, 2007; Giroux, 2003; Noguera, 2003; 
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Sughrue, 2003). Violators of zero-tolerance policies are often labeled “trouble makers,” 
(Bowditch, 1993; Fenning & Rose, 2007) and contact with the criminal or juvenile justice 
system might lead to other stigmatizing labels, which may actually perpetuate  future 
delinquent involvement (Cocozza et al, 2005; Potter & Kakar, 2003). Furthermore, 
referrals to the juvenile justice system have overwhelmed the courts, which already have 
overburdened dockets (Hirschfield, 2008; Sullivan, 2010).  
 While a growing body of literature has attempted to elucidate many of the 
negative outcomes associated with zero-tolerance policies and the closely linked school-
to-prison pipeline (Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003; Hanson, 2005; Kim et al., 2010; 
Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Stader, 2006), these studies ignore the issues central to the 
theoretical examination of the emergence of those policies. One relevant critique is posed 
by research (see Hirschfield, 2008) that examines the role economic structures and 
assumptions play as they influence social institutions under neoliberal capitalism.  A 
primary outcome of neoliberal economic policies is the removal of social safety nets, and 
the adoption of more conservative and punitive responses to social problems.  In the 
school setting, the adoption of zero-tolerance policies can be seen as an extension of the 
influence of neoliberal capitalism on social institutions. Some researchers argue that the 
enforcement of zero tolerance policies across the nation’s educational system is one way 
that the state may punish and remove those who are perceived to have no market value 
such as those who are identified as flawed consumers, and who are classified as “other” 
because of their perceived associations with crime, redundancy, poverty, or expendability 
(Giroux, 2003; Hall & Karanxha, 2012).  
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 In order to better understand the influence structural conditions have on 
institutions such as public education, it is necessary to examine the historical context of 
such changes in a political economic context. Contemporary, neoliberal restructuring of 
capitalism in the US, which began in the 1990s, continues to greatly reduce the welfare 
state, privatize state enterprises, and eliminate state regulations on the economy (Kotz, 
2003, 2008, 2009; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b).  The consequence is the restriction of forces 
of controls that would seek to redistribute resources more equitably in response to 
evidence of injustice (Kotz, 2008, 2009; Wacquant, 2009b). Ironically, in order for the 
markets to enjoy such freedom from controls, it is also necessary to undermine working 
class power to facilitate the expansion of social control over workers and the 
economically marginalized  (Kotz, 2009; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Thus, neoliberal 
capitalism frees the mobility of capital across markets from government regulations, 
while also increasing formal social controls on marginal populations to manipulate the 
labor market and perpetuate the existing class structure (Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). The 
social controls which are exerted, tend to be punitive and carceral2 in nature (Wacquant, 
2009b). In addition, zero tolerance is expected to be increasingly applied to marginalized 
groups, including minorities and those living in concentrated disadvantage (Wacquant, 
2009a). 
 Additionally, the recent neoliberal restructuring of the economy and its intrusion 
into other social institutions, such as the educational system (Shapiro, 1984), presents a 
legitimation crisis in need of reconciliation. Classical liberalism refers to a market-based 
ideology, which justifies a capitalist mode of production by freeing the market from 
                                                          
2 Carceral refers to practices of social control and discipline that transforms public spaces into prison-like 
settings characterized by heightened surveillance and security (see Foucault, 1977). 
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government regulations and encouraging self-interested individualism among citizens 
(Wolfe, 1977). Conversely, democracy promotes the maximization of civic participation 
by the populace in an effort to establish a community defined by equality, mutual respect, 
and cooperative interaction among citizens toward commonly agreed-upon goals (Wolfe, 
1977). The logic behind these dueling ideologies presents a contradiction, whereby 
liberalism creates inequality via power imbalances across rigid class lines, while 
democracy struggles to respond by promoting social welfare remedies and state 
regulations to alleviate social ills (Habermas, 1975; Shapiro, 1984; Wolfe, 1977). When 
punitive social control efforts consistent with the neoliberal agenda conflict with the 
equitable and democratic roles the educational system traditionally serves by being a 
public good, the state must overcome attempts to challenge its credibility and authority in 
light of such a legitimation problem. To date, no study has investigated the manner in 
which these zero-tolerance policies are legitimized by the state when constitutional 
challenges are raised in the courts by those affected. 
 Concurrent with the neoliberal restructuring efforts of 1990s, serious violent 
juvenile offending reached a peak in the US in 1993 at 1.2 million victimizations with at 
least one juvenile involved, its  highest level since 1973 (Snyder & Sickmund, 1999). 
These rates sparked renewed concern over youthful offenders, and many prominent 
public figures, including James Alan Fox, John J. DiIulio, and William J. Bratton, 
inflamed the rhetoric being publicized by mass media when they exaggerated reports of 
youth “wilding” and growing legions of juvenile “superpredators” (Fuentes, 2003; 
Welch, 2005, p. 168-169; Welch, 2011, p.216-217). Indeed, wilding became synonymous 
with youth violence and fed the media-driven moral panic by drawing on racial and 
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ethnic stereotypes already embedded in the prevailing political economy (Welch, 2005).   
As a result, minority youth were targeted as threats to society, while racial and economic 
inequalities were reinforced via ever-increasing, “get tough” responses to the perceived 
panic over youth crime (Welch, 2005, 2011). 
 Recent instances of deadly school shootings (e.g., Sandy Hook Elementary, 
Columbine High School, Chardon High School shootings, and Lake Worth High School)  
resulted in efforts to increase security within schools through the widespread adoption of 
zero-tolerance policies (Hirschfield, 2008; Stinchcomb, Bazemore, & Riestenberg, 2006; 
Sullivan, 2010). Thus, society’s focus on social control efforts shifted from street corners 
to school yards (Stinchcomb et al., 2006).  In fact, the rigid, punitive response to the 
moral panic caused by the school shootings of the 1990s and 2000s has allowed the 
juvenile justice system to broaden its reach to include school disciplinary policy 
(Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Chen, 2008; Hirschfield, 2008).  As a result, students now 
face juvenile court proceedings and expulsion for even minor school misconduct instead 
of the brief school suspension they would have received years ago (Scott & Steinberg, 
2008).   
 Whereas zero-tolerance policies were first intended to punish possession of 
weapons and drugs at school, these policies have undergone net-widening to include 
minor offenses such as speech, truancy, excessive tardiness, shoving matches, dress code 
violations, profanity, and possession of common health aids (e.g., Advil and cough drops; 
Black, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Insley, 2001; Morrison & Skiba, 2001; Sughrue, 2003).  
Such harsh realities are becoming more and more commonplace in light of the fact that 
the actual probability of an American student being murdered in school is lower than that 
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of being struck by lightning (Orpinas, Horne, & Staniszewski, 2003; Scott & Steinberg, 
2008).  Ironically, juvenile offending has been declining ever since 1993 (FBI, 2008), but 
school criminalization efforts have continued to escalate (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). 
While episodic moral panics may provide the impetus for school criminalization via the 
expansion of zero-tolerance efforts, there appears to be larger political, organizational, 
and structural forces needed in order for these policies to become institutionalized 
(Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). 
The Current Study 
 This study examines the enforcement of zero-tolerance policies in school settings 
and seeks to explain the emergence and sustained longevity of such policies. A thorough 
examination of the historical and structural conditions necessary for the development of 
such punitive policies within the educational system will be conducted. Several meta-
narratives regarding the theoretical mechanisms influencing school criminalization and 
the increased use of zero-tolerance policies will be explored and critiqued for their 
necessity and sufficiency in conceptualizing this phenomenon. In addition, the various 
explanations offered by the extant literature will be pieced together to offer a more 
complete theoretical explanation of the expansion of zero-tolerance policies in the school 
setting.  Unlike previous investigations, this study will also incorporate an empirical 
exploration of how these school criminalization efforts have been implemented and 
legitimized by the state, specifically through the authority of the courts.  
 As part of that effort, attention will also be focused on the court’s responses to 
legal challenges to penalties carried out to reinforce zero-tolerance school-based social 
control. Attempts by youthful defendants to challenge zero tolerance outcomes on the 
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grounds of violations of First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights have 
largely been dismissed by the courts (Kim et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2010; Yell & Rozalski, 
2000). It is hypothesized that the affirmation of zero tolerance policies through court 
decisions legitimates the state’s control of marginal populations. Examination of both the 
relevant state appellate and Supreme Court decisions surrounding the possible 
constitutional rights violations exhibited by zero tolerance policies is warranted to extract 
this jurisprudential intent, which permits and regenerates these crime control processes. 
Court decisions, like other legal documents, serve as archival data that record mainstream 
legal thoughts on several justice-related matters, and as such, they can be interpreted to 
reveal societal meaning. A qualitative textual analysis via a case law method approach is 
employed to investigate the underlying jurisprudential intent guiding these legal 
decisions, which provides legitimacy to the practice of zero tolerance in the education 
system and promote disciplinary strategies that will be consistent with neoliberal ideals. 
 An examination of neoliberal policies’ influence on the national trends regarding 
increased mandatory disciplinary actions across elementary and secondary schools is 
largely absent from the current research. As a result, studies tend to ignore the historical 
association between the impacts of neoliberal policies on social control outcomes, such as 
the expansion of zero-tolerance polices and their outcomes.  In addition, prior studies 
have failed to explore the scope of this extension of this form of social control, and have 
tended to employ case study approaches. Few existing quantitative studies are cross-
sectional in scope (Chen, 2008; Kupchik & Ellis, 2008; Mayer & Leone, 1999). This 
study expands prior research by exploring this issue across both time and location. 
Relevant data collected nationally from the School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) 
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provides a source for information regarding disciplinary problems and actions across 
several years (e.g., 2004, 2006, and 2008) and across locations. SSOCS surveys a 
nationally representative sample of public elementary and secondary school principals. 
Principals were asked about the amount of crime and violence, disciplinary actions, 
prevention programs and policies, and other school characteristics, including some 
demographic variables. Quantitative analyses of the available variables regarding the 
various forms of disciplinary actions taken, with or without continued educational 
services, in response to a variety of school-based infractions, are conducted to identify 
trends that may reflect the increased punitiveness in the social control of marginal 
populations within the educational system during the recent neoliberal transition. 
 Finally, a critical evaluation of the qualitative and quantitative findings will 
inform implications for policy and practice. Viable alternatives for zero-tolerance policies 
will be explored and future directions for research will be explicated. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 There are several bodies of literature on zero tolerance policies, which need to be 
reviewed. First of all, there were numerous historical events that led to the development 
of school criminalization. How these developments factored into the widespread 
implementation of zero tolerance policies across schools in America will be discussed. 
Secondly, the various theoretical rationales that underpin zero tolerance policies will be 
explained to elucidate how proponents buttress their support for the application of such 
policies. Thirdly, the empirical evidence of the net-widening of zero tolerance policies 
and their adverse impact on minority and disabled students will be clarified. Next, the 
existing metanarratives3 that attempt to critically explain the theoretical foundations for 
the origins and growing use of zero tolerance policies in school will be reviewed and 
appraised. Finally, neoliberal theory and the crisis of liberal democracy will be described 
in detail to provide a historical context of how market forces affected the emergence zero 
tolerance policies in the educational system.  
 
Factors Affecting the Accelerated Criminalization of Schools 
                                                          
3 Metanarrative refers to a grand narrative or story-like explanation that attempts to provide a 
comprehensive account to various historical events, experiences, and social/cultural phenomena by 
appealing to some kind of universal knowledge, theoretical basis, or schema (See, Habermas, 1981; 
Lyotard, 1979). 
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 Several rationales for why harsh, punitive school disciplinary practices have 
emerged in recent years are noted in the existing literature on school violence and 
discipline. Most of the potential factors affecting the acceleration of the criminalization 
of school children have been identified as instilling fear in a reactionary public and the 
power brokers of the current political-economic system (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & 
Celinska, 2011; Simon, 2007; Welch, 2005, 2011). Zero-tolerance policies, which 
automatically impose severe punishments regardless of the circumstances, are 
prominently featured in recent school criminalization efforts (Kim et al., 2010). 
Traditionally, criminalization refers to the development and diffusion of criminal law that 
“targets a set of activities perceived to be attached to a social group” in need of control 
(Jenness, 2004, p.150). Thus, school criminalization includes policies and practices that 
sanction student misconduct as crime and casts students as suspects, criminals, or 
prisoners in need of control (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). 
 The 1960s and 1970s were a period that experienced high tides of youthful 
violence in schools (Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1985; Snyder & Sickmund, 1999; Toby, 
1998). This period was also marked by social unrest due to the civil-rights revolution, the 
women’s liberation movement, and anti-war protest, which questioned authority, the 
status quo, and conformity to outdated social structures and controls. The sentiments that 
emerged from these social movements spread into public schools (Toby, 1998). As such, 
teachers and school administrators began to express concerns over maintaining control 
within the classroom when students misbehaved, especially since U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions in the 1960s and 1970s extended greater due process protections to juveniles 
(Bowditch, 1993; Goss v. Lopez, 1975; In re Gault, 1967; In re Winship, 1970; Kent v. 
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United States, 1966; Toby, 1998). Thus, teachers and administrators perceived that these 
social and legal changes weakened their authority to swiftly administer punishments, 
which subsequently undermined order within schools (Toby, 1998). Indeed, it has been 
hypothesized that school personnel’s fear of loss of control, coupled with public scrutiny 
in regards to school safety, has contributed to an influx of classroom conflict between 
students and educators (Casella, 2003a; Fenning & Rose, 2007; Noguera, 1995; Vavrus 
& Cole, 2002). Throughout the 1970s, the number of media reports regarding school 
violence continued to increase to the point that public concern resulted in Congressional 
hearings on the matter (Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1985; Toby, 1998).  
 Consequently, the Ninety-Third Congress mandated a study on the scope and 
severity of school violence be conducted in 1974. This comprehensive national study on 
school crime and safety surveyed principals in 4,014 schools in urban, suburban, and 
rural areas (Asner & Broschart, 1978). In addition, 31,373 students and 23, 895 teachers 
in 642 junior and senior high schools were also surveyed on their exposure to school 
crime, especially victimizations (Asner & Broschart, 1978). The final report was 
published by the National Institute of Education and the findings were presented to 
Congress in 1978 (Asner & Broschart, 1978). Unfortunately, no previous studies existed 
by which to compare the findings in order to determine if school violence was increasing 
and by how much (Asner & Broschart, 1978; Toby, 1998). Regardless, Asner and 
Broschart (1978) concluded with incomplete evidence that classroom disruption was 
significantly more serious than 15 years prior but that levels remained steady within the 
past five years. While the report vacillated on the reasons for this increase in school crime 
and disruption, it was argued that the single most important difference between safe 
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schools and violent schools was the presence of a strong, dedicated principal who served 
as a role model for both students and teachers, and who instituted a firm, fair, and 
consistent system of discipline (Asner & Broschart, 1978).  
 Increasing reports of misbehaving students were blamed primarily on teachers 
abandoning their roles as disciplinarians because they were being intimidated by unruly 
youths (Bowditch, 1993; Toby, 1998). Some argued that teachers needed to reassert their 
role as agents of control and bolster their authority, because control of the classroom was 
deemed a prerequisite for education (Bowditch, 1993; Toby, 1998). Moreover, Jackson 
Toby (1998), as a social control theorist, claimed that an element of fear was necessary to 
maintain classroom control, because students would be less likely to be disruptive if it 
would jeopardize the teacher’s approval of them. It was also perceived by some that 
American students simply did not fear their teachers anymore and they no longer 
perceived the potential loss of stakes in conformity, which formal education provided 
(Toby, 1998). Thus, increased security, surveillance, and formal sanctions for disruptive 
and violent behavior in schools were proclaimed as essential to restore a controlled, 
disciplined environment so educational processes could be effective, since students 
would conform to school norms or face strict consequences for misbehaviors (Bowditch, 
1993; Toby, 1998).  
 Also, from the 1960s to the 1980s, an association between youth culture and 
drugs and drug trafficking was framed by the government and media as a major threat to 
the safety and educational missions of schools (Simon, 2007). The nationwide crackdown 
on drug-related offenses during the 1980s gave rise to the concept of zero tolerance, 
which promotes holding people accountable for their behavior via a punitive, 
15 
 
exclusionary response (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Fuentes, 2003; Skiba & Knesting, 
2001; Stinchcomb et al., 2006). However, the crime-related politics behind the war on 
drugs has shifted the crime control efforts of drug policy from the street corners to 
schoolyards (Stinchcomb et al., 2006). In addition, criminologists like James Q. Wilson 
and John DiIulio predicted a rising tide of violent youth crime to be perpetrated by 
growing numbers of “superpredators” (Fuentes, 2003; Welch, 2005, p. 168-169; Welch, 
2011, p.216-217). By 1997, at least 79% of schools nationwide adopted zero-tolerance 
policies toward alcohol and drugs (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011).  
 The National Center for Education Statistics (2012) reports that 60% of public 
high schools utilize random dog sniffs to check for drugs and roughly 29% use some 
other form of random sweeps to search for contraband and drugs. A Texas company 
called Interquest Detection Canines has supplied over 1,000 schools in 14 states with 
drug-sniffing dogs (Beger, 2002). Thus, the potential for profit may motivate the 
continued expansion of canine searches in schools (Beger, 2002).  
 Around 13% of public high schools drug test athletes, while 8% drug test students 
who are participating in nonathletic extracurricular activities (Sullivan, 2010). The 
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995) decision upheld the school policy allowing 
for all student athletes to subject to mandatory drug testing under the argument that the 
testing would not lead to any law enforcement consequences or used for any internal 
disciplinary actions. A positive drug test would only result in exclusion from the 
extracurricular activity. Such testing has mostly been restricted to participation in 
competitive extracurricular activities; however, the district court in one locale has 
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actually upheld the random drug testing of student drivers (Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l 
High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 2003).  
 Students who are found possessing or using drugs, including alcohol and tobacco, 
or drug paraphernalia, while on school property, face not only suspension or expulsion 
but also a potential referral to the juvenile and criminal justice systems (Beger, 2002; 
Education Law Center, 2012). Therefore, it is possible for students to receive 
imprisonment for possession and distribution of drugs in or around schools, especially 
given the increased use of juvenile waiver in recent years (Arya, 2011; Beger, 2002; 
Sellers & Arrigo, 2009). However, empirical evidence has revealed that zero tolerance 
policies were actually encouraging students to “conceal rather than deal with their drug 
use” and/or abuse and many of those students who are caught and expelled are not 
necessarily the ones who use drugs the most (Hammersley, Marsland, & Reid, 2003, p. 
xi; Stinchcomb et al., 2006). In fact, disciplinary action, like in-school suspension has 
been associated with later drug use and long-term disaffection and alienation 
(Stinchcomb et al., 2006). Alternative evidence-based programs, like Reconnecting 
Youth, have been implemented in several states (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011) and 
experimental evaluations found that students who successfully completed the program 
had lower rates of alcohol and drug use than those who did not participate (Eggert, 
Thompson, Herting, & Nicholas, 1995; Eggert, Thompson, Herting, Nicholas, & Dickers, 
1994). Regardless, concerns over the presence of drugs in schools have emboldened the 
use of zero-tolerance policies for drug-related offenses and they remain largely in place 
in the majority of elementary and secondary schools (Kim et al., 2010; Simon, 2007). 
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 Perhaps the most salient issue affecting the implementation of draconian 
disciplinary practices in schools would be the recent incidents of schoolyard shootings 
and murders in the 1990s and 2000s. The Safe School Initiative identified 37 separate 
incidents of targeted violence between 1974 and 2000, which involved 41 perpetrators 
across 26 states (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2002). The primary 
weapon used by the attackers in these instances was some type of gun, with over half 
using handguns (n=25, 61%) and nearly half using rifles or shotguns (n=20, 49%; 
Vossekuil et al., 2002). Possibly the most noteworthy events of this kind were the 
Columbine High School shootings (by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold) in Littleton, 
Colorado, the Chardon High School shootings (by Thomas Lane) in Ohio, and the 
shootings in Lake Worth High School (by Nathaniel Brazill) in Florida (Greene, 2005; 
Hirschfield, 2008; Kim et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2010). The media’s coverage of such 
violent incidents has influenced the framing of the issue of school violence as one that is 
out-of-control (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Simon, 2007). Thus, the public perception 
in society is that schools are no longer safe and fear has created a moral panic, especially 
among middle-class families in the suburbs (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 
2011; Schoonover, 2007, Simon, 2007). 
 Although weapons in schools are relatively rare (Devine, 1996; Stader, 2004), a 
culture of fear has persevered, whereby control and surveillance are the paramount 
concerns of new “get tough” policies in schools (Giroux, 2003, p.560). As such, the fear 
of school-based crime is used as the overarching rationale to tighten controls on the 
movements of students in and out of schools, as well as the automatic punitive responses 
for policy violations (Barrett, Jennings, & Lynch, 2012; Noguera, 1995; Simon, 2007). 
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Thus, the implementation of zero tolerance policies has continued to expand and the 
scope of their restrictions has broadened to include infractions other than illicit drugs, 
guns, and serious violence (Casella, 2003b; Schoonover, 2007; Stinchcomb et al., 2006). 
Theory, Rationales, and Policies Supporting Zero Tolerance in Schools 
 The main underlying theories guiding the implementation of zero tolerance 
policies in schools are deterrence and rational choice theory (Casella, 2003b). Studies 
testing deterrence theory often looked either at specific deterrence or general deterrence. 
Specific deterrence refers to when an individual is deterred from crime because he or she 
received punishment directly (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Kubrin, Stucky, & Krohn, 2009). 
Conversely, general deterrence refers to when society overall is deterred from crime 
because some offender was punished for his or her crime (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Kubrin 
et al., 2009). Thus, either direct (specific) or indirect (general) punishment is what was 
traditionally scrutinized by researchers. Both specific and general deterrence can occur 
during the administration of a single punishment (Kubrin et al., 2009). For example, a 
person who is punished may be specifically deterred from the personal experience, and in 
addition, the general public be also be deterred from the indirect knowledge that this 
individual was punished.  
 Certainty and severity of punishment are the factors that are most often examined 
to determine the effects of specific and general deterrence (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Kubrin 
et al., 2009). Certainty refers to the likelihood of being caught for a crime and 
subsequently punished. Severity refers to the magnitude or nature of the punishment, 
which may deter crime if it is perceived as slightly more harmful then the harm caused by 
the crime (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Kubrin et al., 2009). Celerity refers to the swiftness in 
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which the punishment is administered, with swifter punishments thought to have more of 
a deterrent effect (Kubrin et al., 2009). However, there is one fundamental aspect that the 
past conception of specific and general deterrence has neglected to take into account.   
 Stafford and Warr (2006) reveal that punishment avoidance can actually affect 
and distort one’s perception of the certainty or severity of punishment. In other words, a 
person may become more inclined to continue to commit crime in the future if he or she 
has never actually been caught or knows others who commit crimes and are never caught. 
Thus, punishment avoidance can have both a direct and indirect effect on one’s persistent 
criminal behavior (Stafford & Warr, 2006). For example, if a student gets into a violent 
altercation with another student, while at school, and he or she is never stopped by school 
administrators or teachers, then he or she may perceive the chances of being disciplined 
and arrested as slim. Similarly, if a student witnessed someone fighting at school, and this 
person is not stopped by school officials, then the certainty of punishment may be 
perceived as less likely. Moreover, if such a student were observed but did not receive 
automatic punishment, then others may not be deterred. Therefore, punishment avoidance 
may encourage an initial criminal act or recidivism according to such logic (Stafford & 
Warr, 2006).  
 Thus, there is a mixture of indirect and direct experiences with punishment and 
punishment avoidance. This differential experience can either reinforce crime or deter it 
(Stafford & Warr, 2006). Zero tolerance policies in schools seek to maintain control of 
students through deterrence by having strict, certain, and automatic punishments that are 
not delayed by taking in to account the circumstance of the school-based violation (APA 
Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Casella, 2003b; Heitzeg, 2009). In addition, zero 
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tolerance policies in schools are intended to overcome the potential phenomenon of 
punishment avoidance by eliminating discretion in an attempt to improve consistency, 
and thereby, send a clear disciplinary message to other students (APA Zero Tolerance 
Task Force, 2008). Zero-tolerance policies seek to deter potential offenders from 
committing school-based infractions by adhering closely to the strategy of “punishing 
dangerousness,” which is both preventive and preemptive in nature (Chen, 2008; 
Robinson, 2001, p. 1432).  
 This new perspective on deterrence is very compatible with social learning theory, 
especially since differential reinforcement plays a role in how one perceives the certainty 
and severity of punishment in relation to direct and indirect experiences with punishment 
and punishment avoidance (Stafford & Warr, 2006). Besides, social learning theory 
argues that behavior can be learned through experience as well as by observational or 
vicarious learning (Akers, 1973; Bandura, 1977). An example of experiential learning 
would be if a person shoplifts but is never arrested and finds the behavior to be positively 
reinforced so he or she decides to continue to shoplift based on this experience. An 
example of vicarious learning would be if a person had a friend who smoked marijuana 
everyday behind the gym but was never caught, which might result in that person 
deciding to smoke also. Of course these scenarios can alter behavior if punishment is 
actually experienced or observed (Stafford & Warr, 2006). It is a more diverse way of 
thinking about deterrence and why some are deterred, while others are not. Thus, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the rationales for zero tolerance efforts in schools are 
buttressed by deterrence theory and differential reinforcement in order to dissuade school 
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violence and misbehavior by students for fear that they will receive swift, harsh, and 
certain consequences (Casella, 2003b; Ewing, 2000; Heitzeg, 2009). 
 Rational choice theory draws greatly from classical criminological theory and 
economic theory, and hypothesizes that perceived certainty and severity of shame, 
embarrassment, and legal sanction may deter potential criminals if they engage in a 
cost/benefit analysis (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 2006). The theory examines the benefits 
of crime as well as its costs by applying Bentham’s hedonistic calculus to the 
mechanisms of deterrence theory (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). In regard to costs, this 
theory conceptualizes self-imposed shame as an internalized punishment and socially 
imposed embarrassment as an informal punishment (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). Shame 
refers to a person’s conscience that causes the individual to feel guilt for committing a 
crime, while embarrassment refers to a person feeling ashamed of criminal behavior by 
letting down those who are closest to him or her (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). Hence, this 
theory assumes that criminals are rational agents who weigh the costs and benefits of 
engaging in crime before executing the act (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Proponents of 
deterrence and rational choice theories often affix blame to the individual, while 
dismissing any external social forces that may constrain that individuals options (Pratt, 
2009). 
 Rational choice theory reinforces a primary rationale for the adult criminal justice 
system, which operates under the premise that adults are rational decision makers who 
are capable of making cost benefit analyses that deter them from criminal or antisocial 
behavior for fear of criminal sanctions (Levick, 2000). Mandatory expulsion and the 
likelihood of a follow-up referral to juvenile court makes zero tolerance policies reflect 
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adult sanctions, which begs the question of whether school officials should examine and 
provide proof of the youth’s intent or knowledge of his or her actions (Hanson, 2005). 
Currently, zero tolerance policies do not give discretion to school authorities in order to 
determine the student’s intent (Hanson, 2005). 
 As a “get tough” strategy for school violence, zero tolerance policies make it 
possible for students to face imminent punishment without consideration for possible 
developmental immaturity, or related social and emotional deficits, which may impair 
their decision making. Empirical evidence specifies that the deficiencies in “psychosocial 
maturity” among juveniles are caused by their impulsivity (Grisso et al, 2003; Oberlander 
et al, 2001; Scott & Grisso, 2005), reliance on peer acceptance (Feld, 2003; Katner, 2006; 
Kupchik, 2006, p. 19; Redding & Frost, 2001; Scott, 2000, p. 304; Scott & Grisso, 2005), 
lack of autonomy (Katner, 2006), and poor judgment in relation to future consequences 
(Grisso, 2006; Katner, 2006; Oberlander et al, 2001; Redding & Frost, 2001; Scott & 
Grisso, 2005, p. 335). In addition, neuroscience research acknowledges that the cognitive 
capabilities of juveniles are also hindered because of biological development (Arya, 
2011; Deitch et al., 2009; MacArthur Foundation Research, n.d.; Sowell, Thompson, 
Tessner, & Toga, 2001). For instance, the adolescent brain is not fully developed since 
the prefrontal cortex is still maturing throughout this developmental period (Arya, 2011; 
Sowell et al., 2001). Moreover, this underdeveloped region of the adolescent’s brain is in 
charge of rational decision-making, long-term planning, impulse control, insight, and 
judgment (Arya, 2011; Heide & Solomon, 2006, 2009; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Sowell et 
al., 2001). Thus, the adolescent’s brain is typically focused on the immediate present and 
not the consequences from the overall situation, which may entail severe collateral 
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consequences affecting future employment and educational aspirations (Heitzeg, 2005; 
Deitch et al., 2009). 
 Notwithstanding the findings from social, behavioral, and neuroscience research, 
public policy has been fashioned to reflect school disciplinary practices in line with 
deterrence and rational choice principles in an effort to make schools safer. In fact, zero 
tolerance policies are a part of a larger set of federal school violence prevention 
initiatives that were developed in the 1990s, which include the following: (1) 
development of violence prevention and conflict resolution programs, (2) attempts at gun 
control laws, and (3) the implementation of punitive and judicial forms of discipline 
(Casella, 2003b). Zero tolerance policies are derived from the latter two initiatives 
(Casella, 2003b).  
 The initial federal legislation began with the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, 
which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a public, 
parochial, or private school. However, this law was found unconstitutional under the 
ruling of U.S. v. Lopez (1995). The subsequent Gun-Free school Act (GFSA) of 1994 
required all states receiving federal funds to expel any student bringing a gun to school 
for a period of no less than a year. An amendment to the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 required that federal funding be withheld from any school that did 
not conform to the expulsion mandated by the GFSA for students who bring firearms 
within 1,000 feet of a school (Casella, 2003b).  
 In addition to the mandatory expulsion of violators for at least a year, GFSA also 
required the school systems to report these individuals to the criminal justice or juvenile 
justice system as well as report discipline statistics to the federal government annually 
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(Sughrue, 2003). Another provision within the GFSA, which was included in the 
modifications made under the No Child Left Behind Act (2001), permits the school 
administrators the discretion to reduce disciplinary action for firearm violation on a case-
by-case basis (Stader, 2006; Sughrue, 2003). Thus, the school administrators are able to 
consider extemporaneous circumstances by which the student in question may receive 
modified disciplinary action. However, zero tolerance policies were widely implemented 
by the GFSA and amendments to the act in 1995 changed the word “firearms” to 
“weapons,” which broadened the category of weapons and items that can be used as 
weapons that will result in mandatory expulsion if a student is found possessing one 
(Casella, 2003b). Zero tolerance policies aim to prevent violence by punishing youths for 
their potential for violence and the dangerousness they exhibit (Casella, 2003b; 
Robinson, 2001).  
 The Safe Schools Act of 1994 (H.R. 2455--103rd Congress) and the Safe and 
Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 provided funding via grants to 
educational agencies and non-profit groups to supply violence education programs, peer 
mediation, conflict resolution, and various other violence prevention programs associated 
with the first category of federal initiatives, as well as programs to deter use of illegal 
drugs and alcohol. Under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
over $30 billion was authorized to fund more police officers, new prison construction, 
and community-based crime prevention programs, which were related to school safety 
efforts by targeting at risk youth in high-crime and high-poverty areas and promoting 
projects that involve community participation and school cooperation (see also Yell & 
Rozalski, 2000). Lastly, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 
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1997 permitted school administrators to place students in special education in an interim 
alternative educational setting (IAES) for 45 days if they brought a weapon to school or 
any school function. In addition, the amendments to this act allows a hearing officer to 
place a special education student in an IAES for 45 days if the school district can provide 
cogent evidence that this student presents a danger to self or others (Yell & Rozalski, 
2000). 
 Under these theoretical rationales and federal legislation, zero tolerance policies 
are assumed to accomplish many objectives. First of all, zero tolerance is expected to 
make schools safer and more effective in handling disciplinary problems (APA Zero 
Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Heitzeg, 2009). This argument comes from the assumption 
that school violence is at a crisis level and ever-increasing, which necessitates the need 
for stringent, no-nonsense strategies for violence prevention (APA Zero Tolerance Task 
Force, 2008; Ashford, 2000; Litke, 1996). Also, it is assumed that zero tolerance 
increases the consistency of school discipline and the clarity of the disciplinary message 
to students (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008). Next, it is expected that the removal 
of students who violate school rules will foster a school climate that is more conducive to 
learning for those students who do not misbehave (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 
2008; Bowditch, 1993; Ewing, 2000). Finally, it is assumed that the swift and certain 
punishments associated with zero tolerance policies will have a deterrent effect on 
students, and these policies will improve overall student behavior and discipline (APA 
Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008). 
 The American Psychological Association Zero Tolerance Task Force (2008) 
examined the data from the existing research and literature and found a lack of support 
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for the above mentioned assumptions. For instance, the empirical evidence does not 
support the argument that school violence is spiraling out-of-control, as incidents of 
deadly school violence are a relatively rare occurrence that make up only a small portion 
of school disruptions (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; De Voe et al., 2004; 
NCES, 2009; Orpinas et al., 2003; Scott & Steinberg, 2008). In addition, there is no 
evidence that zero tolerance policies have increased the consistency of school discipline, 
because suspension and expulsion rates vary widely across schools and schools districts 
(APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; NCES, 2009). In fact, recent research has found 
that higher rates of suspension and expulsion are associated with worsening school 
environments and poor school wide academic achievement (APA Zero Tolerance Task 
Force, 2008; Skiba & Rausch, 2006). Yet, zero tolerance policies continue to flourish 
even without evidence that they actually increase school safety and security (APA Zero 
Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Skiba & Knesting, 2001). 
 Furthermore, evidence from adolescent development and neuroscience have 
found that if a particular structure in the youth’s brain is still immature, then the functions 
that it governs will exhibit immaturity (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Baird & 
Fugelsang, 2004; Luna & Sweeney, 2004). In other words, adolescents are more likely to 
engage in risker behaviors and reason insufficiently in regards to consequences for their 
actions because of their psychosocial immaturity and underdeveloped brain structures 
(APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Grisso, 2006; Sowell et al., 2001). 
 Developmental research has also identified certain characteristics of secondary 
schools that conflict with the developmental challenges of adolescence, which includes 
the need for close peer relationships, autonomy, adult and parental support, identity 
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negotiation, and academic self-efficacy (Eccles, 2004). If used improperly, zero tolerance 
policies may intensify the challenges of early adolescence and the possible mismatch 
between an adolescent’s developmental stage and the punitive structure of secondary 
schools (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008). For example, if the youth’s 
misbehavior is a result of developmental or neurological immaturity, and the action does 
not pose a threat to school safety, then the harsh punishments prescribed by zero 
tolerance may unnecessarily impose detrimentally long-term consequences for poor 
judgment that is common in the developmental stage of adolescence (APA Zero 
Tolerance Task Force, 2008). Indeed, zero tolerance policies may create, enhance or 
perpetuate negative mental health outcomes for students by increasing feelings of 
alienation, anxiety, and rejection in students, as well as breaking healthy bonds to adult 
figures in school settings (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008). 
Net-widening and the Impact of Zero Tolerance on Minority and Disabled Students 
 Although the original intent for the GFSA was to require automatic punishments 
for seriously dangerous violations involving weapons, zero tolerance policies have 
frequently been applied to very minor and non-violent infractions, such as tardiness, the 
use of profane language, and disruptive behavior (Heitzeg, 2009). Some of the violations 
in which zero tolerance sanctions are being applied to are extreme given the nature of the 
infraction (Hall & Karanxha, 2012; Heitzeg, 2009; Schoonover, 2007; Stinchcomb et al., 
2006; Sullivan, 2010). For instance, in 1998, five-year-old Jordan Locke was suspended 
for wearing a five-inch plastic axe as a part of his firefighter costume he wore to his 
class’s Halloween party (Skiba, 2000). School administrators have in fact “cast a very 
wide net,” especially when students have been expelled for possessing nail clippers, 
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Advil, and mouthwash (Heiteg, 2009, p. 9; Skiba, 2000). In Texas, students face 
suspension and placement in alternative programs if they are found cheating, violating 
dress codes, engaging in horseplay, being excessively noisy, and failing to bring 
homework to class (Fuentes, 2003). 
 In some states, an expellable offense can “include willful or continued defiance of 
authority or disruptive behavior and habitual profanity” (Morrison & Skiba, 2001, p. 
174). Another example is the case of LaVine v. Blaine School District (2001), where the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that the school district did not infringe upon a student’s freedom of 
speech rights for expelling LaVine when he presented a poem to his teacher, which 
contained violent themes (Sughrue, 2003). School officials believed that the nature of the 
themes conveyed in the poem posed an imminent threat, and an emergency expulsion of 
the student was applied (Sughrue, 2003). In addition, two fifth-graders, in Virginia, who 
were accused of slipping soap into a teacher’s drinking water, were charged with felonies 
that carried a maximum sentence of 20 years (Giroux, 2003; Heitzeg, 2009). Then there 
is the case of the youth who was brought up on a drug charge for giving fellow students 
two cough drops (Giroux, 2003; Gorman & Pauken, 2003). Several other cases are 
documented in the literature (see Advancement Project, 2005; Heitzeg, 2009, pp. 9-10; 
Justice Policy Institute, 2009; Sullivan, 2010, p. 190) and include the following:  
• A 5-year-old girl handcuffed, arrested, and taken into custody in St. 
Petersburg, FL for throwing a temper tantrum and disrupting class. 
• An 11-year-old girl in Orlando, FL tasered by a police officer, arrested, 
and charged with battery on a security resource officer for disrupting a 
school event and resisting with violence because she pushed another 
student. 
• A 14-year-old disabled student in Palm Beach, FL referred to the 
principal’s office for allegedly stealing $2 from another student. The 
principal referred the student to the police, where he was charged with 
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strong-armed robbery and held in an adult jail for six weeks even though 
this was his first arrest. 
• A 5-year-old boy in Queens, NY arrested, handcuffed, and taken into 
custody for having a temper tantrum and disrupting class. 
• A 12-year-old boy in Ponchatoula, LA, who suffered from hyperactive 
disorder, warned other students not to eat all the potatoes, or “I’m going to 
get you.” The student was suspended for 2 days and referred to the police 
for making “terroristic threats.” He remained incarcerated for 2 weeks 
while awaiting his trial. 
• A 13-year-old boy in Denton County, TX was assigned to write a “scary” 
Halloween story for class; however, when he wrote a story about shooting 
up a school, he both received a passing grade by his teacher and was 
promptly referred to the principal. The police were called and the student 
spent 6 days in jail before the courts dismissed the case, because they 
confirmed no crime had been committed. 
• In West Virginia, a child in the seventh grade gave a zinc cough drop to 
another student and was suspended for 3 days because the cough drop had 
not been cleared by the administration. 
• A 6-year-old boy in North Carolina was suspended for a day for violating 
the school’s rule regarding “unwarranted and unwelcome touching” 
because he kissed his classmate. 
• In Louisiana, a student in the second grade brought his grandfather’s 
watch to class for show-and-tell. When it was discovered that the watch 
had a one-inch-long pocketknife attached to it, the youth was suspended 
and sent to an alternative school for a month. 
• An 11-year-old girl in South Carolina brought a knife to school to cut her 
chicken, which her mother packed in her lunch box and she was taken 
away in a police car. 
 As one can see, the examples mentioned above reveal the nature of the net-
widening trends that school zero tolerance policies are undergoing. These policies are 
now punishing minor infractions with force and arrest, while also focusing more on 
younger elementary and pre-school students (Heitzeg, 2009). Also, the net-widening 
effect reveals enhanced cooperation between schools and the justice system, and how 
many of the barriers separating the two in the past have been removed (Hirschfield, 
2008). 
 While such trends are alarming, perhaps the most troubling finding in the extant 
research is the overrepresentation of minority students, particularly African American 
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males, in the exclusionary practices enforced by zero tolerance policies (APA Zero 
Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Casella, 2003b; Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003; 
Lawrence, 2007; Reyes, 2006; Skiba et al, 2002; Skiba & Rausch, 2006; Skiba & 
Knesting, 2001; Sughrue, 2003). In fact, empirical evidence dating back to 1975 
documented that African American males disproportionately receive exclusionary 
disciplinary consequences (Children’s Defense Fund, 1975). Recent national data reveals 
that African-American students comprised 35% of students suspended once, 46% of 
students suspended more than once, and 39% of students expelled from school (USDOE, 
2012). Moreover, compared to their White counterparts, African-American students are 
over three and a half times more likely to be suspended or expelled, especially due to 
enhanced use of zero-tolerance policies (Heitzeg, 2009; USDOE, 2012). Under zero 
tolerance policies, 56% of students who are expelled are either Hispanic or African-
American (USDOE, 2012). Furthermore, Hispanic and African-American students make 
up 70% of students who are arrested or referred to law enforcement for school-based 
infractions (USDOE, 2012).  
 Minority students are predominantly from lower socioeconomic status and more 
likely to attend inadequately resourced inner-city schools (Christle et al., 2004; Giroux, 
2003; Skiba et al., 2002). However, some studies have found that racial disparities, in 
regards to disciplinary action, continue to exist after controlling for socioeconomic status 
(SES; Fenning & Rose, 2007; Skiba et al., 2002). While the association between low SES 
and minority status is well-documented in social science research, suspension and 
expulsion as it relates to zero tolerance policies potentially has an additional adverse 
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effect on poor minority students compared to others because these kids are typically 
unable to afford tutoring and often fall behind their peers (Casella, 2003b). 
 Skiba and colleagues (2002) found that African American students received more 
referrals for subjective and nonviolent offenses, such as insubordination or being too 
loud, when compared to their White counterparts (See also APA Zero Tolerance Task 
Force, 2008). A Harvard study reported that even though African American students only 
comprised 17% of students enrolled in public schools, they represented 33% of out-of-
school suspensions due to zero tolerance (Advancement Project/Civil Rights Project, 
2000). More recent findings reveal that while African American students make up 17% of 
the school age population, they represent 37% of suspensions and 35% of all expulsions 
(Witt, 2007). Usually, when a group of people represents a certain category at a rate of 
10% or more than their percent makeup in the general population, they group is being 
overrepresented for that category (Reschly, 1997).  
 Studley’s (2002) study investigated discipline rates among 4 of the largest school 
districts in California and found African American students were suspended at the highest 
rate out of all ethnic and racial groups. Similarly, Mendez and colleagues (2002) 
analyzed discipline data from 1996-1997 for the second largest school district in Florida, 
and they found that African American males were suspended at a greater rate than any 
other racial or ethnic group for all elementary, middle, and high schools in that district. 
Nelson and colleagues’ (2003) review of the literature on administrative referrals for 
discipline revealed that African American students were twice as likely to receive 
referrals as their White peers.  
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 Research has also found that students with disabilities, especially those with 
emotional or behavioral disorders, are disproportionately suspended or expelled (Leone, 
Mayer, Malmgren, & Meisel, 2000; Wagner, Kutash, Duchnowski, Epstein, & Sumi, 
2005). Historically, minorities, predominantly African Americans, are disproportionately 
placed in special education, and this finding has been documented since the 1960s (Dunn, 
1968; Fuentes, 2003; Skiba et al., 2008). Nationally, African American students represent 
33% of students who are identified as mentally retarded when they only make up 17% of 
the school-age population (Skiba et al., 2008). A meta-analysis between 1975 and 2000 
found that African American and Latino students received referrals to special education 
more frequently than White students (Hosp & Reschly, 2003). 
 Research indicates that African American youth do not violate school rules at a 
higher rate than other students (Skiba et al., 2002); therefore, racial disparities cannot 
adequately be explained by differences in behavior, but instead should be explained by 
differences in application by school teachers and administrators (APA Zero Tolerance 
Task Force, 2008; Heitzeg, 2009). This differential treatment of minority students may be 
a reflection of teachers’ lack of preparation in classroom management, lack of cultural 
diversity training, and the perpetuation of racial stereotypes (APA Zero Tolerance Task 
Force, 2008; Heitzeg, 2009). Eighty-three percent of teachers in the U.S. are White and 
mostly female (Heitzeg, 2009). Qualitative research findings suggest that White teachers 
tend to feel more threatened by minority students because they are perceived to be 
disruptive (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Bowditch, 1993; Fenning & Rose, 
2007; Heitzeg, 2009; Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Morrison & 
Skiba, 2001; Witt, 2007).  
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 In fact, there is a tendency for teachers and school officials to classify 
misbehaving White students as in need of psychological or psychiatric intervention rather 
than of harsh punishment as prescribed by zero tolerance policies (Heitzeg, 2009). For 
example, psychiatric labels, such as Conduct Disorder (CD), Oppositional Defiant 
Disorder (ODD), and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) make it possible 
for school officials and law enforcement to handle disciplinary infractions and drug use 
by White students as a mental health problem rather than disruptive or disobedient 
behavior (Heitzeg, 2009). In fact, studies have revealed racial disparities in the diagnosis 
and treatment of ADHD and other Disruptive Behavior Disorders, which suggest that 
teachers are more likely to expect and define these disorders as an issue for White 
students (Bussing, Zima, Perwien, Belin, & Widawski, 1998; Heitzeg, 2009; LeFever, 
Dawson, & Morrow, 1999; Rowland et al., 2002; Safer & Malever, 2000; Safer & Zito, 
1999; Zito, Safer, dosReis, & Riddle, 1998). Moreover, a child’s social class, insurance 
coverage, and race are often key factors in who receives treatment for such disorders 
(Bussing et al., 1998; Rowland et al., 2002; Safer & Malever, 2000). 
 Empirical content analyses have found that poor, minority students are 
consistently labeled by school officials as “troublemakers” (Fenning & Rose, 2007, p. 
544 & 548; Hirschfield, 2008, p. 92; Morrison & Skiba, 2001, p. 178). Casella’s (2003b) 
findings also suggest that African American and Latino students are labeled as potentially 
dangerous and often in need of removal. Of course the most common nonviolent offenses 
in which minority students are disciplined for are classroom defiance, disruptive 
behavior, and profanity (Bowditch, 1993; Mendez et al., 2002). One possible explanation 
for why teachers label minority students as troublemakers may have to do with a 
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perceived loss of control whereby teachers feel that their authority is threatened by 
disruptive behavior, regardless of the absence of violence or threat of harm (Fenning & 
Rose, 2007). The practice of labeling, as it is associated with the frequently exclusionary 
nature of zero tolerance approaches to school-based discipline, may actually amplify 
disruption and crime in schools (Cocozza et al, 2005; Potter & Kakar, 2003).  
 Lemert (1967) argued that social control precedes deviance just as much as the 
reverse. Lemert (1967) also stated that when the individual initially commits a deviant 
act, a societal reaction ensues, which sanctions this individual for violating accepted 
norms.  The repetition of deviant or criminal acts by this individual leads to further public 
reactions and subsequent labels.  By experiencing negative labels the deviant person 
becomes entrenched in a criminal persona, and thus, the person accepts his or her fate as 
a publicly and self-identified criminal who continues to engage in such a lifestyle 
(Lemert, 1967).  Thus, as Tannenbaum stated, “The person becomes the thing he is 
described as being” (1938, p. 20). Similar to labeling theory, Lemert’s arguments suggest 
that societal reaction is required in order for offenders to become both psychologically 
and behaviorally rooted in a criminal lifestyle (1976).  Zero-tolerance policies, which 
mandate automatic disciplinary action and referrals to the criminal or juvenile justice 
system, are examples of reactionary responses to disruptive behavior exhibited by 
adolescent students who may merely be immature (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 
2008; Curwin & Mendler, 1997; Grisso, 2006; Sowell et al., 2001). Additionally, the very 
conceptualization of school criminalization alludes to labeling theory because in order to 
“criminalize” someone, or a group, one must first label them a criminal (Hirschfield & 
Celinska, 2011, p. 2). 
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 Thus, it is possible for teachers to project criminal futures onto students, 
especially African American youth (Hirschfield, 2008). Noguera (2003) found that less 
than half of African American students in California believed that their teachers cared for 
their future and supported them. Ferguson’s (2000) investigation of how penal practices 
are adopted by school officials and the overall school’s disciplinary process revealed 
African American students are disproportionally cast into roles as “at-risk of failing,”  
“unsalvageable,” and “bound for jail” (p. 9). Indeed, students who are frequently 
suspended or expelled from school face an increased risk of juvenile or criminal 
incarceration (Skiba et al., 2003). In addition, studies have found a significant 
relationship between high rates of minority student suspensions and minority student 
dropout rates in urban areas (Bullara, 1993; Felice, 1981; Fuentes, 2003; Gordon, Della 
Piana, & Keleher, 2000; Hall & Karanxha, 2012; Sheley, 2000).  
 When students experience expulsion, it is very difficult to be readmitted to 
schools, which also increases the likelihood of dropping out completely (Fenning & 
Rose, 2007). Thus, racial disparities in the enforcement of zero tolerance policies, which 
are closely associated with subsequent contact with the justice system and high dropout 
rates, increase the likelihood that minority students will be funneled into a school-to-
prison pipeline (Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003; Hanson, 2005; Hirschfield, 2008; 
Kim et al., 2010; Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Skiba et al., 2003; Stader, 2006). For example, 
roughly 60% of African American male high school dropouts are incarcerated by age 30-
34 (Pettit & Western, 2004). 
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Existing Metanarratives in the Literature 
 There are several metanarratives, which have been developed in recent years in an 
attempt to critically explain the theoretical foundation for the origins and growing use of 
zero tolerance policies in schools (see Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). 
While these explanations describe conditions that are necessary to the formation and 
perpetual implementation of such policies in the American educational system, they are 
not adequately sufficient to explain this phenomenon on an individual basis. In other 
words, these metanarratives collectively contribute to a better understanding of some of 
the root causes behind the emergence of zero tolerance in schools. This subsection will 
briefly explain the tenets of these theoretical frameworks and their potential 
shortcomings, which will lay the groundwork for a more complete theoretical explanation 
of the expansion of zero-tolerance policies in school settings that will be developed in 
Chapter 3. 
 The moral panic narrative has already been mentioned above, and it functions as 
one of the major interpretations of school criminalization. School crime and school 
violence began to surge in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, especially in regards 
to school shootings (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Chen, 2008; DeMitchell & Cobb, 
2003). Unlike the rise in school violence in the 1960s and 1970s, these later decades were 
met with much more media attention (Hirschfield, 2008; Toby, 1998). Under the moral 
panic narrative, fear of school violence, as driven by media framing of the issue, serves to 
unify a frightened public, school teachers, school administrators, and public officials in a 
stance against a marginalized “folk-devil” (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Cohen, 1972). The 
emotionally-charged American public often demands immediate solutions to the crisis 
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that spawned the moral panic (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008). As such, the 
emotional and political response results in “quick-fix, punitive solutions,” such as zero 
tolerance policies and increased security measures that are typically excessive given the 
actual threat of future violence (Hirschfield, 2008, p. 85).  
Media framing of social issues can often be distorted and exacerbate the public’s 
fears (Burns & Crawford, 1999). The media is capable of influencing popular beliefs 
through an assortment of accessibility and applicability effects that utilize agenda setting 
and priming in order to provide persistent coverage of particular aspects of issues (Kim, 
Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). As a result, the media’s 
agenda becomes easier to recall for people in order for them draw a connection between 
two concepts and accept it as fact (Kim, Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002; Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2007).  
Accessibility and applicability effects are complimentary because applicable 
constructs are much more likely to be acknowledged when made readily accessible to the 
public (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Thus, the belief that issue A is connected to issue 
B will tend to persevere and mold public perceptions and attitudes provided that the 
message is consistently presented or unless some opposing information is made apparent 
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Thus, agenda setting and priming are utilized by the 
media to identify what vital issues require an optimal amount of processing time and 
attention from audiences, while framing focuses on the manner in which these issues are 
presented to the public (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).  
According to Entman (1993), framing entails selecting certain aspects of a 
perceived reality and making them more prominent in a communication text so that a 
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particular perspective is promoted over others and people’s attitudes may shift. In other 
words, framing permits the media to tailor perception and shape reality through various 
methods which include, the amount and placement of coverage, exclusion of factual 
material, word choice, the repetition of information, and whether or not a link is 
established between familiar symbols and the subject matter so the coverage is more 
noticeable and evocative (Bullock, 2007; Bullock & Cubert, 2002; Entman, 1993). The 
more frequent a particular frame for an issue is utilized by the media, the more likely it is 
to be accepted and rationalized by the public (Carlyle, Slater, & Chakroff, 2008). 
Therefore, the successful framing of news can influence the discourse on problems such 
as crime (Sasson, 2010).  
The moral panic perspective argues that prompt political responses, accompanied 
by policy changes, are a product of media driven outrage over a social problem that 
mobilizes popular support among the citizenry (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Giroux, 2003; 
Hirschfield, 2008). Politicians seize the opportunity to bolster public support by 
attempting to swiftly remedy the problematic situation by instituting social controls 
targeting the perceived deviant or potentially dangerous offenders (Burns & Crawford, 
1999; Giroux, 2003). The reactions of policymakers tend to lead to more sensationalizing 
of the social problem by the media. Thus, the media’s message, which persistently 
conveys to the public that school violence is an out-of-control social problem, is fueling 
the implementation of misguided zero tolerance policies by political powerbrokers (Burns 
& Crawford, 1999; Giroux, 2003). A moral panic exists when a large number of non-
deviant people believe there is a larger number of people engaging in the stigmatized 
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behavior than there actual are and the media’s framing of the issue prolongs this 
sentiment (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Giroux, 2003).  
However, such reactionary tactics by policymakers seem unnecessary given that 
juvenile and school-related violence has been declining ever since 1993 (De Voe et al., 
2004; FBI, 2008). In fact, far more children’s lives are claimed daily by family violence 
than by school violence, yet family violence receives less media attention (Burns & 
Crawford, 1999; Males, 1998). Family violence and child abuse/neglect may even be 
underlying cause for violence in schools (Males, 1998).  
Moral panics tend to be sporadic in nature (Cohen, 1972; Hirschfield, 2008) and 
driven by alarming media portrayals. However, this type of hysteria does not always 
result in policy shifts. If the tightening of disciplinary practices and school security are 
characterized by spikes in school crime and violence, then why were zero tolerance 
policies not implemented during the school violence panic of the 1970s, which did 
receive media coverage (Hirschfield, 2008; Toby, 1998)? Perhaps there is a larger 
political agenda at play regarding recent school criminalization efforts. The moral panic 
narrative does explain how school criminalization, via the implementation of zero 
tolerance policies and enhanced security, is potentially initiated; however, it does not 
sufficiently explain how such policies changes become institutionalized and continually 
expand when the moral panic recedes (Hirschfield, 2008). It may require powerful 
political, organizational, and structural forces, beyond public outrage, for school 
criminalization policies and practices to become long-term protocol in the educational 
system (Hirschfield, 2008). 
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 Next, the school accountability metanarrative somewhat explains the longevity of 
school disciplinary reforms produced by episodic moral panics, but does so by focusing 
on the neoliberal imperative for school accountability rather than politically-motivated 
reactions from politicians (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008). This narrative 
suggests that market competition, performance monitoring, and accountability for 
underperformance and failure are economic principles that have infiltrated the 
educational system in an effort to promote more efficiency and improve educational 
outcomes for youth (Hirschfield, 2008). The No Child Left Behind Act (2001) directly 
ties school funding to scores on annual achievement tests in reading and math (Fuentes, 
2003; Heitzeg, 2009).  
 The accountability perspective argues that teachers and administrators in 
“financially strapped schools” are under pressure to raise standardized test scores and 
attendance rates to the extent that they are willing to exclude underachieving students in 
order to focus on high-achievers (Fuentes, 2003; Heitzeg, 2009; Hirschfield, 2008, p. 85; 
NAACP, 2005). Zero tolerance policies serve as the mechanism by which teachers can 
weed out low-performing students who, as outliers, might drag down standardized test 
scores for struggling schools (Fuentes, 2003; NAACP, 2005). The net-widening of the 
possible infractions for which a student may receive suspension and/or expulsion makes 
it easier for school officials to remove failing students and conceal educational deficits 
caused by a lack of resources and teaching quality (Fuentes, 2003; NAACP, 2005). This 
perspective acknowledges the promotion of selective or frequent exclusionary practices 
by school officials to focus on the best performing students and dismiss those who 
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threaten overall performance on standardized tests so schools may avoid harsh sanctions 
(Fuentes, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; NAACP, 2005).  
 However, zero tolerance policies actually weaken school authorities’ discretion 
and replace it with strict guidelines and security agents (e.g., school resource officers), 
which means that some promising students will be sacrificed in the process (Fuentes, 
2003). The accountability narrative does not explain this possibility very well, especially 
since it is possible for honor roll students to face expulsion for infractions covered under 
zero tolerance policies (Hirschfield, 2008). Thus, there are larger social, legal, cultural, 
political, and economic contexts that influence how the educational system acts in 
response to moral panics and greater demands for accountability (Hirschfield, 2008). 
 In regard to a portion of the legal context underpinning disciplinary reforms in 
schools, the due process narrative offers a rationale for why school officials support zero 
tolerance policies, which minimize their discretion in matters of enforcing punishment on 
misbehaving students (Hirschfield, 2008). Under this perspective, it is argued that the 
ineffectiveness of school discipline and low educational achievement is associated with 
the erosion of moral authority in public schools, which creates an “atmosphere of 
disorder” (Arum, 2003, p. 3). When schools become unable to enforce moral authority 
over the student body, their objective to effectively socialize youth appropriately is 
threatened and the teaching environment becomes chaotic as a result (Arum, 2003). 
 The due process narrative claims that the students’ rights movement of the 1960s 
and 1970s, which led to a series of judicial rulings that curtailed arbitrary and capricious 
disciplinary practices by school officials and standardized many disciplinary procedures, 
actually undermined the traditional moral authority that school administrators 
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traditionally exerted (Arum, 2003; Toby, 1998). Arum (2003) and Toby (1998) both 
argue that the court decisions also encouraged students to overtly defy their teachers’ 
authority. As such, school principals became cautious when administering suspension and 
expulsion for fear of litigation (Arum, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008). In fact, among the 
crucial stakeholder groups supporting zero tolerance policies in schools are the national 
school principals associations (Boylan & Weiser, 2002). Furthermore, the due process 
narrative elucidates that reasoning behind the increased role that police and the justice 
system play in school disciplinary matters, because by expanding law enforcement 
entities’ involvement, school administrators are able to reduce their susceptibility to 
litigation (Hirschfield, 2008). With both school violence and school funding crises 
coinciding at similar periods, the political atmosphere necessary to support zero tolerance 
initiatives was reached (Hirschfield, 2008). However, this narrative neglects to 
adequately explain why strict zero tolerance codes and an armed police presence are 
mostly found in inner-city school systems (Hirschfield, 2008). Disadvantaged, minority 
students and their families are less likely to seek legal challenges against school officials 
and sustain the cost of drawn out court proceedings without institutional assistance 
(Arum, 2003). Therefore, concerns over liability explain only a portion of the rationale 
for school criminalization efforts, but do not clarify the reasoning for racial disparity in 
the application of harsh zero tolerance policies and practices (Hirschfield, 2008). 
 A governing through crime metanarrative also exists, and it offers an 
understanding of the governance pertaining to the highest levels of policy making in the 
American educational system, especially zero tolerance and school criminalization 
initiatives (Simon, 2007). School criminalization reflects a political agenda to refocus 
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social control measures and enforce harsh punishment for crimes (Simon, 2007). Of 
course “the consent and complicity of the governed” are necessary in order for the focus 
to be placed on personal responsibility, such that students, teachers, and failing schools 
bear the burden for transgressions and attention is diverted away from deep-rooted and 
complex social, structural, and cultural problems affecting school violence (Hirschfield, 
2008, p. 88; Simon, 2007). Federally mandated legislation, such as zero tolerance 
policies, are instrumental in shifting school governance toward a crime control model 
(Simon, 2007).  
 The fear of crime becomes an overarching rationale to bolster support for 
increased social controls over students in hopes of creating safer school environments 
(Simon, 2007). Much of this fear is associated with “parental insecurity” (Simon, 2007, 
p.230). Schools use to be a mechanism used to promote racial segregation and inequality, 
but social reforms in the 1960s and 1970s reversed this trend and actively pursued racial 
equality and interracial solidarities (Simon, 2007). However, not all Americans saw racial 
justice as essential to improving educational experiences (Simon, 2007). Actually, some 
parents perceive compulsory education through desegregation was a way in which 
parents were forced to surrender control over their children’s safety, while at school, 
because now their kids would be required to attend dangerous schools (Simon, 2007). 
Just like the accountability narrative acknowledges school criminalization as a tool to 
exert political pressure for a school voucher system (Arum, 2003), this narrative similarly 
recognizes the role that parents and communities give to the criminalization of schools in 
hopes of gaining back control over their children’s safety (Simon, 2007).  
44 
 
 Consequently, the governing through crime narrative claims that in the school 
context, disruptive students and failing schools must be recast as criminals, while high-
performing students and their parents are recast as victims, and educational policymakers 
are elevated to the role of prosecutor and judge (Simon, 2007). Zero tolerance policies 
become the means through which schools are expected to document and manage 
problems of violence and crime, or otherwise face sanctions (Simon, 2007). Thus, the 
criminal element in schools must be isolated and removed in hopes of improving 
educational achievement among deserving students (Simon, 2007). As mentioned before, 
the No Child Left Behind Act embraces market mechanisms in order to link funding of 
public schools with test scores and hold failing schools accountable, which in essence 
creates a climate of competition for resources (Simon, 2007). The reform structure of this 
legislation is very much in sync with the crime model because those schools with 
worsening overall test scores will suffer serious consequences (Simon, 2007). In addition, 
the formal barriers between the school system and the juvenile justice system are 
eradicated and criminal justice officials receive greater access to student files and 
administrative databases, which may allow law enforcement to make schools a favored 
place to search for suspects (Simon, 2007). However, the governing through crime 
metanarrative does not account for some provisions in recent legislation that promotes 
violence prevention and conflict resolution programs, which are not in step with a crime 
control paradigm (Casella, 2003b; Hirschfield, 2008). 
 Hirschfield (2008) developed another metanarrative that acknowledges two 
emergent structural realities, which have surfaced under recent political-economic 
conditions marked by deindustrialization and mass incarceration. These realities include 
45 
 
the following: (1) that prison awaits African American youth who fail or dropout of 
school, and (2) that schools do not possess the necessary resources to reverse the 
wayward paths of problematic students without also detracting from the quality of 
teaching and services meant for those perceived as more deserving and promising 
students (Hirschfield, 2008). When coupled with school criminalization policies, such as 
zero tolerance, the realities imply that troublesome, African American students are 
“unsalvageable,” and thus, teachers and administrators project criminal futures onto their 
most disruptive and chronically disobedient African American students (Hirschfield, 
2008, p.92). This classification and socialization narrative identifies the anticipatory 
labeling of students, by education professionals, as “future prisoners” who must be 
controlled or excluded for the sake of other students (Hirschfield, 2008, p.92).  
 It is argued by many sociologists that structural forces “condition” and 
“constrain” individual perceptions and interactions with others (Bourdieu & Passeron, 
1977; Hirschfield, 2008, p. 91). Therefore, changes in the political-economic system, 
which may affect social class status, can influence teachers’ perceptions of students’ 
future prospects by linking social structure with students’ educational and occupational 
aspirations and classroom effort (Hirschfield, 2008). As a result, how teachers decide to 
call upon school resource officers to remove a disruptive student or how principals 
determine if they want to refer a student to law enforcement for arrest is all mediated by 
individual interpretation of social and structural realities (Hirschfield, 2008). If a poor, 
African American student is already being labeled as “bound for jail,” then a teacher is 
more likely to have that student removed to hasten his or her projected future reality, so 
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instruction can be focused on more economically viable students (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; 
Hirschfield, 2008).  
 Zero tolerance policies make it possible for school officials to “fast track” 
undesirable and disruptive students into the school-to-prison pipeline (Hirschfield, 2008, 
p. 92). In addition, the neoliberal push for the accountability of underperforming schools 
creates an added impetus to motivate teachers to control and remove disaffected or 
disruptive students, who hinder the collective improvement on standardized test scores 
(Hirschfield, 2008). For these reasons, school officials, who may be politically 
progressive, tend to comply with school criminalization policies that are consistent with 
neoliberal ideals (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011).  
 Criminal justice agents, including school resource officers (SROs), police 
officers, and judges also play a crucial role in the recent transformation of school 
disciplinary practices and policies (Arum, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; Simon, 2007). Justice 
system professionals constantly strive to preserve and increase their legitimacy, and a 
thorough theoretical explanation of zero tolerance policies must explicate their role in 
conjunction with other actors (e.g., teachers, school administrators, and policymakers), 
who also promote the prevailing neoliberal political agenda underpinning school 
criminalization (Giroux, 2003: Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik & Monahan, 
2006; Lyons & Drew, 2006). The metanarratives described above all contribute to the 
theorizing of the emergence and expansion of zero tolerance policies (Hirschfield, 2008; 
Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). However, the manner in which these theoretical 
components function to also promote the neoliberal goal of limited government, the 
retraction of social welfare, and the coercive control over marginal populations in 
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educational settings needs to be further developed (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & 
Celinska, 2011; Lyons & Drew, 2006).  
 Undoubtedly, the methods of school criminalization have been recognized as 
reinforcing the dominant neoliberal political agenda and governing model (Giroux, 2003; 
Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lyons & Drew, 2006). Furthermore, zero tolerance policies 
aid the government in concealing social injustices and underinvestment in public schools 
by removing discretion and the relevance of mitigating circumstances (Giroux, 2003). 
Hence, the penetration of the neoliberal agenda into school governance encourages a 
contracted public sphere and a docile citizenry (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Lyons & 
Drew, 2006). How this neoliberal agenda and its various agents of enforcement overcome 
legal challenges, which are often based on a lack of due process and fairness and threaten 
the perceived legitimacy of school disciplinary reform, requires further investigation 
(Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). 
Extending the Neoliberal State and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy 
 According to neoliberal theory, the state should support strong individual property 
rights, legal certainty, and the strengthening of financial institutions of free markets and 
trade (Harvey, 2005). These aims are best achieved through privatization and 
deregulation of economic sectors, which are expected to promote and guarantee 
individual freedoms (Harvey, 2005). As such, competition (between individuals, 
companies, and other entities) is a virtue necessary to garner in new modes of efficiency, 
economic growth, innovation, and prosperity for all (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003). Thus, 
unbridled individualism is championed over social solidarity, which has long been a 
hallmark of social justice (Harvey, 2005).  
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 Government intervention in the functioning of free markets and free trade is seen 
only as an obstruction that will hinder the establishment of a healthy business climate 
(Harvey, 2005). Therefore, privatization and deregulation, coupled with competition, are 
perceived to eradicate bureaucratic red tape, enhance productivity, increase product and 
service quality, and lower costs to the consumer by generating cheaper commodities and 
reducing tax burdens (Harvey, 2005). Increased productivity is expected to raise the 
standard of living for everyone, because neoliberal theory assumes that “a rising tide lifts 
all boats,” and poverty can be eliminated only by freeing markets and trade from 
government constraints (Harvey, 2005, p.64).  
 The theory holds the individual accountable and personally responsible for his or 
her actions and overall well-being (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). 
Furthermore, this principle of individual responsibility encompasses the domains of 
welfare, education, healthcare, and social security (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberal theory 
assumes that every citizen has equal access to information and opportunity; therefore, 
there are no power imbalances that would allow more powerful people to take advantage 
of the free market system (Harvey, 2005). Those who fail to succeed where others have 
are simply lazy and unwilling to work hard (Harvey, 2005). So individual success or 
failure is perceived to be blamed on the individual, while structural and social inequalities 
are overlooked and dismissed (Harvey, 2005).  
 As Margaret Thatcher stated, there is “no such thing as society, only individual 
men and women” (Harvey, 2005, p.23). Under a neoliberal state, all forms of social 
solidarity are replaced with individualism, private property, personal responsibility, and 
family values (Harvey, 2005). Ironically, according to this logic, individuals are allegedly 
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free to choose, but they should not choose to organize collectively in the form of worker 
unions or social movements (Harvey, 2005). The neoliberal state is overtly hostile to 
organized labor, or any form of social solidarity for that matter (Harvey, 2005). 
Neoliberals are seriously suspicious of democratic governance, and they see majority 
rule, under a democracy, to clearly be a potential threat to individual rights and liberties 
(Harvey, 2005). Consequently, neoliberals prefer a government run by elites and laws 
determined by executive order or judicial decision making rather than democratic 
decision making by a representative legislature (Harvey, 2005).  
 In practice, the neoliberal state treats labor and the environment as mere 
commodities to be exploited in order to benefit the financial system regardless of the 
means (Harvey, 2005). The health of workers and the protection of the environment are 
sacrificed for the freedom of the market from intrusive government regulations (Harvey, 
2005). Unsafe working conditions and polluted ecosystems are necessary side effects to a 
robust, global financial market (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberals desire flexible specialization 
in labor markets, which allow real wages to be suppressed, job insecurity to be increased, 
and the reduction of benefits and job protections to workers (Harvey, 2005). These 
conditions create a labor market that is void of bargaining power and a welfare state that 
is greatly reduced (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009). In fact, the only thing in need 
of strict regulation in the neoliberal state is the labor market, which enables wages to be 
low and the labor force compliant (Harvey, 2005).  
 To better understand why the US political economy recently underwent a 
neoliberal restructuring, one must first reflect on the historical conditions and social 
climate that permitted this transformation. Then it is easier to recognize the 
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contradictions between neoliberal theory and representative democracy. Additionally, one 
may also begin to comprehend how a neoliberal agenda can extend into other institutions, 
such as public education. 
 After World War II, the US government chose a tightly regulated economy under 
a Keynesian framework (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2008). The US government feared a return 
to the conditions that led to the Great Depression; thus, the Keynesian model permitted 
the state to regulate the market, create a number of social welfare programs, and 
empower strong trade unions (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008). Keynesian economics 
authorized the state to pursue full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of the 
citizenry by using its power to intervene and regulate business cycles and influence sound 
fiscal policies (Harvey, 2005).  
 This form of political-economic organization is known as “embedded liberalism,” 
whereby several social and political restrictions are placed on market processes and 
actions by corporations (Harvey, 2005, p.11). Neoliberlism seeks to disembed the market 
and capital from such restraint (Harvey, 2005). The 1950s and 1960s were marked by 
high rates of economic growth, and these successes were largely attributed to effective 
functioning of embedded liberalism and an interventionist state (Harvey, 2005). 
However, by the end of the 1960s, embedded liberalism was threatened by a serious crisis 
of capital accumulation that saw a surge in unemployment and inflation (Harvey, 2005; 
Kotz, 2003, 2008). This stagflation lasted well into the 1970s where a social and 
economic crisis reached critical levels (Giroux, 2003; Harvey, 2005, Kotz, 2008). 
 Keynesian policies and social democratic solutions proved inconsistent by the 
mid-1970s (Harvey, 2005). As a result, corporate and conservative groups from the 
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political right blamed the crisis on government meddling in the economy (Harvey, 2005; 
Kotz, 2003). Moreover, economic elites and the ruling class felt threatened by the 
widespread reforms and state interventions under the Keynesian model (Harvey, 2005). 
The growth collapse of the 1970s, which saw real interest rates plummet into the negative 
range and dividends and profits dwindle, gave the ruling classes plenty of reason to feel 
threatened (Harvey, 2005). 
 In October 1979, Paul Volcker, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, shifted 
US fiscal policy to abandon the Keynesian model and implement policies with the sole 
purpose to quash inflation regardless of the effects on unemployment rates (Harvey, 
2005). After all, neoliberal theory contends that unemployment is always voluntary and a 
reflection of the ability of the worker (Harvey, 2005). As a result, the nominal rate of 
interest rose immediately, and the newly elected Reagan administration ushered in a new 
era of neoliberal reforms that sought further deregulation, tax cuts, budget cuts, and an 
assault on trade unions and organized labor (Harvey, 2005). Tax cuts on investment led to 
capital flight out of the unionized Northeast and Midwest into the non-union South and 
West, as well as markets abroad (Harvey, 2005). Under Reagan, deindustrialization 
rapidly increased and manufacturing moved to countries like China and India, where 
taxation and environmental regulations were much more lax (Harvey, 2005). In addition, 
Reagan lowered corporate taxes and reduced the top personal tax rate from 70 to 28%, 
which created a wider gap between the rich and the poor, as well as a restoration of 
economic power to the upper class (Harvey, 2005). US investment banks increased the 
amount of capital loaned to foreign governments, which required the further liberalization 
of international credit and financial markets (Harvey, 2005). Among the many 
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institutional reforms, there were cuts to welfare programs and the establishment of more 
flexible labor market laws (Harvey, 2005). This neoliberal restructuring led to the slow 
growth and economic instability until the economic expansion of the 1990s (Kotz, 2003).  
 The Clinton administration continued the neoliberal agenda by cutting 
government spending, advocating free trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA), and freeing 
markets and trade from barriers (Kotz, 2003). The rate of profit reached its peak in the 
1990s, while real wages continued to decline and the tax burden was shifted from capital 
to labor (Kotz, 2003). The rate of profit refers to “the ratio of total surplus value to capital 
invested, where total surplus value includes not just profit narrowly defined but also 
interest, some tax payments, and some wage and salary incomes” (Kotz, 2008, p.3). 
There was also a shift from high-wage jobs to temporary or part-time work in the service 
sector, which brought in lower wages for employees (Kotz, 2009). Tax cuts on business 
and the wealthiest Americans created drastic income inequality where the ratio of average 
CEO’s salary compared to the average worker’s salary was 500 to 1 by the year 2000 
(Harvey, 2005). Business and technology investments and consumer spending rose 
rapidly in the late 1990s, and eventually led to the speculative stock market bubble (Kotz, 
2003).  
 Consumers were able to continue to spend in spite of decreasing wages by 
borrowing against appreciating assets (Kotz, 2003). Stock prices rose by 24% per year 
from 1995 to 1999, and middle-class Americans felt the momentary benefits, which were 
followed by a stock market crash in 2000 and the 2001 recession (Kotz, 2003). Consumer 
spending, which was financed by Americans leveraging assets by adding debt, prevented 
the 2001 recession from becoming severe (Kotz, 2008). Asset bubbles tend to emerge 
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under neoliberal structure, because increased borrowing against assets, like home equity, 
is necessary in order to keep economic expansion growing under neoliberal capitalism 
and offset crises of overproduction (Kotz, 2008, 2009). Thus, further financial 
deregulation, speculative and high-risk activities of the financial sector, and the 
development of the housing bubble led to the economic crisis of 2008 and the current 
recession (Kotz, 2009). 
 Neoliberal theory adheres to the free market principles of neoclassical economics, 
which developed in the late nineteenth century (Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). However, 
the neoliberal theoretical framework is not very compatible with its political obligation to 
individual freedom, and its demand for a strong coercive state that will defend property 
rights and individual liberties does not mesh well with its distrust of all state power 
(Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). Karl Polanyi (1954) stated that the neoliberal interpretation 
of freedom may very well mean the freedom to exploit others, the freedom to make 
excessive gains without reinvesting them in the community, the freedom to prevent the 
public from benefiting from certain technological innovations, and the freedom to profit 
from national catastrophes that are secretly concocted for private gain. Appeals to 
tradition and fear were used by the economic elite to drum up support for neoliberalism 
in the late 1960s (Harvey, 2005).  
 The political movements of the late 1960s, especially the student movements for 
greater due process rights, demanded freedom from parental, educational, corporate, 
bureaucratic, and state constraints (Arum, 2003; Harvey, 2005; Toby, 1998). However, 
the enhanced individual freedoms sought in the student movement clashed with the 
traditional objectives of social justice (Harvey, 2005). Social justice assumes that 
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individual wants, needs, and desires will be suppressed in favor of striving for a more 
collective good, such as social equality (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberal reformers, in the 
economically troubled 1970s, used the rhetoric of individual freedoms to bolster popular 
support against the interventionist and regulatory policies of the Keynesian model 
(Harvey, 2005). Neoliberalism offered a message of differentiated consumerism and 
individual libertarianism, which would combat the intrusive state and allow individual 
freedoms to triumph (Harvey, 2005). Individualism is grounded in the American culture 
and history, so neoliberal perspectives were easily disseminated and well-received by 
academics, politicians, corporations, and citizens who were tired of the economic slump 
of the late 1970s (Harvey, 2005). Thus, the neoliberal appeal to individualism constructed 
the necessary consent from the public to elect political leaders, like Reagan, who 
promised to carry out the neoliberal restructuring of the US economy (Harvey, 2005). 
 The duality of liberal democracy, within the US, currently faces a crisis of 
legitimacy (Habermas, 1975; Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). Classical liberalism refers to a 
market-based ideology, which justifies a capitalist mode of production by freeing the 
market from government regulations and encouraging self-interested individualism 
among citizens (Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). Conversely, democracy promotes the 
maximization of civic participation by the populace in an effort to establish a community 
defined by equality, mutual respect, and cooperative interaction among citizens toward 
commonly agreed-upon goals (Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). The logic behind these 
dueling ideologies presents a contradiction, whereby liberalism creates inequality via 
power imbalances across rigid class lines, while democracy struggles to respond by 
promoting social welfare remedies and state regulations to alleviate social ills (Habermas, 
55 
 
1975; Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). Neoliberalism exerts an ideology that is highly 
suspicious of democracy (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberal policies and practices are 
determined to return all responsibility to the individual, and in the process, severely 
diminish welfare provisions, such as healthcare, public education, and other social 
services that will leave greater segments of society impoverished (Harvey, 2005; 
Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). The social safety net created in the era of embedded liberalism 
is reduced to a “bare minimum” under a neoliberal system emphasizing individual 
accountability (Harvey, 2005, p.76). Neoliberal theory embraces the rule of law and any 
conflict or opposition must be “mediated through the courts” (Harvey, 2005, p.66). 
Therefore, judicial rulings may serve as the vehicle by which neoliberal contradictions 
are legitimized in a representative democracy, like the US. 
 Loïc Wacquant (2009a, 2009b) argues that contemporary, neoliberal restructuring 
of capitalism in the US continues to greatly reduce the welfare state, privatize state 
enterprises, and eliminate state regulations on the economy.  The consequence is the 
restriction of forces of controls that would seek to redistribute resources more equitably 
(Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Ironically, in order for the markets to enjoy such freedom 
from controls, social controls on marginal populations representing the surplus labor 
force and underclass must be exerted to weaken trade unions, reject worker’s bargaining 
power, regulate the poor, and repress wages (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009; 
Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Thus, neoliberal capitalism frees the mobility of capital across 
markets from government regulations, while also increasing formal social controls on 
marginal populations to manipulate the labor market and perpetuate the existing class 
structure (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). As Polanyi 
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(1954) feared, the freedoms of the masses are controlled to secure the freedoms of the 
few. The social controls which are exerted, tend to be punitive and carceral in nature 
(Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Thus, the neoliberal state resorts to coercive legislation and 
policing tactics to quell and subdue any collective forms of opposition to corporate power 
(Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). In the US, incarceration becomes the ideal 
strategy to overcome problems coming from discarded workers and marginalized 
populations (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). In addition, zero tolerance policies 
and practices are expected to be increasingly applied to marginalized groups, such as 
impoverished minorities (Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b).  
 According to Wacquant (2009b), the regulation of the poor is accomplished 
through two processes: prisonfare and workfare. Prisonfare refers to the hyper-intensive 
and extensive use of punitive controls over the economically superfluous, while workfare 
refers to the retraction of welfare safety nets through new responsibilities, obligations, 
and surveillance (e.g., welfare-to-work requirements) associated with access to public 
services (Wacquant, 2009b). The penal arm of the state (i.e., the police, the courts, and 
corrections) serves not only to enforce law but also as a mechanism to produce the 
political reality favored by the ruling upper class (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009b). The 
neoliberal reshaping of the state exerts control over all facets of social life except for the 
economy (Wacquant, 2009b). The “rolling out of the police-to-prison dragnet” and the 
“rolling back of the social safety net” is the state’s response to contain poor, marginalized 
populations produced by neoliberal practices (Wacquant, 2009b, p.304). Thus, Wacquant 
(2009b) argued that for the neoliberal state to be fully actualized four institutional logics 
must be achieved: (1) economic deregulation, (2) welfare state retraction and 
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reconfiguration, (3) societal emphasis on individual responsibility, and (4) an extensive 
and proactive penal apparatus. This recipe permits the state to embrace laissez-faire 
market values to benefit the wealthiest Americans, while providing the means to 
punitively deal with the social insecurity arising from the growing poor populations and 
surplus laborers (Wacquant, 2009b). 
 Public schools did not escape the neoliberal offensive (Hirschfield, 2008; 
Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Noguera, 2003; Nolan & Anyon, 2004). Neoliberal 
initiatives to enhance school accountability have made it easier for school officials to 
rationalize the use of zero tolerance policies in order to isolate disruptive students who 
are believed to be “bound for prison” and incapable of functioning in today’s economy 
(Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; Fuentes, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; NAACP, 2005). Wacquant 
(2001) argues that just like ghettos have become more like prisons, so have inner-city 
public schools become like “institutions of confinement” (p.108). He further argues that 
the neoliberal transformations of the political economy have repositioned inner-city 
public schools to act as lockdown environments to “neutralize” disadvantaged African 
American and Latino youths who are deemed “unworthy” and “unruly” (Wacquant, 
2001, p. 108). Thus, the political practices of the penal realm of the state have infiltrated 
the educational system (Giroux, 2003).  
 Zero tolerance policies emerged as a mechanism in which to punish and remove 
students perceived to have no market value and identified as flawed consumers because 
they are associated with crime, redundancy, poverty, and expendability (Giroux, 2003; 
Hall & Karanxha, 2012; Hirschfield, 2008; Wacquant, 2001). Subsequent referrals to the 
justice system hinder future hopes of higher education and jeopardize the economic 
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viability for these stigmatized youth (Hall & Karanxha, 2012). Thus, the nation’s most at-
risk youth are controlled and funneled into confinement, which perpetuates their 
marginalization prior to entering the workforce (Hall & Karanxha, 2012). The neoliberal 
agenda advanced through school criminalization promotes a “narrow public sphere” and 
a “docile citizenry” (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011, p.7). Whereas public schools 
traditionally provided the arena for battles over full citizenship and equal opportunity, 
their role has now transformed to serve as a model of disempowered citizenship where 
students’ rights are weakened and their movements are controlled (Lyons & Drew, 2006; 
Nolan & Anyon, 2004). School criminalization may aid in instilling a “passive 
acquiescence to state and corporate power” among the student population and their 
parents (Lyons & Drew, 2006, p. 195). Furthermore, state legislators, with vested 
interests in building or expanding prisons, are likewise able to vote on the funding of 
urban education, school security, and punitive school policy (Hirschfield, 2008). Thus, 
states with large prison populations may benefit more politically by expanding 
exclusionary school policies in order to keep prisons full rather than finance urban 
schools that lack adequate resources (Hirschfield, 2008). In addition, school 
criminalization may facilitate teacher disengagement, which reduces their ability to 
understand and confidently address their students’ problems (Hirschfield & Celinska, 
2011). Disengagement coupled with aggressive, exclusionary practices that result in 
racial disparities may erode students’ trust and threaten the perceived legitimacy of 
school rules because they are seen as unfair given their lack of due process (Brotherton, 
1996; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik, 2010). 
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 The American educational system reproduces the structure of capitalist society by 
socializing students in the values of the market place as favored by the economic ruling 
class (Shapiro, 1984). At the same time, schools face a legitimation crisis since they also 
serve to represent democratic principles, such as equality of access, mutuality, universal 
responsibility, and collective obligation (Shapiro, 1984). Democratic ideals are 
increasingly opposed by the neoliberal imperatives of a class-divided society (Shapiro, 
1984). When students experience unfairness in regard to the limitation of due process via 
mandatory zero tolerance policies, they are acknowledging the contradictory nature of the 
socialization processes that promotes the values and norms of a dominant economic class 
while drawing into question the legitimacy of a public educational system claiming to 
serve as a communal good (Shapiro, 1984). The legitimation problem facing education is 
inflamed by the neoliberal goals of the ruling class conflicting with the traditional 
democratic aims of an educational system based on equity and fairness (Shapiro, 1984). 
Therefore, as neoliberal theory affords, challenges to the contradictory nature of the 
expansion of the neoliberal agenda into school disciplinary policy must be “mediated 
through the courts” (Harvey, 2005, p.66). As such, affirmation of zero tolerance policies 
through court decisions may legitimate the state’s control of marginal populations in 
school settings and the neoliberal influence on educational policy, regardless of the 
infringement on democratic rights and liberties of students. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 Scholars have developed comprehensive, theoretical causal narratives to 
conceptualize school criminalization efforts in recent decades (Hirschfield, 2008). 
Indeed, five meta-narratives, which were described in detail above, are currently the 
predominate theoretical explanations for the emergence of zero tolerance policies. While 
these explanations define theoretical mechanisms that are necessary for the creation and 
longevity of such policies in the American educational system, they are not adequately 
sufficient to explain this phenomenon on an individual basis. Moreover, while a couple of 
the narratives allude to neoliberal influences, most are not grounded in the context of 
recent social and political-economic transformations in the US.  In other words, these 
metanarratives collectively contribute to a better understanding of some of the root causes 
behind the emergence of zero tolerance in schools.  
 However, a more complete theoretical framework that accounts for the historical 
context of the neoliberal restructuring of the US political economy is needed to explicate 
how these theoretical mechanisms function processually in order to overcome threats to 
legitimacy, which the neoliberal agenda faces as it conflicts with the traditional 
democratic aims of the American educational system (Shapiro, 1984). What follows is a 
new conceptualization that reconfigures components of the prevailing theoretical 
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narratives along with neoliberal theory to better construct a theoretical framework that 
accounts for historical context and incorporates descriptions of the political, 
organizational, and structural forces that enable school criminalization to become 
institutionalized and legitimized in America (see Appendix A for visual depiction). 
The Backdrop of Neoliberal Restructuring 
 Neoliberal restructuring of the US economy began amid the crisis of capital 
accumulation in the middle to late 1970s, which led to a shift away from the Fordist 
model of mass production and toward a more flexible, service-oriented economic system 
in the 1980s and 1990s (De Giori, 2006, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009; 
Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lynch, 2007, 2010). The practices performed during this 
restructuring of the political economy reflect the principles of neoliberal theory, which 
holds that the state should not interfere in the economy and should only concern itself 
with providing stronger individual property rights to individual citizens and corporate 
entities, while reinforcing legal certainty and further strengthening financial institutions 
of free markets and trade (Harvey, 2005). Under this neoliberal logic, several practices 
were put into play, such as deregulation, labor outsourcing, decentralization, moving 
production abroad, computerized automation, privatization, and displacement of workers 
into low-wage, service sector jobs where temporary employment is more common 
(Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lynch, 2007, 2010). 
The neoliberal principles of individualism and personal responsibility were rhetorically 
used to reinforce the movement to deregulate industry and promote competition among 
individuals and companies (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003; Lynch, 2007). In the neoliberal 
state, the individual is to blame for success or failure, while economic, racial, and social 
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inequalities are ignored because it is assumed everyone has equal access and opportunity 
(Harvey, 2005). 
 Deindustrialization and mass incarceration are two major developments that 
occurred in the neoliberal era of American capitalism. In fact, in 1973 the rate of 
imprisonment began to steadily rise in the US just as the US economy was experiencing a 
contraction of the manufacturing sector and an expansion of the service sector (Lynch, 
2007, 2010). These two trends are characteristic of how the neoliberal transformation of 
the American economy produces economic marginalization and the need for social 
control to manage class conflict (De Giorgi, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Kupchik & Monahan, 
2006; Lynch, 2007, 2010; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) 
argued that every system of production discovers punishments consistent and compatible 
with the primary focus of that system’s form of production. Their work examined the 
relationship between rates of unemployment and incarceration, and they found that 
imprisonment, in capitalist societies, served to control surplus labor populations, 
potentially provide production of goods without labor costs, and resocialize marginalized 
workers through hard work (Lynch, 2007, 2010; Rusche & Kirchheimer, 1939). 
However, counter to Rusche and Kirchheimer’s labor market model, imprisonment did 
not decline in the 1980s and 1990s as the US experienced a mild economic recovery and 
unemployment rates decreased due to the expansion of service sector employment 
(Lynch, 2007, 2010). The unique transformation that the US system of production 
underwent must be taken into account in order to understand why incarceration exploded 
while unemployment rates vacillated (Lynch, 2007, 2010).  
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 Michalowski and Carlson (1999) addressed this phenomenon with their 
empirically-based argument that the economy passed through stages of social structures 
of accumulation (SSAs), which include economic exploration, decay, consolidation, and 
expansion. Thus, the relationship between unemployment and incarceration is 
conditioned by the characteristics of the stage the economy is experiencing as it 
progresses through the long cycles of SSA (Lynch, 2007; Michalowski & Carlson, 1999). 
SSAs also affect how imprisonment is used to control economically marginalize groups 
(Lynch, 2007; Michalowski & Carlson, 1999). The contraction of manufacturing and the 
expansion of the service industry, during the neoliberal restructuring of the economy, was 
characterized by job losses due to technological automation, moving production abroad, 
deregulation, and privatization (Lynch, 2007, 2010).  
 Deindustrialization displaced workers into lower-paying service sector jobs or 
into the ranks of the marginalized unemployed (De Giorgi, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 
2003, 2008, 2009; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lynch, 2007, 2010). Economic 
marginalization encompasses more than just unemployment, and it can include partial 
and seasonal employment, economic exploitation common in wage-based economies 
where class membership defines owning and laboring options, and broad shifts in the 
salary structure correlated with service sector expansion (Lynch, 2007, 2010). From the 
1970s through the 1990s, there was a long-term decline in unemployment; however, 
economic marginalization continued because income inequality expanded during this 
same period (Lynch, 2007, 2010). Aggregate income growth grew for the top 20 percent 
of families, while the bottom 20 percent experienced an approximate $2,000 decrease in 
average income (Lynch, 2007). The gap between the rich and poor has never been as 
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wide as it is currently, and the social insecurity stemming from the growing economic 
inequality has created the conditions in which social safety nets can be retracted and 
punitive penal practices of social control can be extended by the state, while enjoying 
popular public support that driven is by fear (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). 
 In the service sector, capitalists desire commodities or services that have a 
relatively frequent replacement cycle (e.g., barber shop) and long-term inelastic demand 
(e.g., food) compared to commodities with longer consumption cycles, such as 
automobiles (Lynch, 2007). Moreover, the service-sector capitalist wants an inelastic 
market that is also expanding to maximize accumulation (Lynch, 2007). The prison 
apparatus provides such a marketplace because the correctional system requires services, 
such as data storage and retrieval; food services; laundry and clothing services; 
telecommunications services; Internet services; electronic monitoring systems; healthcare 
services; insurance; mailing services; financial services; transportation services; 
maintenance services; educational and vocational services; housing services; building 
services; and security (correctional officers) services (Lynch, 2007). Of course, 
unemployment cannot be the only reason why the correctional industrial complex has 
become a “service marketplace” and “viable financial investment,” especially since the 
service sector offset some of the rise in unemployment (Lynch, 2007, p. 133).  
 The increase in economic inequality creates the potential for class conflict, and 
social control is used to manage this conflict and prevent it from upending the existing 
power structure (De Giorgi, 2006, 2007; Lynch, 2007, 2010; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). 
In addition, the privatization of state services, which started under the Reagan 
administration, allows for billions of tax dollars to be redirected to the purchase of private 
65 
 
sector services rather than the state providing them (Lynch, 2007). The growth of the 
private prison apparatus parallels the Reagan-initiated privatization efforts (Lynch, 2007). 
Furthermore, the private prison sector has a powerful lobby, political action committees 
(PACs), and industry groups to pressure politicians to support expanding prison growth 
and the services it requires (Lynch, 2007). Therefore, privatization permits the state to 
spend revenue it has obtained through taxation on private service providers who absorb a 
portion of the state’s social expense bill as profit via a service provision fee before the 
services are provided to the state (Lynch, 2007). Through this process, the American 
taxpayer bears the burden of operating the US correctional system and private entities get 
to profit from prison expansion (Lynch, 2007). In fact, the per capita expenditures, via 
taxpayer dollars, on the correctional system increased to over 480 percent since 1980, 
while imprisonment rose by 243 percent and the number of inmates rose by 318 percent 
in the same time period (Lynch, 2007). 
 Recent U.S. Census Bureau data on income distribution, as measured by the GINI 
index of income concentration, revealed that income inequality between the 20 percent of 
households making the lowest level of income and the top 5 percent making the greatest 
amount of income has increased by 25 percent since 1968 (Lynch, 2007). Class conflict 
typically goes unnoticed but is waged through the mechanisms of the criminal justice 
system, which magnifies the crimes of the marginal classes and minimizes the crimes of 
the rich and powerful (Lynch, 2007; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Social control achieves 
the conditions required by capitalism in a number of ways. First of all, mass incarceration 
reinforces individual and private property rights, because the majority of criminals 
punished in the US have committed property crimes (Lynch, 2007).  Next, imprisonment 
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attaches a criminal label to offenders, who predominantly come from the lower and 
working classes, which further marginalizes them into the surplus labor market of 
unemployable workers (Lynch, 2007). Finally, mass incarceration expands the 
marketplace for goods and services sold by the ruling capitalist class, who profit from 
this social control process via the prison apparatus (Lynch, 2007). Additionally, keeping 
class conflict manageable requires the average citizen to pay more in taxes for the 
growing prison industrial complex through the privatization of state services, which 
enables for-profit, private service providers to benefit from the social control of the 
economically marginalized populations produced by neoliberal capitalism (Lynch, 2007). 
 In order for prison to remain a viable financial investment, a mechanism must be 
in place to continually expand the types and numbers of people who are defined as 
“dangerous” and in need of social control (Di Giorgi, 2007; Lynch, 2007, p. 133). In the 
US, incarceration becomes the ideal strategy to overcome problems coming from 
discarded workers and marginalized populations (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 
2009b). In addition, zero tolerance policies and strategies are expected to be increasingly 
applied to marginalized groups, such as impoverished minorities (Lynch, 2007; 
Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b).  
 Public schools were also influenced by the neoliberal conversion of the political 
economy, especially since they reproduce the economic and racial inequalities present in 
the community and society at large (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; 
Noguera, 2003; Nolan & Anyon, 2004; Shapiro, 1984). Zero tolerance policies in public 
schools now serve as one such mechanism to identify troublesome students who are 
considered a danger to the success of other more promising students who are expected to 
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adapt well to a more flexible, service-oriented economy (Giroux, 2003; Hall & Karanxha, 
2012; Hirschfield, 2008; Wacquant, 2001). How zero tolerance policies emerged as a tool 
of neoliberal social control in American public schools to isolate at-risk, marginalized 
youth and funnel them away from education and toward imprisonment before they may 
compete in an increasingly competitive labor market (Hall & Karanxha, 2012) will now 
be further discussed and theorized. 
School Violence, Media Effects, and Moral Panic Amidst Child-Saving Rhetoric 
 High-profile instances of school shootings and violence captured immediate 
media attention in the late 1980s and 1990s, just as neoliberal changes in the political 
economy were taking hold (Blumstein & Wallman, 2006; Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; 
Chen, 2008; DeMitchell & Cobb, 2003). The media’s coverage of school-based crime 
and violence depicted this social issue as a crisis that threatened the safety of school 
children across the US (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008). Media portrayals of 
gruesome murder scenes at schools depicted assailants as extremely dangerous threats, 
risky “others,” and even “folk-devils” in need of control and harsh punishment (Burns & 
Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). The exaggerated 
perception of defenselessness in America’s relatively low-violence schools is shaped by 
the media’s framing of this social issue, which feeds off of the fears of an already 
frightened and hyper-vigilant public (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield 
& Celinska, 2011; Lyons & Drew, 2006; Simon, 2007). These alarming media portrayals 
spark moral panics that are fueled by public outrage and “parental insecurity,” which are 
later seized by politicians as opportunities to bolster popular support in order to seek 
punitive policy changes that enable broader social controls over the perceived threats to 
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school safety (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Giroux, 2003; Simon, 2007, 
p. 230). 
 Media framing of social problems can have an impact on public opinion through a 
variety of agenda setting and priming techniques that have previously been discussed 
(Kim et al., 2002; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Often the media’s primary agenda is to 
increase viewer ratings and seek profits by providing news coverage that is controversial 
and entertaining; therefore, a logic of “if it bleeds, it leads” is often applied (Beale, 2006). 
By increasing the amount of time a particular news story is accessible to viewers and 
what aspects of it are predominantly presented (e.g., placement of coverage, exclusion of 
factual material, emotional word choices, and repetition of startling information), the 
media is able to tailor the public’s perception of violent crime in schools as out-of-
control, regardless of evidence suggesting the contrary (Beale, 2006; Blumstein & 
Wallman, 2006; Bullock, 2007; Bullock & Cubert, 2002; De Voe et al., 2004; Dorfman 
& Schiraldi, 2001; Entman, 1993; FBI, 2008; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). In fact, 
fatal assaults in or around schools are rare and make up less than one percent of the 
violent deaths of school-age children (Blumstein & Wallman, 2006). 
 Indeed, despite statistics revealing falling crime rates in the 1990s, media 
networks intensified their coverage of crime-related newscasts during prime time viewing 
slots (Beale, 2006; Dorfman & Schiraldi, 2001). The increased prevalence of violent 
crime stories (including school shootings and other school violence) in the news during 
the 1990s and 2000s was a result of economic pressures driven by profit motives that 
forced networks to shift away from objective news toward “tabloid-style” crime stories 
(Beale, 2006, p. 424). Neoliberal-style mergers and deregulation changed how network 
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news operated in the 1980s and 1990s (Beale, 2006). The new economic environment 
made it so that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) no longer policed the 
public service requirements of networks, and large-scale mergers made it so that the 
majority of news networks were owned by only a few corporate conglomerates (Beale, 
2006). The pressure from corporate owners to increase profit margins forced network 
news to seek programming that was deemed more entertaining, so it would attract and 
maintain viewers (Beale, 2006). Thus, a focus on violent crime stories was pursued 
across news networks since the 1980s (Beale, 2006). 
 Research in crime and media studies has found that racial typification, which is 
the media’s stereotypical portrayal of crime as a minority phenomenon, is associated with 
increased punitiveness among viewers (Beale, 2006; Chiricos & Eschholz, 2002; 
Chiricos, Eschholz, & Gertz, 1997). Moreover, several studies examining race in crime-
related news found that African Americans are disproportionately depicted as dangerous 
and that they appear more frequently in crime news stories overall (Dorfman & Schiraldi, 
2001). In 75 percent of studies examined by Dorfman & Schiraldi (2001), minorities 
were overrepresented as perpetrators of crime. Furthermore, 86 percent of the studies 
paid more attention to White victims than to African American victims, and their 
conclusions argued that the story was deemed more newsworthy when the victim was 
White (Dorfman & Schiraldi, 2001).  
 Dorfman & Schiraldi (2001) also found that when youth appeared in the news, 
they were linked to crime and violent contexts, suggesting that juveniles, as well as 
minorities, are more criminally dangerous than others (also see Beale, 2006; Schiraldi, 
1999). Likewise, researchers found that media coverage inflates the prevalence of 
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juvenile crime, which in turn, inflames the public’s fear of youthful “predators” (Soler, 
2001, p. 5; Schiraldi, 1999). Several scholars argue that root fears of school violence and 
crime are actually generalized fears of youth (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; Lyons & 
Drew, 2006; Simon, 2007), which are influenced by the media. Some empirical evidence 
suggests that skewed news coverage, which typifies crime according to race and youth, 
contributes to increased punitiveness among a viewing public (Beale, 2006; Chiricos et 
al., 1997). For example, researchers surveyed the public about their attitudes toward 
punishment and African American involvement in crime, as depicted in the news, and 
they found that white participants who associated crime with African Americans 
exhibited more punitive attitudes (Chiricos et al., 1997).  
 Thus, well-publicized and sensationalized media coverage of school shootings in 
the 1980s and 1990s served as a catalyst to intensify fear among parents, school officials, 
and local politicians, which resulted in an emotionally driven and media-fed moral panic 
(Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008). These media representations captured the 
attention of political elites who then become compelled to respond (Burns & Crawford, 
1999). Such a climate provided the opportunity for political power brokers to pursue new 
legislation that would reflect a neoliberal-influenced agenda of zero tolerance for 
“dangerous” youth in public schools. 
 Therefore, students became the new potentially dangerous offender group in need 
of social control. Politicians seized the opportunity to encourage popular public support 
in an attempt to swiftly remedy the media-inflated problem of school violence by 
instituting new social controls for this group of perceived deviants and dangerous youth 
(Burns & Crawford, 1999). As a result, troublesome and marginalized youth served as the 
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scapegoats onto which the media and politicians shifted social anxieties about urban 
social pathologies, economic inequality, and the diminishing ability of the government 
and corporations to insulate the white ruling majority from them (Giroux, 2003; 
Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lyons & Drew, 2006, Simon, 2007).  
 Policy makers generated public support in favor of the application of zero 
tolerance policies that would act as new mechanisms of social control to further advance 
neoliberal trends across the public sector and institute the adoption of market logics that 
harmonize public education with the needs of the post-industrial, neoliberal economy 
(Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). The tightening of school disciplinary practices serves to 
mold students into compliant future employees who conform to the service-oriented 
needs of the neoliberal economy (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Hirschfield, 2008). In 
other words, the production of “compliant bodies” for the demands of the 
deindustrialized neoliberal state requires a reconfiguring of social control agents and 
mechanisms within public schools (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). 
 As described by Kupchik and Monahan (2006), “These idealized students embody 
extreme and flexible compliance to the vicissitudes of the marketplace; they submit 
willingly to scrutiny and manipulation; they demand nothing more than a chance to 
participate in rituals of mass consumption; and, when required, they provide a criminal 
counterpoint to justify the system’s necessary exclusions and deferrals” (p. 627). Thus, 
under these reconfigurations, schools would serve to prepare students for the volatile 
labor markets and uncertain service sector employment, which are characteristic of the 
neoliberal state, by socializing them into class-defined roles, while the school 
environment transformed to resemble and contribute to mass incarceration (Hirschfield, 
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2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Kim et al., 2010). Additionally, students were 
socialized to expect a police presence in their lives as pro-law enforcement views were 
fostered among students since SROs and other security personnel maintained a constant 
visible presence in schools (Horne, 2004; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Therefore, the 
media-driven moral panic resulting from episodes of school violence in the 1980s and 
1990s presented the window of opportunity necessary for policy makers to gain public 
support to push through policies that would allow this reconfiguration of neoliberal social 
control mechanisms to be enforced in the public educational system (Burns & Crawford, 
1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). 
 In order to obtain the necessary public support for zero tolerance policies in 
schools, policy makers needed to employ the political utility of fear mongering in an 
effort to convince parents and school officials that schools should and could be safer 
through the implementation of such policies (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; Lyons & 
Drew, 2006). In congruence with the media messaging of fear, politicians employed 
rhetoric similar to the child-saving movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries to 
manipulate and bolster public opinion.  
 The child-saving movement was led predominantly by politically conservative, 
socially prominent, middle-class women who sought to serve as caretakers for juveniles 
identified as delinquent or troublesome youth (Platt, 2009). However, the underlying 
motivation to the child-saving movement was to reinforce a code of White, middle class 
moral values, which were threatened by the rapidly changing and complex urban life of 
the working classes during industrialization at the beginning of the 20th century (Platt, 
2009). While progressive, middle-class women’s groups and professionals where the 
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most active figures in the child-saving movement, their vision was shared and financed 
by the ruling class elites (Platt, 2009). Thus, the child-saving movement sought to 
properly socialize and expand government control over the movements and actions of 
working class, urban youth, which typically was informally handled (Platt, 2009). The 
movement was also an “attempt to regulate deviant behaviors of working class men and 
women, using ‘panics’ to either establish new or re-instate fragile, social norms” (Evans, 
Davies, & Rich, 2008, p. 119). 
 The child-saving movement directly affected the children of the urban poor as 
they were depicted as “sick,” “maladjusted,” “unsocialized,” “pathological,” or 
“troublesome” youth, who needed to be confined “for their own good” (Platt, 2009, p. 
177). Therefore, the movement focused on delinquent youth via a social Darwinian 
perspective, which perceived the working class poor as morally bankrupt (Platt, 2009). 
Thus, delinquent youth where stigmatized as dangerous “others” in the political rhetoric 
during the movement (Mills, 1943). The child-saving movement brought about new 
forms of control, restraint, and punishment for poor, urban youth with the creation of the 
juvenile court, reformatories, detention centers, and new categories of youthful crime 
(Platt, 2009). The political rhetoric of the child-saving era functioned under the distress 
of a media-influenced moral panic, which argued for the immediate need to control 
juvenile delinquency and crime that was perceived to be increasingly unmanageable 
(Platt, 2009).  
 The founders of the child-saving movement argued that it was an effort to 
alleviate the miseries of urban life resulting from the structural inequalities of unregulated 
capitalism (Platt, 2009). However, this so-called, benevolent rhetoric from the child 
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savers was really masking a class-based system of harsh punishment, which deprived 
impoverished youth of due process while increasing the role the state played in the daily 
lives of the working class (Platt, 2009). One of the overarching aspects of the child-
saving movement was the characterization or demonization of lower- and working-class 
youth as problematic and deserving of intervention from law enforcement and the courts 
(Platt, 2009). 
 Over time, media-based “child saving” techniques have been employed to 
manufacture biased and misguided opinions about the need to regulate dangerous youth. 
Indeed, rhetoric from James Alan Fox, John J. DiIulio, William Bennett, John Walters, 
and William J. Bratton exaggerated the reports being publicized by the mass media in the 
1990s of youth “wilding” and the growing legions of juvenile “superpredators” (Bennett, 
DiIulio, & Walters, 1996; Fuentes, 2003; Welch, 2005, p. 168-169; Welch, 2011, p. 216-
217). Of course, this political rhetoric coincided with the neoliberal restructuring of the 
US economy in the 1990s (Harvey, 2005; Simon, 2007). Collectively, their descriptions 
of inner city adolescent offenders as being criminogenic, valueless, and “new threats to 
public safety” received constant and sustained media coverage (Welch, 2011, p. 216).  
 In addition, the school shootings of the 1990s were linked to this growing juvenile 
crime problem (Hirschfield, 2008; Stinchcomb et al., 2006; Sullivan, 2010). This 
stigmatizing rhetoric was reiterated by policy makers and the media, which played a 
crucial role in vilifying and demonizing disruptive and troublesome youth in America’s 
schools (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). As 
a result, minority, urban youth were targeted as threats to society, while racial and 
economic inequalities were reinforced by the state legislatures’ ever-increasing, “get 
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tough” responses to the perceived panic over youth crime (Welch, 2005; 2011). 
Moreover, increased security, surveillance, and formal sanctions for disruptive and 
violent behavior in schools were proclaimed as essential to restoring a controlled, 
disciplined environment in which educational processes could be effective, because 
students would conform to school norms or face strict consequences for misbehaviors 
(Bowditch, 1993; Toby, 1998). Zero tolerance policies served as the legislative answer to 
controlling school violence and crime caused by a perceived growing number of 
“dangerous” youth in American schools (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Hirschfield, 
2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Stinchcomb et al., 2006). 
 The political-economic pressures to prepare American students for the 
deindustrialized, service-oriented labor market of the neoliberal state has also played an 
influential role in the political rhetoric that seeks to strengthen school disciplinary 
policies (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). The punitive responses from policy makers to the 
moral panic caused by media portrayals of school violence have allowed the juvenile 
justice system to broaden its reach into school disciplinary practices (Boccanfuso & 
Kuhfeld, 2011; Chen, 2008; Hirschfield, 2008). Over time, zero tolerance policies have 
undergone net-widening, which allows rather minor offenses, such as disruptive 
behavior, speech, excessive tardiness, shoving matches, dress code violations, profanity, 
and insubordination to receive suspension and expulsion penalties (Black, 1999; 
Hirschfield, 2008; Insley, 2001; Morrison & Skiba, 2001; Scott & Steinberg, 2008; 
Sughrue, 2003). The mass hysteria over schools shootings enabled policy makers to 
garner the essential public support for zero tolerance policies that would attempt to deter 
the presence of guns and drugs on school campuses; however, once in place, these 
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policies have been extended to criminalize troublesome behaviors that might inhibit 
teachers’ roles in socializing the “compliant bodies” needed for the flexible labor force of 
the new neoliberal state (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006).  
 Students who exhibit these forms of disruptive behaviors are stigmatized and 
labeled as “at-risk of failing,”  “unsalvageable,” and “bound for jail,” which mirrors the 
otherizing rhetoric of the original child-saving movement that sought to contain and 
control problematic youth because their behavior was not in accordance with the 
mainstream American values and norms (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; NAACP, 2005; Platt, 
2009). In the case of broadening zero tolerance policies, the tightening of school 
disciplinary practices attempts to mold students into compliant future employees who 
conform to the service-oriented needs of the neoliberal economy (Kupchik & Monahan, 
2006; Hirschfield, 2008). Those students who disturb this socializing process are 
perceived to hinder the future prospects of other “promising” students who are expected 
to be economically viable laborers and consumers in the neoliberal economy (Hirschfield, 
2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Media depictions of school violence and the political 
efforts of policy makers have shaped public opinion so that harsh punishment of those 
who violate school policies is considered necessary to control the “folk devils” deemed 
risky threats to the safety of their children, as well as threats to their children’s future 
occupational prospects if their education is obstructed in any way (Burns & Crawford, 
1999; Hirschfield, 2008). 
 The labeling and categorizing of particular groups of students as “unworthy,” 
“unruly,” and “unsalvageable” (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; Wacquant, 2001, p. 108) is 
reminiscent of the child-saving movement of the 19th and 20th centuries that was harmful 
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to poor, urban youth identified as delinquents and treated as dangerous (Platt, 2009). 
Such rhetoric suggests that certain groups are indeed different and require social control, 
which may perpetuate racialized fears of urban youth. Numerous studies and national 
statistics reveal that the exclusionary practices enforced by zero tolerance policies in 
schools are disproportionately applied to racial and ethnic minorities, especially African 
Americans (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Skiba et al., 2002; USDOE, 2012; 
Witt, 2007).  
 The child savers established a movement that responded to a media-driven moral 
panic in which the threat posed by marginalized, urban youth to society and the economy 
required new forms of social control (Platt, 2009). Essentially, the child-savers movement 
was motivated by class warfare that pitted White, middle-class values and norms against 
the delinquent behaviors of wayward, working-class youth (Platt, 2009; Sutherland, 
1969). Similar to the original child-savers movement, current school criminalization 
efforts have further stigmatized marginal populations of poor, inner-city youth, which 
predominantly consist of racial and ethnic minorities (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; 
Wacquant, 2001). Thus, zero tolerance policies effectively function as the neoliberal 
social control mechanisms needed to punish and remove students perceived to have no 
market value and identified as flawed consumers because of their associations with 
crime, redundancy, poverty, and expendability (Giroux, 2003; Hall & Karanxha, 2012; 
Hirschfield, 2008; Wacquant, 2001). The school criminalization policies and practices 
enforced in the neoliberal state attempt to instill a “passive acquiescence to state and 
corporate power” among the student populations and their parents (Lyons & Drew, 2006, 
p. 195). This goal is pursued by isolating and funneling those students, who disrupt this 
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socialization process, out of school and onto a path leading to confinement and perpetual 
marginalization before they can even enter the labor force (Hall & Karanxha, 2012). 
Thus, the new American educational apparatus assists in the criminalization of poor 
students, which aids in the establishment and maintenance of a criminal class that 
legitimates systems of inequality in modern capitalist societies, while flexible students 
who adapt or succumb easily to the labor instability, invasive monitoring, and 
exploitative working conditions of the neoliberal state are rewarded (Kupchik & 
Monahan, 2006). 
Legislation Reflecting Neoliberal Agenda of Zero Tolerance 
 In 1990, original federal legislation efforts by policy makers to create safer 
schools made the possession of firearms within 1,000 feet of school campuses a federal 
felony, but this was found unconstitutional (see US v. Lopez, 1995). Later, the Gun-Free 
School Act (GFSA) of 1994 required all federally funded schools to automatically expel 
any student who brought a firearm to school for no less than a year. Subsequently, 
amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 required federal 
funding to be withheld from schools that did not abide by the mandatory expulsion policy 
for students possessing firearms within 1,000 feet of school under the GFSA (Casella, 
2003b). Thus, the initial legislation appeared to be responding solely to the issue of gun 
violence in schools as supported by the public, which was struggling to recover from the 
media-fed moral panic. However, the GFSA was later amended in 1995 to broaden the 
categories of weapons and items that could potentially be used as weapons that would 
also result in mandatory expulsion if found in a student’s possession (Casella, 20003b). 
The application of formal social controls in schools quickly became a slippery slope in 
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which a variety of student behaviors faced swift and harsh punishments (Heitzeg, 2009). 
 Legislative efforts widened to further implement zero tolerance policies for 
students possessing drugs, including alcohol, tobacco, and drug paraphernalia, while on 
school property (Beger, 2002). Moreover, under the new policies, if students were found 
with weapons or drugs, they also faced referral to the juvenile or criminal justice systems 
on top of the automatic suspension or expulsion they would receive for violating the zero 
tolerance policies of the school (Berger, 2002; Education Law Center, 2012). Net-
widening continued through the 1990s and 2000s, so that zero tolerance policies are now 
regularly applied to very minor and non-violent school infractions, such as tardiness, the 
use of profane language, disruptive behavior, insubordination, possession of health aids 
(e.g., Advil, mouthwash, cough drops), cheating, violating dress code, engaging in 
horseplay, being excessively noisy, failing to bring homework to class, throwing temper 
tantrums, shoving, speech, and writing on topics with violent or criminal themes 
(Fuentes, 2003; Giroux, 2003; Heitzeg, 2009; Hirschfield, 2008; Justice Policy Institute, 
2009; Schoonover, 2007; Skiba, 2000; Stinchcomb et al., 2006; Sullivan, 2010). These 
policies are now punishing minor infractions with force and arrest (Giroux, 2003; 
Heitzeg, 2009; Justice Policy Institute, 2009). 
 Net-widening effects reveal an elevated effort between schools and the justice 
system to cooperate in the implementation of zero tolerance policies and the execution of 
punishment for violators (Heitzeg, 2009). Under the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, over $30 billion was authorized to fund more police officers 
and new prison construction that was related to school safety efforts (Yell & Rozalski, 
2000). Additionally, the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Policing Services 
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(COPS) was given over $350 million to hire new SROs across the US (Beger, 2002). As 
a result of this funding, public schools in the US added more full-time police officers and 
security personnel to their staffs since 1990, and the number of SROs continues to grow 
rapidly (Beger, 2002; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). While these officers are stationed in 
schools throughout American cities, they are typically concentrated in schools found in 
areas marked by adverse poverty (Devine, 1996; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). 
Surveillance technologies, such as metal detectors, video recording devices, Internet 
tracking, biometrics, ID cards, transparent lockers and book bags, electronic gates, and 
two-way radios were also increasingly used in schools throughout the 1990s and today 
(Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). The increased presence of police officers and surveillance 
technologies makes it easier for students to be socialized into disciplinary roles and for 
zero tolerance policies to be enforced efficiently (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006).  
 The practices put in place in accordance with zero tolerance disciplinary reforms 
reflect many of the principles of the neoliberal agenda. Specifically, legislation like the 
No Child Left Behind Act (2001) introduced the neoliberal imperative of school 
accountability by connecting school funding directly to scores on annual achievement test 
in reading and math (Fuentes, 2003; Heitzeg, 2009). Under the accountability standards 
enforced by this legislative act, neoliberal concepts of market competition, performance 
monitoring, and accountability for underperformance and failure infiltrated the American 
educational system (Fuentes, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). 
These neoliberal embodiments served to promote more efficiency and increase 
culpability for students and teachers, while enhancing the mechanisms of social control 
available to school administrators and law enforcement (Fuentes, 2003; Hirschfield, 
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2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Additionally, the market mechanisms embraced by 
the No Child Left Behind Act (2001) creates a climate of competition for resources, 
which is expected to motivate school officials to obtain better scores regardless of the 
means (Simon, 2007). 
 Thus, under the neoliberal push for accountability requirements, teachers and 
administrators at “financially strapped schools” are under such tremendous pressure to 
improve standardized test scores and attendance rates that they are prepared to exclude 
underachieving students to benefit of high-achieving students (Fuentes, 2003; Heitzeg, 
2009; Hirschfield, 2008, p. 85). The expanded application of zero tolerance policies to a 
wide array of disciplinary problems provides school officials with the social control 
mechanism in which teachers can weed out low-performing students who affect the 
overall standardized test scores for struggling schools (Fuentes, 2003; NAACP, 2005). 
Because of net-widening, school officials are able to enforce suspensions and/or 
expulsions for disruptive behaviors, insubordination, cheating, failure to complete 
homework, and other infractions common among failing students while concealing 
educational deficits caused by a lack of resources and poor teaching quality (Fuentes, 
2003; NAACP, 2005). Therefore, by using zero tolerance exclusionary practices, school 
administrators and educators are able to focus on the best performing students and 
remove those students who threaten overall school performance, as well as undermine the 
controlled and disciplined school environment required for the didactic socialization 
efforts promoted under the neoliberal state to produce students who accommodate the 
needs of the restructured economy (Bowditch, 1993; Fuentes, 2003; Giroux, 2003; 
Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Toby, 1998). 
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 This form of zero tolerance discipline assists the neoliberal state in masking social 
injustices, economic inequality, and underinvestment in public education by explicitly 
denying the significance of political, structural, and social factors underpinning school 
misconduct and focusing on the individual student offenders (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield 
& Celinska, 2011; Lyons & Drew, 2006). School criminalization, in the new zero 
tolerance culture, transfers disciplinary authority away from traditional school authorities 
and into the control of inflexible disciplinary codes, law enforcement, and the justice 
system (Beger, 2002; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Lyons & Drew, 2006). The students’ 
rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s secured due process for students by curbing 
arbitrary and capricious disciplinary practices by school officials and standardizing many 
of the existing disciplinary practices (Arum, 2003; Toby, 1998). Some scholars believe 
that the added due process undermined the traditional moral authority exhibited by school 
administrators and emboldened students to defy their teachers (Arum, 2003; Toby, 1998). 
This perspective suggests that the ineffectiveness of school discipline, coupled with low 
educational achievement, was associated with the erosion of moral authority in schools, 
which created an “atmosphere of disorder” (Arum, 2003, p. 3). However, after the 
judicial rulings of the 1960s and 1970s, school principals were reluctant to administer 
suspensions and/or expulsions for fear of litigation (Arum, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008).  
 By increasing the role that the police and the justice system play in school 
disciplinary matters by way of school criminalization and zero tolerance, school 
administrators are able to reduce their likelihood of being sued (Hirschfield, 2008). Thus, 
discipline is “outsourced” to other law enforcement and state agencies, so that teachers 
are now simply responsible for students’ minds while security staff are responsible for 
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their bodies (Beger, 2002; Devine, 1996; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Furthermore, the 
transfer of disciplinary authority to strict zero tolerance codes and law enforcement 
entities allows school administrators to circumvent litigious claims from students who 
believe their constitutional privacy and due process rights have been violated by zero 
tolerance practices (Arum, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008). Consequently, the manner in which 
neoliberal social controls are exerted via school-based zero tolerance policies and an 
increased law enforcement presence at schools has reinforced the formation of a crime 
control model where students’ rights are weakened, due process is minimized, and the 
movements of students are controlled (Lyons & Drew, 2006; Nolan & Anyon, 2004). 
School criminalization teaches students three things: (1) they have no meaningful 
influence over their schools, (2) they have little recourse should the government violate 
their rights, and (3) they have few rights to begin with (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; 
Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lyons & Drew, 2006). 
 Zero tolerance furthers the neoliberal agenda in public schools by supporting a 
governing through crime initiative, which approaches problems faced by schools or 
students as criminal problems rather than social or counseling problems (Kupchik & 
Monahan, 2006; Simon, 2007). As such, disruptive students and failing schools are recast 
as criminals, while high-performing students and their parents are recast as victims, and 
educational policymakers are elevated to the role of prosecutor and judge (Simon, 2007). 
Under this governing through crime logic, the criminal element threatening schools must 
be identified and expelled in order to improve the prospects and performance of 
deserving students, such as those who are flexible and compliant to the needs of the 
economy that awaits them (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Simon, 2007).  
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 Thus, the classification of students, via anticipatory labeling, allows teachers and 
school administrators to project perceived future social and structural realities onto their 
disaffected and disruptive students (Hirschfield, 2008). Sociologists argue that structural 
forces, like those relevant to neoliberal restructuring, “condition” and “constrain” 
individual perceptions and interactions with others (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; 
Hirschfield, 2008, p. 91). Therefore, the neoliberal transformation of the US political 
economy can influence teachers’ perceptions of students’ future prospects by linking 
social structure to the students’ educational and occupational aspirations and classroom 
effort (Hirschfield, 2008). Teachers are able to perceive the changes in occupational 
structure and acknowledge which students will be able to perform best in the flexible, 
service-orient labor market of the neoliberal state (Hirschfield, 2008).  
 Students who are already being labeled as “at risk of failing,” “bound for jail,” 
“unsalvageable,” “unworthy,” and “unruly” are more likely to be removed in order to 
accelerate their projected future reality, and in the process, allow educators to focus 
classroom instruction on more economically viable students (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; 
Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Wacquant, 2001, p. 108). Zero tolerance 
policies serve as the neoliberal social control mechanism that allows school officials to 
“fast track” undesirable and disruptive students into the school-to-prison pipeline 
(Hirschfield, 2008, p. 92). The tasks of classification and socialization forces teachers to 
consciously and unconsciously prepare students for their rightful position in the social 
strata by sorting future “dropouts” from those students who have a legitimate chance at 
functioning in the new workplace environment (Bowditch, 1993; Ferguson, 2000; 
Hirschfield, 2008). Moreover, the pressure to achieve neoliberal standards of 
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accountability for underperforming schools further motivates educators to control and 
remove disaffected and disruptive students, who obstruct the socialization processes that 
promote the values and norms of a dominant economic class (Kupchik & Monahan, 
2006; Shapiro, 1984).  
 In practice, the exclusionary practices enforced by zero tolerance policies 
disproportionately affect minority students, especially African American males (APA 
Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Casella, 2003b, Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003; 
Skiba & Rausch, 2006; USDOE, 2012). A large proportion of minority students attend 
inner-city schools in low-income neighborhoods (Christle et al., 2004; Giroux, 2003; 
Skiba et al., 2002). There are often bleak employment and imprisonment prospects for 
inner-city students, which affects the future realities that teachers and school 
administrators project for these students (Hirschfield, 2008). The reasons for why 
minority students engage in disruptive or disobedient behaviors while at school may be a 
reflection of the extreme poverty, economic inequality, and social marginalization they 
experience daily in their communities and home environments (Ferguson, 2000; 
Hirschfield, 2008).  
 Two structural realities emerged from the neoliberal transformation, which 
include the following: (1) that prison awaits African American youth who fail or dropout 
of school, and (2) that schools do not possess the necessary resources to reverse the 
wayward paths of problematic students without also detracting from the quality of 
teaching and services meant for those perceived as more deserving and promising 
students (Hirschfield, 2008). These structural realities are produced by unregulated 
neoliberal capitalism (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009; Wacquant, 2001, 2009a, 
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2009b).   Regardless of the potentially numerous sources for disruptive behavior, which 
likely stems from the polarizing social conditions of the neoliberal state, chronically 
disobedient African American boys are consistently viewed by school authorities as 
“bound for jail” and “unsalvageable” (Ferguson, 2000). As a result, poor, urban minority 
youth are disproportionately suspended and expelled, which further perpetuates their 
marginalization in society (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Casella, 2003b, 
Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003; Skiba & Rausch, 2006; USDOE, 2012; Wacquant, 
2001). 
Legitimacy Crisis and the Role of the Courts 
 Neoliberal initiatives, which reconfigure social control agents and mechanisms 
within public schools, as well as enhance the accountability for underperforming schools 
has transformed public schools to become more like “institutions of confinement” 
(Wacquant, 2001, p. 108). Now school-based zero tolerance policies serve as a social 
control mechanism to punish and remove those students perceived to have no future 
market value in the restructured labor market that is more flexible and service-oriented 
(Giroux, 2003; Hall & Karanxha, 2012; Hirschfield, 2008; Lynch, 2007; Wacquant, 
2001). The neoliberal agenda applied to school criminalization efforts endorses a “narrow 
public sphere” and a “docile citizenry” (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2011, p. 7). In the 
past, public schools provided the venue for battles over full citizenship and equal 
opportunity; however, their role has now converted to replicate a model of disempowered 
citizenship that is similar to neoliberal labor dynamics, where students’ rights are 
weakened and their movements are controlled and scrutinized (Giroux, 2003; Lyons & 
Drew, 2006).  
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 The pedagogical imperatives of the neoliberal agenda conflicts with the 
traditional, more progressive pedagogical imperatives of public education rooted in 
values of liberty, equality, tolerance, citizenship, and personal growth (Giroux, 2003; 
Hirschfield, 2008). Liberal democracies confront crises of legitimation because economic 
liberalism creates inequality through power imbalances across rigid class lines, while 
democracy struggles to respond by upholding social welfare through the promotion of 
social equality, mutual respect, and cooperative interaction among citizens (Habermas, 
1975; Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). American schools can reproduce the structure of 
capitalist society by socializing students in the values of the market place as preferred by 
the ruling elites (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Shapiro, 1984). Schools, similar to other 
social institutions, serve as “sites of dynamic social interaction” in which the dueling 
ideologies of liberal democracy are continuously negotiated to legitimize these 
conflicting forces (Hirschfield, 2008).  
 Public schools represent democratic ideals and principles, such as equality of 
access, mutuality, universal responsibility, and collective obligations, which oppose the 
neoliberal imperatives of a class-divided society (Giroux, 2003; Shapiro, 1984). Thus, the 
enforcement of the neoliberal agenda by way of school criminalization has put the 
traditional role of public schools as a public good at odds with itself (Giroux, 2003; 
Shapiro, 1984). School criminalization alters the role of teachers so that they manage and 
classify students much like employees would be treated in a neoliberal economy 
(Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). In addition, school 
criminalization facilitates teacher disengagement, because their new role reduces their 
capacity to understand and address the needs of their students (Brotherton, 1996; Devine, 
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1996; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). This disengagement, along with racially disparate 
exclusionary disciplinary practices, serves to erode students’ trust of their teachers and 
threatens the overall legitimacy of school rules because students interpret their treatment 
as unfair due to a perceived lack of due process (Brotherton, 1996; Hirschfield & 
Celinska, 2011; Kupchik, 2010).  
 According to neoliberal theory, any challenges to the expansion of the neoliberal 
agenda into school disciplinary policy must be mediated through the courts (Harvey, 
2005). School criminalization subjects students to conditions of constant monitoring, 
which reinforces a surveillance culture that individualizes students and presumes their 
guilt until proven otherwise (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Civil liberty advocates have 
targeted the application of school criminalization efforts from an approach that focuses 
on violations of privacy (ACLU, 2001). However, the net-widening of zero tolerance 
policies broadens the number of constitutional rights that they potentially violate. In 
addition to students’ privacy rights, their freedom of speech protections, protection from 
unlawful searches and seizures, protections from cruel and unusual punishments, and due 
process rights are also potentially violated when zero tolerance policies are enforced. 
 Attempts by youthful defendants to challenge zero tolerance outcomes on the 
grounds of violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights have 
largely been dismissed by the courts (Kim et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2010; Yell & Rozalski, 
2000). The courts interpret and apply the law in order to arbitrate legal disputes between 
parties in accordance with the rule of law, and they are the primary means for dispute 
resolution in the neoliberal state (Harvey, 2005). When court rulings uphold zero 
tolerance policies in light of challenges based on constitutional violations, they create a 
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precedent, which establishes the policies and practices of the state as legitimate under the 
law. Thus, it is theorized that affirmation of zero tolerance policies through court 
decisions serves to legitimate the state’s social control of marginal populations in schools 
and the neoliberal influence on educational policy by declaring that they do not infringe 
on the democratic rights and liberties of students. Verification by the courts that zero 
tolerance policies are legitimate allows neoliberal social control mechanisms to be 
institutionalized and further applied in the American educational system.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Qualitative Research Design 
 Attempts by student defendants to challenge zero tolerance outcomes on the 
grounds of violations of First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights have 
largely been dismissed by the courts (Kim et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2010; Yell & Rozalski, 
2000). Given the neoliberal influence over the transformation of school disciplinary 
practices, which is documented in the literature, affirmation of zero tolerance policies 
through court decisions may serve to legitimate how the state controls marginal 
populations in educational settings through zero tolerance. Examination of both the state 
appellate and Supreme Court decisions surrounding the possible constitutional rights 
violations exhibited by zero tolerance policies is warranted to extract this jurisprudential 
intent, which permits and regenerates these crime control processes.  
 Jurisprudential intent refers to an evaluation of the “judicial construction of the 
opinion,” which is derived from a close analysis of specific phrasing or language used to 
express the plain meaning of the ruling more thoroughly (Arrigo, 2003, p.59). Court 
decisions, like other legal documents, serve as archival data that record mainstream legal 
thought on several justice-related matters, and as such, they can be interpreted to reveal 
societal meaning (Arrigo, Bersot, & Sellers, 2011). Therefore, legal inquiries of existing 
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case law permit researchers to identify the many facets of juridical decision making that 
influence how the law is socially structured to reflect the dominant ideology of the 
political economy (Banaker & Travers, 2005, p. 134). A qualitative textual and discourse 
analysis via a case law method is proposed to investigate the underlying jurisprudential 
intent guiding these legal decisions, which provide legitimacy to the practice of zero 
tolerance in the education system and promote disciplinary strategies that will be 
consistent with neoliberal ideals. 
 Legal anthropology is the study of how societies construct and implement laws 
and legal systems to control antisocial deviance and other forms of behavioral patterns 
among citizens, as well as control access to justice (Conley & O’ Barr, 1993). Thus, legal 
anthropologists investigate both how the law works and how society is regulated (Conley 
& O’ Barr, 1993). Regardless of the research questions posed or the theoretical positions 
taken, legal anthropologists usually rely on court cases as the basic unit of analysis and 
the case method as a qualitative analytic paradigm (Conley & O’ Barr, 1993). Case law 
will be the unit of analysis in the study at hand. Court decisions are forms of narratives, 
and as narratives, they portray a meaningful sequence of temporal events that organize 
human experience and understanding through documented language and discourse 
(Rapport, 2000). Narratives articulate and “emplot” events, experiences, sensations, 
rationales, and interpretations, which serve as a rich source for ethnographic examination 
from which legal reasoning and contextual meaning may be unearthed (Conley & O’ 
Barr, 1993; Rapport, 2000, p. 76). Thus, the narrative of the court decisions becomes the 
landscape that the embedded legal researcher uses to construct the field of legal inquiry 
(Rapport, 2000). 
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 Qualitative research of this nature requires the qualitative evaluation concept of 
justifiability of interpretation in order to take into account subjectivity, interpretation, and 
context rather than apply quantitative concepts of reliability and validity (Auerbach & 
Silverstein, 2003). Qualitative methodologists believe it is justifiable and often inevitable 
for a researcher to use his or her subjectivity in analyzing and interpreting data; however, 
it is never justifiable for a researcher to impose his or her own subjectivity in an arbitrary 
manner that is not grounded in his or her data (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). Thus, 
qualitative studies employ different criteria for methodological rigor compared to 
quantitative studies (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Whitley & Kite, 2012). 
 The criteria used to check against the tendency of a qualitative researcher 
imposing his or her own subjectivity in data analysis includes transparency, 
communicability, coherence, and confirmability (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). In order 
for qualitative data analysis to be justifiable it must be transparent, which means that 
others are made aware of the steps by which the researcher arrived at his or her 
interpretation (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). This check is accomplished through 
clearly describing the process of data collection and analysis and being consistent 
(Whitley & Kite, 2012). Transparency, also referred to as dependability (see Whitley & 
Kite, 2012), does not mean that other researchers need to actually agree with the 
researcher’s interpretation; however, they only need to know how he or she arrived at it 
(Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). In this study, each step of the case law method procedure 
will be explained; so that others will know exactly how theoretical themes were built up 
from the repeating ideas that were derived from relevant text (see Auerbach & 
Silverstein, 2003). Identifying relevant text segments, or passages, from the court cases 
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allows for repeating concepts to be grouped into themes in an understandable way that 
will tie them to theoretical mechanisms, which reflect the patterns among the themes (see 
Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003).  
 In order for the data analysis to be communicable, the themes and constructs must 
be understood by, and make sense to, other researchers (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). 
Communicability does not mean that other researchers would have to come up with the 
same themes, constructs, or concepts, or agree with them; however, it does means that the 
themes or constructs need to be explainable so others will understand why the researcher 
has arrived at his or her conclusions (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). Communicability is 
achieved in the second level of analysis in the case law method procedure. In this second 
step, the researcher explains how the plain meaning of particular text segments reflects 
language that identifies with constructs and conceptual mechanisms in the theoretical 
framework (see Arrigo et al, 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010; Sellers & Arrigo, 2009). 
 Coherence means that theoretical constructs or concepts must fit together so that 
the researcher can tell a coherent story (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). Of course, 
coherence does not require that the story developed by the researcher be the only possible 
version, but that his or her story helps to organize the data to produce coherent ideas by 
identifying themes and constructs that fit into an organized theoretical narrative 
(Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). Coherence is achieved in the third level of the case law 
method in which a thematic analysis is conducted across the cases to identify the 
theoretical mechanisms that are predominantly applied to the court decisions and how 
they allow for the larger theoretical framework to be evidenced in the body of relevant 
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case law under investigation (see Arrigo et al, 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010; Sellers & 
Arrigo, 2009). 
 In order to obtain confirmability, the qualitative researcher must actively seek out 
instances within his or her data that does not fit with initial conclusions or fails to support 
research hypotheses (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Whitley & Kite, 2012). This step 
also helps to reinforce that the data analysis is transparent (Auerbach & Silverstein, 
2003). In the case law method, the researcher keenly searches the court decisions for text 
segments that either support or fail to support the research questions, which are used to 
guide the careful reading of each case (see Arrigo et al, 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010; 
Sellers & Arrigo, 2009). Qualitative data that supports or fails to support hypotheses or 
research questions will be gleaned and documented via written field notes. To be clear, 
text segments that represent, or fail to represent, plain meaning responses to the research 
hypotheses will be highlighted in the court decision and written down as evidence for or 
against, the corresponding research hypothesis. In this study, eight research questions are 
applied to the textual analysis. If no data can be found in a court decision that either 
supports or fails to support a hypothesis, then “no data could be ascertained” will be 
documented in the field notes (see Arrigo et al, 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010; Sellers & 
Arrigo, 2009).  
 In qualitative research, transferability of theoretical constructs is used instead of 
the quantitative concept of generalizability (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Whitley & 
Kite, 2012). If a qualitative study is transferable, then its theoretical constructs or 
concepts can be applied to different samples (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). In other 
words, the theoretical constructs defined and identified in the study at hand will serve as a 
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guide for investigating a new sample, and once applied, these constructs will help the 
researcher to understand textual patterns in the new sample (Auerbach & Silverstein, 
2003). Of course, theoretical constructs may not apply automatically, and the researcher 
may need to extend their meaning or develop them further, which will refine and further 
develop the theory (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). It is expected that the theoretical 
constructs in the current study will serve as transferable in other empirical applications of 
this theory in new samples of case law, where neoliberal social controls in either similar 
or different social institutions are being applied. 
 Criterion-based Sampling. A selective criterion-based sampling design was 
employed. Criterion-based sampling is a form of purposive sampling, which allows the 
researcher to purposely select court cases for their relevance to the issue being studied 
(see Gray, Williamson, Karp, & Dalphin, 2007). This sampling strategy is typically used 
in studies of social phenomena that are either extremely rare or so specific that a 
representative cross section of a population would not be effective (Gray et al., 2007). 
Samples for qualitative content analyses typically consist of purposively selected texts, 
which may inform the research questions under examination (Zhang & Wildemuth, 
2009). Thus, criterion-based sampling ensures that at least some information from legal 
data sources, which are either hard to locate and/or essential to the study, are included in 
the sample (Gary et al., 2007).  
 The following case law methodology (Arrigo et al., 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010; 
Sellers & Arrigo, 2009) sourced jurisprudential intent as communicated in district court, 
state appellate court, and Supreme Court decisions addressing school zero tolerance 
policies and privacy rights of students, where the First Amendment’s freedom of speech 
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protections, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unlawful searches and seizures, the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of due process rights are at issue. In order to identify this 
judicial temperament, specific criteria were established to determine which court cases 
would be considered for examination. The individual court cases will serve as the units of 
analysis. First, an initial search on LexisNexis was conducted for key terms and phrases. 
Those words/phrases included “zero tolerance,” “school,” “student*,” “privacy right*,” 
“First Amendment,” “Fourth Amendment,” “Eighth Amendment,” and “Fourteenth 
Amendment.”   
 “Zero tolerance” was chosen because this term is the one most commonly applied 
to school policies that mandate automatic sanctions for students found in violation of 
rules without any consideration given to mitigating circumstances. Additionally, “school” 
was included because zero tolerance policies can be utilized in various workplace settings 
and even public transportation. For the purpose of this investigation, the researcher is 
primarily interested in the application of zero tolerance policies in middle or high school 
settings only. Any cases involving college settings were excluded from the final data set. 
“Student” was also added to the search criteria to identify court decisions where 
defendants were actual youths attending school and not teachers or administrative 
officials working in the school. Only cases with juvenile defendants were included in the 
final data set. Next, “privacy right*” was included to yield all cases involving issues of 
the privacy rights of students with regard to the application of zero tolerance practices in 
schools. Finally, “First Amendment,” “Fourth Amendment,” “Eighth Amendment,” 
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and/or “Fourteenth Amendment” were all included in the search criteria to identify those 
cases where violations of these constitutional rights were raised.  
 Criterion-Sample Results: With these criteria in mind, the LexisNexis search 
yielded a preliminary 122 court cases. These initial 122 court cases were examined to 
ensure that they substantively met the sampling criteria. Seventy-five cases that did not 
specifically address zero tolerance policies in schools, issues of privacy rights, and/or 
First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment protections for students were excluded 
from the final data set. These excluded cases dealt with zero tolerance policies in other 
arenas, such as universities, the transit authority, or various workplace settings and not in 
public elementary and secondary schools. The 47 remaining cases of interest were 
shepardized, and internal cites were scrutinized in order to ascertain any other important 
court decisions that should be included in the sample, notwithstanding their lack of 
identification as derived from initial LexisNexis inquiries. As a result, 28 additional court 
decisions were added to finalize the sample at 75 court cases that met the inclusion 
criteria. 
 Case Law Method. In this inquiry, a recently developed case law methodology 
was applied (see Arrigo et al., 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010; Sellers & Arrigo, 2009), 
whereby the plain meaning of particular terms within the existing case law of interest was 
scrutinized for textual context and usage to unpack jurisprudential intent. There were 
several steps to this process. 
Probing the legal language of these court decisions for embedded perceptions and 
attitudes entailed the first step of the textual analysis. This first step extracted 
jurisprudential intent from the documents, which is the plain meaning made apparent in 
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the judicial opinion. The second steps entailed identifying the use of neoliberal 
mechanisms embedded within court decisions that reflect the prevailing jurisprudential 
perspective on zero tolerance policies, the privacy rights of students, and whether such 
practices infringed upon the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights of 
students were made explicit. The data extracted in the second step addressed the question 
of whether and how the court employed neoliberal justifications to reinforce zero-
tolerance social control efforts in schools.  
Previous studies have utilized textual or narrative inquiry to conduct statutory 
analyses, and this strategy is a common form of legal analysis.  For example, in order to 
unearth legislative intent, legal scholars have investigated the “ordinary usage” of terms 
and the “textual context” distinguished within various legislative provisions (Hall & 
Wright, 2008; Karkkainen, 1994; Phillips & Grattet, 2000; Randolph, 1994).  However, 
some researchers have challenged the subjective nature of this qualitative technique, 
because it is often difficult to extract the complex meaning behind the perspectives of the 
policymakers (Easterbrook, 1994; Posner, 2008).  Therefore, critics of this approach 
argue that meaning is interpreted based on context.  Thus, results from such an approach 
may vary according to an individual’s comprehension of the language (Posner, 2008).   
However, others (Arrigo et al., 2011; Randolph, 1994) argue that determining a 
court’s jurisprudential intent through rigorous textual examination of its judicial decisions 
is an essential, although certainly heuristic, approach to interpreting juridical meaning 
when experiments are not ethically possible or feasible. Additionally, it is logistically and 
physically impossible to observe courtroom proceedings and rulings for all relevant 
cases, which may span several decades. Also, quasi-experimental designs using survey 
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sampling methods may prove difficult since judges, as elected officials, may be reluctant 
to provide candid details on their decision making, especially if the case may undergo 
appeal. Thus, interpretive analyses of legal texts are better served by seeking 
jurisprudential plain meaning from judicial decisions themselves rather than attempting to 
peer into the minds of policymakers in which the “broader systems of meaning” that 
justify and rationalize a court’s rulings are determined (Phillips & Grattet, 2000, p. 569; 
see also, Easterbrook, 1994; Sellers & Arrigo, 2009).  It should also be noted that the 
purpose of the legal text that discusses the basis for the legal opinion rendered in a given 
case is designed in such a way as to preclude the necessity of directly observing trials, or 
surveying judges, who have already self-described their rationale in legal materials.  
Therefore, the variant of the plain meaning rule described above was utilized to engage in 
an interpretive analysis of the legal language expressed in the court decisions that made 
up this data set. 
Given the proposed theoretical approach, it was hypothesized that relevant court 
decisions regarding zero tolerance school policies would be more likely to embrace 
public safety rationales and disciplinary goals rather than the individual rights of 
juveniles. In order to conduct an interpretive analysis in which the plain meaning of the 
courts’ rhetoric is discerned, a series of research questions were compiled from this 
general hypothesis:  
(RQ1)  Court cases will contain reference to: (A) the control of potential threats of 
danger, and/or disruption that are posed by school-based infractions, 
regardless of circumstance or context, or (B) the focus on potential 
individual rights violations. Empirical evidence favoring A over B would 
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support the hypothesis that neoliberal court mechanisms are employed to 
reinforce zero-tolerance social control efforts in schools.  
(RQ2)  Court cases will include reference to (A) the intentions, good or bad, of 
the student(s) among the criteria used by the courts for deciding zero 
tolerance school policy cases, and (B) will discuss striking a balance 
between the intent of students and school safety concerns.  If empirical 
evidence favors B over A, this finding would support the hypothesis that 
courts employ neoliberal mechanisms to reinforce zero-tolerance social 
control efforts in schools. 
(RQ3)  In some court decisions on zero tolerance policies, the court will make 
decisions related to the liability of school administrators for alleged 
infringement of student rights, and in order to determine if student rights 
were violated. The court may exclude or refuse to rule on certain legal 
issues, and may find school administrators immune from any charges of 
liability for the alleged infringement on the individual rights of students. 
At issue in these cases is the content of the ruling and its reference to 
neoliberal rationale. Data supporting this interpretation would support the 
effort of neoliberal court mechanisms to reinforce zero-tolerance social 
control efforts in schools. 
(RQ4)  The court’s preference for security over individual rights reflects a 
preference for neoliberal policy, and will tend to result in decisions to 
uphold automatic expulsion or suspension for disruptive behaviors. Thus, 
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with respect to decisions, it is hypothesized that the court will more often 
decide in favor of schools over individuals.  
(RQ5)  The court’s preference for neoliberal policy over individual rights will 
impact decisions where the security threat presented by students is small.  
If this is true, it can be hypothesized that even when the cases involve 
student behaviors that poses no imminent physical threat, the court will 
preference the use of automatic expulsions and suspensions as appropriate 
sanctions over claims that such practices constitute cruel or unusual 
punishment.  
(RQ6)  If the courts are strongly committed to neoliberal policy, then it can be 
hypothesized that courts will tend to dismiss allegations of violating 
constitutional protections as being without merit and not binding on the 
court’s decision. Data supporting this interpretation would support the 
effort of neoliberal court mechanisms to reinforce zero-tolerance social 
control efforts in schools. 
(RQ7)  The court’s preference for neoliberal policy will affect the likelihood of 
the court accepting non-punitive responses to school infractions.  As a 
result, it can be hypothesized that the court will reject recommendations 
for viable alternative punishments that are rehabilitative in nature or which 
seek to continue educational services in place of expulsions or 
suspensions. Data supporting this interpretation would support the effort 
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of neoliberal court mechanisms to reinforce zero-tolerance social control 
efforts in schools. 
(RQ8)  The court’s emphasis on security is hypothesized to lead to decisions that 
promote strict disciplinary actions that preemptively seek to prevent 
possible future disruption over school policies that promote restorative 
sanctions. Data supporting this interpretation would support the effort of 
neoliberal court mechanisms to reinforce zero-tolerance social control 
efforts in schools. 
These questions guided a careful reading of the legal language used in the various court 
rulings in the data set. The words, phases, or passages, which constitute respective 
responses to these guiding questions, will reveal the plain meaning of the underlying 
judicial intent embedded within each judicial decision. 
 To summarize, the case law method used in this study engaged in a qualitative 
textual analysis of judicial decisions regarding school zero tolerance policies when 
challenges were raised on the grounds of violations of First, Fourth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of students. The first step, in this analysis, elicited 
information underpinning the jurisprudential intent by applying the eight research 
questions that guided an examination of the plain meaning of the court cases in the data 
set. Secondly, the evidence gathered from the first step were contextualized and 
examined to unpack terms or expressions that signified principles representative of the 
various mechanisms identified in the theoretical framework detailing how neoliberal 
court mechanisms supported zero-tolerance social control initiatives in schools. Finally, 
the theoretical mechanisms employed by the courts were inspected across the cases to 
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determine which mechanisms were predominantly applied to legitimate neoliberal 
judicial support for zero tolerance social control efforts in schools. 
Quantitative Research Design 
 There is a surprising dearth of quantitative studies examining school 
criminalization measures (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). In fact, the few published 
quantitative studies that exist are cross-sectional and tend to rely primarily on measures 
of school characteristics rather than the political economic dynamics of this social 
problem (Brady, Balmer, & Phenix, 2007; Chen, 2008; Kupchik & Ellis, 2008; Mayer & 
Leone, 1999). Currently, data collected nationally from the School Survey on Crime and 
Safety (SSOCS) by the National Center for Education Research (NCES), provides a 
source for information regarding school crime, disciplinary problems, programs, and 
policies across several years (United States Department of Education, 2004, 2006, & 
2008). SSOCS surveys a nationally representative sample of about 3,500 public 
elementary and secondary schools (NCES, 2012). School principals from these roughly 
3,500 public schools were asked about the amount of crime and violence, disciplinary 
actions, prevention programs and policies, and other school characteristics, including 
some demographic variables (NCES, 2012). The SSOCS was administered in the spring 
of 1999-2000, 2003-04, 2005-06, 2007-08 school years (NCES, 2012). Three waves of 
data were used. Data from 1999-2000 was not used in this study because this wave of 
data did not have the variables of interest that are available in the other three waves 
(NCES, 2012). 
 The SSOCS data provides estimates of school crime, discipline, disorder, 
programs, policies, and the sociodemographic makeup of the schools (NCES, 2012). 
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Thus, these data enabled the researcher to investigate the utilization of various school 
practices as they relate to school security, crime prevention, disciplinary action, the 
frequency of particular crimes or infractions, and the frequency of incidents reported to 
law enforcement (NCES, 2012). Therefore, an empirical analysis of relevant variables 
permitted the researcher to identify whether there was an increased use of neoliberal 
social controls (e.g., enhanced surveillance, increased security, expulsion and suspension 
without continued educational services, more referrals to law enforcement for infractions, 
and the like) in schools over time. Additionally, the researcher was able to determine if 
these neoliberal social controls adversely affected marginal populations within schools 
over time. 
 Eight variables were used from the relevant waves of data. The percent minority 
student enrollment variable and crime where students live variable measured 
sociodemographic characteristics of the schools in the sample, and they were used to 
statistically test for racial and economic disparities. Four variables measure social control 
efforts that increase police presence and surveillance technologies in schools. These 
school security variables include: access controlled/monitored doors, students pass 
through metal detectors, security cameras monitor the school, and security used during 
school hours. The last two variables served as outcome variables that measured 
exclusionary school practices. These outcome variables are total number of disciplinary 
actions and total number of removals with no continued school services. 
 
Variables 
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 Percent Minority Student Enrollment. The racial/ethnic composition of the school 
was measured by the percentage of minority students.  The four categories include the 
following: 1= less than 5 percent, 2= 5 to 20 percent, 3= 20 to 50 percent, and 4= 50 
percent or more. 
 Crime Where Students Live. This ordinal variable measured the levels of crime 
reported in the areas where students attending the school live. The four categories 
included: 1= high level of crime, 2= moderate level of crime, 3= low level of crime, and 
4= students come from areas with very different levels of crime. 
 Access Controlled Locked/Monitored Doors. This variable is a measure of school 
security that documents whether or not access to school buildings are controlled, by being 
locked or monitored, during school hours.  
 Students Pass Through Metal Detectors. This school security variable measured 
whether or not students are required to pass through metal detectors upon entering school 
each day. 
 Security Cameras Monitor the School. This school security variable captured 
whether schools use one or more security cameras to monitor school buildings and 
grounds throughout the day. 
 Security Used During School Hours. This variable measured whether or not 
sworn law enforcement officers, security guards, or security personnel regularly used in 
or around the school at any time during school hours. 
 Total Number of Disciplinary Actions. This continuous variable measured how 
many total disciplinary actions were taken overall against students for all varieties of 
infractions. 
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 Total Number of Removals with No Continuing School Services. This continuous 
variable measured the total times administrative action was taken to expel or suspend a 
student for any infraction without permitting any educational services to be provided. All 
of these variables were consistently measured in 2003-04, 2005-06, and 2007-08. 
 A quantitative analysis of the available variables regarding the various forms of 
disciplinary actions taken, with or without continued educational services, in response to 
a variety of school-based infractions, was conducted to identify trends that might reflect 
the increased punitiveness in the social control of marginal populations within the 
education system during the recent neoliberal transition. These hypotheses are as follows:  
(H1)     Over time, the concern with school security will reflect an increased 
number of security measures in schools with a higher percentage of 
minority students. 
(H2)     Over time, disciplinary actions will show an increase in total disciplinary 
actions taken by the school administrators for schools with a higher 
percentage of minority students. 
(H3)     Over time, disciplinary removals, with no continued educational services, 
will be increasingly applied in schools with a higher percentage of 
minority students. 
(H4)     Over time, students living in areas with higher levels of crime will be 
more likely to attend schools with a higher percentage of minority 
students. 
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(H5)     Over time, disciplinary removals, without continued educational services, 
will be more likely to be applied in schools that have students living in 
areas with higher levels of crime. 
These proposed quantitative analyses are exploratory and descriptive in nature. The aim 
is to identify the nature of the relationships between the relevant variables and possibly 
understand how social controls are being applied in elementary and secondary schools in 
the US.  
Data Analytic Plan 
 In order to test the first hypothesis, four one-way ANOVAs, one for each of the 
three waves of school data were conducted. To clarify, the independent variable to be 
used in each of the four ANOVAs were the percentage of minority students and the four 
dependent variables were access controlled, students pass through metal detectors, 
security cameras used, and security used during school hours. Thus, a total of 12 
ANOVAS were run for hypothesis number one; four for each wave of data.  
For the second hypothesis, 3 one-way ANOVAs (i.e., one for each wave of data) 
were conducted, where the independent variable is the percentage of minority students 
and the dependent variable is the total number of disciplinary actions. The third 
hypothesis also required 3 one-way ANOVAS, where the independent variable remained 
as the percentage of minority students, but the dependent variable was the total number of 
removals with no continuing school services.  
Testing the fourth hypothesis required chi-square analyses (i.e., one for each wave 
of data) that used percentage of minority students and crime where students live as the 
variables of interests. The fifth hypothesis required 3 one-way ANOVAs (i.e., one for 
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each wave of data) to be conducted, where the independent variable was crime where 
students live and the dependent variable was the total number of removals with no 
continuing school services. 
 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and chi-square analyses were conducted using 
SPSS statistical software. Statistical significance was set at the .05 level. For the 
ANOVAs, Tukey and Games-Howell post-hoc tests were used to identify where the 
significant differences between groups are. Additionally, a test of homogeneity of 
variances was conducted for each ANOVA to assess the assumption that variances are 
homogenous. The Welch statistic was calculated to determine whether significant 
differences between groups are robust. Phi or Cramer’s V statistics were calculated for 
chi-square analyses to evaluate effect size of significant relationships. Also, Bonferroni 
adjustments were used in the crosstabulations to compare column proportions and 
subsequently adjust p values to identify the statistically significant relationships from the 
chi-square analyses. Finally, the means for all ANOVA calculations were plotted and 
graphed to visually depict any patterns or changes over time. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
 
 The qualitative data set, which consisted of 75 court decisions that met the 
relevant search criteria, was subjected to two levels of qualitative textual analysis, via the 
case law method, and a third overall thematic analysis. The dates of the court decisions 
ranged between the years of 1969 to 2012. There were forty-one U.S. District Court (DC) 
cases, fifteen U.S. Court of Appeals (CA) cases, twelve State Supreme Court (SSC) 
cases, and seven U.S. Supreme Court (SC) cases in the final sample. Appendix B 
includes a brief synopsis of all the court cases.  
 The first level of textual analysis identified terms, phrases, and passages that 
reflect the plain meaning from which the court’s jurisprudential intent can be unpacked 
(Arrigo et al., 2011). In other words, the text segments extracted from the judicial 
decisions, as guided by the research questions, reflect the factors that influence the 
attitudes, motivations, and rationales informing the courts’ decision making in zero 
tolerance cases where students have alleged that their constitutional rights have been 
violated. Tables 1.1A through 1.1O display key text segments and passages as derived 
from the plain meaning findings, which represent the responses to the eight research 
questions through which these legal decisions were filtered4. Explained differently, court 
                                                          
4 Data is available upon request. 
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cases that contained reference to specific elements mentioned in the research questions 
were acknowledged as either supporting or failing to support the appropriate research 
question. For instance, if a court decision reflected language that found the control of 
potential threats and disruptions deserved more weight when balanced against the 
potential intrusion into the individual rights of students, then that passage, or text 
segment, was categorized as support for research question number one.  
 Consistent with confirmability, any passages in the plain meaning results tables 
that are underlined represent text segments that fail to support the corresponding research 
question. Conversely, text segments, which are not underlined, represent support for the 
applicable research question. When qualitative data could not be ascertained for a 
research question, “No data” was listed in the table under the appropriate case. Data were 
presented in fifteen tables with five cases to a table in the order they appeared in the 
criterion-based sample search produced by LexisNexis.  
 Abbreviations (e.g., DC, CA, SSA, and SC) signifying court level of each case are 
also included in Tables 1.1A through 1.1O, as well as Tables 1.3A through 1.3E. For 
instance, the columns in these tables provide the name of the case followed by the 
decision date and court level in parentheses just like the following example: Stafford v. 
Redding (2009, SC). Thus, the column heading in this example means that the Stafford 
case was a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in 2009. 
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Table 1.1A. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 Stafford v. 
Redding (2009, 
SC) 
K.M. v. Sch. 
Bd. (2005, CA) 
S.G. v. 
Sayreville Bd. 
of Educ. 
(2003, CA) 
Cuesta v. Sch. 
Bd. (2002, CA) 
Ratner v. 
Loudoun (2001, 
CA) 
RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
Because there 
was no reasons 
to suspect the 
drugs presented 
a danger or were 
concealed in her 
underwear, we 
hold that the 
search did 
violate the 
Constitution (p. 
368). 
No data A school need 
not tolerate 
student speech 
that is 
inconsistent 
with its basic 
educational 
mission, even 
though the 
government 
could not 
censor similar 
speech outside 
the school (p. 
422). 
…it requires a 
balancing of the 
need for the 
particular search 
against the 
invasion of 
personal 
rights…officers 
had reasonable 
suspicion to 
search based 
upon the violent 
and threatening 
language…(p. 
968-969). 
Ratner’s 
complaint 
asserted that his 
suspension… 
amounted to 
violations of 
Ratner’s 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
rights… Having 
heard oral 
argument…we 
find no 
reversible error, 
and we 
affirm…(p. 142). 
RQ2 
Intent vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
No data No data No data No data …Ratner acted 
in what he saw 
as the girl’s best 
interest and that 
at no time did 
Ratner pose a 
threat to harm 
anyone with the 
knife… 
Nonetheless, 
Ratner was then 
suspended…(pp. 
141-142). 
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
The official who 
ordered the 
unconstitutional 
search is entitled 
to qualified 
immunity (p. 
368). 
No data In any event, 
defendants are 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity (p. 
423). 
…the school 
board cannot be 
held liable for 
any 
constitutional 
deprivation…(p. 
968). 
No data 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data  
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Table 1.1A Continued 
RQ5 
No 
Imminent 
Threat 
No data No data No data No data However harsh 
the result in this 
case, the federal 
courts are not 
properly called 
upon to judge 
the wisdom of a 
zero tolerance 
policy of the sort 
alleged to be in 
place…or of its 
application to 
Ratner (p. 142). 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding on 
the Courts 
Standards of 
conduct are for 
school 
administrators to 
determine 
without second-
guessing by the 
courts lacking 
the experience 
to appreciate 
what may be 
needed (p. 356). 
…the denial of 
his records 
could not be 
pursuant to a 
custom of 
delaying 
complete 
copies of 
records…that 
circumstance 
does not 
establish a 
custom (p. 
959). 
…the 
determination 
or what manner 
of speech is 
inappropriate 
properly rests 
with the school 
officials (p. 
423). 
Because we hold 
that the school 
board’s policy 
was not the 
moving force 
behind the arrest, 
there is no need 
for us to address 
whether § 836.11 
was “grossly and 
flagrantly 
unconstitutional” 
(p. 967). 
The district court 
also concluded, 
correctly, that 
the school 
officials gave 
Ratner 
constitutionally 
sufficient, even 
if imperfect, 
process in the 
various 
notices… and 
we agree (p. 
142). 
RQ7 
Rejection  
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevent 
Future 
Disruption 
No data No data It was not 
unreasonable 
for the 
principal to 
seek to avoid 
conduct which 
has the 
capacity to 
interfere with 
the orderly 
conduct of the 
school (p. 425). 
No data No data 
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Table 1.1B. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 Seal v. Morgan 
(2000, CA) 
West v. Derby 
Unified Sch. 
(2000, CA) 
Piekosz-
Murphy v. Bd. 
of Educ. (2012, 
DC) 
Ottaviano v. 
Kings Park 
(2010, DC) 
Evans v. Bd. of 
Educ. (2010, 
DC) 
RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
…what process 
is due depends 
on appropriate 
accommodation 
of the 
competing 
interests 
involved. In the 
context of 
disciplining 
public school 
students, the 
student’s 
interest is to 
avoid unfair or 
mistaken 
exclusion… 
Schools, of 
course, haven an 
unquestionably 
powerful 
interest in 
maintaining the 
safety of their 
campuses…That 
said, suspending 
or expelling a 
student for 
weapon 
possession even 
if the student 
did not 
knowingly 
possess any 
weapon, would 
not be rationally 
related to any 
legitimate state 
interest (p. 574-
575). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…where school 
authorities 
reasonably 
believe that a 
student’s 
uncontrolled 
exercise of 
expression 
might 
substantially 
interfere with 
the work of the 
school or 
impinge upon 
the rights of 
other students, 
they may forbid 
such expression 
(p. 1366). 
No data It is reasonable 
to conclude 
that the 
regulations 
require 
suspension for 
any drug use… 
while 
permitting 
suspension for 
drug use off 
school 
premises. 
Whatever may 
be the judge’s 
personal view 
as to the 
wisdom of its 
decision, the 
board acted on 
rational and 
specific 
grounds 
relevant to the 
education and 
welfare of the 
school 
children... (pp. 
32-33). 
No data 
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Table 1.1B continued 
RQ2 
Intent vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
We believe, 
however, that 
the board’s zero 
tolerance policy 
would surely be 
irrational if it 
subjects to 
punishment 
students who 
did not 
knowingly or 
consciously 
possess a 
weapon (p. 
578). 
…rejecting any 
notion that the 
Constitution 
requires a 
finding of an 
intent to harass 
or intimidate 
before the Derby 
School District 
may apply its 
Racial 
Harassment and 
Intimidation 
policy… (p. 
1363). 
N.M. 
nevertheless 
argues that the 
school’s 
disciplinary 
policy is 
arbitrary… 
because it does 
not require a 
scienter…Under 
these 
circumstances, 
the school’s 
discipline of 
N.M. does not 
shock the 
conscience (pp. 
960-961). 
No data No data 
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
Because we 
have concluded 
that 
Superintendent 
Morgan was 
entitled to 
summary 
judgment on the 
basis of 
qualified 
immunity, we 
need not and do 
not address the 
question… of 
whether he had 
the authority… 
(p. 581). 
No data No data No data …he failed to 
address the 
situation or take 
any remedial 
measures, and 
that he then 
retaliated 
against L.E. by 
suspending her 
when she was 
subject to forced 
sexual conduct. 
Therefore, 
Smathers is not 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity… (pp. 
32-33). 
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Table 1.1B Continued 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
No data 
 
School officials 
in Derby had 
evidence from 
which they 
could reasonably 
conclude that 
possession and 
display of 
Confederate flag 
images, when 
unconnected 
with any 
legitimate 
educational 
purpose, would 
likely lead to a 
material and 
substantial 
disruption of 
school discipline 
(pp. 1361-1362). 
It is not the role 
of the federal 
courts to set 
aside decisions 
of school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking a basis 
in wisdom or 
compassion (p. 
961). 
The system of 
public 
education that 
had 
evolved…relies 
necessarily 
upon the 
discretion and 
judgment of 
school 
administrators 
and school 
board members 
and section 
1983 was not 
intended to be 
a vehicle for 
federal court 
correction of 
errors in the 
exercise of that 
discretion… (p. 
25). 
No data  
RQ5 
No 
Imminent 
Threat 
No data 
 
No data No data …the plaintiff 
argues that 
there is no 
rational basis 
for her 
excessive 
punishment in 
light of her 
relatively 
minor alcohol 
related 
infraction… 
contrary to the 
plaintiff’s 
argument, the 
severity of the 
alcohol related 
transgression is 
not the 
underlying 
basis for the 
difference in 
punishment. 
Rather it is the 
perceived 
danger posed… 
(pp. 32-33). 
 
 
 
 
 
No data 
116 
 
Table 1.1B Continued 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding on 
Courts 
The fact that we 
must defer to 
the Board’s 
rational 
decisions in 
school 
discipline cases 
does not mean 
that we must, or 
should 
rationalize away 
its irrational 
decisions (p. 
579). 
T.W.’s argument 
is meritless…To 
impose in 
countless 
disciplinary 
suspensions a 
requirement that 
the suspect 
student possess a 
mens rea akin to 
criminal intent 
might well 
require trial-like 
procedures and 
proof which 
could 
overwhelm 
administrative 
facilities… (p. 
1364). 
It is not the role 
of the federal 
courts to set 
aside decisions 
of school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking a basis 
in wisdom or 
compassion…It 
seems that the 
professionals in 
this sad train of 
events exercised 
questionable 
judgment…But 
we can’t say 
what the 
defendant’s did 
violated the due 
process 
clauses... (p. 
961). 
…the Supreme 
Court has 
stated that 
federal courts 
are not 
authorized to 
construe school 
regulations… 
the court is 
sadly mindful 
of the 
collegiate 
opportunities 
that Nina may 
miss out on as 
a result of this 
situation. 
However… 
viewing it in 
the light most 
favorable to 
Nina, the court 
cannot 
conclude that 
she is likely to 
succeed… (pp. 
25-26 & pp. 
32-34). 
Section 1983 
does not extend 
the right to 
relitigate in 
federal court 
evidentiary 
questions 
arising in school 
disciplinary 
proceedings or 
the proper 
construction of 
school 
regulations. The 
system of public 
education that 
has evolved in 
this nation relies 
necessarily upon 
the discretion 
and judgment of 
school 
administrators… 
(p. 16). 
RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No data  
 
No data No data No data No data 
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Table 1.1B Continued 
RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevention 
of Future 
Disruption 
No data 
 
The history of 
racial tensions in 
the district made 
administrators’ 
and parents’ 
concerns about 
future 
substantial 
disruptions from 
possession of 
Confederate flag 
symbols at 
school 
reasonable…The 
district had the 
power to act to 
prevent 
problems before 
they occurred; it 
was not limited 
to prohibiting 
and punishing 
conduct only 
after it caused a 
disturbance (pp. 
1366-1367). 
No data No data No data 
 
Table 1.1C. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 Cuff v. Valley 
Cent. Sch. Dist. 
(2010, DC) 
Lee v. Lenape 
Valley Reg’l 
(2009, DC) 
Hardie v. 
Churchill (2009, 
DC) 
Doran v. 
Contoocook 
(2009, DC) 
Brett N. v. 
Cmty. Unit 
Sch. Dist. 
(2009, DC) 
 
RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
…Not only are 
school officials 
free to act before 
the actual 
disruption occurs, 
they are not 
required to 
predict disruption 
with absolute 
certainty to 
satisfy the 
Tinkers 
standard…the 
risk of substantial 
disruption is not 
only reasonable, 
but clear (pp. 
468-469). 
Defendants 
cannot shield 
themselves 
from liability 
by enacting 
anti-
discrimination 
policies if 
they do not 
follow 
them…There 
is also a 
question of 
fact as to 
whether 
defendants 
were willfully 
indifferent to  
…the court finds 
that the process 
used for Hardie’s 
expulsion 
proceedings 
struck the proper 
balance between 
administrative 
efficiency and 
protecting 
Hardie’s interest 
in attending 
school. The 
benefit of an 
additional hearing 
to ensure 
Hardie’s 
punishment was  
Reasonableness 
is the touchstone 
in any 
assessment of 
the 
constitutionality 
of a search or 
seizure, and 
while, in most 
cases, 
reasonableness 
demands a 
warrant and a 
showing of 
probable cause, 
such is not 
necessarily the 
case in the  
The parties 
agree that the 
zero tolerance 
policy does not 
create a suspect 
class…the 
policy aims to 
minimize 
violence by 
deterring 
students from 
escalating 
fights, even if 
merely in self-
defense… 
Here, Section 
7:190 is not 
impermissibly 
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Table 1.1C Continued 
  harassment of 
E.L. (p. 21). 
just was 
outweighed by 
the cost imposed 
on the limited 
resources of the 
school board (pp. 
19-20). 
public school 
context… 
searches and 
seizures in 
public schools 
can be 
conducted 
without warrant 
or probable 
cause (p. 191). 
Plaintiffs argue 
that the New 
Hampshire 
Constitution is 
more 
protective…wit
h respect to 
searches and 
seizures… 
plaintiffs 
deserve a full 
and fair hearing 
on this issue, 
and because the 
state court is 
better equipped 
to interpret…the 
case shall be 
remanded (pp. 
194-195). 
 
 
 
 
vague because 
the disciplinary 
code is 
publically 
available and 
all students are 
put on notice 
that if they 
fight, even in 
self-defense, 
they are subject 
to punishment. 
(pp.8-12). 
RQ2 
Intent vs. 
Balance 
of Intent 
vs. Safety 
Under Tinker, it 
is the objective 
reasonableness of 
the school 
administrators’ 
response, rather 
than the student’s 
private intentions, 
that are 
relevant…Finally
, whether or not 
B.C. had the 
capacity to blow 
up the school, or 
was at all likely 
to do so, is not 
dispositive, and 
indeed has only 
minimal 
relevance(p. 469). 
 
No data Hardie admitted 
to bring the knife 
onto the bus, 
albeit by accident. 
His intent did not 
matter, however, 
because the 
disciplinary 
policy followed 
by his high school 
treats possession 
of a weapon as a 
strict liability 
offense that 
results in either a 
mandatory 
suspension or 
expulsion (p. 17). 
No data  No data 
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Table 1.1C Continued 
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
School 
administrators 
must be permitted 
to react quickly 
and decisively to 
address a threat 
of physical 
violence against 
their students, 
without worrying 
that they will 
have to face years 
of litigation 
second-guessing 
their judgment as 
to whether the 
threat posed a 
real risk of 
substantial 
disturbance (p. 
470). 
Whether Mr. 
deMarrais 
qualifies for 
immunity is a 
triable issue 
because there 
exists 
questions of 
fact as to 
whether Mr. 
deMarrais’ 
failure to 
comply with 
board policy 
rises to the 
level of a 
knowing 
violation of a 
right… (pp. 
27-28). 
Plaintiff argues 
that the 
municipality 
should be liable 
for the board’s 
violation of 
Hardie’s due 
process right due 
to failure to train 
or adequately 
supervise school 
district 
personnel…the 
court dismisses 
this claim (p. 20). 
No data Public officials 
may have 
qualified 
immunity if 
their conduct 
does not violate 
clearly 
established 
statutory or 
constitutional 
rights of which 
a reasonable 
person would 
have known… 
Here, the 
individual 
defendants are 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity… (p. 
13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
 
Under this 
standard, 
defendants need 
not prove that 
school 
administrators’ 
initially-stated 
justifications for 
punishment fully 
incorporate all the 
objective facts 
that could support 
a likelihood of 
substantial 
disruption, and 
they need not 
demonstrate that 
substantial 
disruption was 
inevitable… (p. 
468). 
No data While there is a 
colorable 
argument that this 
constituted a 
departure from 
the applicable 
administrative 
regulations, the 
failure to follow 
state or local 
regulations does 
not ordinarily 
establish a 
procedural due 
process 
violation…While 
Hardie received a 
severe 
punishment for 
what may have 
been an innocent  
…Plaintiffs 
complain that 
Dell’s orders 
instructing the 
students to leave 
their personal 
belongings 
inside the 
building resulted 
in an improper 
seizure. I am 
unpersuaded by 
plaintiff’s 
argument. 
Again, the 
school setting is 
crucial to the 
analysis. 
Students are 
often restricted 
in what items  
The court notes 
that while it is 
within the 
power board to 
devise and 
implement a 
policy to check 
violence in 
schools, the 
results of 
enforcement of 
Section 7:190 
can be 
draconian when 
applied to the 
student who 
unwittingly 
finds himself 
under attack by 
a schoolyard 
bully…If the  
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Table 1.1C Continued 
   mistake, CCHS 
school 
administrators 
likely adopted 
their zero 
tolerance policy 
as a result of a 
rising tide of 
violence in our 
public schools (p. 
14 & pp. 19-20). 
they can bring to 
school and 
where they can 
leave those 
items. 
Accordingly I 
reject plaintiff’s 
contention… (p. 
194). 
student-victim 
cannot flee, his 
choice is either 
be pummeled, 
or to fight back 
and face certain 
suspension. 
Despite this 
observation, it 
is not the role 
of the court to 
second-guess 
the board’s 
policy, however 
misguided it 
may be, so long 
as it is 
rationally 
related to the 
interests sought 
to be protected 
(p. 11). 
RQ5  
No 
Imminent 
Threat 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding 
on Courts 
Although 
plaintiffs seek to 
second-guess 
with hindsight the 
judgment of 
school 
administrators, 
that is not the role 
of the courts…It 
is not the role of 
the federal courts 
to set aside 
decisions of 
school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking a basis in 
wisdom or 
compassion (pp. 
469-470). 
No data …a school 
administrator 
involved with 
initiating charges 
may participate in 
the deliberations, 
reasoning that 
due process 
requires an 
impartial 
decisionmaker 
but not a full 
adversarial 
process…grantin
g Hardie another 
opportunity to 
address the board 
would do nothing 
to mitigate the 
risk of an 
erroneous 
deprivation… 
(pp. 14-15 & p. 
18). 
The traditional 
understanding of 
what constitutes 
a seizure-that a 
reasonable 
person would 
have believed 
that he was not 
free to leave-is 
analytically 
inapplicable to 
the school 
setting, because 
students are 
generally not at 
liberty to leave 
the school 
building when 
they wish… 
Unemancipated 
minors lack 
some of the 
most 
fundamental 
rights of self-
determination-
including the  
 
The Seventh 
Circuit has held 
that the right to 
self-defense is 
not a 
fundamental 
right within the 
Due Process 
Clause of the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment…i
t is not the role 
of the court to 
second-guess 
the board’s 
policy, however 
misguided it 
may be, so long 
as it is 
rationally 
related to the 
interests sought 
to be protected 
(pp. 8-11). 
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    right to come 
and go at will… 
(p. 193). 
 
RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alterna-
tive 
Sanctions 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ8 
Preemp-
tive 
Preven-
tion of 
Future 
Disrup-
tion 
defendants need 
not prove that 
school 
administrators’ 
initially-stated 
justifications for 
punishment fully 
incorporate all the 
objective facts 
that could support 
a likelihood of 
substantial 
disruption, and 
they need not 
demonstrate that 
substantial 
disruption was 
inevitable… Such 
a rule is not 
required by 
Tinker, and 
would be 
disastrous public 
policy: requiring 
school officials to 
wait until 
disruption 
actually occurred 
before 
investigating 
would cripple the 
officials’ ability 
to maintain order 
(pp. 468-469). 
No data No data No data …the ultimate 
purpose of the 
board’s zero-
tolerance policy 
is to maintain a 
peaceful and 
orderly 
environment in 
the schools. 
Specifically, 
the policy aims 
to minimize 
violence by 
deterring 
students from 
escalating 
fights, even if 
merely in self-
defense… 
Consequently, 
the court finds 
that Section 
7:190 is 
rationally 
related to a 
legitimate 
government 
interest (pp. 10-
11). 
 
Table 1.1D. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 Barnett v. 
Tipton County 
(2009, DC) 
Griffin v. 
Crossett Sch. 
(2008, DC) 
Hill v. Sharber 
(2008, DC) 
Simonian v. 
Fowler 
Unified (2008, 
DC) 
Morgan v. 
Snider High 
(2007, DC) 
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RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
…the court 
cannot find that 
plaintiffs’ 
websites are 
protected as 
parodies under 
the First 
Amendment…in 
school discipline 
cases a 
substantive due 
process claim 
will succeed 
only in the rare 
case when there 
is no rational 
relationship 
between the 
punishment and 
the offense…the 
court finds the 
disciplinary 
proceedings did 
not violate the 
plaintiffs’ 
substantive due 
process rights (p. 
985). 
No data The Supreme 
Court has held 
that the 
substantial need 
of teachers and 
administrators 
for freedom to 
maintain order in 
the schools does 
not require strict 
adherence to the 
requirement that 
searches be 
based on 
probable 
cause…The 
Sixth Circuit has 
also noted that, 
in the case of 
searches in the 
school context, 
individualized 
suspicion is not 
necessarily 
required (pp. 
676-677). 
No data The 
accommodation 
of the privacy 
interests of 
school children 
with the 
substantial need 
of teachers and 
administrators 
for freedom to 
maintain order 
in the schools 
does not require 
strict adherence 
to the 
requirement that 
searches be 
based on 
probable cause 
(p. 15)…In the 
context of 
school rules, 
flexibility or 
breadth should 
not necessarily 
be confused for 
vagueness… 
Given the 
peculiar issues 
facing school 
administrators, a 
school’s 
disciplinary 
rules need not 
be drafted as 
narrowly or with 
the same 
precision as 
criminal statutes 
(p. 21). 
RQ2  
Intent vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
No data 
 
No data Although the 
Sixth Circuit has 
warned schools 
against applying 
zero-tolerance 
policies blindly 
where a student 
has no 
knowledge that 
he possesses 
contraband, such 
was not the case 
here, as Hill 
acknowledged  
No data The thrust of 
Kevin’s 
argument at the 
hearing was that 
by the time he 
realized “A” had 
marijuana, he 
was on a busy 
street, close to 
school, and he 
did not have a 
reasonable 
opportunity to 
eject “A” from  
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   that the alcohol 
contained in the 
car was his  (p. 
682). 
 
 
 the car until they 
were on school 
grounds and 
safely out of 
traffic…he 
believed he was 
doing the right 
thing…Platz 
rendered her 
determination… 
that Kevin 
knowingly 
drove a student 
that was in 
possession of 
marijuana onto 
school property 
(pp. 7-8). 
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
Under the 
TGTLA, all 
government 
entities are 
immune from 
suit for any 
injury which 
stems from the 
exercise of 
governmental 
functions, except 
as specifically 
provided by the 
act (p. 986). 
No data …there is no 
need to address 
the defendants’ 
arguments that 
the claims 
against Deputy 
Booker and Ryan 
are barred under 
the qualified 
immunity 
doctrine, and that 
the official 
capacity claims 
against all four 
defendants fail 
because Hill has 
not established 
governmental 
entity liability 
under Section 
1983 (p. 681). 
No data Simmons and 
Bailey are not 
liable for any 
purported 
constitutional 
violations 
arising from the 
vehicle searches 
(pp. 14-
15)…even if the 
court somehow 
found a 
constitutional 
violation, the 
case law 
probably 
reassured the 
defendants that 
they were on 
solid legal 
footing, and thus 
they are entitled 
to qualified 
immunity (p. 
28). 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
No data 
 
No data No data No data In the context of 
school rules, 
flexibility or 
breadth should 
not necessarily 
be confused for 
vagueness… 
Given the 
peculiar issues 
facing school 
administrators, a 
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     school’s 
disciplinary 
rules need not 
be drafted as 
narrowly or with 
the same 
precision as 
criminal statutes 
(p.21). 
RQ5  
No 
Imminent 
Threat 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding on 
Courts 
District courts of 
Tennessee 
frequently have 
held they do not 
have jurisdiction 
over claims 
under the 
TGTLA…Thus, 
because the 
court declines to 
exercise 
jurisdiction over 
these claims and 
because 
plaintiffs have 
not put forth any 
evidence to 
support them, 
plaintiffs’ claims 
under the 
TGTLA are 
dismissed (p. 
986). 
Here, the 
school district’s 
discipline of 
both Willie and 
Jacob was 
controlled by 
the decisions of 
their respective 
504 
committees. 
Willie’s 
committee 
found that his 
behavior was 
not a 
manifestation 
of his 
disability… 
Jacob’s 504 
committee, 
however, found 
that his 
behavior was a 
manifestation 
of his behavior. 
There exists a 
rational basis 
for the district’s 
dissimilar 
treatment of 
these two 
students…they 
have presented 
no evidence 
showing that 
the decision of 
either 
committee was 
affected by 
racial  
 
…the Sixth 
Circuit has held 
that law 
enforcement 
officers may 
sweep a parking 
lot with drug 
dogs without 
implicating the 
Fourth 
Amendment, as 
individuals do 
not have a 
reasonable 
expectation of 
privacy in a 
parking lot that is 
accessible to the 
public…although 
the search was 
not conducted by 
school officials, 
there does not 
appear to be any 
basis for Hill’s 
assertion that the 
school is 
prevented from 
taking 
disciplinary 
action simply 
because the 
misconduct was 
discovered by 
law enforcement 
in the process of 
conducting a 
legal search (pp. 
679-681). 
Plaintiff’s 
contention that 
he was the 
only pupil at 
Fowler High 
School who 
was expelled 
for the mere 
suspicion of 
possessing 
marijuana has 
no evidentiary 
support other 
than plaintiff’s 
conclusory 
declaration… 
Even if 
plaintiff could 
prove 
plaintiff’s 
assignment to 
alternate 
education was 
unsupported, 
there is no 
evidence 
plaintiff was 
treated 
differently 
from any other 
student with 
possession of 
marijuana (pp. 
45-46). 
It is not the role 
of federal courts 
to set aside the 
decisions of 
school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking a basis 
in wisdom or 
compassion. 
The Seventh 
Circuit of 
Appeals also has 
stressed that 
federal courts 
ought to refrain 
from second-
guessing the 
disciplinary 
decisions made 
by school 
administrators 
(p. 13)… 
The role of the 
courts is not to 
second-guess 
the decisions of 
school 
administrators 
(pp. 23-24). 
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  discriminatory 
intent…mere 
allegation is not 
enough (pp. 14-
15). 
   
RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevention 
of Future 
Disruption 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
 
Table 1.1E. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 Roy v. Fulton 
County Sch. 
(2007, DC) 
Bogle-Assegai 
v. Bloomfield 
(2006, DC) 
Langley v. 
Monroe 
County (2006, 
DC) 
Vann v. Stewart 
(2006, DC) 
McKinley v. Lott 
(2005, DC) 
 
 
RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
…plaintiffs 
claim that 
defendants 
violated Mark’s 
constitutional 
right to equal 
protection by: 1) 
treating Mark, 
who is black, 
differently from 
a white student 
who was also 
allegedly 
involved in the 
MP3 theft; and 
2) applying the 
zero tolerance 
policy to black 
students but not 
to white 
students…These 
allegations are 
sufficient to state 
a claim for 
violation of 
Mark’s right to 
equal protection 
of the law…the  
Plaintiffs were 
provided 
notice of the 
expulsion 
hearing, given 
the opportunity 
to be 
represented by 
counsel (which 
they were) and 
given a full-
blown hearing 
(p. 243)... 
Presentation of 
summaries of 
student witness 
statements at 
hearing where 
witnesses were 
not present and 
plaintiff thus 
had no 
opportunity to 
cross-examine 
them did not 
undermine 
sufficiency of 
process  
No data The court cannot 
conclude that 
the punishment 
imposed by 
school officials 
in this case bore 
no rational 
relationship to 
plaintiff’s 
offense. Stat 
authorities have 
expressed a 
legitimate 
interest in 
maintaining safe 
and secure 
learning 
environments… 
officials adopted 
a zero tolerance 
policy that 
includes a one 
year suspension 
for violations. 
Plaintiff admits 
that he 
possessed a 
pocket knife in  
When society 
requires large 
groups of 
students, too 
young to be 
considered 
capable of 
mature restraint 
in their use of 
illegal 
substances or 
dangerous 
instrumentalities, 
it assumes a duty 
to protect them 
from dangers 
pose by 
antisocial 
activities…and 
to provide them 
with an 
environment in 
which education 
is possible… To 
fulfill that duty, 
teachers and 
school 
administrators 
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 motion to 
dismiss 
plaintiffs’ equal 
protection claim 
is denied (p. 
1323). 
…however, the 
process that is 
due when a 
student is 
suspended for 
less than ten 
days is 
extremely 
limited… (p. 
1323). 
afforded… 
Including 
reading or 
reciting 
statements 
made by 
teachers in 
response to his 
inquiries, was 
not violative of 
due process (p. 
243). 
 violation…even 
considering 
plaintiff’s 
contention that 
the school 
officials’ action 
might have been 
harsh or unwise 
in view of the 
circumstances, 
the decision was 
not so flawed 
that it bore no 
rational 
relationship to 
plaintiff’s 
offense (p. 890). 
must have broad 
supervisory and 
disciplinary 
powers (pp. 13-
14). 
RQ2  
Intent vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
No data 
 
No data …there is no 
requirement in 
the school 
handbook that 
a student must 
knowingly 
possess alcohol 
to be subject to 
the penalties 
therein (p. 
10)… 
In light of the 
fact that the 
plaintiffs have 
presented 
evidence to 
indicate that 
the principal 
and vice-
principal did 
not believe that 
Laura knew the 
beer can was in 
the vehicle, 
and the fact 
that the MCSD 
has not 
produced a 
policy 
outlining the 
time period 
that a student 
should be sent 
to alternative 
school, this 
court finds that 
there is a  
 
No data Mr. McKinley 
became confused 
about the 
question that Dr. 
Lott asked him. 
He responded 
yes to a question 
of whether he 
had been 
smoking. 
However, he 
believed that Dr. 
Lott was asking 
him whether he 
had ever smoked 
marijuana in the 
past and not 
whether he had 
smoked 
marijuana that 
morning before 
school. Dr. Lott 
and Officer 
Suttles both 
understood Mr. 
McKinley to 
acknowledge and 
admit that he had 
smoked 
marijuana…Mr. 
McKinly was 
then informed he 
was being 
arrested… (pp. 
3-5). 
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   sufficient jury 
question as to 
whether 
Laura's penalty 
was rationally 
related to the 
school boards 
interests (pp. 
11-12). 
  
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
The gist of the 
plaintiffs’ 
allegations is 
that school 
officials 
breached various 
express policies 
designed to 
protect students’ 
constitutional 
rights. Assuming 
that is true, the 
school district is 
not liable for its 
employee’s 
breach of 
admittedly 
constitutional 
express policies 
(p. 1321). 
In light of the 
court’s 
dismissal of 
plaintiffs’ 
claims for the 
reasons 
detailed above, 
the court need 
not reach 
defendants’’ 
arguments 
concerning 
qualified 
immunity (p. 
244). 
No data No data However, a 
municipality 
may not be held 
liable under 
Section 1983 
under a theory of 
respondent 
superior (pp. 9-
10). 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ5 No 
Imminent 
Threat 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding on 
Courts 
No data 
 
No data … in a 
situation where 
the attorneys 
moderated the 
hearing, ruled 
on objections 
and procedural 
matters, and 
retired with the 
Board of 
Trustees to 
deliberate, 
there are no 
grounds for 
complaint 
unless it can be 
shown in fact  
Assuming, 
arguendo, the 
DHA and school 
board applied 
the improper 
standard when 
considering 
plaintiff’s case, 
the court cannot 
conclude that 
such a failure 
was so 
significant or 
substantial that 
it could result in 
unfair or 
mistaken  
Federal courts 
have determined 
that a violation 
of the Fifth 
Amendment 
privilege against 
self-
incrimination 
only occurs 
when an 
incriminatory 
statement that is 
obtained 
unlawfully is 
introduced at 
trial…he never 
faced a criminal  
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   that the 
attorney did 
corrupt or 
otherwise 
destroy the 
impartiality of 
the process. 
While this 
court is 
concerned 
about the 
method in 
which the 
board 
deliberations 
occurred, the 
plaintiffs have 
made no 
showing of 
actual 
corruption (pp. 
8-10). 
…there is 
enough 
evidence to 
present a jury 
question as to 
mental anxiety 
and stress 
suffered by 
Laura (p. 13). 
findings or 
misconduct or 
an arbitrary 
exclusion from 
school (p. 
889)…the right 
to attend public 
school, however, 
is not a 
fundamental 
right or liberty 
interest…it is 
not the role of 
the courts to set 
aside decisions 
of school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking a basis 
in wisdom or 
compassion (p. 
890). 
proceeding…For 
this reason, the 
court will 
dismiss Mr. 
McKinley’s Fifth 
Amendment 
claim (pp. 23-
25). 
RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevention 
of Future 
Disruption 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
 
Table 1.1F. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 Posthumus v. 
Bd. of Educ. 
(2005, DC) 
Collins v. 
Prince 
William 
County (2004, 
DC) 
 
 
Sypniewski v. 
Warren Hills 
(2001, DC) 
Anderson v. 
Milbank Sch. 
(2000, DC) 
D.G. v. 
Independent 
(2000, DC) 
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RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
The right to 
attend public 
school is not a 
fundamental 
right for the 
purposes of due 
process 
analysis. When 
a fundamental 
right is not at 
issue, the 
government’s 
action must be 
upheld if it is 
rationally 
related to a 
legitimate state 
interest (p. 
899)…because 
the 
constitutional 
rights of 
students in 
public school 
are not 
automatically 
coextensive 
with the rights 
of adults in 
other settings, 
school officials 
may limit 
speech in 
schools in ways 
that the 
government 
could not do 
outside the  
A school 
board’s ability 
to discipline 
students for 
offenses 
occurring off 
school grounds 
has been 
upheld by the 
vast majority 
of courts as a 
reasonable  
exercise of the 
board’s general 
authority over 
the conduct of 
its students and 
duty to ensure 
the safety of its 
schools, 
provided that 
the offense has 
a material 
effect on the 
operation or 
general welfare 
of the school 
(pp. 21-22)… 
they may 
subject pupils 
to punishment 
for acts 
committed 
away from 
school 
property and 
outside of 
school hours  
Regardless of 
whether, in the 
abstract, the 
Foxworthy T-
shirt may be 
banned, moving 
plaintiffs have 
established a 
reasonable 
probability of 
success as to the 
constitutionality 
inappropriate 
overbreadth and 
vagueness of the 
specific 
provisions of the 
dress code and 
racial harassment 
or intimidation 
policy…Schools, 
however, must 
consider the 
sensibilities of 
other students, 
and the freedom 
to express 
unpopular 
opinions must be 
balanced against 
the interest in 
teaching students 
the limitations of 
socially 
appropriate 
behavior…the 
rights of public 
school students  
The student was 
talking to 
herself in an 
office setting 
with only one 
other person 
present. The 
better course of 
valor may well 
have been for 
the secretary to 
have strongly 
reminded the 
student of the 
rule…the 
conduct was 
certainly not 
disruptive…the 
violation was 
perhaps too 
much to do 
about relatively 
little. Having 
said all of this, 
however, the 
rule was 
clear…the 
student, without 
dispute, violated 
the rule…the 
rule was a zero 
tolerance rule… 
constitutional 
rights of public 
school students 
are not 
automatically 
coextensive with  
It is impossible 
to have a “no 
tolerance” 
policy against 
“threats” if the 
threats involve 
speech. A 
student cannot 
be penalized for 
what they are 
thinking. If 
those thoughts 
are then 
expressed in 
speech, the 
ability of the 
school to censor 
or punish the 
speech will be 
determined by 
whether it was 
(1) a “true” or 
“genuine” 
threat, or (2) 
disruptive of 
the normal 
operation of the 
school. Neither 
of those 
circumstances 
exist in the case 
before the 
court. In sum, 
the court finds 
that any 
commotion 
caused by the 
poem did not  
 school context 
(p. 900). 
which are 
detrimental to 
the interests of 
the school or 
adversely 
affect school 
discipline (pp. 
23-24). 
are also not 
necessarily as 
expansive as the 
rights of adults 
in society…the 
school bears the 
responsibility for 
determining the 
manner of 
speech 
appropriate in a 
school (pp. 52-
59). 
the rights of 
adults…a school 
need not tolerate 
speech that is 
inconsistent 
with its 
pedagogical 
mission, even 
though the 
government 
could not 
suppress that 
speech outside 
of the 
schoolhouse… 
schools must  
 
rise to the level 
of a substantial 
disruption 
required to 
justify a 
suspension of 
the plaintiff (pp. 
15-16). 
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    teach by 
example the 
shared values of 
a civilized social 
order…These 
shared values 
include 
discipline, 
courtesy, and 
respect for 
authority… 
civility is a 
legitimate 
pedagogical 
concern…so, 
too, is 
compliance with 
school rules (p. 
686). 
 
RQ2  
Intent vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
No data The facts 
indicated that 
Collins was not 
replicating a 
chemistry 
experiment and 
knew, or 
should have 
known, that by 
teaching fellow 
PWCPS 
students how 
to explode 
bottle 
bombs…his 
conduct was 
likely to cause 
a disruption so 
significant that 
it would 
impact the 
school division 
(p. 34). 
The court need 
not and does not 
decide the 
specific role of 
student 
motivation and 
intent in cases of 
the regulation of 
speech (p. 76). 
No data As far as her 
intent is 
concerned, the 
defendants 
admit that 
student did not 
write the poem 
as a genuine 
threat, nor was 
it written with 
the intent of 
putting teacher 
or any other 
teacher in fear. 
In addition, the 
psychologist 
who examined 
student does not 
believe student 
intended the 
poem as a 
genuine threat, 
but rather only 
as a way to 
express her 
frustration and 
anger with 
teacher (pp. 13-
14). 
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RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
The court finds 
it unnecessary 
to address all of 
defendants’ 
arguments 
because it 
concludes that 
Posthumus’ 
claims fail at the 
preliminary 
stage of the 
qualified 
immunity 
analysis…the 
court finds no 
valid 
claim…the 
court need not 
reach the issue 
of qualified 
immunity (p. 
897). 
The school 
officials had 
qualified 
immunity as it 
was not clearly 
established that 
they could not 
recommend 
expulsion for a 
student’s 
unlawful 
activity 
occurring off 
school grounds 
(p. 1). The 
school board 
cannot be held 
liable for the 
decision to 
expel 
Collins… 
protected by 
the qualified 
immunity 
doctrine (pp. 
34-37). 
No data No data No data 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
In examining a 
school’s interest 
in prohibiting 
lewd or vulgar 
speech, the 
court noted that 
while students 
have an interest 
in expressing 
unpopular and 
controversial 
views, schools 
have a 
countervailing 
interest in 
teaching 
students the 
boundaries of 
socially 
appropriate 
behavior (p. 
900)… 
Posthumus’ 
argument 
cannot be 
sustained 
because his 
statement was  
 
No data While ensuring 
that 
reasonableness is 
honored, a court 
should generally 
defer to the 
limitations of 
vulgarity defined 
by the local 
school board (pp. 
70-71). 
No data No data 
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 insubordinate 
speech… (p. 
901). 
    
RQ5 No 
Imminent 
Threat 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding on 
Courts 
Fraser teaches 
that judgments 
regarding what 
speech is 
appropriate in 
school matters 
should be left to 
the schools 
rather than the 
courts. A school 
is entitled to 
make the point 
to pupils that 
vulgar speech 
and lewd 
conduct is 
wholly 
inconsistent 
with the 
fundamental 
values of public 
school 
education (p. 
901)… School 
disciplinary 
rules need not 
be as detailed as 
a criminal code 
(p. 903). 
No data No data Finally, the 
education of the 
nation’s youth is 
primarily the 
responsibility of 
parents, 
teachers, and 
state and local 
school officials, 
and not of 
federal 
judges…This 
case, although it 
presents matters 
of some concern 
to the court, as 
already 
expressed, is an 
appropriate case 
for summary 
judgment (p. 
689). 
No data 
RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevention 
of Future 
Disruption 
No data 
 
No data While these 
restrictions 
impose real 
constraints on a 
school’s ability 
to regulate 
student speech, a 
school is not 
completely 
without the 
means to ensure 
the existence of a  
However, 
school officials 
may restrict 
even individual 
student 
expression that 
materially and 
substantially 
interferes with 
the requirements 
of appropriate 
discipline in the  
 
No data 
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   safe and 
productive 
learning 
environment, 
even under the 
Tinker 
substantial 
disruption test. 
In fact, a school 
may prohibit or 
punish student 
speech based on 
a specific fear of 
disruption (p. 
63). 
operation of the 
school, or that 
would 
substantially 
interfere with 
the work of the 
school or 
impinge upon 
the rights of 
other students 
(p. 687). 
 
 
Table 1.1G. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 Hammock v. 
Keys (2000, DC) 
Colvin v. 
Lowndes 
County (2000, 
DC) 
James P. v. 
Lemahieu 
(2000, DC) 
Fuller v. 
Decatur Pub. 
(2000, DC) 
Doe v. Bd. of 
Educ. (1995, 
DC) 
RQ1 
Threat 
vs. 
Individ-
ual 
Rights 
The purpose in 
this case, 
ensuring that 
schools are drug-
free, is certainly 
a legitimate 
purpose. In fact, 
the Alabama 
legislature finds 
that this purpose 
is “a compelling 
public interest”… 
suspension and 
expulsion of a 
student found to 
be in possession 
of a drug, even if 
“possession” is 
interpreted by 
school officials 
to mean being 
found in a 
vehicle or locker, 
is rationally 
related to that 
purpose. While 
such an 
interpretation 
may be severe, it  
These zero-
tolerance 
policies provide 
for immediate 
suspension or 
expulsion of 
students that 
possess weapons 
or drugs on 
school grounds. 
In general, a 
student found 
carrying a 
weapon, such as 
a gun or knife, 
on school 
property is given 
no second 
chance, no 
appeal, and no 
guarantee of 
alternative 
school programs 
or education… 
School boards of 
this and other 
states and of 
their aim to 
create a school 
environment  
Unlike the right 
to public 
education and 
liberty of 
reputation, 
however, a 
student has no 
constitutional 
right to 
participate in 
school athletic 
or social 
activities… 
Therefore, if 
Robert P. was 
punished under 
the authority of 
the athletic 
department’s 
rules, it is very 
unlikely that 
plaintiffs will 
prevail on the 
merits of their 
claim (p. 
1119)… the 
purposes of Act 
90 is to keep 
alcohol and its 
use out of the  
If the school 
board had failed 
to take action 
against these 
students or 
otherwise 
ignored their 
conduct at the 
game, the 
students who 
were not 
involved in the 
fight, as well as 
the citizens of 
Decatur, might 
be led to believe 
that the school 
board was 
unable to 
control conduct 
in schools. It is 
also important  
to recognize that 
the Seventh 
Circuit Court of 
Appeals 
recently noted 
that the 
Supreme Court 
has repeatedly  
It is not disputed 
that Doe 
received both 
notice and a 
formal hearing 
as to the 
disciplinary 
action being 
considered 
against him. At 
that hearing, 
which lasted five 
hours, Doe was 
represented by 
counsel and had 
both the 
opportunity to 
present and 
cross-examine 
witnesses. As a 
matter of law, 
therefore, OPRF 
argues that Doe 
was afforded all 
the protections 
which due 
process requires 
(pp. 11-12)… 
The board’s 
failure to make  
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 is not 
unconstitutionall
y arbitrary or 
unreasonable… 
Given a school’s 
need to be able to 
impose 
disciplinary 
sanction for a 
wide range of 
unanticipated 
conduct 
disruptive of the 
educational 
process, school 
disciplinary rules 
need not be as 
detailed as a 
criminal code 
which imposes 
criminal 
sanctions (pp. 
1230-1232) 
conducive to 
learning, by 
eliminating fear 
of crime and 
violence, such 
efforts must be 
balanced with 
the 
constitutional 
guarantees 
afforded to the 
children (p. 
506)… To be 
sure, the court is 
not offended by 
the school 
board’s decision 
to overrule the 
hearing officer’s 
recommendation
, clearly it had 
the authority to 
do so. The court 
is, however, 
offended by the 
manner in which 
it blindly meted 
out the student’s 
punishment… 
The district’s 
zero-tolerance 
policy requires 
that the board 
impose the same 
penalty 
regardless of 
circumstances… 
(p. 513). 
schools by 
suspending 
students who 
possess alcohol 
while attending 
school. Since 
this is not a 
suspect class, 
there is no other 
evidence that 
any other 
classification 
was used to 
punish Robert 
(p. 1121)… 
since it would 
be 
fundamentally 
unfair to punish 
someone for 
some 
wrongdoing that 
he did not 
commit, a 
disciplinary 
body must have 
evidence of a 
statutory 
violation by an 
individual 
before it may 
punish that 
individual… 
Robert did not 
possess 
intoxicating 
liquor…while 
attending school 
even if he did 
drink liquor 
prior to the 
school event ( p. 
1120). 
emphasized the 
need for 
affirming the 
comprehensive 
authority of the 
states and of 
school officials, 
consistent with 
fundamental 
constitutional 
safeguards, to 
prescribe and 
control conduct 
in the schools 
(p. 815)… The 
court first 
concludes that 
each student 
received notice 
of a hearing 
before an 
independent 
hearing officer 
and before the 
school 
board…each 
student received 
a separate 
hearing before a 
hearing 
officer… 
accordingly, 
this court 
concludes that 
the students’ 
procedural due 
process rights 
were not 
violated (p. 
815). 
specific findings 
as to any 
possible 
mitigating 
circumstances in 
Doe’s case 
likewise does not 
violate the 
plaintiff’s 
rights…Althoug
h such a 
punishment 
might appear to 
be harsh under 
the given 
circumstances, 
the decision 
properly 
remained within 
the province of 
the board (pp. 
13-14). 
RQ2 
Intent 
vs. 
Balance 
of 
Intent 
vs. 
Safety 
 
 
 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
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RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liabi-
lity 
No data 
 
No data 
 
No data 
 
No data 
 
No data 
 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
Indeed, courts 
staunchly resist 
the suggestion 
that school 
discipline 
hearings should 
emulate criminal 
trials (p. 1229)… 
the court notes 
that the system of 
public 
education… 
relies necessarily 
upon the 
discretion of 
school 
administrators 
and school board 
members… 
Vesting a school 
official with the 
discretion to 
determine which 
situations warrant 
expulsion is not 
only necessary in 
order to maintain 
discipline and 
good order, it is 
desirable (pp. 
1232-1233). 
While the court 
is fully aware 
that school 
disciplinary 
matters are best 
resolved in the 
local community 
and within the 
institutional 
framework of 
the school 
system, the court 
is of the opinion 
that the board 
employed an 
erroneous 
standard in 
considering 
Jonathan’s case 
(p. 513). 
No data No data No data 
RQ5  
No 
Immin-
ent 
Threat 
No data 
 
No data First, there is a 
legitimate 
possibility of 
irreparable harm 
that could result 
from not 
rescinding 
disciplinary 
action prior to 
the end of the 
litigation. For 
example, Robert 
P.’s college 
applications will 
be tarnished 
since the actions 
taken by the 
school will be 
on his record,  
No data No data 
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   his grades will 
suffer if he is 
not able to make 
up his work and 
he will not be 
able to compete 
in athletic 
events. It is also 
very possible 
that his inability 
to 
participate…wil
l negatively 
affect his ability 
to obtain an 
athletic 
scholarship (p. 
1122). 
  
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding 
on the 
Courts 
It is not the role 
of the federal 
courts to set aside 
decisions of 
school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking a basis in 
wisdom or 
compassion (p. 
1224)…In the 
school context, it 
is both 
impossible and 
undesirable for 
administrators 
involved in 
incidents of 
misbehavior 
always to be 
precluded from 
acting as decision 
makers (p. 
1229)… Even if 
the discipline 
imposed could be 
construed as 
harsh or drastic, 
the United States 
Supreme Court 
position on this is 
clear: § 1983 was 
not intended to 
be a vehicle for 
federal-court 
corrections of  
No data No data At the outset, it 
is important to 
note that a 
federal court’s 
role in school 
disciplinary 
matters is very 
limited. School 
discipline is an 
area which the 
courts are 
reluctant to 
enter (p. 
821)…It is not 
the role of the 
federal courts to 
set aside 
decisions of 
school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking a basis 
in wisdom or 
compassion… 
Moreover, the 
right to an 
education is not 
guaranteed, 
either explicitly 
or implicitly, by 
the 
Constitution, 
and therefore 
could not 
constitute a 
fundamental  
It is not the role 
of the federal 
courts to set 
aside decisions 
of school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking a basis in 
wisdom or 
compassion (p. 
10)…The area of 
school discipline 
is a realm in 
which the courts 
enter with great 
hesitation and 
reluctance. 
Generally, the 
decision of 
whether or not to 
expel a student 
for gross 
disobedience or 
misconduct is 
best left to the 
discretion of the 
school board (pp. 
13-14). 
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 errors by school 
administrators in 
the exercise of 
discretion… (p. 
1234). 
  right (pp. 821-
822)…This 
court ordered 
Arndt to review 
school records 
and, by any 
means available, 
to determine the 
race of each 
expelled 
student…the 
summary 
indicated that 
82% of students 
expelled from 
the beginning of 
the 1996-1997 
school year 
through 
December 1999, 
were African 
American…Thi
s court notes the 
statistics… 
However, this 
court cannot 
make its 
decision solely 
upon statistical 
speculation (p. 
824). 
 
RQ7 
Reject-
ion of 
Alterna-
tive 
Sanc-
tions 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ8 
Preemp
-tive 
Preven-
tion of 
Future 
Disrup-
tion 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
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 Edwards v. O’ 
Fallon Twp. 
(1999, CA) 
Northwestern 
Sch. v. Linke 
(2002, SSC) 
In re L.A. 
(2001, SSC) 
Commonwealth 
v. Lawrence L. 
(2003, SSC) 
Covington 
County v. G.W. 
(2000, SSC) 
RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
No data 
 
After weighing 
the students’ 
privacy 
interests and 
the character of 
the search 
against the 
nature and 
immediacy of 
the 
governmental 
concern at 
issue, we 
conclude that 
the drug-testing 
program here is 
constitutional 
(p. 974)…The 
United States 
Supreme Court 
has taken the 
view that while 
public schools 
are state actors 
subject to  
constitutional 
oversight, the 
nature of a 
school’s role is 
custodial and 
tutelary, 
permitting a 
degree of 
supervision and 
control that 
could not be 
exercised over 
free adults (p. 
979)…We find 
that students 
are entitled to 
less privacy at 
school than 
adults would 
enjoy in 
comparable 
situations. In 
any realistic 
sense, students 
within the  
…a school 
security officer 
is not required to 
give a student 
Miranda 
warnings (p. 
879)…a 
schoolchild’s 
interest in 
privacy must be 
set against the 
substantial 
interest of 
teachers and 
administrators in 
maintaining 
discipline in the 
classroom and 
on school 
grounds. The 
court noted that 
maintaining 
order in the 
classroom has 
never been easy, 
but in recent 
years, school 
disorder has 
often taken 
particularly ugly 
forms…the 
court pointed 
out that it 
previously had 
recognized that 
maintaining 
security and 
order in the 
schools requires 
a certain degree 
of flexibility in 
school 
disciplinary 
procedures and 
had respected 
the value of 
preserving the 
informality of 
the student-
teacher  
…the typical 
requirements of 
warrant and 
probable cause 
are relaxed 
when a school 
official conducts 
a search of a 
student. The 
relaxation of the 
warrant and 
probable cause 
requirements of 
the Fourth 
Amendment are 
only applicable 
to school 
officials who are 
not acting in 
conjunction with 
or at the behest 
of law 
enforcement 
agencies…the 
Supreme Court 
recognized the 
particular 
interests of 
school officials 
in maintaining a 
safe learning 
environment and 
taking swift 
disciplinary 
action (pp. 880-
822). 
…school 
officials need 
not obtain a 
warrant before 
searching a 
student who is 
under their 
authority…the 
warrant 
requirement, in 
particular, is 
unsuited to the 
school 
environment: 
requiring a 
teacher to obtain 
a warrant before 
searching a child 
suspected of an 
infraction of 
school rules (or 
of the criminal 
law) would 
unduly interfere 
with the 
maintenance of 
the swift and 
informal 
disciplinary 
procedures 
needed in 
schools (p. 
193)…While it 
is important to 
note that 
students have a 
reasonable 
expectation of 
privacy in their 
school lockers, 
we must also 
emphasize that 
high school 
students fall into 
a different and 
generally less 
suspect class… 
the realities of 
the school 
setting require  
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  school 
environment 
have a lesser 
expectation of 
privacy than 
members of the 
population 
generally (pp. 
979-980). 
relationship (p. 
884)…It is 
evident that the 
school setting 
requires some 
easing of the 
restrictions to 
which searchers 
by public 
authorities are 
ordinarily 
subject…School 
officials need 
not obtain a 
warrant…the 
substantial 
interest of 
teachers and 
administrators in 
maintaining 
order in the 
schools does not 
require strict 
adherence to the 
requirement that 
searches be 
based on 
probable cause 
(p. 885). 
 that teachers and 
other school 
personnel have 
the power to 
make an 
immediate, 
limited search 
for contraband, 
weapons, or 
other prohibited 
objects or 
substances… 
society places a 
high value on 
education, which 
requires an 
orderly 
atmosphere 
which is free 
from danger and 
disruption (pp. 
193-194). 
RQ2  
Intent vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
No data 
 
No data No data Because Ridley 
was not acting 
as an agent of 
the police, he 
was exempt 
from obtaining a 
search warrant, 
and must only 
demonstrate that 
the search was 
reasonable in all 
of the 
circumstances 
(p. 822). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No data 
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RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
We are 
consistently 
reluctant to 
intrude upon 
the disciplinary 
decisions of 
school districts. 
If the 
opportunity to 
earn college 
financial 
assistance were 
to elevate 
participation in 
interscholastic 
athletics into a 
protected 
property right, 
school districts 
would have to 
afford 
procedural due 
process in 
practically all 
disciplinary 
actions…we 
cannot accept a 
notion that 
would invite a 
due process 
claim by every 
student 
engaged in 
interscholastic  
athletics and 
extracurricular 
activities. 
Judicial 
intervention in 
school 
discipline 
would become 
the rule rather 
than the 
exception 
unless school 
districts 
provided due 
process hearing 
in all such 
disciplinary 
actions (p. 
1078). 
 
 
That NSC has 
the 
responsibility 
of supervising 
its students and 
enforcing 
desirable 
behavior in 
carrying out 
school 
purposes is not 
questioned… 
Therefore, 
school 
corporation 
personnel have 
the right, 
subject to this 
chapter, to take 
any 
disciplinary 
action 
necessary to 
promote 
student conduct 
that conforms 
with an orderly 
and effective 
educational 
system. 
Students must 
follow 
responsible 
directions of 
school 
personnel in all 
educational 
settings and 
refrain from 
disruptive 
behavior that 
interferes with 
the education 
environment 
(p. 983). 
No data No data No data 
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RQ5  
No 
Imminent 
Threat 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding of 
Courts 
A player’s 
hope, no matter 
how justified, 
cannot elevate 
his high school 
playing 
privileges to a 
protectable 
property 
interest at any 
stage where 
disciplinary  
action would be 
taken against 
those 
privileges. 
Jordan did not 
possess the 
right to 
participate in 
interscholastic 
athletics. Nor 
did his 
scholarship 
opportunities 
confer such a 
right. 
Therefore, a 
protectable 
property 
interest was not 
at stake when 
the school 
imposed 
discipline, and 
a due process 
hearing was not 
required… we 
are consistently 
reluctant to 
intrude upon 
the disciplinary 
decisions of 
school districts 
(p. 1078). 
 
 
 
 
 
No data No data No data This school 
district has 
imposed a zero 
tolerance policy, 
which absent a 
violation of 
G.W.’s due 
process rights, it 
has the 
discretion to 
enforce. We find 
that no such due 
process violation 
occurred (p. 
192). 
G.W. contends 
that he was 
denied a fair and 
impartial hearing 
before the school 
board because 
the board 
considered 
hearsay 
testimony…This 
court rejects this 
argument and 
finds it to be 
without merit… 
Furthermore, 
hearsay 
testimony from 
school 
employees is 
apparently 
treated 
differently, and 
admitting this 
type of hearsay 
does not deprive 
a student of due 
process… (p. 
194). 
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RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
No data 
 
No data No data No data While it is true 
that there are 
many 
punishments that 
would seem less 
harsh or more 
appropriate in 
this case, we 
must recognize 
that the law 
commits this 
entire matter to 
the discretion of 
the school board 
(p. 192). 
RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevention 
of Future 
Disruption 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
 
Table 1.1I. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 Hinds County v. 
R. B. (2007, 
SSC) 
State v. Best 
(2010, SSC) 
In re K.K. 
(2011, CA) 
In the Interest 
of F.B. (1999, 
SSC) 
In re 
Hinterlong 
(2003, CA) 
RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
No data 
 
A school 
administer 
need only 
satisfy the 
lessor 
reasonable 
grounds 
standard rather 
than the 
probable cause 
standard to 
search a 
student’s 
vehicle parked 
on school 
property (p. 
102) 
…The need for 
school officials 
to maintain 
safety, order, 
and discipline 
is necessary 
whether school 
officials are  
We join the 
majority of 
courts that have 
examined this 
issue in 
concluding that 
the 
accommodation 
of the privacy 
interests of 
schoolchildren 
with the 
substantial need 
of teachers and 
administrators 
for freedom to 
maintain order 
in the schools 
does not require 
strict adherence 
to the 
requirement 
that searches by 
based on 
probable cause  
A student’s 
privacy right in 
personal items 
was limited and 
the means of 
search did not 
have to be the 
least intrusive 
and most 
efficient 
possible…the 
interest in 
keeping 
weapons out of 
public schools 
was so obvious 
that failure to 
develop a record 
as to why the 
search was held 
was superfluous 
and the trial 
court had taken 
judicial notice 
of the increased  
Having 
determined that 
the crime 
stoppers 
privilege 
restricts 
Hinterlong’s 
cognizable 
common law 
claims, we next 
determine 
whether the 
abrogation of 
those claims is 
arbitrary and 
unreasonable 
when balanced 
against the 
legislature’s 
actual 
purpose…His 
inability to 
obtain 
discovery 
concerning how  
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  addressing 
concerns inside 
the school 
building or 
outside on the 
school parking 
lot. It is the 
school 
environment 
and the need 
for safety, 
order, and 
discipline that 
is the 
underpinning 
for the school 
official…We 
have 
repeatedly 
declared that 
the school 
setting calls for 
protections 
geared toward 
the safety of 
students (pp. 
109-113). 
to believe that 
the subject of 
the search has 
violated or is 
violating the 
law (p. 
653)…There is 
nothing in the 
developing case 
law that 
indicates school 
officials must 
conduct an 
independent 
investigation as 
to the tip or its 
reliability (p. 
654). 
rate of violence 
in schools (p. 
663)…Although 
students possess 
a legitimate 
expectation of 
privacy 
concerning their 
person and 
personal 
belongings, that 
privacy right is 
limited. The 
need to protect 
all students, to 
ensure school 
discipline, and 
protect school 
property, limits 
the student’s 
expectation of 
privacy while in 
the school 
environment (p. 
669)… 
the tipster 
obtained the 
information 
provided to 
Clements 
severely 
impedes 
Hinterlong’s 
prosecution of 
his common law 
causes of action 
against these 
parties (p. 
630)…The 
purpose of the 
crime stoppers 
statute is to 
promote 
legitimate 
reports of 
criminal 
activities, not to 
shield a student 
who for 
personal gain or 
retaliatory 
motives makes 
a set up tip to 
achieve 
expulsion of a 
rival (pp. 631-
632)…We 
understand 
AMHS’s 
unfortunate 
need for a zero 
tolerance 
policy. We also 
understand the 
usefulness of a 
crime stoppers 
program…and 
the need for 
tipster 
anonymity…the 
Thomas in 
camera review 
procedure 
would satisfy 
the 
government’s 
interest in 
protecting its 
witnesses while 
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     satisfying the 
defendant’s 
Sixth 
Amendment 
rights…(p.633). 
RQ2  
Intent vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
No data 
 
No data No data No data Absent both 
pleading and 
proof of 
immunity, 
Clements can be 
held liable 
under 
Hinterlong’s 
claims (p. 
627)… 
Clements is also 
not cloaked 
with immunity 
from personal 
liability where 
her actions are 
not incident to 
or within the 
scope of her 
professional 
duties…(p. 
628). 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
No data 
 
The court 
recognized that 
the school 
setting requires 
some easing of 
the restrictions 
to which 
searches by 
public 
authorities are 
ordinarily 
subject…In 
weighing the 
student’s 
expectations of 
privacy on the 
one hand and 
the school’s 
interest in 
maintaining 
discipline and  
There is 
nothing in the 
developing case 
law that 
indicates school 
officials must 
conduct an 
independent 
investigation as 
to the tip or its 
reliability (p. 
654)…We 
conclude that it 
was because of 
the zero 
tolerance policy 
in the school’s 
code of conduct 
and it was the 
policy to act on 
all tips  
The interest in 
keeping 
weapons out of 
public schools is 
a matter so 
obvious that the 
need to develop 
a record on this 
point is 
superfluous 
(p.672)…The 
myriad of 
interests at issue 
include the 
physical safety 
of the school 
students, 
teachers, 
administrators 
and other 
employees, the 
  
No data 
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  order on the 
other, the court 
decided that 
the public 
interest is best 
served by a 
Fourth 
Amendment 
standard of 
reasonableness 
that stops short 
of probable 
cause (pp. 109-
110). 
regardless of 
the source (p. 
654). 
public concern 
of eliminating 
violence in the 
community in 
general and in 
the schools in 
specific, and the 
need to maintain 
schools as 
centers of 
learning free of 
fear for personal 
safety (p. 672). 
 
RQ5  
No 
Imminent 
Threat 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding on 
Courts 
The court finds 
that the school 
board’s decision 
was arbitrary and 
capricious and 
not supported by 
substantial 
evidence. The 
school board 
relied solely on 
the report from 
the appeals 
committee and 
the faxed 
photocopy of an 
item purporting 
to be the “knife” 
found on R.B. 
The findings of 
the appeals 
committee are 
themselves 
deficient, as the 
appeals 
committee chose 
to rely on the 
written reports 
characterizing 
the device as a 
pocket knife 
without 
examining the 
device 
themselves…Had 
the school board  
No data No data Thus, although 
we acknowledge 
that a search of 
a student 
involves the 
greater intrusion 
of the student’s 
privacy interest 
than a search of 
a school locker, 
where the 
character of the 
intrusion is non-
invasive such as 
here, the 
intrusion 
remains 
minimal (pp. 
669-670)…a 
search will not 
be barred 
because less 
intrusive means 
exist than those 
actually utilized 
if the means, as 
employed, are 
not so expansive 
as to be 
disproportionate 
to the purpose 
of the search (p. 
670). 
Accordingly, 
we hold that the 
trial court did 
not abuse its 
discretion in 
determining that 
the student 
informant made 
the tip to an 
appropriate 
school official, 
invoking 
section 
414.008’s crime 
stopper 
privilege (p. 
624)…We have 
addressed each 
of Hinterlong’s 
arguments 
claiming that 
the crime 
stopper 
privilege is not 
applicable to the 
present facts; 
therefore, we 
overrule his first 
issue (p. 625). 
…because the 
identity of the 
tipster and 
information 
provided by the 
tipster may be  
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 conducted even a 
cursory 
examination of 
the actual device, 
it would have 
realized that the 
appeals 
committee’s 
recommendation 
…did not 
constitute 
substantial 
evidence upon 
which to 
discipline R.B. 
for possession of 
a weapon (pp. 
501-502). 
   crucial to 
Hinterlong’s 
tort claims…the 
extent of the 
abrogation of 
Hinterlong’s 
right to redress 
is almost total. 
He cannot 
prosecute his 
common law 
causes against 
either Clements, 
the tipster, or 
the person or 
persons who 
planted the 
Ozarka water 
bottle for injury 
done him, in 
his…person or 
reputation 
without learning 
the tipster’s 
identity (p. 
630). 
RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevention 
of Future 
Disruption 
No data 
 
No data No data The schools are 
simply not 
required to wait 
for a tragedy to 
occur within 
their walls to 
demonstrate that 
the need is 
immediate (p. 
673). 
No data 
 
Table 1.1J. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 E.M. v. Briggs 
(1996, SSC) 
Cathe A. v. 
Doddridge (1997, 
SSC) 
J.M. v. Webster 
County Bd. 
(2000, SSC) 
Goss v. Lopez 
(1975, SC) 
Tinker v. Des 
Moines Sch. 
(1969, SC) 
RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
No data 
 
The court found 
that a child could 
be constitutionally 
removed from a 
Because the 
state has a 
compelling 
interest in 
Those young 
people do not 
shed their 
constitutional 
…prohibiting 
students from 
thus wearing 
the armbands 
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  classroom when 
he engaged in 
disruptive conduct 
(p. 
521)…Because 
the state has a 
compelling 
interest in 
providing a safe 
and secure 
environment to 
the school 
children of this 
state pursuant to 
W. Va. Const. art. 
XII, section 1, and 
because expulsion 
from school for as 
much as twelve 
months…is 
reasonably 
necessary and 
narrowly tailored 
method to further 
that interest, the  
mandatory 
suspension period 
of the Act is not 
facially 
unconstitutional... 
another legitimate 
concern is the 
need to effectively 
deter other 
children from 
engaging in 
prohibited 
conduct (p.524) 
Where the state is 
able to safely 
provide 
reasonable basic 
educational 
opportunities and 
services to a child 
who has been 
removed from 
regular school 
under the 
provisions…there 
is no compelling 
state interest in a 
policy of 
providing the  
providing a safe 
and secure 
environment to 
the school 
children of this 
state pursuant to 
W. Va. Const. 
art. XII, 
section1, and 
because 
expulsion from 
school for as 
much as twelve 
months…is 
reasonably 
necessary and 
narrowly 
tailored method 
to further that 
interest, the  
mandatory 
suspension 
period of the 
Act is not 
facially 
unconstitutional 
(p. 498)…In 
Cathe A., supra, 
we were asked 
whether or not 
the requirement 
of a one-year 
expulsion for 
violating the 
statute could 
pass 
constitutional 
muster; we 
answered that 
question in the 
affirmative 
because the 
state has a 
compelling 
interest in 
providing a safe 
and secure 
environment… 
(pp. 501-502). 
rights at the 
schoolhouse 
door…Among 
other things, 
the state is 
constrained to 
recognize a 
student’s 
legitimate 
entitlement to a 
public 
education as a 
property 
interest which 
is protected by 
the Due 
Process Clause 
and which may 
not be taken 
away for 
misconduct 
without 
adherence to 
the minimum 
procedures 
required by that 
clause (p. 
574)… But it 
would be a 
strange 
disciplinary 
system in an 
educational 
institution if no 
communication 
was sought by 
the 
disciplinarian 
with the student 
in an effort to 
inform him of 
his dereliction 
and to let him 
tell his side of 
the story in 
order to make 
sure that an 
injustice is not 
done (p.581)… 
We stop short 
of construing 
the Due 
Process Clause 
to require,  
violated the 
students’ rights 
of free speech 
under the First 
Amendment, 
where there was 
no evidence 
that the 
authorities had 
reason to 
anticipate that 
the wearing of 
the armbands 
would 
substantially 
interfere with 
the work of the 
school 
(p.503)… It can 
hardly be 
argued that 
either students 
or teachers shed 
their 
constitutional 
rights to 
freedom of 
speech or 
expression at 
the schoolhouse 
gate (p. 506)… 
Certainly where 
there is no 
finding and no 
showing that 
engaging in the 
forbidden 
conduct would 
materially and 
substantially 
interfere with 
the 
requirements of 
appropriate 
discipline in the 
operation of the 
school, the 
prohibition 
cannot be 
sustained… 
School officials 
do not possess 
absolute 
authority over  
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  opportunities and 
services only if 
the child’s parents 
are able and 
willing to 
reimburse the 
state for the cost 
(p.524)…Well 
before the passage 
of the Safe 
Schools Act, this 
court recognized 
that a child may 
be constitutionally 
removed from the 
classroom 
environment 
when he or she 
engages in 
disruptive 
conduct…the 
pupils were not 
entitled to 
reinstatement 
because the 
pupils’ behavior 
involved 
substantial 
disorder…(p.528). 
 countrywide, 
that hearings in 
connection 
with short 
suspensions 
must afford the 
student the 
opportunity to 
secure counsel, 
to confront and 
cross-examine 
witnesses 
supporting the 
charge, or to 
call his own 
witnesses to 
verify his 
version of the 
incident. Brief 
disciplinary 
suspensions are 
almost 
countless. To 
impose in each 
case even 
truncated trial-
type procedures 
might well 
overwhelm 
administrative 
facilities in 
many places, 
and by 
diverting 
resources, cost 
more than it 
would save in 
educational 
effectiveness 
(p. 583). 
their students 
(pp. 507-511)… 
But conduct by 
that student, in 
class or out of 
it, which for 
any reason—
whether it 
stems from 
time, place, or 
type of 
behavior- 
materially 
disrupts 
classwork or 
involves 
substantial 
disorder or 
invasion of the 
rights of others 
is, of course, 
not immunized 
by the 
constitutional 
guarantee of 
freedom of 
speech (p. 513). 
RQ2  
Intent vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
No data 
 
No data The coach 
found the 
particular 
expletive 
chosen by 
J.M.’s father to 
be quite 
objectionable, 
and feared that 
the argument 
might escalate 
into a physical 
altercation, so 
he asked J.M.’s 
Requiring that 
there be at least 
an informal 
give-and-take 
between 
student and 
disciplinarian, 
preferably prior 
to the 
suspension, 
will add little to 
the factfinding 
function where 
the 
 
No data 
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   father to go 
outside and 
calm 
down…After 
his father left 
the room, J.M. 
took out the 
loaded gun and 
fifty-six 
additional 
rounds of 
ammunition, 
and surrendered 
them to the 
coach, asking 
the coach to 
“take care of 
them,” and 
adding that he 
thought his 
father “was 
going to kill 
him” (p. 500)… 
There is no 
question that 
J.M. had a 
firearm on his 
person while on 
school grounds. 
However, J.M. 
argues that he 
had not 
intended to be 
upon school 
grounds and 
was transported 
to the school by 
his father and 
against his will. 
Thus he argues 
that the lack of 
a mental 
element or 
mens rea of 
“intent” makes 
it impossible for 
him to be guilty 
of possession 
(pp. 502-503)… 
the fact finder 
determined that 
J.M.’s actions 
in having a gun 
tucked into his  
 
disciplinarian 
himself has 
witnessed the 
conduct 
forming the 
basis for the 
charge. But 
things are not 
always as they 
seem to be, and 
the student will 
at least have 
the opportunity 
to characterize 
his conduct and 
put it in what 
he deems the 
proper context 
(p.584). 
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   pants on school 
property 
constituted a 
violation of the 
statute…even if 
the initial taking 
of the gun were 
defensible 
(which we 
question) J.M. 
had several 
opportunities to 
discard the gun 
or the bullets. 
While J.M.’s 
actions might 
be excusable to 
some, they were 
not to the 
principal, the 
board, nor the 
superintendent 
(p.507). 
  
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
…the board 
did not act 
arbitrarily and 
capriciously in 
violation of the 
students’ 
constitutional 
rights when it 
expelled them 
for the 
remainder of 
the year with 
homebound 
services. The 
school’s drug 
and alcohol 
policy and its 
handbook both 
stated that 
expulsion was 
an appropriate 
discipline for 
students 
possessing 
illegal drugs on 
school property  
Indeed, a school 
system that did 
not take rigorous 
steps to eliminate 
violence and 
weapons could 
find itself in 
serious liability 
problems if a 
child or teacher 
were injured by 
the presence of 
conditions that the 
school could have 
detected and 
prevented. We 
conclude that the 
Safe Schools 
Act’s twelve-
month expulsion 
period sends a 
strong message 
that we think the 
legislature was 
entitled to believe 
needs to be sent to  
It may be that 
some of the 
school officials 
misunderstand 
their duty under 
the statute. I 
may also be 
significant that 
J.M.’s incident, 
of May 12, 
1999, came just 
three weeks 
after the April 
20, 1999 
massacre at 
Columbine 
High school in 
Colorado, 
where two 
students 
murdered many 
of their 
classmates. 
However, we 
do not feel it 
appropriate to  
 
No data No data 
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 (p. 757). further a 
compelling state 
interest (p. 529)… 
In applying the 
mandate… 
articulating a 
policy that a child 
who is removed 
from the 
classroom 
setting…is not 
entitled to any 
form of state-
funded instruction 
during the 
pendency of their 
expulsion. We are 
not unmindful of 
the enormous 
demands upon our 
state’s educational 
system… 
Recognizing that 
our decision today 
will do nothing to 
reduce those 
demands, we must 
nevertheless 
conclude that the 
broad and 
sweeping policy 
set forth…is 
incompatible with 
the place of 
education as a 
fundamental, 
constitutional 
right of this state 
(p. 531). 
undermine the 
authority of 
school officials, 
by rejecting the 
factual findings 
of those closest 
to the events in 
this case (p. 
507). 
  
RQ5  
No 
Imminent 
Threat 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding on 
Courts 
It should be 
here noted that 
the 
management, 
supervision 
and 
determinations 
of policy are 
the prerogative 
and 
No data No data Among other 
things, the state 
is constrained 
to recognize a 
student’s 
legitimate 
entitlement to a 
public 
education as a 
property 
 
No data 
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 responsibility 
of the school 
officials; and 
that the courts 
should be 
reluctant to 
enter 
therein…It is 
the policy of 
the law not to 
favor 
limitations on 
the powers of 
boards of 
education, but 
rather to give 
them a free 
hand to 
function within 
the sphere of 
their 
responsibilities 
(p. 757)… 
Section 1983 
does not 
extend the 
right to 
relitigate in 
federal court 
evidentiary 
questions 
arising in 
school 
disciplinary 
proceedings or 
the proper 
construction of 
school 
regulations. 
The system of 
public 
education that 
has evolved in 
this nation 
relies 
necessarily 
upon the 
discretion and 
judgment of 
school 
administrators 
and school 
board 
members, and  
 
  interest which 
is protected by 
the Due 
Process Clause 
and which may 
not be taken 
away for 
misconduct 
without 
adherence to 
the minimum 
procedures 
required by that 
clause (p. 574). 
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 § 1983 was not 
intended to be 
a vehicle for 
federal court 
correction of 
errors in the 
exercise of that 
discretion (p. 
757). 
    
RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
No data 
 
The twelve-month 
expulsion period... 
may seem to be a 
severe penalty. 
But the legislature 
is entitled to 
believe that only 
such a penalty 
would serve as an 
effective deterrent 
to further the 
important goal of 
a strict weapons-
free environment 
in our schools… 
(p.529). 
No data No data No data 
RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevention 
of Future 
Disruption 
No data 
 
No data No data No data The district 
court concluded 
that the action 
of the school 
authorities was 
reasonable 
because it was 
based upon 
their fear of a 
disturbance 
from the 
wearing of the 
armbands. But, 
in our system, 
undifferentiated 
fear or 
apprehension of 
disturbance is 
not enough to 
overcome the 
right to freedom 
of expression 
(pp. 508-509). 
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 Hazelwood v. 
Kuhlmeier 
(1988, SC) 
New Jersey v. 
T.L.0. (1985, 
SC) 
Bethel Sch. 
Dist. v. Fraser 
(1986, SC) 
Vernonia Sch. 
Dist. v. Acton 
(1995, SC) 
Binder v. Cold 
Spring Harbor 
(2010, DC) 
RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
…the control 
that educators 
are entitled to 
exercise over 
school-
sponsored 
publications, 
theatrical 
productions, 
and other 
expressive 
activities that 
might 
reasonably be 
perceived to 
bear the 
imprimatur of 
the school is 
greater than the 
control, 
governed by the 
standard 
articulated in 
Tinker…A 
school need not 
tolerate student 
speech that is 
inconsistent 
with its basic 
educational 
mission, even 
though the 
government 
could not 
censor similar 
speech outside 
the school (p. 
261)… we have 
nonetheless 
recognized that 
the First 
Amendment 
rights of 
students in the 
public schools 
are not 
automatically 
coextensive 
with the rights 
of adults in  
…greater 
emphasis should 
be placed on the 
special 
characteristics of 
elementary and 
secondary 
schools that 
make it 
unnecessary to 
afford students 
the same 
constitutional 
protections 
granted adults 
and juveniles in 
a non-school 
setting…the 
special need for 
an immediate 
response to 
behavior that 
threatens either 
the safety of 
school children 
and teachers or 
the educational 
process itself 
justifies the 
court in 
[exempting] 
school searches 
from the warrant 
and probable 
cause 
requirements, 
and in applying 
a standard 
determined by 
balancing the 
relevant interests 
(p. 325)… But 
striking a 
balance between 
schoolchildren’s 
legitimate 
expectations of 
privacy and the 
school’s equally 
legitimate need  
…the 
determination 
of what manner 
of speech in the 
classroom or 
school assembly 
is inappropriate 
properly rests 
with the school 
board…Given a 
school’s need to 
be able to 
impose 
disciplinary 
sanctions for a 
wide range of 
unanticipated 
conduct 
disruptive of the 
educational 
process, school 
disciplinary 
rules need not 
be as detailed as 
a criminal code 
which imposes 
criminal 
sanctions (p. 
676)…The 
undoubted 
freedom to 
advocate 
unpopular and 
controversial 
views in 
schools and 
classrooms 
must be 
balanced 
against the 
society’s 
countervailing 
interest in 
teaching 
students the 
boundaries of 
socially 
appropriate 
behavior (p. 
681)…the  
Students were 
not entitled to 
full Fourth 
Amendment 
protections 
where the 
state’s interest 
in preventing 
drug addiction 
among students 
was compelling 
and student 
athletes had a 
decreased 
expectation of 
privacy (p. 
646)…The state 
may exercise a 
degree of 
supervision and 
control greater 
than it could 
exercise over 
free adults (p. 
647)… 
balancing the 
intrusion on the 
individual’s 
Fourth 
Amendment 
interests against 
its promotion of 
legitimate 
governmental 
interests (p. 
653)…We have 
found such 
“special needs”  
to exist in the 
public school 
context. There, 
the warrant 
requirement 
would unduly 
interfere with 
the maintenance 
of the swift and 
informal 
disciplinary 
procedures that  
…it is well-
established that 
the school 
setting requires 
some easing of 
the restrictions 
to which 
searches by 
public 
authorities are 
ordinarily 
subject (p. 
14)…Under the 
more flexible 
approach 
afforded to 
school 
administrators 
in conducting 
searches, and 
especially in 
light of the 
seriousness of 
bringing 
marijuana to a 
school, Browne 
had sufficient 
cause to 
conduct the 
search as a 
matter of law 
(p.17). 
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 other settings, 
and must be 
applied in light 
of the special 
characteristics 
of the school 
environment 
(pp. 266-267). 
to maintain an 
environment in 
which learning 
can take place 
requires some 
easing of the 
restrictions to 
which searches 
by public 
authorities are 
ordinarily 
subject 
(p.326)…Where 
a careful 
balancing of 
governmental 
and private 
interests suggest 
that the public 
interest is best 
served by a 
Fourth 
Amendment 
standard of 
reasonableness 
that stops short 
of probable 
cause, we have 
not hesitated to 
adopt such a 
standard (pp. 
340-341). 
constitutional 
rights of 
students in 
public school 
are not 
automatically 
coextensive 
with the rights 
of adults in 
other settings 
(p. 682)… 
maintaining 
security and 
order in the 
schools requires 
a certain degree 
of flexibility in 
school 
disciplinary 
procedures… 
Given the 
school’s need to 
be able to 
impose 
disciplinary 
sanctions for a 
wide range of 
unanticipated 
conduct 
disruptive of the 
educational 
process, the 
school 
disciplinary 
rules need not 
be as detailed as 
a criminal code 
(p. 686). 
are needed, and 
strict adherence 
to the 
requirement 
that searches be 
based on 
probable cause 
would undercut 
the substantial 
need of teachers 
and 
administrators 
for freedom to 
maintain order 
in the schools 
(p. 653). 
 
RQ2  
Intent vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
No data 
 
No data I wish 
therefore…to 
disclaim any 
purpose…to 
hold that the  
 
No data No data 
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   Federal 
Constitution 
compels the 
teachers, 
parents, and 
elected school 
officials to 
surrender 
control of the 
American 
public school 
system to public 
school students 
(p. 686). 
  
RQ5  
No 
Imminent 
Threat 
No data 
 
…the Eighth 
Amendment’s 
prohibition of 
cruel and 
unusual 
punishment 
applies only to 
punishments 
imposed after 
criminal 
convictions and 
hence does not 
apply to the 
punishment of 
school children 
by public school 
officials (p.334). 
No data No data No data 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding on 
Courts 
We thus 
recognized that 
the 
determination 
of what manner 
of speech in the 
classroom or in 
the school 
assembly is 
inappropriate 
properly rest 
with the school 
board, rather 
than with the 
federal courts 
(p. 267). 
Absent any 
suggestion that 
the rule violates 
some substantive 
constitutional 
guarantee, the 
courts should, as 
a general matter, 
defer to that 
judgment and 
refrain from 
attempting to 
distinguish 
between rules 
that are 
important to the 
preservation of 
order in the 
schools and rules 
that are not 
(p.342). 
The 
determination 
of what manner 
of speech in the 
classroom or in 
school assembly 
is inappropriate 
properly rests 
with the school 
board (p. 
683)… 
maintaining 
security and 
order in the 
schools requires 
a certain degree 
of flexibility in 
school 
disciplinary 
procedures… 
Given the 
school’s need to 
be able to  
Accordingly, 
we reach the 
same 
conclusion as in 
Skinner: that the 
invasion of 
privacy was not 
significant (p. 
660). 
The Supreme 
Court has long 
held that § 1983 
does not extend 
the right to 
relitigate in 
federal court 
evidentiary 
questions 
arising in school 
disciplinary 
proceedings… 
The system of 
public 
education that 
has evolved in 
this nation relies 
necessarily 
upon the 
discretion and 
judgment of 
school 
administrators  
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   impose 
disciplinary 
sanctions for a 
wide range of 
unanticipated 
conduct 
disruptive of the 
educational 
process, the 
school 
disciplinary 
rules need not 
be as detailed as 
a criminal code 
(p. 686). 
 and school 
board members 
and § 1983 was 
not intended to 
be a vehicle for 
federal court 
correction of 
errors in the 
exercise of that 
discretion (p. 
10). 
RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevention 
of Future 
Disruption 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
 
Table 1.1L. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 C.H. v. Folks 
(2010, DC) 
Beard v. 
Whitmore Lake 
(2005, CA) 
Sims v. 
Bracken 
County Sch. 
(2010, DC) 
Lausin v. Bishko 
(2010, DC) 
Pendleton v. 
Fassett (2009, 
DC) 
RQ1 
Threat 
vs. 
Individ-
ual 
Rights 
No data …the character of 
the intrusion was 
far more invasive 
than the character 
of the urinalysis 
in Vernonia, 
where students 
remained fully 
clothed…the boys 
were required to 
lift their shirts and 
to remove both 
their pants and 
underwear 
(p.605)…The 
highly intrusive 
nature of the 
searches, the fact 
However, 
students 
typically have a 
lesser 
expectation of 
privacy than 
members of the 
public 
generally. 
While students’ 
constitutional 
rights do not 
evaporate at the 
public school’s 
doors, the 
essence of those 
rights is 
balanced 
…it is clear that in 
a school setting 
the standard for a 
Fourth 
Amendment 
analysis does not 
require probable 
cause (p. 629). 
Generally, in 
order to conduct 
a search, an 
officer must 
have probable 
cause to believe 
an individual is 
engaged in 
illegal activity 
and that 
evidence 
bearing on that 
offense will be 
found in the 
place to be 
searched. In the 
school setting, 
however, the 
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  that the searches 
were undertaken 
to find missing 
money, the fact 
that the searches 
were performed 
on a substantial 
number of 
students, the fact 
that the searches 
were performed in 
the absences of 
individualized 
suspicion, and the 
lack of consent, 
taken together, 
demonstrate that 
the searches were 
not reasonable. 
Accordingly, 
under T.L.O. and 
Vernonia, the 
searches violated 
the Fourth 
Amendment (p. 
605)…At the time 
of the search at 
issue, the prior 
law involving 
strip searches of 
students did not 
clearly establish 
that the 
defendants’ 
actions in this 
case were 
unconstitutional… 
Given the lack of 
a factual context 
similar to that of 
this case, T.L.O. 
and Vernonia 
could not have 
truly compelled 
the defendants to 
realize that they 
were acting 
illegally when 
they participated 
in the searches of 
the students in 
this case… 
Because the 
searches in this  
against the need 
for teachers and 
administrators 
to have the 
freedom to 
maintain order 
in school…the 
Supreme court 
held that the 
Fourth 
Amendment  
applies to 
searches 
conducted by 
school officials, 
but rejected the 
adherence to a 
probable cause 
requirement 
(pp. 18-19)… 
Reasonable 
suspicion 
demands a less 
exacting 
standard of 
constitutional 
scrutiny than 
does probable 
cause (p. 22)… 
To determine 
the 
constitutionality 
of a 
seizure…courts 
will look to the 
school official’s 
actions 
balanced 
against the 
special needs 
dictated in the 
public school 
setting where 
the state is 
responsible for 
maintaining 
discipline, 
health, and 
safety (p.  30). 
 level of 
suspicion 
required to 
justify a search 
is less than 
probable 
cause…the 
accommodation 
of the privacy 
interests of 
schoolchildren 
with the 
substantial need 
of teachers and 
administrators 
for freedom to 
maintain order 
in the schools 
does not require 
strict adherence 
to the 
requirement that 
searches be 
based on 
probable cause 
(pp. 15-16)…In 
a school setting, 
it is not always 
necessary that 
the reasonable 
suspicion be 
individualized; 
that is, school 
officials my 
conduct 
searches of 
multiple 
students without 
a suspicion that 
a particular 
student has 
committed an 
infraction (p. 
18)… Here, the 
governmental 
interest was 
maintaining 
order…The 
general 
governmental 
interest in safe 
and disciplined 
schools in order 
to promote and  
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  case did not 
violate clearly 
established law, 
the defendants are 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity (pp. 
607-608). 
  ensure a 
productive 
learning 
environment is 
more weighty 
here…(p. 21). 
However, the 
complete lack of 
any reasonable 
belief that 
Pendleton—or 
any other 
student on her 
bus- possessed 
contraband 
detracts from 
the generally 
compelling 
nature of the 
government 
interest… 
without any 
individualized 
suspicion, the 
intrusive search 
of each 
individual is that 
much less likely 
to be 
successful…she 
suffered a 
violation of her 
Fourth 
Amendment 
rights (pp. 22-
24). 
RQ2 
Intent 
vs. 
Balance 
of Intent 
vs. 
Safety 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
Defendants 
violated a 
clearly 
established 
constitutional 
right when the 
custodian 
peered into the 
restroom stall. 
If plaintiff’s  
However, the 
teachers and 
officer were 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity because 
the law at the time 
the searches were 
conducted did not 
clearly establish  
Defendant Ray  
is entitled to 
qualified 
immunity 
relative to her 
search of the 
jacket (p. 23)… 
Defendant Ray 
is entitled to 
qualified  
...a political 
subdivision is not 
liable in damages 
in a civil action 
for injury, death, 
or loss to person 
or property 
allegedly caused 
by any act or 
omission of the  
The available 
case law 
therefore did not 
give the instant 
officials fair 
warning that 
their conduct 
was 
unconstitutional. 
Accordingly,  
 
160 
 
Table 1.1L Continued 
 allegations are 
proven to be 
true, Principal 
Perez and Vice 
Principal Gray 
would not be 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity with 
regard to the 
search of the 
restroom stall 
… Plaintiff 
fails, however, 
to tie the 
search of his 
pockets in any 
manner to any 
action or 
inaction of 
Perez and 
Gray. 
Therefore, at 
this point, 
plaintiff fails 
to allege 
sufficient facts 
to implicate 
their 
supervisory 
liability for the 
pocket search 
(pp. 25-26)… 
The district 
retains its 
governmental 
immunity 
(p.28). 
that the searches 
were 
unreasonable 
under the 
particular 
circumstances 
present in the case 
(p. 598)… 
Because the 
searches in this 
case did not 
violate clearly 
established law, 
the defendants are 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity (p. 
608). 
immunity for 
authorizing the 
search of K.S.’ 
s person (p. 
26)… 
Defendant Ray 
is also entitled 
to qualified 
immunity 
relative to this 
seizure (pp. 33-
34). 
political 
subdivision or an 
employee of the 
political 
subdivision in 
connection with a 
governmental or 
proprietary 
function… 
Richmond 
Heights Board of 
Education is a 
political 
subdivision, and 
as such, it had 
immunity (p. 
631)…the 
individual school 
board defendants, 
Mr. Bishko, Dr. 
Wallace, and Dr. 
Calinger, are 
entitled to 
immunity (p. 
631). 
Fisher, Welch, 
Fassett, and 
Riggs are 
protected from a 
civil damages 
suit for their 
allegedly 
unconstitutional 
conduct by the 
doctrine of 
qualified 
immunity (p. 
32). 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ5  
No 
Immin-
ent 
Threat 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding 
on the 
Courts 
The court 
agrees. Texas 
law does not 
recognize a 
cause of action 
in tort for 
The actions of the 
defendants were 
unconstitutional. 
However, at the 
time the searches 
occurred, the law 
In essence, 
plaintiffs allege 
municipal 
liability based 
on the Board’s 
alleged practice 
The fact that 
plaintiffs did not 
have counsel at 
the suspension 
hearing or that 
Gina was not 
Whether or not 
the conduct rises 
to the level of 
outrageous is a 
question of law. 
The court 
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 money 
damages for a 
violation of 
the Texas 
Constitution… 
Accordingly, 
plaintiff’s 
claims under 
the Texas 
Constitution 
are dismissed 
(p. 32). 
regarding the 
reasonableness of 
a strip search 
under these 
circumstances 
was not clearly 
established. The 
denial of 
summary 
judgment is 
therefore reversed 
(p.601). 
of tacitly 
approving its 
employees’ 
unconstitutional 
conduct. A 
municipality, 
however, only 
violates § 1983 
where its 
official policy 
or custom 
actually serves 
to deprive an 
individual of his 
or her 
constitutional 
rights…because 
the individual 
defendants did 
not violate the 
plaintiff’s 
constitutional 
rights, plaintiff 
cannot rely on 
their conduct to 
establish a 
claim of 
municipal 
liability 
(p.39)… When 
all federal 
claims are 
dismissed 
before trial, the 
balance of 
considerations 
usually will 
point to 
dismissing the 
state law claims 
(pp. 42-43). 
permitted to 
consult with her 
mother prior to 
the hearing does 
not offend due 
process (pp. 626-
627) 
The Supreme 
Court has held 
that the right to 
attend public 
school is not a 
fundamental right 
for the purposes 
of substantive due 
process analysis 
…it is not the role 
of the federal 
courts to set aside 
decisions of 
school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking a basis in 
wisdom or 
compassion (pp. 
627-628)… While 
the police officers 
admit 
misrepresenting 
certain facts to 
Gina, such as their 
claim that they 
had handwriting 
analysis finding 
that Gina had 
written the 
threat…these 
misrepresentations 
did not rise to the 
level of coercive 
police activity… 
the suppression of 
Gina’s confession 
in the juvenile 
proceedings does 
not have 
preclusive effect 
on this court… 
(pp. 635-636). 
 
 
 
 
concludes that 
the conduct the 
plaintiff 
complains of is 
not so 
outrageous and 
extreme so as to 
support this 
claim. 
Accordingly, it 
will grant the 
defendants 
summary 
judgment as to 
this claim (pp. 
52-53). 
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RQ7 
Reject-
ion of 
Alterna-
tive 
Sanction 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ8 
Preemp-
tive Pre-
vention 
of 
Future 
Disrup-
tion 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
 
Table 1.1M. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 Wooleyhan v. 
Cape 
Henlopen 
(2011, DC) 
Porter v. 
Ascension 
(2004, CA) 
Demers v. 
Leominster 
Sch. (2003, DC) 
Bundick v. Bay 
City Indep. Sch. 
(2001, DC) 
Butler v. Rio 
Rancho Pub. 
(2003, CA) 
RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
In establishing 
these minimum 
procedural 
guidelines, the 
court balanced 
the school’s 
need to 
maintain order 
free from the 
burden of 
elaborate 
hearing 
requirements 
against the 
general interest 
of arriving at 
the truth 
inherent in the 
concept of due 
process and 
giving a 
student in 
jeopardy of 
serious loss 
notice of the 
case against 
him and 
opportunity to 
meet it (pp. 40- 
Because the 
search of the 
younger son was 
reasonable at 
inception, and 
conducted in a 
reasonable 
manner when 
balanced against 
the school’s 
interest in its 
students’ safety 
and welfare, the 
younger son’s 
Fourth 
Amendment 
claim failed (p. 
608)…A school 
need not tolerate 
student speech 
that is 
inconsistent with 
its basic 
educational 
mission, even 
though the 
government 
could not censor 
similar speech  
While the 
supreme court 
has made it 
clear that public 
school students 
do not shed 
their 
constitutional 
rights as the 
schoolhouse 
gate, it has also 
established that 
a student’s First 
Amendment 
rights are not 
coextensive 
with the rights 
of adults in 
other settings 
(p. 200). In 
order to 
suppress speech 
that is not 
constitutionally 
protected, the 
court must 
justify its 
decision by 
showing facts 
However, given 
the relaxed 
standard 
applicable to 
searches and 
seizures o school 
properties, 
Bundick’s claim 
fails. In striking 
the balance of 
students’ 
legitimate 
expectations of 
privacy and 
schools’ equally 
legitimate need 
to maintain the 
proper 
educational 
environment, the 
United States 
Supreme Court 
eased the 
restrictions to 
which searches 
by public 
authorities are 
ordinarily 
subject; the 
There is no 
doubt the 
school has a 
legitimate 
interest in 
providing a 
safe 
environment 
for students 
and staff. It is 
not 
unreasonable 
for the school 
to conclude 
that student 
possession of 
weapons on 
school property 
threatens this 
interest. In 
order to protect 
against this 
threat and 
further the 
school’s 
interest in 
safety, we 
believe there is 
a rational basis 
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 41). outside the 
school…While 
certain forms of 
expressive 
conduct and 
speech are 
sheltered under 
the First 
Amendment, 
constitutional 
protection is not 
absolute, 
especially in the 
public school 
setting. 
Educators have 
an essential role 
in regulating 
school affairs 
and establishing 
appropriate 
standards of 
conduct (p. 615). 
Because Adam’s 
drawing was 
composed off-
campus, 
displayed only to 
members of his 
own household, 
stored off-
campus, and not 
purposefully 
taken by him to 
EAHS or 
publicized in a 
way certain to 
result in its 
appearance at 
EAHS, we have 
found that the 
drawing is 
protected by the 
First 
Amendment. 
Furthermore, we 
have found that it 
is neither speech 
directed at the 
campus nor a 
purposefully 
communicated 
true threat (p. 
620) 
 
which might 
reasonably have 
led school 
authorities to 
forecast 
substantial 
disruption of or 
material 
interference 
with school 
activities (p. 
202)… 
Michael’s 
suspension and 
subsequent 
expulsion were 
rationally 
related to the 
school’s interest 
in maintaining a 
safe school 
environment, 
particularly in 
light of the 
apprehensive 
climate that 
existed at the 
time due to 
highly 
publicized 
incidents of 
school violence 
around the 
country. In the 
wake of other 
episodes of 
school violence, 
many of which 
occurred close 
in time to the 
events in this 
case, student 
safety had to be 
considered by 
the school 
officials in 
Leominster 
when faced with 
a potentially 
dangerous 
situation (p. 
206). 
Court rejected 
the requirements 
of a warrant or 
probable cause 
in favor of a 
simple 
reasonableness 
under the 
circumstances 
standard (p. 
738). 
for the school 
to suspend Mr. 
Butler, even for 
one year, when 
he should have 
known he 
brought a 
weapon onto 
school 
property. The 
school’s 
decision was 
not arbitrary, 
nor does it 
shock the 
conscience. 
Accordingly, 
the decision did 
not violate Mr. 
Butler’s 
substantive due 
process rights, 
if any (p. 
1201). 
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  …However, a 
reasonable 
school official 
facing this 
question for the 
first time would 
find not pre-
existing body of 
law from which 
he could draw 
clear guidance… 
a reasonable 
school official 
would encounter 
a body of case 
law sending 
inconsistent 
signals as to how 
far school 
authority to 
regulate student 
speech reaches 
beyond the 
confines of the 
campus (p. 620). 
   
RQ2  
Intent vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
No data 
 
Inter alia, the 
instant court 
found that the 
older son did not 
intentionally or 
knowingly 
communicate his 
drawing in a way 
sufficient to 
remove it from 
First Amendment 
protection. The 
drawing’s 
introduction to 
the school was 
wholly 
accidental and 
unconnected 
with an earlier 
display of the 
drawing to 
household 
members. Thus, 
the state had no 
authority to issue 
sanctions for the 
message it 
contained(p.608). 
The appropriate 
focus is on what 
the defendant 
reasonably 
should have 
foreseen. Under 
this standard, 
there is no 
requirement that 
the speaker had 
the ability or 
actually 
intended to 
carry out the 
threat. Michael 
should have 
concluded that 
his drawing and 
note would be 
considered a 
threat to the 
school and to 
himself (p. 
202). 
Bundick relies 
heavily upon a 
recent split 
decision from 
the Sixth 
Circuit, Seal v. 
Morgan…which 
held that a 
school board 
may not expel a 
student without 
first determining 
that the student 
intentionally 
committed the 
acts for which 
his expulsion is 
sought. The 
court must admit 
that this 
argument has a 
virtuous appeal, 
however, with 
all due respect to 
the Seal 
majority, it 
seems Judge 
Surheinrich, in 
dissent, has a  
…the school 
board later 
concluded Mr. 
Butler should 
have known, as 
the driver of 
the vehicle, 
that he was in 
possession of 
and 
transporting a 
weapon onto 
school 
grounds…Mr. 
Butler knew, or 
should have 
known that he 
was 
responsible for 
the vehicle he 
brought onto 
school property 
and the 
contents 
thereof…As a 
result of the 
board’s 
decision, we 
need not decide 
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    better 
understanding of 
the law in this 
area. Scienter is 
not a 
requirement of 
the school 
district’s policy 
and that policy is 
entitled to 
deference. 
Moreover, 
scienter can be 
imputed from 
the fact of 
possession. 
Bundick carried 
the machete in 
his truck when 
he worked and 
he had worked 
the day before it 
was found. 
While clear 
findings of fact 
from the 
superintendent 
may have been 
helpful, it was 
not irrational to 
find Bundick 
knew, even if he 
had forgotten, of 
the machete’s 
presence (p. 
740). 
whether 
suspending a 
high school 
student for 
unknowingly 
bringing a 
weapon onto 
school property 
violates the 
student’s 
substantive due 
process rights 
(p. 1201). 
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
Accordingly, 
the court 
concludes that 
a reasonable 
official would 
not know that 
such conduct 
violated 
procedural due 
process, and 
Yor, Mrazeck, 
and Maull are 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity on 
the procedural 
due process 
claim  
Even if we find 
that the right was 
clearly 
established at the 
time of the 
alleged violation, 
however, a 
defendant will 
still be entitled to 
qualified 
immunity if the 
defendant’s 
conduct was 
objectively 
reasonable in 
light of clearly 
established law 
at the time of the  
Even if the law 
is clearly 
established, an 
official is 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity if at 
the time of the 
challenged 
actions, such 
official’s belief 
that his or her 
actions were 
lawful is 
objectively 
legally 
reasonable…A 
reasonable,  
 
No data Since the 
Butlers failed 
to state a 
substantive due 
process 
violation, we 
conclude the 
school is 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity on 
the Butlers' 
substantive due 
process claims 
(p. 1201). 
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 (p.80)…Jester 
is not entitled 
to qualified 
immunity for 
Wooleyhan’s 
only remaining 
federal law 
claim against 
her- unlawful 
detention. The 
right to be free 
from false 
arrest is a 
clearly 
established 
right, which 
necessarily 
includes the 
right  to be free 
from false 
accusations in 
obtaining the 
authority to 
arrest…No 
state actor 
could 
reasonably 
believe that 
making a false 
accusation to 
procure a 
student’s arrest 
is lawful under 
the 
circumstances 
of this case. 
Accordingly, 
Jester is not 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity (pp. 
80-81). 
violation. The 
reasonableness 
of an official’s 
actions must be 
assessed in light 
of the facts 
available to him 
at the time of his 
actions and the 
law that was 
clearly 
established at the 
time of the 
alleged acts (p. 
614)…While we 
cannot agree 
with its finding 
that there was no 
violation of the 
First 
Amendment, we 
affirm its 
judgment on its 
alternative 
ground that 
Principal Braud 
is entitled to 
qualified 
immunity (p. 
625). 
though 
mistaken 
conclusion 
about the 
lawfulness of 
one’s conduct 
does not subject 
a governmental 
official to 
personal 
liability (p. 
207)…there is 
limited case law 
on this issue of 
school violence 
in this Circuit, 
which lends 
further credence 
to conclude that 
this area of the 
law is unsettled. 
Therefore, the 
individual 
defendants are 
entitled to 
qualified 
immunity (p. 
208). 
  
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
No data 
 
No data On these facts, a 
reasonable 
interpretation of 
the law would 
allow a school 
official to 
prevent 
potential 
disorder or 
disruption to 
school safety, 
particularly in 
…given the 
relaxed standard 
applicable to 
searches and 
seizures on 
school 
properties, 
Bundick’s claim 
fails…The need 
to obtain either a 
warrant or 
Bundick’s 
There is no 
doubt the 
school has a 
legitimate 
interest in 
providing a 
safe 
environment 
for students 
and staff. It is 
not 
unreasonable 
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   the wake of 
increased 
school violence 
across the 
country. We 
review, 
however, with 
deference, 
schools’ 
decisions in 
connection with 
the safety of 
their students 
even when 
freedom of 
expression is 
involved. At the 
time when 
school officials 
made their 
determination to 
emergency 
expel him, they 
had facts which 
might 
reasonably have 
led them to 
forecast a 
substantial 
disruption of or 
material 
interference 
with school 
activities… 
Michael’s 
suspension and 
subsequent 
expulsion were 
rationally 
related to the 
school’s interest 
in maintaining a 
safe school 
environment, 
particularly I 
light of the 
apprehensive 
climate that 
existed at the 
time due to 
highly 
publicized 
incidents of 
school violence  
 
consent was, 
therefore, 
vitiated and it 
was legally 
permissible to 
begin a search 
(p.738). 
for the school 
to conclude 
that student 
possession of 
weapons on 
school property 
threatens this 
interest. In 
order to protect 
against this 
threat and 
further the 
school’s 
interest in 
safety, we 
believe there is 
a rational basis 
for the school 
to suspend Mr. 
Butler, even for 
one year, when 
he should have 
known he 
brought a 
weapon onto 
school 
property. The 
school’s 
decision was 
not arbitrary, 
nor does it 
shock the 
conscience. 
Accordingly, 
the decision did 
not violate Mr. 
Butler’s 
substantive due 
process rights, 
if any (p. 
1201). 
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   around the 
country 
(pp.203-206). 
  
RQ5  
No 
Imminent 
Threat 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding on 
the Courts 
The alleged 
conduct reveals 
poor judgment, 
insults, 
indignities, or 
annoyances, 
but did not 
create atrocious 
or intolerable 
conditions (p. 
65)…Further, 
there is no 
reputation 
interest or 
injury resulting 
from 
dissemination 
of criminal acts 
(p. 67)… 
Wooleyhan 
obviously feels 
strongly, and 
his feeling are 
not irrational. 
Having been 
arrested and 
prosecuted, and 
acquitted, 
Wooleyhan, as 
any similarly 
situated 
individual, has 
a right to seek 
damages if 
defendants 
acted 
wrongfully (p. 
86). 
No data Public school 
officials have 
been granted 
substantial 
deference as to 
what speech is 
appropriate. The 
daily 
administration 
of public 
education is 
committed to 
school officials. 
The 
determination 
of what manner 
of speech in the 
classroom or in 
school assembly 
is inappropriate 
properly rests 
with the school 
board, rather 
than with the 
federal courts 
(p. 202). 
Because federal 
courts are 
extremely, and 
quite properly, 
hesitant to 
become involved 
in the public 
schools’ 
disciplinary 
decisions, only 
rudimentary 
precautions are 
commanded of 
the 
Constitution… 
Without 
question, 
expulsion is a 
harsh 
punishment, but 
it is not the 
business of a 
federal court to 
set aside 
decisions of 
school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking in a 
basis in wisdom 
or compassion 
(pp. 740-741). 
Although we 
questioned in 
Tonkovich 
whether the 
“shock the 
conscience” 
standard 
applies to all 
due process 
violations, we 
need not decide 
the issue in this 
case because 
we conclude 
the school’s 
conduct does 
not violate the 
due process 
clause under 
any of the 
standards (p. 
1201). 
RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
 
 
 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
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RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevention 
of Future 
Disruption 
No data 
 
No data However, the 
potential for 
disruption or 
disorder to the 
students of the 
Northwest 
School was 
greater than 
merely the 
school’s 
negative 
reaction to an 
unpopular 
political 
viewpoint…On 
these facts, a 
reasonable 
interpretation of 
the law would 
allow a school 
official to 
prevent 
potential 
disorder or 
disruption to 
school safety, 
particularly in 
the wake of 
increased 
school violence 
across the 
country. We 
review, 
however, with 
deference, 
schools’ 
decisions in 
connection with 
the safety of 
their students 
even when 
freedom of 
expression is 
involved. At the 
time when 
school officials 
made their 
determination to 
emergency 
expel him, they 
had facts which 
might 
reasonably have 
led them to  
 
No data No data 
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   forecast a 
substantial 
disruption of or 
material 
interference 
with school 
activities (p. 
203). 
  
 
Table 1.1N. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 Defabio v. E. 
Hampton Union 
(2009, DC) 
Tun v. Fort 
Wayne Cmty. 
(2004, DC) 
T.T. v. 
Bellevue Sch. 
Dist. (2009, 
DC) 
S.H. v. 
Rowland 
Unified Sch. 
(2005, CA) 
Jones v. Long 
County Sch. 
(2012, DC) 
RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
Given that there 
were threats to 
plaintiff’s safety 
on the day the 
comment was 
first attributed to 
plaintiff and in 
the following 
weeks, the court 
held that it was 
reasonable for 
defendants to 
conclude that 
plaintiff’s 
presence at 
school posed a 
threat to his 
safety and the 
safety of others 
because of the 
possibility that 
violence might 
have erupted in 
the school due to 
plaintiff’s 
presence or 
speech (p. 
461)…student 
expression may 
be restricted 
where it would 
substantially 
interfere with 
the work of the 
school, or would 
cause material 
and substantial 
…the court must 
weigh the value 
of providing Tun 
with 
Constantine’s 
statement and 
the opportunity 
to cross-examine 
him against the 
burden that such 
a practice would 
place on the 
school 
administration. 
As this court 
recently noted, 
in light of the 
increasing 
challenges 
schools face in 
maintaining 
order and 
discipline, 
requiring them to 
permit the 
confrontation of 
student 
witnesses or 
even to disclose 
their identities in 
expulsion 
hearings is 
overly 
burdensome and 
unrealistic. This 
is particularly 
true given that 
…prior to 
T.T.’s 
emergency 
expulsion, the 
school district 
provided 
sufficient 
rudimentary 
precautions to 
comport with 
due process. As 
a general rule, 
notice and 
hearing should 
precede 
removal of that 
student from 
school. 
However, a 
student whose 
presence poses 
an ongoing 
threat of 
disrupting the 
academic 
process may be 
immediately 
removed from 
school, and the 
necessary 
notice and 
rudimentary 
hearing should 
follow as soon 
as practicable 
(pp. 15-
16)..The school  
Due to the 
nature of the 
violation and 
seriousness of 
possession of a 
weapon, the 
District Review 
Panel finds that 
other means of 
correction are 
not feasible or 
have repeatedly 
failed to bring 
about proper 
conduct. The 
presence of 
appellant would 
cause a 
continuing 
danger to the 
physical safety 
of the pupil or 
others (p. 
15)…although 
appellant 
presents a good 
school record, 
zero tolerance 
for dangerous 
weapons does 
not allow for 
different 
treatment for 
certain students 
who bring 
dangerous 
weapons to 
 
In order for a 
suspension to 
constitute a 
deprivation of a 
property 
interest in 
public 
education, the 
suspension 
must constitute 
a total 
exclusion from 
the education 
process (p. 14). 
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 interference with 
schoolwork or 
discipline (p. 
473)…Although 
students do not 
shed their 
constitutional 
rights to 
freedom of 
speech or 
expression at the 
schoolhouse 
gate, their 
constitutional 
rights are not 
automatically 
coextensive with 
the rights of 
adults in other 
settings (p. 474). 
In this context, it 
is well settled 
that school 
officials do not 
have to wait for 
actual disruption 
from the speech 
before they act; 
instead, school 
officials have an 
affirmative duty 
to not only 
ameliorate the 
harmful effects 
of disruptions, 
but to prevent 
them from 
happening in the 
first place…Not 
only are school 
officials free to 
act before the 
actual disruption 
occurs, they are 
not required to 
predict 
disruption with 
absolute 
certainty to 
satisfy the 
Tinker standard 
(pp. 480-481)… 
Moreover, 
forecasting  
the purpose 
behind the 
administrative 
expulsion 
process is to 
avoid the 
formalistic 
trappings, 
complexity and 
cost of 
adversarial 
litigation…Thus, 
in balancing all 
the factors, the 
defendants’ 
interests in 
avoiding the 
administrative 
burdens of 
formalized 
expulsion 
proceeding and 
protecting 
student 
witnesses greatly 
outweighs the 
minimal value 
derived from 
providing Tun 
with 
Constantine’s 
written statement 
and the 
opportunity to 
cross-examine 
him (pp. 943-
944)…Indeed, 
no one could 
possibly 
conclude that 
merely allowing 
one’s photo to be 
taken in the 
shower equates 
with something 
sexual. This is 
particularly true 
here because, as 
the photos 
reveal, Tun is 
not so much 
posing as trying 
to cover his 
nudity…  
 
district 
undeniably has 
a legitimate 
interest in 
preventing 
drug use near 
school and 
preventing 
disruption of 
the educational 
process (p. 26). 
school (p. 47).  
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 disruption is 
unmistakably 
difficult to do. 
Thus, rather than 
requiring 
certainty of 
disruption, 
Tinker allows 
school officials 
to act and 
prevent the 
speech where 
they might 
reasonably 
portend 
disruption form 
the student 
expression at 
issue…Because 
of the special 
circumstances of 
the school 
environment, the 
level of 
disturbance 
required to 
justify official 
intervention is 
lower inside a 
public school 
than it is outside 
the school (p. 
481). 
Accordingly, this 
is one of those 
rare school 
discipline cases 
where there is no 
rational 
relationship 
between the 
punishment and 
the offense (p. 
949)…In short, 
as there was no 
evidence to 
support either 
Whitticker’s 
charge or Platz’s 
finding that Tun 
engaged in some 
form of 
inappropriate 
sexual conduct, 
their acts, 
shocking to the 
conscience, and 
a violation of 
Tun’s 
substantive due 
process rights as 
a matter of law 
(p. 950). 
   
RQ2  
Intent vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
No data 
 
No data No data Bryan also 
reputedly said 
that he believed 
appellant had no 
intention of 
doing anything 
to Mr. Pollock’s 
car until the 
event actually 
occurred and 
was sorry about 
what had 
happened. 
Bryan further 
allegedly stated 
he believed that 
appellant had no 
intention of 
bringing the 
knife to school. 
He apologized 
 
No data 
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    for having to 
recommend 
appellant for 
expulsion and 
continued to 
stress that he 
had no say so in 
the matter in 
light of the 
district’s no 
tolerance 
policy…the 
principal 
arguments made 
against 
expulsion were 
that appellant’s 
possession of a 
knife at school 
was 
unintentional, 
appellant was 
not a danger to 
himself or 
anyone else, 
appellant 
deserved a 
second chance, 
and that there 
were 
alternatives to 
expulsion 
available (pp. 
12-14)…But 
even if the 
evidence in this 
regard were 
lacking, there is 
no question that 
appellant 
possessed a 
knife  on 
campus (pp. 24-
25)… Appellant 
attempted to 
mitigate his 
actions by 
essentially 
testifying that 
he put the 
binder in his 
backpack 
unconsciously 
when he was in 
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    a rush. But there 
is no 
requirement that 
the district 
review panel, 
who had the 
right to believe 
or disbelieve 
any witness’s 
testimony, give 
that explanation 
credence. Their 
rejection of 
appellant’s 
credibility on 
this point does 
not constitute 
reversible error 
(p. 39). 
 
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability 
Accordingly, 
even assuming 
arguendo that 
there was a First 
Amendment 
violation as to 
Daniel’s 
freedom of 
speech (which 
there was not), 
the individual 
school officials 
are entitled to 
summary 
judgment under 
the doctrine of 
qualified 
immunity (pp. 
483-484). 
Consequently, 
both Whitticker 
and Platz either 
knew, or 
reasonably 
should have 
known that there 
at least had to be 
some evidence 
of the Behavior 
Code violation 
before Tun could 
be expelled or 
otherwise 
disciplined, and 
correspondingly, 
that to expel him 
for a violation 
for which there 
was no evidence 
violated a clearly 
established 
fundamental 
right of due 
process. Thus, 
neither is entitled 
to qualified 
immunity as a 
matter of 
law…The 
defendants’ 
motion for 
summary 
judgment is 
granted as to  
 
No data No data No data 
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  Tun’s claims 
against FWCS, 
Mohr, and 
Rhodes, and also 
as to Tun’s 
claims against 
Whitticker and 
Platz to the 
extent they are 
being sued in 
their official 
capacities (p. 
951). 
   
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
…while the 
distribution of 
his speech at the 
school in his 
absence would 
eliminate any 
potential harm 
to Daniel at the 
school, it would 
not eliminate the 
potential harm 
and disruption to 
the school that 
could reasonably 
result from the 
response of 
students to his 
speech even in 
his absence (p. 
480)…courts 
must keep in 
mind that school 
officials also are 
entitled to rely 
upon their 
expertise and 
experience in 
making these 
often difficult 
judgments in 
extraordinary 
circumstance… 
The First 
Amendment 
does not deprive 
school 
administrators of 
the ability to 
rely upon their 
own 
considerable  
Finally, the court 
must weigh the 
value of 
providing Tun 
with 
Constantine’s 
statement and 
the opportunity 
to cross-examine 
him against the 
burden that such 
a practice would 
place on the 
school 
administration. 
As this court 
recently noted, 
in light of the 
increasing 
challenges 
schools face in 
maintaining 
order and 
discipline, 
requiring them to 
permit the 
confrontation of 
student 
witnesses or 
even to disclose 
their identities in 
expulsion 
hearings is 
overly 
burdensome and 
unrealistic. Thus, 
in balancing all 
the factors, the 
defendants’ 
interests in 
avoiding the  
 
No data No data No data 
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 experience, 
expertise, and 
judgment in 
recognizing and 
diffusing the 
potential for 
disruption and 
violence in 
public schools. 
Indeed, they are 
duty-bound to 
do just that. That 
duty is 
particularly 
acute when 
threats of 
physical 
violence have 
already been 
made and actual 
violence could 
well erupt if the 
hostile situation 
is not promptly 
and 
emphatically 
controlled (p. 
481). 
administrative 
burdens of 
formalized 
expulsion 
proceeding and 
protecting 
student 
witnesses greatly 
outweighs the 
minimal value 
derived from 
providing Tun 
with 
Constantine’s 
written statement 
and the 
opportunity to 
cross-examine 
him (pp. 943-
944) 
   
RQ5  
No 
Imminent 
Threat 
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ6 
Deemed 
Not 
Binding on 
Courts 
Although 
plaintiffs seek to 
second-guess 
with hindsight 
the judgment of 
school 
administrators, 
that is not the 
role of the 
courts. If the 
school’s 
decision satisfies 
the 
constitutional 
standard in 
Tinker, then it is 
irrelevant that a 
litigant or court 
believes the 
situation could 
have been  
When it comes 
to disciplinary 
matters, this 
court is to resist 
the temptation to 
become a super-
school board by 
substituting its 
judgment for that 
of school 
administrators. 
The Supreme 
Court cautions 
that it is not the 
role of the 
federal courts to 
set aside the 
decisions of 
school 
administrators 
which the court  
It is not the role 
of the federal 
courts to set 
aside decisions 
of school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking a basis 
in wisdom or 
compassion. 
Public high 
school students 
do have 
substantive and 
procedural 
rights while at 
school. But § 
1983 does not 
extend the right 
to relitigate in  
Perfection is 
seldom 
achieved in trial 
[or 
administrative] 
proceedings, 
and minor or 
trivial errors 
(e.g., in 
procedural 
matters or 
evidentiary 
rulings) are not 
uncommon. 
Such errors are 
usually found to 
be insubstantial, 
not warranting 
reversal on 
appeal (pp. 21-
22)…although  
…once school 
administrators 
tell a student 
what they heard 
or saw, ask why 
they heard or 
saw it, and 
allow a brief 
response, a 
student has 
received all the 
process that the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
demands (p. 
17)…the right 
to attend public 
school is not 
fundamental (p. 
21)…As such, 
courts must  
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 handled better. It 
is not the role of 
the federal 
courts to set 
aside decision of 
school 
administrators 
which the court 
may view as 
lacking a basis 
in wisdom or 
compassion (p. 
481). 
may view as 
lacking a basis in 
wisdom or 
compassion. The 
Seventh Circuit 
also has 
emphasized that 
federal courts 
must refrain 
from second-
guessing the 
disciplinary 
decisions made 
by school 
administrators 
(p. 938). 
federal court 
evidentiary 
questions 
arising in 
school 
disciplinary 
proceedings or 
the proper 
construction of 
school 
regulations. 
The system of 
public 
education that 
has evolved in 
this nation 
relies 
necessarily 
upon the 
discretion and 
judgment of 
school 
administrators 
and school 
board 
members, and 
§ 1983 was not 
intended to be 
a vehicle for 
federal-court 
corrections of 
errors in the 
exercise of that 
discretion… (p. 
25). 
administrative 
panel erred in 
refusing to issue 
witness 
subpoenas 
requested by 
student, reversal 
would not be 
required where 
student did not 
make offer of 
proof 
concerning 
what those 
witnesses would 
have said…The 
only harm 
identified by 
appellant is that 
Mr. H. was 
unable to attack 
the witnesses’ 
credibility… 
Thus, we do not 
see how 
attacking the 
credibility of 
the witnesses 
would have 
assisted 
appellant…The 
error in 
restricting Mr. 
H.’s questioning 
of them was 
therefore 
harmless (pp. 
35-37). 
bear in mind 
that schools are 
unlike the adult 
workplace and 
that children 
may regularly 
interact in a 
manner that 
would be 
unacceptable 
among adults 
(p. 27)…The 
undisputed 
facts show that 
the cafeteria 
incident did not 
constitute 
harassment and 
even if it did, 
Peek was not 
indifferent. As 
noted 
previously, 
conduct that 
would be 
deeply 
offensive, and 
actionable 
harassment, in 
an adult 
workplace may 
be part of the 
ordinarily 
unpleasantness 
that is a middle 
school cafeteria 
(p. 29). 
RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
No data 
 
No data No data Due to the 
nature of the 
violation and 
seriousness of 
possession of a 
weapon, the 
District Review 
Panel finds that 
other means of 
correction are 
not feasible or 
have repeatedly 
failed to bring 
about proper 
conduct. The 
presence of  
 
No data 
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    appellant would 
cause a 
continuing 
danger to the 
physical safety 
of the pupil or 
others (p. 15). 
 
RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevention 
of Future 
Disruption 
…student 
expression may 
be restricted 
where it would 
substantially 
interfere with 
the work of the 
school, or would 
cause material 
and substantial 
interference with 
schoolwork or 
discipline (p. 
473)…Given 
those fact, it was 
reasonable for 
the school to 
conclude that 
Daniel’s 
presence at the 
school- even if 
to engage in 
some type of 
speech to 
proclaim his 
innocence- 
posed a threat to 
his personal 
safety and the 
safety of other 
students because 
of the real 
possibility that 
violence could 
erupt in the 
school due to his 
presence and/or 
speech, and no 
rational jury 
could find 
otherwise (p. 
479). 
In this context, it 
is well settled 
that school 
officials do not 
have to wait for  
 
No data No data No data No data 
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 actual disruption 
from the speech 
before they act; 
instead, school 
officials have an 
affirmative duty 
to not only 
ameliorate the 
harmful effects 
of disruptions, 
but to prevent 
them from 
happening in the 
first place…Not 
only are school 
officials free to 
act before the 
actual disruption 
occurs, they are 
not required to 
predict 
disruption with 
absolute 
certainty to 
satisfy the 
Tinker standard 
(pp. 480-481) 
    
 
Table 1.1O. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent 
 J.S. v. Blue Mt. 
Sch. Dist. 
(2011, CA) 
Boim v. Fulton 
County Sch. 
(2006, DC) 
Commonwealth 
v. Smith (2008, 
CA) 
J.S. v. 
Bethlehem 
(2002, SSC) 
R.M. v. 
Washakie 
(2004, SSC) 
RQ1 
Threat vs. 
Individual 
Rights 
Because J.S. 
was suspended 
from school for 
speech that 
indisputably 
caused no 
substantial 
disruption in 
school and that 
could not 
reasonably have 
led school 
officials to 
forecast 
substantial 
disruption in 
school, the 
school district’s 
action violated  
…the court 
concludes that 
the content of 
Rachel’s story 
was sufficiently 
disturbing to 
cause school 
officials to 
reasonably fear 
substantial 
disruption of 
school 
activities. 
Therefore, the 
disciplinary 
action taken by 
defendants was 
justified under 
the Supreme 
The Supreme 
Judicial Court 
has 
acknowledged 
that 
notwithstanding 
the legitimate 
goal of school 
administrators 
to maintain a 
safe learning 
environment, 
students 
continue to 
have a 
legitimate 
expectation of 
privacy in their 
persons and in 
The court 
concluded that 
courts have 
permitted school 
officials to 
discipline 
students for 
conduct 
occurring off 
school premises 
where the 
conduct 
materially and 
substantially 
interferes with 
the educational 
process. The 
court pointed to 
the damaging 
The school 
district asserted 
that it had a 
compelling 
interest in 
providing for 
the safety and 
welfare of its 
students and that 
is was that 
interest that the 
expulsions 
protected. The 
Court agreed… 
the fundamental 
right to an 
opportunity for 
an education did 
not guarantee 
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 J.S.’s First 
Amendment 
free speech 
rights. We will 
accordingly 
reverse and 
remand that 
aspect of the 
District Court’s 
judgment (p. 
920)…The 
exercise of First 
Amendment 
rights in school, 
however, has to 
be applied in 
light of the 
special 
characteristics 
of the school 
environment, 
and thus the 
constitutional 
rights of 
students in 
public schools 
are not 
automatically 
coextensive 
with the rights 
of adults in 
other settings. 
Since Tinker, 
courts have 
struggled to 
strike a balance 
between 
safeguarding 
students’ First 
Amendment 
rights and 
protecting the 
authority of 
school 
administrators 
to maintain an 
appropriate 
learning 
environment (p. 
926)…We 
recognize that 
vulgar and 
offensive speech 
such as that  
Court decision 
in Tinker, and 
did not violate 
Rachel’s First 
Amendment 
rights. Given 
this conclusion, 
the Court finds 
it unnecessary 
to address the 
parties’ other 
arguments (p. 
10)…Tinker 
does not 
require school 
officials to wait 
until disruption 
actually occurs. 
In fact, they 
have a duty to 
prevent the 
occurrence of 
disturbances. 
While 
predicting 
disruption is 
unmistakably 
difficult, Tinker 
does not 
require 
certainty that 
disruption will 
occur, but 
rather the 
existence of 
facts which 
might 
reasonably lead 
school officials 
to forecast 
substantial 
disruption (pp. 
10-11)…The 
court concludes 
that Rachel’s 
story alone, 
when read in 
light of the 
recent history 
of school 
shootings, was 
sufficient to 
lead school 
officials  
the items they 
bring to 
school… In 
order to achieve 
a balance 
between these 
two equally 
legitimate needs 
and 
expectations it 
is evident that 
the school 
setting requires 
some easing of 
the restrictions 
to which 
searches by 
public 
authorities are 
ordinarily 
subject. The 
warrant 
requirement, in 
particular is 
unsuited to the 
school 
environment: 
requiring a 
teacher to 
obtain a warrant 
before 
searching a 
child suspected 
of an infraction 
of school rules 
(or of the 
criminal law) 
would unduly 
interfere with 
the maintenance 
of the swift and 
informal 
disciplinary 
procedures 
needed in the 
schools…Not 
only did the 
United States 
Supreme Court 
conclude in 
T.L.O. that 
obtaining a 
warrant was 
impractical in a  
effects on Mrs. 
Fulmer, Mr. 
Kartsotis and the 
school 
community and 
concluded that 
the school 
district did not 
violate J.S.’s 
First 
Amendment 
rights. 
Moreover, the 
majority noted 
that in this day 
and age where 
school violence 
is becoming 
more 
commonplace, 
school officials 
are justified in 
taking threats 
against faculty 
and students 
seriously (p. 
648)…the 
United States 
Supreme Court 
has recognized 
that the 
unbridled free 
expression of 
speech is not 
permissible in 
every setting… 
One of these 
settings is in the 
unique 
environment of 
our nation’s 
schools (p. 650). 
In various 
situations, the 
high courts of 
both the United 
States and 
Pennsylvania 
have performed 
the delicate 
balance and 
concluded that 
the 
constitutional  
that a student 
could not 
temporarily 
forfeit 
educational 
services through 
his own conduct 
(p. 1)…implicit 
within the 
constitutional 
guarantee of a 
thorough and 
efficient system 
of free schools 
is the need for a 
safe and secure 
school 
environment. A 
school cannot 
fulfill its basic 
purpose of 
providing an 
education 
without such an 
environment (p. 
16). A student’s 
right to an 
education may 
be 
constitutionally 
denied when 
outweighed by 
the school’s 
interest in 
protecting other 
students, 
teachers, and 
school property, 
and in 
preventing the 
disruption of the 
educational 
system (p. 19)… 
It is reasonably 
may be argued 
that a 
requirement that 
a student who is 
expelled for 
misconduct, no 
matter how 
egregious, be 
provided with 
alternate 
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 employed in this 
case-even made 
in jest- could 
damage the 
careers of 
teachers and 
administrators 
and we 
conclude only 
that the punitive 
action taken by 
the school 
district violated 
the First 
Amendment 
free speech 
rights of J.S. (p. 
930)… This 
standard, 
however, is 
relaxed in the 
school 
environment: 
Given the 
school’s need to 
be able to 
impose 
disciplinary 
sanctions for a 
wide range of 
unanticipated 
conduct 
disruptive of the 
educational 
process, the 
school 
disciplinary 
rules need not 
be as detailed as 
a criminal code 
(pp. 935-936). 
reasonably to 
forecast 
substantial 
disruption of or 
material 
interference 
with school 
activities-
specifically, 
that Rachel 
might attempt 
to shoot her 
math teacher 
(p.15). 
school setting, it 
also determined 
that the level of 
suspicion 
required to 
justify a 
warrantless 
search should 
be modified 
within the 
school context. 
Ordinarily, even 
a search that 
may be 
conducted 
without a 
warrant 
nevertheless 
would require a 
basis of 
probable cause 
to believe that a 
crime had been 
committed (pp. 
178-179). 
interests of the 
student, in 
certain 
circumstances, 
must yield to the 
school officials’ 
need to maintain 
order and to 
discipline when 
necessary to 
assure a safe 
school 
environment that 
is conducive to 
learning (p. 
651)…However, 
even if not a 
“true threat,” the 
school district 
might not have 
violated J.S.’s 
constitutional 
right to free 
speech by 
disciplining him 
if the speech 
was otherwise 
protected, but it 
in some fashion 
disrupted school 
work or invaded 
the rights of 
others. As 
discussed in 
greater detail 
below, this is 
because 
otherwise 
protected speech 
nonetheless may 
be subject to 
restriction in a 
school setting 
(pp. 652-653). 
education by a 
public school 
system, would 
be likely to have 
a serious 
detrimental 
effect on the 
ability of school 
officials to deter 
dangerous 
behavior within 
a school by 
imposing 
expulsion as a 
sanction (p. 20). 
We would note 
that just as no 
one doubt that 
the state had a 
compelling 
interest in 
keeping schools 
safe, we are 
confident that 
no one doubts 
that these 
policies are 
indeed good and 
worthwhile 
policies (p. 26). 
RQ2 Intent 
vs. 
Balance of 
Intent vs. 
Safety 
J.S. did not even 
intend for the 
speech to reach 
the school- in 
fact, she took 
specific steps to 
make the profile 
private so that 
only her friends 
could access it  
Regardless of 
whether Rachel 
intended the 
story to be 
read, the fact 
that she 
brought the 
notebook to 
school and 
passed it to  
 
No data No data No data 
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 (p. 930). another student 
was enough to 
cause school 
officials to be 
legitimately 
concerned that 
the story had 
been or might 
be read by 
others (p. 12). 
   
RQ3 
Immune 
from 
Liability  
 
No data 
 
No data No data No data No data 
RQ4 
Prefer 
Security 
No data 
 
No data No data In sum, the 
website created 
disorder and 
significantly and 
adversely 
impacted the 
delivery of 
instruction. 
Indeed, it was 
specifically 
aimed at this 
particular school 
district and 
seemed designed 
to create 
precisely this 
sort of upheaval. 
Based upon 
these facts, we 
are satisfied that 
the school 
district has 
demonstrated 
that J.S.’s 
website created 
an actual and 
substantial 
interference with 
the work of the 
school to a 
magnitude that 
satisfies the 
requirements of 
Tinker. Thus, for 
the reasons 
stated above, we 
find that the 
school district’s 
disciplinary  
 
No data 
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    action taken 
against J.S. did 
not violate his 
First 
Amendment 
right to freedom 
of speech (pp. 
674-675). 
 
RQ5  
No 
Imminent 
Threat 
Since Tinker, 
the Supreme 
Court has 
carved out a 
number of 
narrow 
categories of 
speech that a 
school may 
restrict even 
without the 
threat of 
substantial 
disruption…The 
first exception is 
set out in 
Fraser, which 
we interpreted 
to permit school 
officials to 
regulate lewd, 
vulgar, indecent, 
and plainly 
offensive speech 
in school…The 
second 
exception to 
Tinker is 
articulated in 
Hazelwood 
School District 
v. Kuhlmeier, 
which allows 
school officials 
to regulate 
school-
sponsored 
speech (that is, 
speech that a 
reasonable 
observer would 
view as the 
school’s own 
speech) on the 
basis of any 
legitimate  
 
No data No data No data No data 
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 pedagogical 
concern (p. 
927). 
    
RQ6 
Deemed 
not 
Binding on 
Courts 
Federal courts 
should not 
ordinarily 
intervene in the 
resolution of 
conflicts which 
arise in the daily 
operation of 
school system 
(p. 926)…The 
education of the 
nation’s youth is 
primarily the 
responsibility of 
parents, 
teachers, and 
state and local 
school officials, 
and not of 
federal judges 
(p. 926). 
Plaintiffs argue 
that D.F. is 
distinguishable 
because the 
student in that 
case actually 
read the story 
to his 
classmates. The 
Court does not 
find this 
distinction 
relevant. 
Although 
speech must be 
communicated 
in order to 
constitute a 
“true threat,” 
communication 
is not a 
prerequisite to 
suppression on 
Tinker grounds. 
As previously 
noted, Rachel 
took the 
notebook 
containing the 
story to school 
and passed it to 
another 
student, thus 
creating the 
risk, if not the 
likelihood, that 
it would be 
read. This was 
sufficient to 
qualify the 
story as student 
speech on 
school 
premises and to 
authorize 
school officials 
to take 
disciplinary 
action under 
Tinker (pp. 13-
14). 
No data We caution that 
it is for school 
districts to 
determine what 
is vulgar, lewd 
or plainly 
offensive, at 
least in the first 
instance. Great 
deference should 
be given to their 
determination, 
as courts must 
not become 
embroiled in 
micromanaging 
school officials’ 
administration 
of the 
institution’s 
daily 
affairs…school 
board…is in the 
best position to 
weigh the 
strengths and 
vulnerabilities of 
the town’s 785 
students. The 
First 
Amendment 
does not compel 
the court into 
this arena (p. 
672). 
Thus, we are 
asked to 
consider 
whether the 
provisions of the 
Wyoming 
constitution 
require a school 
district to 
provide an 
education to a 
student who has 
been lawfully 
expelled. We 
answer the 
reserved 
question in the 
negative (p. 
1)…In an ideal 
world it surely 
would be 
preferable to 
provide an 
alternative 
education to 
students who are 
expelled; and 
even in our own 
imperfect world, 
it is still a better 
idea to do so (at 
least in my 
opinion). 
However, we 
are judges, not 
legislators; and 
unless the 
legislation is 
determined to be 
unconstitutional, 
it is really 
properly a 
legislative 
decision as to 
what is a good 
idea. Thus, the 
only proper 
inquiry for this 
court is whether 
our state 
constitution  
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     requires the 
provision of 
such educational 
services. And 
the answer to 
this question is 
quite clearly that 
the constitution 
does not require 
it (p. 26)…We 
similarly find 
that it does not 
violate equal 
protection to 
provide an 
alternate 
education to 
disabled 
students that are 
expelled while 
not providing 
such an 
education for 
non-disable 
student (p. 29). 
RQ7 
Rejection 
of 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
No data 
 
No data No data No data The court held 
that the district’s 
actions were the 
least onerous 
means of 
accomplishing 
that compelling 
interest, and the 
court did not 
agree that an 
alternate 
education had to 
be provided to 
lawfully 
expelled 
students (p. 1). 
In light of these 
considerations, 
we determine 
that a school 
district is not 
constitutionally 
required to 
provide an 
alternate 
education to 
lawfully 
expelled 
students (p. 26). 
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RQ8 
Preemptive 
Prevention 
of Future 
Disruption 
The facts in this 
case do not 
support the 
conclusion that 
a forecast of 
substantial 
disruption was 
reasonable (p. 
928)…The facts 
simply do not 
support the 
conclusion that 
the school 
district could 
have reasonably 
forecasted a 
substantial 
disruption of or 
material 
interference 
with the school 
as a result of 
J.S.’s profile. 
Under Tinker, 
therefore, the 
school district 
violated J.S.’s 
First 
Amendment 
free speech 
rights when it 
suspended her 
for creating the 
profile (p. 931). 
In Tinker, the 
Supreme Court 
held that school 
officials may 
justify the 
suppression of 
student speech 
by showing 
facts which 
might 
reasonably 
have led school 
authorities to 
forecast 
substantial 
disruption of or 
material 
interference 
with school 
activities. 
Tinker does not 
require school 
officials to wait 
until disruption 
actually 
occurs… While 
predicting 
disruption is 
unmistakably 
difficult, Tinker 
does not 
require 
certainty that 
disruption will 
occur, but 
rather the 
existence  of 
facts which 
might 
reasonably lead 
school officials 
to forecast 
substantial 
disruption (pp. 
10-11)…In 
light of the 
recent history 
of school 
shootings, 
school officials 
were justified 
in perceiving 
the story as a 
portent of  
 
No data In fact, it has 
been offered that 
school officials, 
have a duty to 
prevent the 
occurrence of 
disturbances. 
Moreover, due 
to the 
importance of 
the educational 
environment and 
the state’s 
interest therein, 
the level of 
disturbance 
required to 
justify action is 
relatively lower 
in a public 
school than it 
might be on a 
street corner. 
Finally, this 
ability to 
forecast a 
substantial 
disruption is not 
limited to prior-
restraint case, 
but applies to 
punishment after 
publication 
(p.662). 
No data 
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  possible future 
violence 
(p.11)… In this 
case, on the 
other hand, 
school officials 
feared that 
Rachel’s story 
was a possible 
plan disguised 
as a dream, and 
their 
disciplinary 
action was at 
least in part an 
attempt to 
prevent actual 
violence from 
occurring on 
the school 
campus (p. 17). 
   
 
  As depicted in Table 1.2, the first level of textual analysis reveals that a majority 
of the court cases provided support rather than failure to support the research questions. 
Of course support was found more among certain research questions compared to others. 
For example, research questions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 appear to have the largest number of 
court cases providing support. Thus, the issues made apparent in these 5 research 
questions appear to be significant in how the courts decide to rule either for or against the 
neoliberal, zero-tolerance social control efforts in schools. On the other hand, while 
research questions 5, 7, and 8 did find support among the judicial decisions under 
scrutiny, there were far fewer cases providing support for these three research questions. 
Some court decisions revealed passages that provided inconclusive findings, whereby 
statements made by the jurists provided support followed by other statements that failed 
to support a particular research question, or vice versa. Thus, in those instances when a 
research question was sometimes supported and sometimes rejected, the evidence was 
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treated as a rejection of the research question for the applicable court decisions. 
Relatively few cases provided only qualitative evidence rejecting, or failing to support, 
the research questions. Regardless, as displayed in Table 1.2, all of the research questions 
in the first level of textual analysis found more support than failed support. 
 
Table 1.2. Summary Table of Plain Meaning Results for each Research Question 
 Cases 
Supporting 
Cases  
Rejecting 
Cases 
Supporting & 
Rejecting 
No  
Data 
Research 
Question 1 
 
44 (59%) 1 (1%) 20 (27%) 10 (13%) 
Research 
Question 2 
 
16 (21%) 7 (9%) 0 (0%) 52 (69%) 
Research 
Question 3 
 
24 (32%) 3 (4%) 3 (4%) 45 (60%) 
Research 
Question 4 
 
25 (33%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 48 (64%) 
Research 
Question 5 
 
4 (5%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%) 70 (93%) 
Research 
Question 6 
 
50 (67%) 2 (3%) 4 (5%) 19 (25%) 
Research 
Question 7 
 
5 (7%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 70 (93%) 
Research 
Question 8 
 
11 (15%) 2 (3%) 0 (0%) 62 (83%) 
 
 In addition to evaluating jurisprudential intent by carefully examining plain 
meaning, a second level of textual analysis builds upon the first by identifying underlying 
themes that emerge from the plain meaning data and reflect language and concepts 
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embodied in the theoretical framework. The second level of analysis is interpretive, but 
essential in order to explain and uncover how jurisprudential intent conveys a legal 
language that signifies principles representative of the various mechanisms identified in 
the theoretical framework detailing how neoliberal court mechanisms support zero-
tolerance social control initiatives in schools. Thus, the manifest content of legal thought 
is made apparent by first discerning jurisprudential intent from the plain meaning of court 
decisions and then filtering that intent through the theoretical framework to make explicit 
the nature of the political economic philosophy encoded within the law. The text 
segments and/or passages, which serve as manifest content, are listed by court case under 
the emergent theme they support (see Tables 1.3A through 1.3E). How these themes, 
which are represented by repetitious manifest content across cases, relate back to the 
neoliberal theoretical framework will be discussed in detail in chapter 7. 
 
Table 1.3A. Level II Analysis: Emergent Themes from the Jurisprudential Intent 
 Theme 1 Data: Interest Balancing 
 
Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. 
(2002, CA) 
…it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the 
invasion of personal rights (pp. 968-969). 
 
Hardie v. Churchill 
(2009, DC) 
…the court finds that the process used for Hardie’s expulsion proceedings 
struck the proper balance between administrative efficiency and protecting 
Hardie’s interest in attending school. The benefit of an additional hearing to 
ensure Hardie’s punishment was just was outweighed by the cost imposed on 
the limited resources of the school board (pp. 19-20). 
 
Sypniewski v. 
Warren Hills 
(2001, DC) 
Schools, however, must consider the sensibilities of other students, and the 
freedom to express unpopular opinions must be balanced against the interest in 
teaching students the limitations of socially appropriate behavior (pp. 52-59). 
 
Colvin v. Lowndes 
County (2000, DC) 
School boards of this and other states and of their aim to create a school 
environment conducive to learning, by eliminating fear of crime and violence, 
such efforts must be balanced with the constitutional guarantees afforded to the 
children (p. 506). 
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In re Hinterlong 
(2003, CA) 
Having determined that the crime stoppers privilege restricts Hinterlong’s 
cognizable common law claims, we next determine whether the abrogation of 
those claims is arbitrary and unreasonable when balanced against the 
legislature’s actual purpose…His inability to obtain discovery concerning how 
the tipster obtained the information provided to Clements severely impedes 
Hinterlong’s prosecution of his common law causes of action against these 
parties (p. 630). 
 
New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. (1985, SC) 
…the special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either 
the safety of school children and teachers or the educational process itself 
justifies the court in [exempting] school searches from the warrant and probable 
cause requirements, and in applying a standard determined by balancing the 
relevant interests (p. 325)… But striking a balance between schoolchildren’s 
legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need to 
maintain an environment in which learning can take place requires some easing 
of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject 
(p.326)…Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests 
suggest that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard 
of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to 
adopt such a standard (pp. 340-341). 
 
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. 
Fraser (1986, SC) 
The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in 
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing 
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior (p. 
681). 
 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 
v. Acton (1995, SC) 
… balancing the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests (p. 653). 
 
Sims v. Bracken 
County Sch. (2010, 
DC) 
However, students typically have a lesser expectation of privacy than members 
of the public generally. While students’ constitutional rights do not evaporate at 
the public school’s doors, the essence of those rights is balanced against the 
need for teachers and administrators to have the freedom to maintain order in 
school…the Supreme court held that the Fourth Amendment  applies to searches 
conducted by school officials, but rejected the adherence to a probable cause 
requirement (pp. 18-19) …courts will look to the school official’s actions 
balanced against the special needs dictated in the public school setting where the 
state is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety (p.  30). 
 
Wooleyhan v. Cape 
Henlopen (2011, 
DC) 
In establishing these minimum procedural guidelines, the court balanced the 
school’s need to maintain order free from the burden of elaborate hearing 
requirements against the general interest of arriving at the truth inherent in the 
concept of due process and giving a student in jeopardy of serious loss notice of 
the case against him and opportunity to meet it (pp. 40-41). 
 
Porter v. Ascension 
(2004, CA) 
Because the search of the younger son was reasonable at inception, and 
conducted in a reasonable manner when balanced against the school’s interest in 
its students’ safety and welfare, the younger son’s Fourth Amendment claim 
failed (p. 608). 
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Bundick v. Bay 
City Indep. Sch. 
(2001, DC) 
However, given the relaxed standard applicable to searches and seizures o 
school properties, Bundick’s claim fails. In striking the balance of students’ 
legitimate expectations of privacy and schools’ equally legitimate need to 
maintain the proper educational environment, the United States Supreme Court 
eased the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily 
subject; the Court rejected the requirements of a warrant or probable cause in 
favor of a simple reasonableness under the circumstances standard (p. 738). 
 
Tun v. Fort Wayne 
Cmty. (2004, DC) 
Thus, in balancing all the factors, the defendants’ interests in avoiding the 
administrative burdens of formalized expulsion proceeding and protecting 
student witnesses greatly outweighs the minimal value derived from providing 
Tun with Constantine’s written statement and the opportunity to cross-examine 
him …the court must weigh the value of providing Tun with Constantine’s 
statement and the opportunity to cross-examine him against the burden that such 
a practice would place on the school administration (pp. 943-944).  
 
J.S. v. Blue Mt. 
Sch. Dist. (2011, 
CA) 
Since Tinker, courts have struggled to strike a balance between safeguarding 
students’ First Amendment rights and protecting the authority of school 
administrators to maintain an appropriate learning environment (p. 926). 
 
Commonwealth v. 
Smith (2008, CA) 
The Supreme Judicial Court has acknowledged that notwithstanding the 
legitimate goal of school administrators to maintain a safe learning environment, 
students continue to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their persons 
and in the items they bring to school… In order to achieve a balance between 
these two equally legitimate needs and expectations it is evident that the school 
setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public 
authorities are ordinarily subject (pp. 178-179). 
 
J.S. v. Bethlehem 
(2002, SSC) 
In various situations, the high courts of both the United States and Pennsylvania 
have performed the delicate balance and concluded that the constitutional 
interests of the student, in certain circumstances, must yield to the school 
officials’ need to maintain order and to discipline when necessary to assure a 
safe school environment that is conducive to learning (p. 651)…school 
board…is in the best position to weigh the strengths and vulnerabilities of the 
town’s 785 students (p. 672). 
 
Northwestern Sch. 
v. Linke (2002, 
SSC) 
After weighing the students’ privacy interests and the character of the search 
against the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, we 
conclude that the drug-testing program here is constitutional (p. 974). 
 
State v. Best (2010, 
SSC) 
In weighing the student’s expectations of privacy on the one hand and the 
school’s interest in maintaining discipline and order on the other, the court 
decided that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard 
of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause (pp. 109-110). 
 
Pendleton v. 
Fassett (2009, DC) 
Here, the governmental interest was maintaining order…The general 
governmental interest in safe and disciplined schools in order to promote and 
ensure a productive learning environment is more weighty here…(p. 21). 
 
R.M. v. Washakie 
(2004, SSC) 
A student’s right to an education may be constitutionally denied when 
outweighed by the school’s interest in protecting other students, teachers, and 
school property, and in preventing the disruption of the educational system (p. 
19). 
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Table 1.3B. Level II Analysis: Emergent Themes from the Jurisprudential Intent 
 Theme 2 Data: Qualified Immunity 
 
Stafford v. Redding 
(2009, SC) 
The official who ordered the unconstitutional search is entitled to qualified 
immunity (p. 368). 
 
S.G. v. Sayreville 
Bd. of Educ. (2003, 
CA) 
In any event, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity (p. 423). 
 
Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. 
(2002, CA) 
…the school board cannot be held liable for any constitutional deprivation…(p. 
968). 
 
Seal v. Morgan 
(2000, CA) 
Because we have concluded that Superintendent Morgan was entitled to 
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, we need not and do not 
address the question… of whether he had the authority… (p. 581). 
 
Evans v. Bd. of 
Educ. (2010, DC) 
…he failed to address the situation or take any remedial measures, and 
that he then retaliated against L.E. by suspending her when she was subject to 
forced sexual conduct. Therefore, Smathers is not entitled to qualified 
immunity… (pp. 32-33). 
 
Cuff v. Valley Cent. 
Sch. Dist. (2010, 
DC) 
School administrators must be permitted to react quickly and decisively to 
address a threat of physical violence against their students, without worrying 
that they will have to face years of litigation second-guessing their judgment as 
to whether the threat posed a real risk of substantial disturbance (p. 470). 
 
Lee v. Lenape 
Valley Reg’l (2009, 
DC) 
Whether Mr. deMarrais qualifies for immunity is a triable issue 
because there exists questions of fact as to whether Mr. deMarrais’ failure to 
comply with board policy rises to the level of a knowing violation of a right… 
(pp. 27-28). 
 
Hardie v. Churchill 
(2009, DC) 
Plaintiff argues that the municipality should be liable for the board’s violation of 
Hardie’s due process right due to failure to train or adequately supervise school 
district personnel…the court dismisses this claim (p. 20). 
 
Brett N. v. Cmty 
Unit Sch. Dist. 
(2009, DC) 
Public officials may have qualified immunity if their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known… Here, the individual defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity… (p. 13). 
 
Barnett v. Tipton 
County (2009, DC) 
Under the TGTLA, all government entities are immune from suit for any injury 
which stems from the exercise of governmental functions, except as specifically 
provided by the act (p. 986). 
 
Hill v. Sharber 
(2008, DC) 
…there is no need to address the defendants’ arguments that the claims against 
Deputy Booker and Ryan are barred under the qualified immunity doctrine, and 
that the official capacity claims against all four defendants fail because Hill has 
not established governmental entity liability under Section 1983 (p. 681). 
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Morgan v. Snider 
High (2007, DC) 
Simmons and Bailey are not liable for any purported constitutional violations 
arising from the vehicle searches (pp. 14-15)…even if the court somehow found 
a constitutional violation, the case law probably reassured the defendants that 
they were on solid legal footing, and thus they are entitled to qualified immunity 
(p. 28). 
 
Roy v. Fulton 
County Sch. (2007, 
DC) 
The gist of the plaintiffs’ allegations is that school officials breached various 
express policies designed to protect students’ constitutional rights. Assuming 
that is true, the school district is not liable for its employee’s breach of 
admittedly constitutional express policies (p. 1321). 
 
Bogle-Assegai v. 
Bloomfield (2006, 
DC) 
In light of the court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims for the reasons detailed 
above, the court need not reach defendants’’ arguments concerning qualified 
immunity (p. 244). 
 
McKinley v. Lott 
(2005, DC) 
However, a municipality may not be held liable under Section 1983 under a 
theory of respondent superior (pp. 9-10). 
 
Posthumus v. Bd. 
of Educ. (2005, 
DC) 
The court finds it unnecessary to address all of defendants’ arguments because it 
concludes that Posthumus’ claims fail at the preliminary stage of the qualified 
immunity analysis…the court finds no valid claim…the court need not reach the 
issue of qualified immunity (p. 897). 
  
Collins v. Prince 
William County 
(2004, DC) 
The school officials had qualified immunity as it was not clearly established that 
they could not recommend expulsion for a student’s unlawful activity occurring 
off school grounds (p. 1). The school board cannot be held liable for the 
decision to expel Collins… protected by the qualified immunity doctrine (pp. 
34-37). 
 
In re Hinterlong 
(2003, CA) 
Absent both pleading and proof of immunity, Clements can be held liable under 
Hinterlong’s claims (p. 627)… Clements is also not cloaked with immunity 
from personal liability where her actions are not incident to or within the scope 
of her professional duties…(p. 628). 
 
C.H. v. Folks 
(2010, DC) 
Plaintiff fails, however, to tie the search of his pockets in any manner to any 
action or inaction of Perez and Gray. Therefore, at this point, plaintiff fails to 
allege sufficient facts to implicate their supervisory liability for the pocket 
search (pp. 25-26)… The district retains its governmental immunity (p.28). 
 
Beard v. Whitmore 
Lake (2005, CA) 
However, the teachers and officer were entitled to qualified immunity because 
the law at the time the searches were conducted did not clearly establish that the 
searches were unreasonable under the particular circumstances present in the 
case (p. 598)… Because the searches in this case did not violate clearly 
established law, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity (p. 608).
  
Sims v. Bracken 
County Sch. (2010, 
DC) 
Defendant Ray  is entitled to qualified immunity relative to her search of the 
jacket (p. 23)… Defendant Ray is entitled to qualified immunity for authorizing 
the search of K.S.’ s person (p. 26)… Defendant Ray is also entitled to qualified 
immunity relative to this seizure (pp. 33-34). 
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Lausin v. Bishko 
(2010, DC) 
...a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, 
death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of 
the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in 
connection with a governmental or proprietary function… Richmond Heights 
Board of Education is a political subdivision, and as such, it had immunity (p. 
631)…the individual school board defendants, Mr. Bishko, Dr. Wallace, and Dr. 
Calinger, are entitled to immunity (p. 631). 
 
Pendleton v. 
Fassett (2009, DC) 
The available case law therefore did not give the instant officials fair warning 
that their conduct was unconstitutional. Accordingly, Fisher, Welch, Fassett, 
and Riggs are protected from a civil damages suit for their allegedly 
unconstitutional conduct by the doctrine of qualified immunity (p. 32). 
 
Wooleyhan v. Cape 
Henlopen (2011, 
DC) 
Accordingly, the court concludes that a reasonable official would not know that 
such con 
duct violated procedural due process, and Yor, Mrazeck, and Maull are entitled 
to qualified immunity on the procedural due process claim (p.80)…Jester is not 
entitled to qualified immunity for Wooleyhan’s only remaining federal law 
claim against her- unlawful detention. (pp. 80-81). 
 
Porter v. Ascension 
(2004, CA) 
Even if we find that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged 
violation, however, a defendant will still be entitled to qualified immunity if the 
defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established 
law at the time of the violation (p. 614)… While we cannot agree with its 
finding that there was no violation of the First Amendment, we affirm its 
judgment on its alternative ground that Principal Braud is entitled to qualified 
immunity (p. 625). 
 
Demers v. 
Leominster Sch. 
(2003, DC) 
Even if the law is clearly established, an official is entitled to qualified 
immunity if at the time of the challenged actions, such official’s belief that his 
or her actions were lawful is objectively legally reasonable…A reasonable, 
though mistaken conclusion about the lawfulness of one’s conduct does not 
subject a governmental official to personal liability (p. 207)…there is limited 
case law on this issue of school violence in this Circuit, which lends further 
credence to conclude that this area of the law is unsettled. Therefore, the 
individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity (p. 208). 
 
Butler v. Rio 
Rancho Pub. 
(2003, DC) 
Since the Butlers failed to state a substantive due process violation, we conclude 
the school is entitled to qualified immunity on the Butlers' substantive due 
process claims (p. 1201). 
 
Defabio v. E. 
Hampton Union 
(2009, DC) 
Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that there was a First Amendment 
violation as to Daniel’s freedom of speech (which there was not), the individual 
school officials are entitled to summary judgment under the doctrine of qualified 
immunity (pp. 483-484). 
 
Tun v. Fort Wayne 
Cmty (2004, DC) 
Thus, neither is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law…The 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to Tun’s claims against 
FWCS, Mohr, and Rhodes, and also as to Tun’s claims against Whitticker and 
Platz to the extent they are being sued in their official capacities (p. 951). 
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 Theme 3 Data: Disempowered Citizenship 
 
Posthumus v. Bd. 
of Educ. (2005, 
DC) 
…because the constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, school 
officials may limit speech in schools in ways that the government could not do 
outside the school context (p. 900). School disciplinary rules need not be as 
detailed as a criminal code (p. 903). 
 
Anderson v. 
Milbank Sch. 
(2000, DC) 
…the rule was a zero tolerance rule… constitutional rights of public school 
students are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults (p. 686). 
 
Hazelwood v. 
Kuhlmeier (1988, 
SC) 
A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic 
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar 
speech outside the school (p. 261)… we have nonetheless recognized that the 
First Amendment rights of students in the public schools are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, and must be applied in 
light of the special characteristics of the school environment (pp. 266-267). 
 
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. 
Fraser (1986, SC) 
 
…the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings (p. 682)… maintaining 
security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school 
disciplinary procedures… Given the school’s need to be able to impose 
disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of 
the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a 
criminal code (p. 686). 
 
Demers v. 
Leominster Sch. 
(2003, DC) 
While the supreme court has made it clear that public school students do not 
shed their constitutional rights as the schoolhouse gate, it has also established 
that a student’s First Amendment rights are not coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings (p. 200). 
 
Defabio v. E. 
Hampton Union 
(2009, DC) 
…student expression may be restricted where it would substantially interfere 
with the work of the school, or would cause material and substantial interference 
with schoolwork or discipline (p. 473)…Although students do not shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate, 
their constitutional rights are not automatically coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings (p. 474). 
 
J.S. v. Blue Mt. 
Sch. Dist. (2011, 
CA) 
The exercise of First Amendment rights in school, however, has to be applied in 
light of the special characteristics of the school environment, and thus the 
constitutional rights of students in public schools are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings (p. 926)… Given the 
school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of 
unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school 
disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code (pp. 935-936). 
 
Morgan v. Snider 
High (2007, DC) 
The accommodation of the privacy interests of school children with the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in 
the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be 
based on probable cause (p. 15)…In the context of school rules, flexibility or 
breadth should not necessarily be confused for vagueness…Given the 
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 peculiar issues facing school administrators, a school’s disciplinary rules need 
not be drafted as narrowly or with the same precision as criminal statutes (p. 
21). 
Hammock v. Keys 
(2000, DC) 
Given a school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanction for a wide 
range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, school 
disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes 
criminal sanctions (pp. 1230-1232). 
 
Commonwealth v. 
Smith (2008, CA) 
The warrant requirement, in particular is unsuited to the school environment: 
requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an 
infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with 
the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the 
schools…Not only did the United States Supreme Court conclude in T.L.O. that 
obtaining a warrant was impractical in a school setting, it also determined that 
the level of suspicion required to justify a warrantless search should be modified 
within the school context. Ordinarily, even a search that may be conducted 
without a warrant nevertheless would require a basis of probable cause to 
believe that a crime had been committed (pp. 178-179). 
  
Doran v. 
Contoocook (2009, 
DC) 
Reasonableness is the touchstone in any assessment of the constitutionality of a 
search or seizure, and while, in most cases, reasonableness demands a warrant 
and a showing of probable cause, such is not necessarily the case in the public 
school context… searches and seizures in public schools can be conducted 
without warrant or probable cause (p. 191). Unemancipated minors lack some of 
the most fundamental rights of self-determination-including the right to come 
and go at will… (p. 193). 
 
Hill v. Sharber 
(2008, DC) 
The Supreme Court has held that the substantial need of teachers and 
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require 
strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable 
cause…The Sixth Circuit has also noted that, in the case of searches in the 
school context, individualized suspicion is not necessarily required (pp. 676-
677). 
 
In re L.A. (2001, 
SSC) 
It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to 
which searchers by public authorities are ordinarily subject…School officials 
need not obtain a warrant…the substantial interest of teachers and 
administrators in maintaining order in the schools does not require strict 
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause (p. 885). 
 
Commonwealth v. 
Lawrence L. (2003, 
SSC) 
…the typical requirements of warrant and probable cause are relaxed when a 
school official conducts a search of a student. The relaxation of the warrant and 
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment are only applicable to 
school officials who are not acting in conjunction with or at the behest of law 
enforcement agencies…the Supreme Court recognized the particular interests of 
school officials in maintaining a safe learning environment and taking swift 
disciplinary action (pp. 880-822). 
 
State v. Best (2010, 
SSC) 
A school administer need only satisfy the lessor reasonable grounds standard 
rather than the probable cause standard to search a student’s vehicle parked on 
school property (p. 102)… In weighing the student’s expectations of privacy on 
the one hand and the school’s interest in maintaining discipline and order on the 
other, the court decided that the public interest is best served by a Fourth  
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 Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause (pp. 
109-110). 
 
In re K.K. (2011, 
CA) 
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that 
the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in 
the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches by 
based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or 
is violating the law (p. 653)…There is nothing in the developing case law that 
indicates school officials must conduct an independent investigation as to the tip 
or its reliability (p. 654). 
 
New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. (1985, SC) 
…greater emphasis should be placed on the special characteristics of elementary 
and secondary schools that make it unnecessary to afford students the same 
constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a non-school 
setting…the special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens 
either the safety of school children and teachers or the educational process itself 
justifies the court in [exempting] school searches from the warrant and probable 
cause requirements (p. 325).  
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 
v. Acton (1995, SC) 
 
We have found such “special needs”  to exist in the public school context. 
There, the warrant requirement would unduly interfere with the maintenance of 
the swift and informal disciplinary procedures that are needed, and strict 
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause would 
undercut the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to 
maintain order in the schools (p. 653). 
 
Sims v. Bracken 
County Sch. (2010, 
DC) 
However, students typically have a lesser expectation of privacy than members 
of the public generally. (pp. 18-19)…the Supreme court held that the Fourth 
Amendment  applies to searches conducted by school officials, but rejected the 
adherence to a probable cause requirement (pp. 18-19)… Reasonable suspicion 
demands a less exacting standard of constitutional scrutiny than does probable 
cause (p. 22). 
 
Lausin v. Bishko 
(2010, DC) 
…it is clear that in a school setting the standard for a Fourth Amendment 
analysis does not require probable cause (p. 629). 
 
Pendleton v. 
Fassett (2009, DC) 
Generally, in order to conduct a search, an officer must have probable cause to 
believe an individual is engaged in illegal activity and that evidence bearing on 
that offense will be found in the place to be searched. In the school setting, 
however, the level of suspicion required to justify a search is less than probable 
cause…the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in 
the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be 
based on probable cause (pp. 15-16) )…In a school setting, it is not always 
necessary that the reasonable suspicion be individualized; that is, school 
officials my conduct searches of multiple students without a suspicion that a 
particular student has committed an infraction (p. 18). 
 
Bundick v. Bay 
City Indep. Sch. 
(2001, DC) 
In striking the balance of students’ legitimate expectations of privacy and 
schools’ equally legitimate need to maintain the proper educational 
environment, the United States Supreme Court eased the restrictions to which 
searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject; the Court rejected the 
requirements of a warrant or probable cause in favor of a simple reasonableness  
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 under the circumstances standard (p. 738). 
 
Northwestern Sch. 
v. Linke (2002, 
SSC) 
The United States Supreme Court has taken the view that while public schools 
are state actors subject to constitutional oversight, the nature of a school’s role is 
custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could 
not be exercised over free adults (p. 979)…We find that students are entitled to 
less privacy at school than adults would enjoy in comparable situations. In any 
realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expectation 
of privacy than members of the population generally (pp. 979-980). 
 
Table 1.3D. Level II Analysis: Emergent Themes from the Jurisprudential Intent 
 Theme 4 Data: Empowered Discretion of School Authorities 
 
Stafford v. Redding 
(2009, SC) 
Standards of conduct are for school administrators to determine without second-
guessing by the courts lacking the experience to appreciate what may be needed 
(p. 356). 
 
S.G. v. Sayreville 
Bd. of Educ. (2003, 
CA) 
…the determination or what manner of speech is inappropriate properly rests 
with the school officials (p. 423). 
 
Piekosz-Murphy v. 
Bd. of Educ. (2012, 
DC) 
It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school 
administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or 
compassion…It seems that the professionals in this sad train of events exercised 
questionable judgment…But we can’t say what the defendant’s did violated the 
due process clauses... (p. 961). 
 
Ottaviano v. Kings 
Park (2010, DC) 
…the Supreme Court has stated that federal courts are not authorized to 
construe school regulations (pp. 25-26). 
 
Evans v. Bd. of 
Educ. (2010, DC) 
Section 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary 
questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction 
of school regulations. The system of public education that has evolved in this 
nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school 
administrators… (p. 16). 
 
Cuff v. Valley Cent. 
Sch. Dist. (2010, 
DC) 
Although plaintiffs seek to second-guess with hindsight the judgment of school 
administrators, that is not the role of the courts…It is not the role of the federal 
courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view 
as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion (pp. 469-470). 
 
Brett N. v. Cmty 
Unit Sch. Dist. 
(2009, DC) 
…it is not the role of the court to second-guess the board’s policy, however 
misguided it may be, so long as it is rationally related to the interests sought to 
be protected (pp. 8-11). 
 
Morgan v. Snider 
High (2007, DC) 
It is not the role of federal courts to set aside the decisions of school 
administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or 
compassion. The Seventh Circuit of Appeals also has stressed that federal courts 
ought to refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school 
administrators (p. 13)…The role of the courts is not to second-guess the  
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 decisions of school administrators (pp. 23-24). 
 
Vann v. Stewart 
(2006, DC) 
Assuming, arguendo, the DHA and school board applied the improper standard 
when considering plaintiff’s case, the court cannot conclude that such a failure 
was so significant or substantial that it could result in unfair or mistaken 
findings or misconduct or an arbitrary exclusion from school (p. 889)…it is not 
the role of the courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the 
court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion (p. 890). 
 
Posthumus v. Bd. 
of Educ. (2005, 
DC) 
Fraser teaches that judgments regarding what speech is appropriate in school 
matters should be left to the schools rather than the courts (p. 901). 
 
Anderson v. 
Milbank Sch. 
(2000, DC) 
Finally, the education of the nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of 
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal 
judges…This case, although it presents matters of some concern to the court, as 
already expressed, is an appropriate case for summary judgment (p. 689). 
 
Hammock v. Keys 
(2000, DC) 
the court notes that the system of public education… relies necessarily upon the 
discretion of school administrators and school board members… Vesting a 
school official with the discretion to determine which situations warrant 
expulsion is not only necessary in order to maintain discipline and good order, it 
is desirable (pp. 1232-1233). It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside 
decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis 
in wisdom or compassion (p. 1224)… Even if the discipline imposed could be 
construed as harsh or drastic, the United States Supreme Court position on this 
is clear: § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal-court corrections of 
errors by school administrators in the exercise of discretion… (p. 1234). 
 
Fuller v. Decatur 
Pub. (2000, DC) 
At the outset, it is important to note that a federal court’s role in school 
disciplinary matters is very limited. School discipline is an area which the courts 
are reluctant to enter (p. 821)…It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside 
decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis 
in wisdom or compassion (pp. 821-822). 
 
Doe v. Bd. of Educ. 
(1995, DC) 
It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school 
administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or 
compassion (p. 10)…The area of school discipline is a realm in which the courts 
enter with great hesitation and reluctance. Generally, the decision of whether or 
not to expel a student for gross disobedience or misconduct is best left to the 
discretion of the school board (pp. 13-14). 
 
Edwards v. 
O’Fallon Twp. 
(1999, CA) 
…we are consistently reluctant to intrude upon the disciplinary decisions of 
school districts (p. 1078). 
 
E.M. v. Briggs 
(1996, SSC) 
It should be here noted that the management, supervision and determinations of 
policy are the prerogative and responsibility of the school officials; and that the 
courts should be reluctant to enter therein…It is the policy of the law not to 
favor limitations on the powers of boards of education, but rather to give them a 
free hand to function within the sphere of their responsibilities (p. 757)… 
Section 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary 
questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction 
of school regulations. The system of public education that has evolved in this 
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 nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school 
administrators and school board members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a 
vehicle for federal court correction of errors in the exercise of that discretion (p. 
757). 
 
J.M. v. Webster 
County Bd. (2000, 
SSC) 
However, we do not feel it appropriate to undermine the authority of school 
officials, by rejecting the factual findings of those closest to the events in this 
case (p. 507). 
 
Hazelwood v. 
Kuhlmeier (1988, 
SC)  
We thus recognized that the determination of what manner of speech in the 
classroom or in the school assembly is inappropriate properly rest with the 
school board, rather than with the federal courts (p. 267). 
 
New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. (1985, SC) 
Absent any suggestion that the rule violates some substantive constitutional 
guarantee, the courts should, as a general matter, defer to that judgment and 
refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are important to the 
preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not (p.342). 
 
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. 
Fraser (1986, SC) 
The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school 
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board (p. 683). 
 
Binder v. Cold 
Spring Harbor 
(2010, DC) 
The Supreme Court has long held that § 1983 does not extend the right to 
relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary 
proceedings… The system of public education that has evolved in this nation 
relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and 
school board members and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal 
court correction of errors in the exercise of that discretion (p. 10). 
 
Lausin v. Bishko 
(2010, DC) 
The Supreme Court has held that the right to attend public school is not a 
fundamental right for the purposes of substantive due process analysis …it is 
not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators 
which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion (pp. 627-
628). 
 
Demers v. 
Leominster Sch. 
(2003, DC) 
Public school officials have been granted substantial deference as to what 
speech is appropriate. The daily administration of public education is committed 
to school officials. The determination of what manner of speech in the 
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school 
board, rather than with the federal courts (p.202). 
  
Bundick v. Bay 
City Indep. Sch. 
(2001, DC) 
Because federal courts are extremely, and quite properly, hesitant to become 
involved in the public schools’ disciplinary decisions, only rudimentary 
precautions are commanded of the Constitution… Without question, expulsion 
is a harsh punishment, but it is not the business of a federal court to set aside 
decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking in a 
basis in wisdom or compassion (pp. 740-741). 
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Defabio v. E. 
Hampton Union 
(2009, DC) 
Although plaintiffs seek to second-guess with hindsight the judgment of school 
administrators, that is not the role of the courts…It is not the role of the federal 
courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view 
as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion (p. 481). 
 
Tun v. Fort Wayne 
Cmty (2004, DC) 
When it comes to disciplinary matters, this court is to resist the temptation to 
become a super-school board by substituting its judgment for that of school 
administrators. The Supreme Court cautions that it is not the role of the federal 
courts to set aside the decisions of school administrators which the court may 
view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. The Seventh Circuit also has 
emphasized that federal courts must refrain from second-guessing the 
disciplinary decisions made by school administrators (p. 938). 
 
T.T. v. Bellevue 
Sch. Dist. (2009, 
DC) 
It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school 
administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or 
compassion…The system of public education that has evolved in this nation 
relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and 
school board members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal-
court corrections of errors in the exercise of that discretion… (p. 25). 
 
J.S. v. Blue Mt. 
Sch. Dist. (2011, 
CA) 
Federal courts should not ordinarily intervene in the resolution of conflicts 
which arise in the daily operation of school system (p. 926)…The education of 
the nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state 
and local school officials, and not of federal judges (p. 926). 
 
J.S. v. Bethlehem 
(2002, SSC) 
Great deference should be given to their determination, as courts must not 
become embroiled in micromanaging school officials’ administration of the 
institution’s daily affairs…school board…is in the best position to weigh the 
strengths and vulnerabilities of the town’s 785 students. The First Amendment 
does not compel the court into this arena (p. 672). 
 
 
Table 1.3E. Level II Analysis: Emergent Themes from the Jurisprudential Intent 
 Theme 5 Data: Preemptive Exclusion 
 
Demers v. 
Leominster Sch. 
(2003, DC) 
On these facts, a reasonable interpretation of the law would allow a school 
official to prevent potential disorder or disruption to school safety, particularly 
in the wake of increased school violence across the country…At the time when 
school officials made their determination to emergency expel him, they had 
facts which might reasonably have led them to forecast a substantial disruption 
of or material interference with school activities… Michael’s suspension and 
subsequent expulsion were rationally related to the school’s interest in 
maintaining a safe school environment, particularly in light of the apprehensive 
climate that existed at the time due to highly publicized incidents of school 
violence around the country (pp.203-206). 
 
Defabio v. E. 
Hampton Union 
(2009, DC) 
In this context, it is well settled that school officials do not have to wait for 
actual disruption from the speech before they act; instead, school officials have 
an affirmative duty to not only ameliorate the harmful effects of disruptions, but  
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 to prevent them from happening in the first place…Not only are school officials 
free to act before the actual disruption occurs, they are not required to predict 
disruption with absolute certainty to satisfy the Tinker standard (pp. 480-481)… 
Moreover, forecasting disruption is unmistakably difficult to do. Thus, rather 
than requiring certainty of disruption, Tinker allows school officials to act and 
prevent the speech where they might reasonably portend disruption form the 
student expression at issue…Because of the special circumstances of the school 
environment, the level of disturbance required to justify official intervention is 
lower inside a public school than it is outside the school (p. 481). The First 
Amendment does not deprive school administrators of the ability to rely upon 
their own considerable experience, expertise, and judgment in recognizing and 
diffusing the potential for disruption and violence in public schools. Indeed, 
they are duty-bound to do just that. That duty is particularly acute when threats 
of physical violence have already been made and actual violence could well 
erupt if the hostile situation is not promptly and emphatically controlled (p. 
481). 
 
Boim v. Fulton 
County Sch. (2006, 
DC) 
Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs. 
In fact, they have a duty to prevent the occurrence of disturbances. While 
predicting disruption is unmistakably difficult, Tinker does not require certainty 
that disruption will occur, but rather the existence of facts which might 
reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption (pp. 10-
11)…The court concludes that Rachel’s story alone, when read in light of the 
recent history of school shootings, was sufficient to lead school officials 
reasonably to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities-specifically, that Rachel might attempt to shoot her math 
teacher (p.15). 
 
J.S. v. Bethlehem 
(2002, SSC) 
In fact, it has been offered that school officials, have a duty to prevent the 
occurrence of disturbances. Moreover, due to the importance of the educational 
environment and the state’s interest therein, the level of disturbance required to 
justify action is relatively lower in a public school than it might be on a street 
corner. Finally, this ability to forecast a substantial disruption is not limited to 
prior-restraint case…(p.662). The court concluded that courts have permitted 
school officials to discipline students for conduct occurring off school premises 
where the conduct materially and substantially interferes with the educational 
process. The court pointed to the damaging effects on Mrs. Fulmer, Mr. 
Kartsotis and the school community and concluded that the school district did 
not violate J.S.’s First Amendment rights. Moreover, the majority noted that in 
this day and age where school violence is becoming more commonplace, school 
officials are justified in taking threats against faculty and students seriously (p. 
648)…the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the unbridled free 
expression of speech is not permissible in every setting… One of these settings 
is in the unique environment of our nation’s schools (p. 650). 
 
Cuff v. Valley Cent. 
Sch. Dist. (2010, 
DC) 
defendants need not prove that school administrators’ initially-stated 
justifications for punishment fully incorporate all the objective facts that could 
support a likelihood of substantial disruption, and they need not demonstrate 
that substantial disruption was inevitable… Such a rule is not required by 
Tinker, and would be disastrous public policy: requiring school officials to wait 
until disruption actually occurred before investigating would cripple the 
officials’ ability to maintain order (pp. 468-469). School administrators must be 
permitted to react quickly and decisively to address a threat of physical violence 
against their students, without worrying that they will have to face years of  
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 litigation second-guessing their judgment as to whether the threat posed a real 
risk of substantial disturbance (p. 470). 
 
In the Interest of 
F.B. (1999, SSC) 
The schools are simply not required to wait for a tragedy to occur within their 
walls to demonstrate that the need is immediate (p. 673). 
 
Anderson v. 
Milbank Sch. 
(2000, DC) 
…a school need not tolerate speech that is inconsistent with its pedagogical 
mission, even though the government could not suppress that speech outside of 
the schoolhouse… schools must teach by example the shared values of a 
civilized social order…These shared values include discipline, courtesy, and 
respect for authority… civility is a legitimate pedagogical concern…so, too, is 
compliance with school rules (p. 686). 
 
S.G. v. Sayreville 
Bd. of Educ. (2003, 
CA) 
A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic 
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar 
speech outside the school (p. 422). 
 
Hazelwood v. 
Kuhlmeier (1988, 
SC) 
A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic 
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar 
speech outside the school (p. 261)… we have nonetheless recognized that the 
First Amendment rights of students in the public schools are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, and must be applied in 
light of the special characteristics of the school environment (pp. 266-267). 
 
Porter v. Ascension 
(2004, CA) 
A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic 
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar 
speech outside the school…While certain forms of expressive conduct and 
speech are sheltered under the First Amendment, constitutional protection is not 
absolute, especially in the public school setting. Educators have an essential role 
in regulating school affairs and establishing appropriate standards of conduct (p. 
615). 
 
T.T. v. Bellevue 
Sch. Dist. (2009, 
DC) 
As a general rule, notice and hearing should precede removal of that student 
from school. However, a student whose presence poses an ongoing threat of 
disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed from school, and 
the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as 
practicable (pp. 15-16). 
 
  
 Finally, a thematic investigation was conducted intratextually, within relevant 
court decisions, and intertextually, across relevant court decisions. Sixty (80%) of the 
Seventy-five court cases in the sample provided manifest content. The intratextual (see 
Table 1.4) analysis allows the researcher to look within the 60 court decisions that have 
yielded manifest content applicable to emergent themes and determine how many of 
these themes are evident within the legal language used in the court decisions. Table 1.5 
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reveals that 46.7% (n = 28) of the court cases provided evidence supporting at least one 
emergent theme. Twenty-three percent (n = 14) yielded evidence supporting two 
emergent themes within each case. Twenty-seven percent (n = 16) produced evidence 
supporting three emergent themes within each case. Lastly, only 3.33% (n = 2) of court 
decisions generated manifest content supporting four emergent themes. None of the court 
decisions provided manifest content across all five themes. Table 1.5 also displays the 
breakdown of the intratextual patterns for single references, paired references, and three 
or more references to emergent themes. 
Table 1.4. Level III Intratextual Analysis of Emergent Themes Across Cases 
 Emergent Themes 
Interest 
Balancing 
Qualified 
Immunity 
Disempowered 
Citizenship 
Empowered 
Discretion 
Preemptive 
Expulsion 
 
T 
Stafford v. 
Redding 
 X  X  2 
S.G. v. 
Sayreville 
 X  X X 3 
Cuesta v. Sch. 
Bd. 
X X    2 
Seal v. Morgan 
 
 X    1 
Piekosz-
Murphy v. Bd. 
of Educ. 
   X  1 
Ottaviano v. 
Kings Park 
   X  1 
Evans v. Bd. of 
Educ. 
 X  X 
 
 2 
Cuff v. Valley 
Cent. Sch. Dist. 
 X  X X 
 
3 
Lee v. Lenape 
Valley Reg’l 
 
 
 
 X    1 
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Table 1.4 Continued 
Hardie v. 
Churchill 
X X    2 
Doran v. 
Contoocook 
  X   1 
Brett N. v. 
Cmty Unit Sch. 
Dist. 
 X  X 
 
 2 
Barnett v. 
Tipton County 
 X    1 
Hill v. Sharber 
 
 X X   2 
Morgan v. 
Snider High 
 X X X  3 
Roy v. Fulton 
County Sch. 
 X    1 
Bogle-Assegai 
v. Bloomfield 
 X    1 
Vann v. 
Stewart 
   X  1 
McKinley v. 
Lott 
 X    1 
Posthumus v. 
Bd. of Educ. 
 X X 
 
X 
 
 3 
Collins v. 
Prince William 
County 
 X    1 
Sypniewski v. 
Warren Hills 
X     1 
Anderson v. 
Milbank Sch. 
  X X X 
 
3 
Hammock v. 
Keys 
  X X  2 
Colvin v. 
Lowndes 
County 
X     1 
Fuller v. 
Decatur Pub. 
   X  1 
Doe v. Bd. of 
Educ. 
   X  1 
Edwards v. 
O’Fallon Twp. 
 
 
   X 
 
 1 
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Table 1.4 Continued 
Northwestern 
Sch. v. Linke 
X  X   2 
In re L.A. 
 
  X   1 
Commonwealth 
v. Lawrence L. 
  X   1 
State v. Best 
 
X  X   2 
In re K.K. 
 
  X   1 
In the Interest 
of F.B. 
    X 1 
In re 
Hinterlong 
X X    2 
E.M. v. Briggs 
 
   X  1 
J.M. v. Webster 
County Bd. 
   X  1 
Hazelwood v. 
Kuhlmeier 
  X X X 3 
New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. 
X  X X  3 
Bethel Sch. 
Dist. v. Fraser 
X  X X  3 
Vernonia Sch. 
Dist. v. Acton 
X  X   2 
Binder v. Cold 
Spring Harbor 
   X  1 
C.H. v. Folks 
 
 X    1 
Beard v. 
Whitmore Lake 
 X    1 
Sims v. 
Bracken 
County Sch. 
X X X 
 
  3 
Lausin v. 
Bishko 
X  X X  3 
Pendleton v. 
Fassett 
X X X   3 
Wooleyhan v. 
Cape Henlopen 
X X    2 
Porter v. 
Ascension 
 
 
X X   X 3 
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Table 1.4 Continued 
Demers v. 
Leominster 
Sch. 
 X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 4 
Bundick v. Bay 
City Indep. 
Sch. 
X  X X  3 
Butler v. Rio 
Rancho Pub. 
 X    1 
Defabio v. E. 
Hampton 
Union 
 X X X X 4 
Tun v. Fort 
Wayne Cmty. 
X X  X  3 
T.T. v. Bellevue 
Sch. Dist. 
   X X 2 
J.S. v. Blue Mt. 
Sch. Dist. 
X  X X  3 
Boim v. Fulton 
County Sch. 
    X 1 
Commonwealth 
v. Smith 
X  X   2 
J.S. v. 
Bethlehem 
X   X X 3 
R.M. v. 
Washakie  
X     1 
 
 The intertextual (see Table 1.6) analysis permits the researcher to look across the 
60 court cases to determine how many court decisions provided support for the 5 
emergent themes individually. Such an analysis enables the researcher to identify the 
theoretical mechanisms, which are predominantly applied to legitimate neoliberal judicial 
support for zero tolerance social control efforts in schools. As depicted in Table 1.6, 
33.3% (n = 20) of court decisions evidenced interest balancing, 48.3% (n = 29) of the 
cases evidenced qualified immunity, 38.3% (n = 23) of the cases evidenced disempowered 
citizenship, 48.3% (n = 29) of the cases evidenced empowered discretion of school 
authorities, and 18.3% (n = 11) of the cases evidenced preemptive exclusion. With 
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Table 1.5. Patterns in the Level III Intratextual Thematic Analysis 
 
Pattern Types 
 
Number of Cases 
Single References 
          1 only 
          2 only 
          3 only 
          4 only 
          5 only 
 
          Total 
 
3 
10 
4 
9 
2 
 
28 
Paired References 
          1 and 2 
          1 and 3 
          1 and 4 
          1 and 5 
          2 and 3 
          2 and 4  
          2 and 5 
          3 and 4 
          3 and 5 
          4 and 5 
 
          Total 
 
4 
4 
0 
0 
1 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
 
14 
 
Three or More 
 
 
18 
Total 
 
60 
 
just below half of the relevant court cases yielding support for qualified immunity and 
empowered discretion of school authorities, the researcher can conclude that these are the 
two primary, neoliberal theoretical mechanisms utilized by courts to rule in support of 
zero tolerance social control efforts in schools. However, interest balancing and 
disempowered citizenship, while employed by courts roughly 35 to 40% of the time, are 
still theoretical mechanisms that are very pertinent to the process in which court decision 
making reflects support for neoliberal social controls in schools. While preemptive 
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exclusion is the least applied theoretical mechanism, it is still used in approximately 2 out 
of 10 cases to rationalized neoliberal social controls in schools. 
 
Table 1.6. Level III Intertextual Analysis of Emergent Themes Across Cases 
Theme Number of Instances in which Thematic 
Data Emerged 
Interest Balancing 20 
Qualified Immunity 29 
Disempowered Citizenship 23 
Empowered Discretion 29 
Preemptive Exclusion 11 
Total  112 
  
 In summary, the first level of textual analysis predominately found plain meaning 
qualitative data in support of the eight research questions. The majority of support was 
found for research questions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. Conversely, very few cases yielded support 
for research questions 5, 7, and 8. Regardless, the textual support for the research 
questions outweighed the instances where textual evidence rejected the research 
questions. The text segments and passages identified as evidence for or against the 8 
research questions represents the jurisprudential intent as it relates to these queries. Thus, 
the plain meaning rationales elicited from the court cases by way of the 8 research 
questions posed to them, serve as the courts’ jurisprudential intent for why decisions were 
made as they were in these 75 cases. 
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 The second level of textual analysis identified 5 themes, which emerged from 
repetitive language, attitudes, and rationales used by the courts in conveying their 
jurisprudential intent on the matters of zero tolerance policies in schools. The courts’ 
jurisprudential intent conveys a legal language that denotes principles representative of 
the various mechanisms identified in the theoretical framework detailing how neoliberal 
court mechanisms support zero-tolerance social control initiatives in schools. Thus, the 
manifest content of legal thought is made apparent by first discerning jurisprudential 
intent from the plain meaning of court decisions and then filtering that intent through the 
theoretical framework to make explicit the nature of the political economic philosophy 
encoded within the law. The 5 themes include the following: (1) Interest Balancing, (2) 
Qualified Immunity, (3) Disempowered Citizenship, (4) Empowered Discretion of School 
Authorities, and (5) Preemptive Exclusion. How these themes translate back to the 
neoliberal theoretical framework is described in chapter 7.  
 The final thematic analysis revealed that 80% (n = 60) of the court cases in the 
sample evidenced manifest content pertinent to the identification of 5 emergent themes 
from the jurisprudential intent. The remaining 15 court cases did not yield the repetitive 
legal language necessary to be considered representative of manifest content signifying 
one or more of the emergent themes. The intratextual analysis found that 28 ( 46.7%) 
court cases provided content referencing a single theme, 14 (23.3%) court cases 
evidenced some pattern of paired reference to two themes, and 18 (30%) court cases 
referencing 3 or more themes. The intertextual analysis found that just below half of the 
relevant court cases yielded support for qualified immunity (48.3%) and empowered 
discretion of school authorities (48.3%); therefore, the researcher can conclude that these 
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are the two primary, neoliberal theoretical mechanisms utilized by courts to rule in 
support of zero tolerance social control efforts in schools. In addition, interest balancing 
and disempowered citizenship were employed by the courts roughly 35 to 40% of the 
time, which means these theoretical mechanisms are quite important to the process in 
which court decision making reflects support for neoliberal social controls in schools. 
Lastly, preemptive exclusion was the least applied theoretical mechanism; however, it 
was still used in approximately 20% of the cases to rationalize neoliberal social controls 
in schools. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 
 Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American 
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ 
in their average usage of metal detectors for social control measures (see Table 2.1). The 
Levene’s F test revealed that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p < 
.001) for all three ANOVAs. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used except for the 2005-
2006 wave of data in which the F-statistic was reported because one of the minority 
category groups did not have enough variance.  The ANOVAs revealed a statistically 
significant effect: Welch’s F03-04 (3, 1480) = 14.67, p < .001, η2 = .03; F05-06 (3, 2644) = 
35.54, p < .001, η2 = .04; Welch’s F07-08 (3, 1056) = 19.42, p < .001, η2 = .03. 
 Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were 
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means 
differed significantly. The results for the 2003-2004 data revealed that schools with 
greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.94, SD = 0.24) had a significantly lower 
average usage of metal detectors compared to schools with less than 5% minority 
students (M = 1.99, SD = 0.07), 5 to 20% minority students (M = 1.99, SD = 0.08), and 
20 to 50% minority students (M = 2.00, SD = 0.67). The effect size was weak for this 
relationship (η2 = .03). Similarly, the results for the 2005-2006 data revealed that schools 
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with greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.94, SD = 0.24) had a significantly lower 
average usage of metal detectors compared to schools with less than 5% minority 
students (M = 2.00, SD = 0.00), 5 to 20% minority students (M = 2.00, SD = 0.00), and 
20 to 50% minority students (M = 2.00, SD = 0.06). The effect size was also weak for this 
relationship (η2 = .04). Likewise, the results for the 2007-2008 data revealed that schools 
with greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.93, SD = 0.24) had a significantly lower 
average usage of metal detectors compared to schools with less than 5% minority 
students (M = 1.99, SD = 0.08), 5 to 20% minority students (M = 2.00, SD = 0.04), and 
20 to 50% minority students (M = 1.99, SD = 0.10). This relationship was weak too (η2 = 
.03). 
 
Table 2.1. One-Way ANOVAs for Metal Detector Usage Across Minority Categories in 
Three Waves of Data 
 Percent Minority Makeup Categories  
 
 
 
Variable 
 
> 5 % 5 - 20% 20 – 50% > 50% ANOVA 
M 
 
SD 
 
M SD M SD M SD F Ƞ2 
Metal 
Detectors 03-04 
 
1.99 0.07 1.99 0.08 2.00 0.67 1.94 0.24 14.67*** 0.03 
Metal 
Detectors 05-06 
 
2.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 0.06 1.94 0.24 35.54*** 0.04 
Metal 
Detectors 07-08 
 
1.99 0.08 2.00 0.04 1.99 0.10 1.93 0.25 19.42*** 0.03 
Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
 The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of 
metal detector usage at schools with differing minority makeup (see Figure 1). The line 
graph suggests very little differentiation in metal detector deployment across the three 
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waves of data collection. These findings also fail to support hypothesis one, which 
expected schools with greater than 50% minority makeup would use metal detectors as 
security mechanisms significantly more than the other categories. 
Figure 1. Plotted Means for Metal Detector Usage Across 
Percentage Minority Makeup Categories
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 Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American 
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ 
in their average usage of access control, via locked or monitored doors, for social control 
measures (see Table 2.2). The Levene’s F test revealed that the homogeneity of variance 
assumption was not met (p < .001) for the ANOVAs conducted on the 2005-2006 and 
2007-2008 data waves. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used except for the 2003-2004 
wave of data in which the F-statistic was reported because the Levene’s F test was not 
statistically significant (p > .05).  Only the ANOVA for 2005-2006 revealed a statistically 
significant effect: Welch’s F05-06 (3, 1340) = 4.12, p < .001, η2 = .004. The ANOVAs for 
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the other two waves of data did not reveal any significant differences in the average 
usage of access controls in schools across the minority makeup categories. 
 Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were 
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means 
differed significantly. The results for the 2005-2006 data revealed that schools with 
greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.13, SD = 0.34) had a significantly lower 
average deployment of access controls compared to schools with 5 to 20% minority 
students (M = 1.18, SD = 0.39) and 20 to 50% minority students (M = 1.18, SD = 0.39). 
There was no significant difference between the less than 5% and greater than 50% 
category. The effect size was weak for this relationship (η2 = .004).  
 
Table 2.2. One-Way ANOVAs for Access Controls Used in Schools Across Minority 
Categories in Three Waves of Data 
 Percent Minority Makeup Categories  
 
 
 
Variable 
 
> 5 % 5 - 20% 20 – 50% > 50% ANOVA 
M 
 
SD 
 
M SD M SD M SD F Ƞ2 
Access 
Control 03-04 
 
1.16 0.36 1.18 0.38 1.18 0.39 1.17 0.38 0.64 0.01 
Access 
Control 05-06 
 
1.18 0.39 1.18 0.39 1.18 0.39 1.13 0.34 4.12** 0.004 
Access 
Control 07-08 
 
1.13 0.34 1.11 0.31 1.13 0.34 1.11 0.31 0.94 0.001 
Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
 The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of 
access controls utilized at schools with differing minority makeup (see Figure 2). The line 
graph suggests inconsistent and shifting trends in the deployment of access controls 
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across the three waves of data collection. Although only the 2005-2006 wave produced 
statistically significant results, these findings also fail to support hypothesis one, which 
expected schools with greater than 50% minority makeup would use access controls as 
security mechanisms significantly more than the other categories. Additionally, Figure 2 
reveals a declining trend in the use of access controls in schools between the 2005-2006 
and 2007-2008 waves of school data. 
Figure 2. Plotted Means for School Access Controls Across 
Percentage Minority Makeup Categories
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 Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American 
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ 
in their average usage of security cameras for social control measures (see Table 2.3). 
The Levene’s F test revealed that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p 
< .001) for the ANOVAs conducted on the 2003-2004 and 2007-2008 data waves. 
Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used except for the 2005-2006 wave of data in which 
the F-statistic was reported because the Levene’s F test was not statistically significant (p 
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> .05).  Only the ANOVA for 2007-2008 revealed a statistically significant effect: 
Welch’s F07-08(3, 1190) = 4.10, p = .007, η2 = .005. The ANOVAs for the other two 
waves of data did not reveal any significant differences in the average usage of security 
cameras in schools across the minority makeup categories. 
 Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were 
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means 
differed significantly. The results for the 2007-2008 data revealed that schools with 
greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.37, SD = 0.34) had a significantly higher 
average usage of security cameras compared to schools with less than 5% minority 
students (M = 1.30, SD = 0.46) and 5 to 20% minority students (M = 1.30, SD = 0.46). 
There was no significant difference between the 20 to 50% and greater than 50% 
category. The effect size was weak for this relationship (η2 = .005).  
 The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of 
security camera usage at schools with differing minority makeup (see Figure 3). The line 
graph suggests consistent trends in the deployment of security cameras across the three 
waves of data collection, which suggests schools with the largest percentage of minorities 
deployed a higher average usage of security cameras. Although only the 2007-2008 wave 
produced statistically significant results, these findings somewhat support hypothesis one, 
which expected schools with greater than 50% minority makeup would use security 
cameras as security mechanisms significantly more than the other categories. Of course 
this support is limited to the trend line for 2007-2008. However, Figure 3 reveals a 
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Table 2.3. One-Way ANOVAs for Security Camera Usage Across Minority Categories in 
Three Waves of Data 
 Percent Minority Makeup Categories  
 
 
 
Variable 
 
> 5 % 5 - 20% 20 – 50% > 50% ANOVA 
M 
 
SD 
 
M SD M SD M SD F Ƞ2 
Security 
Cameras 03-04 
 
1.53 0.50 1.51 0.50 1.56 0.50 1.56 0.50 1.68 0.001 
Security 
Cameras 05-06 
 
1.46 0.50 1.45 0.50 1.44 0.50 1.47 0.50 0.34 0.0004 
Security 
Cameras 07-08 
 
1.30 0.46 1.30 0.46 1.34 0.47 1.37 0.48 4.10** 0.005 
Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
declining trend in the overall use of security cameras in schools from 2003-2004 to 2005-
2006 and 2005-2006 to 2007-2008, consecutively. 
 Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American 
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ 
in their average deployment of sworn law enforcement officers or other security 
personnel as social control agents during school hours (see Table 2.4). The Levene’s F 
test revealed that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p < .001) for all 
three ANOVAs. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used for all three waves of data.  The 
ANOVAs revealed a statistically significant effect: Welch’s F03-04 (3, 783) = 4.70, p = 
.003, η2 = .01; Welch’s F05-06 (3, 653) = 2.62, p < .05, η2 = .006; Welch’s F07-08 (3, 1154) 
= 18.06, p < .001, η2 = .02. 
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Figure 3. Plotted Means for Security Camera Usage Across 
Percentage Minority Makeup Categories
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 Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were 
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means 
differed significantly. The results for the 2003-2004 data revealed that schools with 
greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.04, SD = 0.19) had a significantly lower 
average usage of security personnel compared to schools with less than 5% minority 
students (M = 1.11, SD = 0.32). The effect size was weak for this relationship (η2 = .01). 
Correspondingly, the results for the 2005-2006 data revealed that schools with greater 
than 50% minority students (M = 1.04, SD = 0.20) had a significantly lower average 
usage of security personnel compared to schools with less than 5% minority students (M 
= 1.09, SD = 0.28). The effect size was also weak for this relationship (η2 = .006). 
Conversely, the results for the 2007-2008 data revealed that schools with greater than 
50% minority students (M = 0.52, SD = 0.91) had a significantly higher average usage of 
security personnel compared to schools with less than 5% minority students (M = 0.07, 
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SD = 1.01), 5 to 20% minority students (M = 0.30, SD = 1.00), and 20 to 50% minority 
students (M = 0.38, SD = 0.98). This relationship was weak too (η2 = .02). 
 
Table 2.4. One-Way ANOVAs for Security Used During School Hours Across Minority 
Categories in Three Waves of Data 
 Percent Minority Makeup Categories  
 
 
 
Variable 
 
> 5 % 5 - 20% 20 – 50% > 50% ANOVA 
M 
 
SD 
 
M SD M SD M SD F Ƞ2 
Security 
Used 03-04 
 
1.11 0.32 1.06 0.24 1.06 0.24 1.04 0.19 4.70** 0.01 
Security 
Used 05-06 
 
1.09 0.28 1.06 0.24 1.03 0.18 1.04 0.20 2.62* 0.006 
Security 
Used 07-08 
 
0.07 1.01 0.30 1.00 0.38 0.98 0.52 0.91 18.06*** 0.02 
Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
 
 The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of 
security personnel usage at schools with differing minority makeup (see Figure 4). The 
line graph suggests consistent trends in the deployment of security cameras across the 
2003-2004 and 2005-2006 waves of data collection, which suggests schools with the 
smallest percentage of minorities deployed a higher average usage of security personnel. 
On the contrary, the 2007-2008 data revealed the opposite trend whereby schools with the 
largest percentage of minorities deployed a higher average usage of security personnel. 
These findings are mixed. Only the 2007-2008 trend line supports hypothesis one, while 
the other two waves fail to support hypothesis one. In addition, Figure 4 reveals a 
221 
 
declining trend in the overall use of security personnel in schools from 2003-2004 and 
2005-2006 compared to 2007-2008, which further fails to support hypothesis one. 
Figure 4. Plotted Means for Security Guard Usage During School 
Hours Across Percentage Minority Makeup Categories
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 Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American 
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ 
in their average total disciplinary actions (see Table 2.5). The Levene’s F test revealed 
that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p < .001) for all three 
ANOVAs. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used.  The ANOVAs revealed a statistically 
significant effect: Welch’s F03-04 (3, 1484) = 32.77, p < .001, η2 = .03; Welch’s F05-06 (3, 
1404) = 26.24, p < .001, η2 = .03; Welch’s F07-08 (3, 1367) = 23.32, p < .001, η2 = .02. 
 Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were 
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means 
differed significantly. The results for the 2003-2004 data revealed that schools with 
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greater than 50% minority students (M = 112.90, SD = 213.00) had a significantly higher 
average of total disciplinary actions compared to schools with less than 5% minority 
students (M = 41.20, SD = 89.00), 5 to 20% minority students (M = 61.8, SD = 129.30), 
and 20 to 50% minority students (M = 96.10, SD = 184.6). The effect size was weak for 
this relationship (η2 = .03). Similarly, the results for the 2005-2006 data revealed that 
schools with greater than 50% minority students (M = 108.60, SD = 164.90) had a 
significantly higher average of total disciplinary actions compared to schools with less 
than 5% minority students (M = 46.80, SD = 100.60), 5 to 20% minority students (M = 
60.80, SD = 111.80), and 20 to 50% minority students (M = 85.00, SD = 161.80). The 
effect size was also weak for this relationship (η2 = .03). Likewise, the results for the 
2007-2008 data revealed that schools with greater than 50% minority students (M = 
157.80, SD = 468.20) had a significantly higher average of total disciplinary actions 
compared to schools with less than 5% minority students (M = 41.10, SD = 74.30), 5 to 
20% minority students (M = 62.10, SD = 122.60), and 20 to 50% minority students (M = 
113.10, SD = 381.30). This relationship was weak too (η2 = .02). 
 The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of 
total disciplinary actions at schools with differing minority makeup (see Figure 5). The 
line graph suggests a steady upward trend in total disciplinary actions taken against 
students across the three waves of data collection. These findings support hypothesis two, 
which expected schools with greater than 50% minority makeup, compared to the other 
categories, to have significantly higher averages of total disciplinary actions serving as 
exclusionary social control mechanisms for marginal groups of students. 
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Table 2.5. One-Way ANOVAs for Total Disciplinary Actions Across Minority 
Categories in Three Waves of Data 
 Percent Minority Makeup Categories  
 
 
 
Variable 
 
> 5 % 5 - 20% 20 – 50% > 50% ANOVA 
M 
 
SD 
 
M SD M SD M SD F Ƞ2 
Total 
Disciplinary 
Actions 03-04 
 
41.2 89.0 61.8 129.3 96.1 184.6 112.9 213.0 32.77*** 0.03 
Total 
Disciplinary 
Actions 05-06 
 
46.8 100.6 60.8 111.8 85.0 161.8 108.6 164.9 26.24*** 0.03 
Total 
Disciplinary 
Actions 07-08 
 
41.4 74.3 62.1 122.6 113.1 381.3 157.8 468.2 23.32*** 0.02 
Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
 Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American 
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ 
in their average total removals without continued educational services (see Table 2.6). 
The Levene’s F test revealed that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p 
< .001) for all three ANOVAs. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used.  The ANOVAs 
revealed a statistically significant effect: Welch’s F03-04 (3, 1451) = 4.31, p = .005, η2 = 
.005; Welch’s F05-06 (3, 1359) = 11.89, p < .001, η2 = .002; Welch’s F07-08 (3, 1373) = 
7.36, p < .001, η2 = .005. 
Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were conducted to 
determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means differed  
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Figure 5. Plotted Means for Total Disciplinary Actions Across 
Percentage Minority Makeup Categories
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significantly. The results for the 2003-2004 data revealed that schools with greater than 
50% minority students (M = 1.03, SD = 4.98) had a significantly higher average of total 
removals without continued educational services compared to schools with less than 5% 
minority students (M = 0.42, SD = 2.06). The effect size was weak for this relationship 
(η2 = .005). In addition, the results for the 2005-2006 data revealed that schools with 
greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.64, SD = 7.13) had a significantly higher 
average of total removals without continued educational services compared to schools 
with less than 5% minority students (M = 0.37, SD = 1.36) and 5 to 20% minority 
students (M = 0.89, SD = 3.53). The effect size was also weak for this relationship (η2 = 
.002). Moreover, the results for the 2007-2008 data revealed that schools with greater 
than 50% minority students (M = 1.27, SD = 6.05) had a significantly higher average of 
total removals without continued educational services compared to schools with less than 
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5% minority students (M = 0.37, SD = 1.47) and 5 to 20% minority students (M = 0.62, 
SD = 2.49). This relationship was weak too (η2 = .005). 
 
Table 2.6. One-Way ANOVAs for Total Removals Without Continued Educational 
Services Across Minority Categories in Three Waves of Data 
 Percent Minority Makeup Categories  
 
 
 
Variable 
 
> 5 % 5 - 20% 20 – 50% > 50% ANOVA 
M 
 
SD 
 
M SD M SD M SD F Ƞ2 
Total 
Removals   
03-04 
 
0.42 2.06 0.56 1.87 0.79 3.20 1.03 4.98 4.31** 0.005 
Total 
Removals   
05-06 
 
0.37 1.36 0.89 3.53 2.05 24.83 1.64 7.13 11.89*** 0.002 
Total 
Removals   
07-08 
 
0.37 1.47 0.62 2.49 1.06 6.56 1.27 6.05 7.36*** 0.005 
Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
 The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of 
total removals without continued educational services at schools with differing minority 
makeup (see Figure 6). The line graph suggests a steady upward trend in total removals 
taken against students attending schools with the highest minority levels across the three 
waves of data collection. The 2005-2006 trend line was unexpectedly higher than 
hypothesized. However, these findings generally support hypothesis three, which 
expected schools with greater than 50% minority makeup, compared to the other 
categories, to have significantly higher averages of total removals without continued 
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educational services acting as exclusionary social control mechanisms for marginal 
groups of students. 
Figure 6. Plotted Means for Total Removals Without Continued 
Educational Services Across Percentage Minority Makeup 
Categories
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 There were significant differences between categories for the percentage of 
minority students at schools in regard to the crime levels where those students lived for 
the 2003-2004 data, χ2 (9) = 847.19; Cramer’s V = .32; p < .001. The Cramer’s V reveals 
that the relationship has a strong effect size given the degrees of freedom in the matrix.5 
As depicted in Table 2.7, in almost 9 out of 10 cases (88.3%), students who attended 
schools with greater than 50% minorities were more likely to live in areas with the 
highest levels of crime. Conversely, in roughly 3 out of 10 cases (30.2%), students who 
came from schools with less than 5% minorities were more likely to live in areas with the 
                                                          
5 According to Cohen (1988; as cited in Gravetter & Wallnau, 2008), when a cross-tabulation uses more 
than three degrees of freedom and is larger than a 2 x 4 matrix, the researcher should interpret any 
Cramer’s V coefficient at or above .29 as a large effect size. 
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lowest levels of crime. Indeed, only 3.9% of students at schools with less than 5% 
minorities lived in high-crime areas. These significant findings support hypothesis four, 
which holds that students living in areas with the highest crime levels will be more likely 
to attend schools with a higher percentage of minority students. 
 
Table 2.7. Chi-Square Results for Percentage of Minority Makeup by Levels of Crime 
Where Students Live (2003-2004) 
 
% Minority 
Makeup 
Levels of Crime Where Students Live  
High (%) Moderate (%) Low (%) Varying (%) Total (%) 
< 5% 
 7 (3.9) 45 (8.0) 470 (30.2) 31 (7.5) 553 (20.4) 
5-20% 
 2 (1.1) 72 (12.7) 548 (35.2) 82 (20.0) 704 (25.9) 
20-50% 
 12 (6.7) 146 (25.8) 343 (22.0) 156 (38.0) 657 (24.2) 
> 50% 
 159 (88.3) 303 (53.5) 196 (12.6%) 142 (34.5) 800 (29.5) 
Total 
 180 (6.6) 566 (20.9) 1557 (57.4) 411 (15.1) 2714 (100) 
Note. χ2 (9) = 847.19; Cramer’s V = .32; p < .001. Bonferroni corrections revealed 
significant differences for all percent minority categories by levels of crime. 
 
 Likewise, the categories for the percentage of minority students at schools were 
significantly associated with the crime levels where students lived for the 2005-2006 
data, χ2 (9) = 875.66; Cramer’s V = .33; p < .001. The Cramer’s V also suggests a strong 
effect size for this relationship. As depicted in Table 2.8, in 9 out of 10 cases (90.9%), 
students who attended schools with greater than 50% minorities were more likely to live 
in areas with the highest levels of crime. On the other hand, around 3 out of 10 cases 
(26.8%), students who came from schools with less than 5% minorities were more likely 
to live in areas with the lowest levels of crime. In fact, only 0.5% of students at schools 
228 
 
with less than 5% minorities lived in high-crime areas. These significant findings also 
support hypothesis four. 
Table 2.8. Chi-Square Results for Percentage of Minority Makeup by Levels of Crime 
Where Students Live (2005-2006) 
 
% Minority 
Makeup 
Levels of Crime Where Students Live  
High (%) Moderate (%) Low (%) Varying (%) Total (%) 
< 5% 
 1 (0.5) 28 (5.5) 417 (26.8) 13 (3.3) 459 (17.3) 
5-20% 
 3 (1.6) 74 (14.5) 565 (36.3) 87 (22.0) 729 (27.5) 
20-50% 
 13 (7.0) 122 (23.9) 371 (23.8) 155 (39.2) 661 (25.0) 
> 50% 
 169 (90.9) 287 (35.9) 203 (13.0) 140 (35.4) 799 (30.2) 
Total 
 186 (7.0) 511 (19.3) 1556 (58.8) 395 (14.9) 2648 (100) 
Note. χ2 (9) = 875.66; Cramer’s V = .33; p < .001. Bonferroni corrections revealed 
significant differences for all percent minority categories by levels of crime. 
 
 Significant differences were also found between categories for the percentage of 
minority students at schools in regard to the crime levels where those students lived for 
the 2007-2008 data, χ2 (9) = 855.24; Cramer’s V = .33; p < .001. The effect size for this 
relationship was also large for the 2007-2008 data. As revealed by Table 2.9, students 
who attended schools with greater than 50% minorities were more likely (88.8%) to live 
in areas with the highest levels of crime. Alternatively, the majority of students who came 
from schools with less than 5% minorities were more likely (20.7%) to live in areas with 
the lowest levels of crime compared to high-crime areas (1.7%). These results support 
hypothesis four. 
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Table 2.9. Chi-Square Results for Percentage of Minority Makeup by Levels of Crime 
Where Students Live (2007-2008) 
 
% Minority 
Makeup 
Levels of Crime Where Students Live  
High (%) Moderate (%) Low (%) Varying (%) Total (%) 
< 5% 
 3 (1.7) 32 (5.8) 297 (20.7) 21 (5.3) 353 (13.8) 
5-20% 
 3 (1.7) 56 (10.1) 580 (40.4) 68 (17.3) 707 (27.6) 
20-50% 
 14 (7.9) 122 (22.1) 371 (25.9) 149 (37.8) 656 (25.6) 
> 50% 
 158 (88.8) 343 (62.0) 187 (13.0) 156 (39.6) 844 (33.0) 
Total 
 178 (21.6) 553 (21.6) 1435 (56.1) 394 (15.4) 2560 (100) 
Note. χ2 (9) = 855.24; Cramer’s V = .33; p < .001. Bonferroni corrections revealed 
significant differences for all percent minority categories by levels of crime. 
 
 Together, the three chi-square analyses produced results consistent with what was 
projected by hypothesis four. Over time, schools with the highest percentage of 
minorities were unfailingly more likely to have a majority of students coming from high-
crime areas (i.e., 88.3% for 2003-2004, 90.9% for 2005-2006, and 88.8% for 2007-2008). 
This trend suggests a slightly increasing or steady percentage of students from high-crime 
areas attending schools with 50% or more minorities across the three waves of data. 
Similarly, over time, schools with the lowest percentage of minorities were consistently 
less likely to have a majority of students coming from high-crime areas (i.e., 3.9% for 
2003-2004, 0.5% for 2005-2006, and 1.7% for 2007-2008). This trend reveals a decrease 
in the percentage of students from high-crime areas attending schools with less than 5% 
minorities across the three waves of data. 
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 Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether students who come 
from areas with high, moderate, low, or varying levels of crime differ in their average 
total removals without continued educational services (see Table 2.10). The Levene’s F 
test revealed that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p < .001) for all 
three ANOVAs. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used.  The ANOVAs revealed a 
statistically significant effect: Welch’s F03-04 (3, 554) = 7.55, p < .001, η2 = .02; Welch’s 
F05-06 (3, 589) = 4.38, p = .005, η2 = .004; Welch’s F07-08 (3, 523) = 5.68, p < .001, η2 = 
.01. 
 Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were 
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means 
differed significantly. The results for the 2003-2004 data revealed that students coming 
from high-crime areas (M = 2.13, SD = 8.94) had a significantly higher average of total 
removals without continued educational services compared to students coming from 
moderate-crime areas (M = 0.88, SD = 3.35) and low-crime areas (M = 0.46, SD = 1.85). 
The effect size was weak for this relationship (η2 = .02). Next, the results for the 2005-
2006 data revealed that students coming from high-crime areas (M = 2.76, SD = 9.56) 
had a significantly higher average of total removals without continued educational 
services compared to students coming from moderate-crime areas (M = 2.52, SD = 27.57) 
and low-crime areas (M = 0.75, SD = 4.22). The effect size was also weak for this 
relationship (η2 = .004). Similarly, the results for the 2007-2008 data revealed that 
students coming from high-crime areas (M = 2.29, SD = 10.88) had a significantly higher 
average of total removals without continued educational services compared to students 
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coming from moderate-crime areas (M = 1.10, SD = 4.42) and low-crime areas (M = 
0.53, SD = 2.24).  This relationship was weak as well (η2 = .01). 
 
Table 2.10. One-Way ANOVAs for Total Removals Without Continued Educational 
Services Across Crime Level Categories in Three Waves of Data 
 Crime Levels Where Students Live  
 
 
 
Variable 
 
High Moderate Low Varying ANOVA 
M 
 
SD 
 
M SD M SD M SD F Ƞ2 
Total 
Removals  
03-04 
 
2.13 8.94 0.88 3.35 0.46 1.85 1.07 3.86 7.55*** 0.02 
Total 
Removals  
05-06 
 
2.76 9.56 2.52 27.67 0.75 4.22 1.19 4.16 4.38** 0.004 
Total 
Removals  
07-08 
 
2.29 10.88 1.10 4.42 0.53 2.24 1.43 7.94 5.68** 0.01 
Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 
 The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of 
total removals without continued educational services for students coming from areas 
with differing crime levels (see Figure 7). The line graph suggests a slight upward trend 
in total removals taken against students coming from areas with higher crime areas across 
the three waves of data collection. The 2005-2006 trend line was unexpectedly higher 
than hypothesized. However, these findings generally support hypothesis five, which 
expected students coming from higher-crime areas, compared to the other crime level 
categories, to have significantly higher averages of total removals without continued 
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educational services, which serves as exclusionary social control mechanisms for 
marginal groups of students. 
Figure 7. Plotted Means for Total Removals Without Continued 
Educational Services Across Crime Level Categories
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 To sum, the quantitative results yielded support for hypotheses two, three, four, 
and five; however, the effect sizes were weak. As such, exclusionary social control 
mechanisms, including all possible disciplinary actions and removals (i.e., expulsions) 
without continued educational services provided, are more likely to be used in schools 
with a higher percentage of minority students and schools with students coming from 
high-crime areas. These relationships tend to be at steadily consistent or increasing levels 
over time. However, the 2005-2006 trend line for total removals without continued 
educational services is uncharacteristically high compared to the other two waves of data. 
Regardless, the 2005-2005 trend line is in the expected direction for Figures 6 and 10. 
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 The findings for the ANOVA analyses testing hypothesis one were mixed, but 
collectively, they did not yield overwhelming support for the first hypothesis, which 
projected higher security measures for schools with larger minority populations. The 
ANOVA analyses for the average usage of metal detectors actually found that schools 
with a greater percentage of minority students were less likely to employ this security 
technology compared to schools with least amount of minority students. These finding do 
not support hypothesis one. ANOVA analyses for the average utilization of access 
controls, via locked or monitored doorways, revealed only significant findings for the 
2005-2006 data. For this wave of data, access controls were more likely to be used in 
schools with the lowest percentage of minority students compared to the schools with the 
highest levels of minority students, which fails to support hypothesis one. 
 For the ANOVA analyses assessing the use of security cameras, only the 2007-
2008 data yielded significant results, which actually supported hypothesis one. For that 
wave of data, security cameras were more likely to be used in schools with the highest 
percentage of minority students compared to schools with the lowest percentage of 
minority students. However, the ANOVA analyses evaluating the deployment of security 
personnel during school hours yielded conflicting findings. For the 2003-2004 and 2005-
2006 waves of data, the results revealed that security personnel was more likely to be 
used at schools with the lowest percentage of minority students compared to the schools 
with the highest percentage of minority students. In contrast, the 2007-2008 data found 
the opposite (albeit at an overall lower rate compared to the previous two waves), where 
security personnel were used more in schools with the highest percentage of minority 
students compared to schools with the lowest percentage of minority students. The mixed 
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findings for security personnel only offer partial support for hypothesis one. The 
rationales for these conflicting findings and trends related to the results for hypothesis 
one will be further explained in the chapter 7 discussion. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION 
 
 In summary, this study is the first of its kind to simultaneously examine, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, the explanatory rigor of political economic theories as 
they relate to the expansion of school-based social control efforts during the neoliberal 
era of U.S. capitalism. In the school setting, widespread implementation of zero-tolerance 
policies have empowered school officials with greater discretion in which to punish and 
remove those students who are perceived to have no market value such as those who are 
identified as flawed consumers, and who are classified as “other” because of their 
perceived associations with crime, redundancy, poverty, or expendability (Giroux, 2003; 
Hall & Karanxha, 2012). Additionally, this study is the first to theoretically incorporate 
neoliberal economic theory with the relevant components of existing theoretical meta-
narratives in order to propose a comprehensive theoretical framework in which to 
empirically test how zero-tolerance policies have emerged and endured as favored 
disciplinary practice in American elementary and secondary schools. The new theoretical 
approach attempts to explain how school criminalization efforts are legitimized by the 
state, primarily through the authority of the courts. 
 Specifically, a qualitative textual and discourse analysis of the pertinent case law, 
in which legal challenges to zero-tolerance policies were litigated for allegedly violating 
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either the First, Fourth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights of students was 
conducted. The applied case law method subjected 75 district court, appellate court, State 
Supreme Court, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions to two levels of textual analysis and a 
final overall thematic investigation. The first level of textual analysis carefully 
investigated the plain meaning of the court decisions by filtering them through the eight 
contextual/diagnostic research questions to distinguish the jurisprudential intent conveyed 
by the courts’ rulings. The second level of textual analysis complimented the first by 
identifying how the legal language, embodied in the jurisprudential intent, represented 
manifest content that could be categorized into five emergent themes relevant to the 
neoliberal theoretical framework. In other words, the second layer of inquiry unpacked 
the political economic philosophy that was encoded within the law. Lastly, the thematic 
investigation examined intratextually and intertextually the patterns in which themes 
appeared within and across court cases. The qualitative findings reveal a majority of 
support for the research questions and the second level analysis provided a theoretical 
link to the framework described in chapter 3.  
 This study also builds upon the limited quantitative research that currently exists 
by investigating whether neoliberal social controls, via zero-tolerance policies, are used 
primarily against marginalized populations and if these practices have increased over 
time. Prior research has primarily been cross-sectional in design. The current study used 
nationally representative data collected from the School Survey on Crime and Safety 
(SSOCS), which provides relevant school disciplinary variables over several years. Five 
research hypotheses were tested to determine if enhanced school security measures, total 
disciplinary actions, and removals from school without continued educational services 
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were disproportionately applied to schools with the highest percentage of minority 
students and students living in high-crime areas compared to schools with the smallest 
percentage of minority students and students who live in low-crime areas. The 
quantitative findings revealed support for four of the five research hypotheses. 
Specifically, support was found for hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. However, the ANOVAs 
conducted to test hypothesis one largely produced results, which suggested that enhanced 
security measures were more likely to be placed in schools with the lowest percentage of 
minority students compared to schools with the highest percentage of minority students.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to further discuss, in detail, the qualitative and 
quantitative findings. Based on these findings, recommendations for changes in school 
policies and practices will be made, while being mindful of evidence-based best practices 
that may serve as viable alternatives to the current zero-tolerance policies. Finally, the 
limitations of this study will be explained and avenues for future research and theory 
development will be delineated. 
Qualitative Findings 
 The case law method employed in this study entailed several steps. The first step 
in this design was to extract jurisprudential intent from the court decisions by probing the 
plain meaning arguments made apparent by the courts. This step was accomplished by 
undertaking a careful reading of the court cases, while filtering the jurists’ attitudes, 
rationales, and conclusions through the eight research questions to determine which text 
segments or passages conveyed the underlying judicial intent in either support of or 
against these queries. In other words, the researcher searched for language, which would 
constitute respective responses to these guiding questions to unearth the plain meaning of 
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the judicial intent underpinning these court decisions. In order to provide some 
perspective on how the researcher arrived at his conclusions regarding what passages 
from the court decisions provided evidence supporting or rejecting the research questions, 
examples and justifications will now be given in hopes of elucidating this process for 
other researchers. 
 Evidence Related to Plain Meaning of Court Cases. For research question one, the 
researcher was searching for language that either suggested that the courts found control 
of potential threats of danger and/or disruption outweighed any intrusion into the 
individual constitutional rights of students, or vice versa. If passages found control of 
threats and disruption was valued more than perceived infringement on the rights of 
students, then the relevant passages represented support for question one. Consider the 
following passage from Covington County v. G.W. (2000):  
School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under 
their authority…the warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school 
environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child 
suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly 
interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures 
needed in schools…While it is important to note that students have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their school lockers, we must also emphasize that high 
school students fall into a different and generally less suspect class… the realities 
of the school setting require that teachers and other school personnel have the 
power to make an immediate, limited search for contraband, weapons, or other 
prohibited objects or substances…society places a high value on education, which 
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requires an orderly atmosphere which is free from danger and disruption. (pp. 
193-194) 
This passage from the Covington decision clearly expressed the juridical argument that 
the students are not fully protected by the Fourth Amendment in school settings as adults 
would be in other contexts, because the court opined that the need for school officials to 
maintain safe schools, free of disruption, outweighed a strict adherence to the Fourth 
Amendment for public school students. Precisely, the Covington court ruled that the 
warrant requirement for searches and seizures was ill-suited for public schools. Many 
other court decisions echo this sentiment and even argue further by stating that the need 
for teachers and administrators to maintain order does not require a strict adherence to the 
requirement of probable cause (see In re L.A., 2001; Hill v. Sharber, 2008; Morgan v. 
Snider High Sch., 2007). Thus, text segments or passages asserting similar arguments or 
language was deemed evidence in support of research question one. There were 44 court 
cases, which yielded such support. 
 However, there were instances where court decisions provided evidence that 
failed to support research question one. In such cases, the courts decided that there was 
not a legitimate state interest that outweighed the rights of the student. For example, 
consider this passage from D.G. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 11 (2000): 
It is impossible to have a “no tolerance” policy against “threats” if the threats 
involve speech. A student cannot be penalized for what they are thinking. If those 
thoughts are then expressed in speech, the ability of the school to censor or punish 
the speech will be determined by whether it was (1) a “true” or “genuine” threat, 
or (2) disruptive of the normal operation of the school. Neither of those 
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circumstances exist in the case before the court. In sum, the court finds that any 
commotion caused by the poem did not rise to the level of a substantial disruption 
required to justify a suspension of the plaintiff. (pp. 15-16) 
As one can see, the court in D.G. did not decide in the fashion that the majority of others 
did when weighing the school’s interests in maintaining an orderly environment, free of 
disruption, against the constitutional rights of students. There were 21 court decisions that 
provided evidence, which failed to support research question one. However, twice as 
many provided evidence supporting the hypothesis that neoliberal court mechanisms are 
employed to reinforce zero-tolerance social control efforts in schools. 
 The second research question sought to identify evidence among the court 
decisions that would determine whether courts took into account the intentions of the 
student transgressors or if their intentions were disregarded in light of school safety 
concerns. If phrases or passages, within court decisions, found that the intensions of the 
students, who were punished by zero-tolerance policies, were overshadowed and 
dismissed in favor of strict disciplinary action to maintain school safety, then such 
passages were deemed evidence in support of research question two. Consider the 
following passage from J.M. v. Webster County Bd. of Educ. (2000): 
The coach found the particular expletive chosen by J.M.’s father to be quite 
objectionable, and feared that the argument might escalate into a physical 
altercation, so he asked J.M.’s father to go outside and calm down…After his 
father left the room, J.M. took out the loaded gun and fifty-six additional rounds 
of ammunition, and surrendered them to the coach, asking the coach to “take care 
of them,” and adding that he thought his father “was going to kill him”…There is 
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no question that J.M. had a firearm on his person while on school grounds. 
However, J.M. argues that he had not intended to be upon school grounds and was 
transported to the school by his father and against his will. Thus he argues that the 
lack of a mental element or mens rea of “intent” makes it impossible for him to be 
guilty of possession…the fact finder determined that J.M.’s actions in having a 
gun tucked into his pants on school property constituted a violation of the 
statute…even if the initial taking of the gun were defensible (which we question) 
J.M. had several opportunities to discard the gun or the bullets. While J.M.’s 
actions might be excusable to some, they were not to the principal, the board, nor 
the superintendent. (pp. 500-507) 
In the case of J.M., a student, threatened by his father, attempted to prevent his father 
from accessing his gun safe by hiding the key. However, he forgot to lock up one 
handgun and a box of ammunition. In a rush, he concealed the weapon and bullets on his 
person, because his father demanded that they go to the school to get permission to 
remove J.M. from school so he could get J.M. a job at the lumber yard as punishment for 
his misbehavior. The only teacher still at school was the football coach. After getting the 
father to calm down and leave the room, the coach was presented with the gun from J.M. 
who intended only to keep the weapon away from his father for his own safety. 
Regardless of J.M.’s well-intended actions, the court ruled in favor of the school’s zero-
tolerance disciplinary action, which suspended him for a year. Therefore, regardless of 
the circumstances and J.M.’s intentions, he still brought a dangerous weapon onto to 
school grounds, and school safety concerns outweighed the context of his good 
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intentions. A total of sixteen cases found support for research question two that were 
similar to the court decision described above. 
 Of course there were court rulings, which provided evidence where the court 
acknowledged the intentions of the student, and regardless of the serious nature of the 
offense, the court ruled in favor of the student because he or she did not knowingly or 
intentionally violate the school’s zero-tolerance policy. Consider the following judgment 
of the court in Seal v. Morgan (2000): 
We believe, however, that the board’s zero tolerance policy would surely be 
irrational if it subjects to punishment students who did not knowingly or 
consciously possess a weapon. (p. 578) 
In Seal, the court rationalized that it was improper to subject a student to an automatic 
expulsion if he did not knowingly, or intentionally, possess a dangerous weapon on 
school grounds. There were only 7 cases which found similar evidence failing to support 
research question two. Still, more than twice as many cases provided evidence supporting 
research question two suggesting that the courts employ neoliberal mechanisms to 
reinforce zero-tolerance social controls in schools. 
 For research question three, the researcher searched for text segments or passages 
where the court provided school administrators and/or teachers with immunity from any 
charges of liability, regardless of whether the court found that the student’s individual 
rights were violated. Such support is found in the following passage from the Morgan v. 
Snider High Sch. (2007) decision: 
Simmons and Bailey are not liable for any purported constitutional violations 
arising from the vehicle searches…even if the court somehow found a 
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constitutional violation, the case law probably reassured the defendants that they 
were on solid legal footing, and thus they are entitled to qualified immunity. (pp. 
14-28) 
School officials were given qualified immunity even when the court ruled that there was 
a violation of a student’s constitutional rights, as in the Stafford v. Redding (2006) 
decision, where school officials were given qualified immunity even though their strip 
search of the female student for ibuprofen pills was found a violation of her Fourth 
Amendment rights. Twenty-four court decisions yielded support for research question 
three. 
 Conversely, there were court decisions which provided passages that failed to 
support research question three. For example, consider the passage from Evans v. Bd. of 
Educ. Southwestern City Sch. Dist. (2010):  
He failed to address the situation or take any remedial measures, and that he then 
retaliated against L.E. by suspending her when she was subject to forced sexual 
conduct. Therefore, Smathers is not entitled to qualified immunity. (pp. 32-33) 
The Evans court decision did not provide the principal with immunity from lawsuit when 
it found a violation of the student’s rights. However, textual evidence rejecting research 
question three was quite rare, with only five other cases yielding similar reasoning. Four 
times as many court decisions found support for research question three. 
 When passages were identified that revealed the court’s preference for security 
and safety from disruptions favored the discretion of school officials over the individual 
rights of students, the researcher listed these passages as support for research question 
four. Consider the court’s reasoning in Hammock ex rel. Hammock v. Keys (2000): 
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Indeed, courts staunchly resist the suggestion that school discipline hearings 
should emulate criminal trials…the court notes that the system of public 
education…relies necessarily upon the discretion of school administrators and 
school board members…Vesting a school official with the discretion to determine 
which situations warrant expulsion is not only necessary in order to maintain 
discipline and good order, it is desirable. (pp. 1229-1233) 
Several other cases presented similar evidence suggesting that the courts were 
“consistently reluctant to intrude upon the disciplinary discretion of school districts” 
(Edwards v. O’Fallon Twp. High Sch. Dist. No 203, 1999, p. 1078). Overall, twenty-five 
court decisions found support for research question four. 
 As with the previously mentioned research questions, there were examples of 
passages in court decisions where the court’s ruling failed to support research question 
four. For example, the Colvin ex rel. Colvin v. Lowndes County (2000) decision revealed 
the following passage:  
While the court is fully aware that school disciplinary matters are best resolved in 
the local community and within the institutional framework of the school system, 
the court is of the opinion that the board employed an erroneous standard in 
considering Jonathan’s case. (p. 513) 
Thus, although the Colvin court acknowledged the typical reasoning of the courts in 
desiring not to second-guess school disciplinary matters or intrude upon the discretion of 
school administrators, it also acknowledged when improper administrative standards 
where applied in a student’s disciplinary case. Nevertheless, only two court decisions 
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provided evidence failing to support research question four, which pales in comparison to 
the twenty-five cases supporting this research question. 
 When searching for evidence supporting research question five, the researcher 
looked for passages where the court provided preference favoring the neoliberal 
disciplinary practices of schools, while dismissing them as not cruel and unusual 
punishments, even if the infractions did not present an imminent threat to the school 
environment. For instance, consider the following passage from New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
(1985):  
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies 
only to punishments imposed after criminal convictions and hence does not apply 
to the punishment of school children by public school officials. (p.334) 
Interestingly, the court in T.L.O. reasoned that school discipline cannot be considered 
cruel and unusual punishment simply because it is not the result of a criminal conviction. 
Such logic dismisses the potential harm zero-tolerance practices can have on students 
who are suspended or expelled for even nonthreatening behaviors. Only four court 
decisions yielded support for research question five. 
 There was only one court case where evidence relevant to research question five 
actually failed to provide support. Consider the following passage from James P. v. 
Lemahieu (2000): 
First, there is a legitimate possibility of irreparable harm that could result from not 
rescinding disciplinary action prior to the end of the litigation. For example, 
Robert P.’s college applications will be tarnished since the actions taken by the 
school will be on his record, his grades will suffer if he is not able to make up his 
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work and he will not be able to compete in athletic events. It is also very possible 
that his inability to participate…will negatively affect his ability to obtain an 
athletic scholarship. (p. 1122) 
The Lemahieu court’s logic definitely acknowledged the potentially harmful effects that 
an automatic suspension can have for a student, especially when the violation is a minor 
one. Still, the Lemahieu decision is outnumbered by the other four decisions providing 
support for research question five. 
 In regard to research question six, any text segment or passages revealing that the 
jurisprudential intent of the court is to dismiss allegations of constitutional violations as 
not binding on the court, or without merit, because it is not the court’s role to make such 
judgments was considered support. For example, such support can be found in the 
following passage from Defabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist. (2009): 
Although plaintiffs seek to second-guess with hindsight the judgment of school 
administrators, that is not the role of the courts. If the school’s decision satisfies 
the constitutional standard in Tinker, then it is irrelevant that a litigant or court 
believes the situation could have been handled better. It is not the role of the 
federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may 
view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. (p. 481) 
The Defabio decision plainly stated that the courts have no role, nor should they, in 
second-guessing the judgment of school officials in disciplinary matters regardless of 
whether the student believes he or she has been treated unfairly. In addition, the court’s 
logic in Defabio suggested that federal courts have no place in overturning the 
disciplinary decisions of school officials even if the court disagrees with the reasoning 
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behind the school’s harsh disciplinary actions. A total of fifty court decisions provided 
evidence supporting research question six.  
 There were a few court decisions where evidence was found that failed to support 
research question six. Once such instance was found in the following passage from the 
ruling in Hinds County Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. R.B. (2007): 
The court finds that the school board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and 
not supported by substantial evidence. The school board relied solely on the 
report from the appeals committee and the faxed photocopy of an item purporting 
to be the “knife” found on R.B. The findings of the appeals committee are 
themselves deficient, as the appeals committee chose to rely on the written reports 
characterizing the device as a pocket knife without examining the device 
themselves…Had the school board conducted even a cursory examination of the 
actual device, it would have realized that the appeals committee’s 
recommendation…did not constitute substantial evidence upon which to 
discipline R.B. for possession of a weapon. (pp. 501-502) 
Although the Hinds court did question the discretion wielded by the school board and 
decided in favor of the student, this case was only one among six, which failed to support 
research question six. Compared to the fifty cases providing support, these few cases that 
reject research question six are largely overshadowed by the numerous instances where 
support was found. 
 The researcher also searched for language in the individual court cases that 
revealed if the courts favored suspensions or expulsions even when viable alternative 
punishments were available. Such passages affirming this preference for harsh discipline 
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in light of less stigmatizing alternatives would provide support for research question 
seven. Only four court cases provided evidence in support of research question seven. 
Consider the evidence provided by the following passage in the Covington County v. 
G.W. (2000) decision: 
While it is true that there are many punishments that would seem less harsh or 
more appropriate in this case, we must recognize that the law commits this entire 
matter to the discretion of the school board. (p. 192) 
The Cathe A. v. Doddridge County Bd. of Educ. (1997) decision provided a similar 
argument with this passage: 
The twelve-month expulsion period...may seem to be a severe penalty. But the 
legislature is entitled to believe that only such a penalty would serve as an 
effective deterrent to further the important goal of a strict weapons-free 
environment in our school. (p.529) 
Thus, it is clear that the courts rarely, if at all, acknowledged alternative punishments to 
zero-tolerance practices of exclusion. When the courts did acknowledge potential 
punishments that were less harsh, and perhaps more restorative or rehabilitative, the 
courts dismissed them and sided with the disciplinary actions taken by the school 
officials. There were no instances where evidence could be distinguished as rejecting 
research question seven. Such a finding reveals that alternative sanctions are seldom 
considered in court rulings regarding the potential infringement zero-tolerance policies 
have on the rights of students. 
 Finally, the researcher also searched for text segments or passages that mentioned 
the need for school officials to enforce strict disciplinary actions in order to preemptively
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prevent possible future disruptions. Evidence suggesting the courts support harsh 
disciplinary actions in order to preemptively stop substantial school disruptions were 
listed as support for research question eight. Consider the following passage from 
Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t. (2003):  
However, the potential for disruption or disorder to the students of the Northwest 
School was greater than merely the school’s negative reaction to an unpopular 
political viewpoint…On these facts, a reasonable interpretation of the law would 
allow a school official to prevent potential disorder or disruption to school safety, 
particularly in the wake of increased school violence across the country. We 
review, however, with deference, schools’ decisions in connection with the safety 
of their students even when freedom of expression is involved. At the time when 
school officials made their determination to emergency expel him, they had facts 
which might reasonably have led them to forecast a substantial disruption of or 
material interference with school activities. (p. 203) 
As evidenced in the Demers opinion, the courts tend to favor disciplinary actions that 
seek to prevent potential disorder or disruption of the school environment even if such 
actions infringe on students’ constitutional rights, such as the First Amendment. Eleven 
court decisions provided similar evidence supporting research question eight. 
 Only two court decisions provided evidence failing to support research question 
eight (see Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 1969; J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 2011). 
Consider the court’s reasoning in the J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. ruling:  
The facts in this case do not support the conclusion that a forecast of substantial 
disruption was reasonable…The facts simply do not support the conclusion that 
250 
 
the school district could have reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption of or 
material interference with the school as a result of J.S.’s profile. Under Tinker, 
therefore, the school district violated J.S.’s First Amendment free speech rights 
when it suspended her for creating the profile. (pp. 928-931) 
Although the court used the Tinker standard in determining that the school erred in 
suspending J.S. in the Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. decision, this evidence is outweighed when 
compared to the support found in favor of research question eight. 
 Evidence Related to Jurisprudential Intent and Neoliberal Theory. In the second 
step of the case law method, the researcher identified the use of repetitive legal language 
conveyed through the jurisprudential intent, which denotes principles characteristic of the 
mechanisms described in the neoliberal theoretical framework advanced in chapter 3. 
Five themes emerged from the manifest content that was discerned from the 
jurisprudential intent collected in the first step of the method. Sixty of the seventy-five 
court decisions yielded manifest content that could be categorized into one or more of 
these themes. The researcher will now explain how the concepts expressed through the 
emergent themes in the case law translate back into the theoretical mechanisms presented 
in the neoliberal theoretical framework. 
 Interest Balancing.  Interest balancing was the first emergent theme identified 
within the jurisprudential intent of the court decisions. Interest balancing refers to 
striking a balance between the school authorities’ interests in maintaining an orderly 
school environment, free from disruption, and ensuring students’ individual constitutional 
rights are not violated in zero tolerance court decisions. The jurisprudential intent 
revealed in the first step of the case law method found that the majority of cases 
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supporting research question one showed that the courts found the school authorities’ 
interests outweighed the interests of individual students claiming constitutional rights 
violations. For instance, consider the following manifest content present in the passage 
from the J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. (2002) decision:  
In various situations, the high courts of both the United States and Pennsylvania 
have performed the delicate balance and concluded that the constitutional interests 
of the student, in certain circumstances, must yield to the school officials’ need to 
maintain order and to discipline when necessary to assure a safe school 
environment that is conducive to learning…[the] school board…is in the best 
position to weigh the strengths and vulnerabilities of the town’s 785 students. (pp. 
651 & 672) 
The court, in the J.S. v. Bethlehem decision, reinforces the concept of moral panic by 
suggesting there are dangerous threats to school safety, as well as threats to the 
maintenance of order and discipline within public schools. In response to these potential 
threats, which the theoretical framework identifies as being driven by sensationalized 
media coverage and manipulated by politicians, the courts suggest that the constitutional 
rights of students are outweighed by the schools’ interests in utilizing broader social 
controls to eliminate perceived threats to school safety (Burns & Crawford, 1999; 
Hirschfield, 2008; Giroux, 2003; Simon, 2007, p. 230).  
 Additionally, the court ruled in Pendleton v. Fassett (2009) that “the general 
governmental interest in safe and disciplined schools in order to promote and ensure a 
productive learning environment is more weighty here,” (p. 21) which reflects the 
theoretical concept in the framework that argues the tightening of school disciplinary 
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practices is necessary to provide the school environment essential to socialize students for 
today’s neoliberal economy. The R.M. v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. (2004) decision 
reiterates this logic by stating that “A student’s right to an education may be 
constitutionally denied when outweighed by the school’s interest in protecting other 
students, teachers, and school property, and in preventing the disruption of the 
educational system” (p. 19).  
 As explained in the theoretical framework, the media-driven moral panic, which 
resulted from the school shootings in the 1980s and 1990s, provided policy makers with 
the opportunity to gain the public support necessary to implement zero-tolerance policies 
that allows school officials to remove and exclude students who threaten the reconfigured 
educational system designed to produce “compliant bodies” demanded by the 
deindustrialized neoliberal state (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & 
Monahan, 2006). Therefore, zero-tolerance policies serve as the legislative answer to 
controlling school violence and crime caused by a perceived growing number of 
“dangerous” youth in American schools, and the courts’ interest-balancing logic 
legitimizes this process (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & 
Celinska, 2011; Stinchcomb et al., 2006). Thus, interest balancing is a neoliberal 
mechanism in which the courts utilize the fear of school violence to rationalize the 
weakening of constitutional rights for public school students while promoting the state’s 
interest in providing a safe, undisturbed educational environment in which students can 
effectively be socialized into their appropriate class-defined roles (Hirschfield, 2008). As 
a result, the political utility of fear mongering from policy makers is coupled with the 
interest balancing dynamics of judicial reasoning to convince, parents, school officials, 
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and society more generally that schools should and could be safer through the continued 
enforcement of zero-tolerance policies (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; Lyons & Drew, 
2006). 
 Qualified Immunity The second theme to emerge from the jurisprudential intent, 
which was communicated through the relevant court decisions, is the concept of qualified 
immunity. Qualified immunity means that even if the court finds that enforcement of zero-
tolerance policies have violated a student’s constitutional rights, school administrators 
and teachers, who are primarily involved in the enforcement of such school disciplinary 
actions, are immunized from any charges of liability. As a result a court may refuse to 
rule on a case or grant summary judgment in favor of the school officials, regardless of 
whether the court finds them to be in violation of the U.S. Constitution or not. 
 Qualified immunity reflects the role that the due process meta-narrative plays in 
the theoretical framework. Recall that the students’ rights movement of the 1960s and 
1970s secured due process for students by curbing arbitrary and capricious disciplinary 
practices by school officials and regulating many of the existing disciplinary practices 
(Arum, 2003).Two of the landmark Supreme Court decisions during this period are 
included in the data set for the current qualitative analysis (see Goss v. Lopez, 1975; 
Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 1969); however, subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
weakened the due process rights granted to students in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Bethel 
Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 1986; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 1988; New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 1985; Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 1995). Scholars argued that the added due 
process undermined the traditional moral authority exerted by school administrators 
because these authorities faced potential litigation for applying harsh disciplinary action 
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without considering the constitutional rights of students (Arum, 2003; Toby, 1998). Zero-
tolerance policies transfer disciplinary authority away from traditional school authorities 
and into the control of inflexible disciplinary codes, law enforcement, and the justice 
system (Beger, 2002; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Lyons & Drew, 2006).  
 Furthermore, the transfer of disciplinary authority to strict zero-tolerance codes 
and law enforcement entities allows school administrators to circumvent litigious claims 
from students who believe their constitutional privacy and due process rights have been 
violated by zero tolerance practices (Arum, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008). Consequently, the 
manner in which neoliberal social controls are exerted via school-based zero tolerance 
policies and an increased law enforcement presence at schools has reinforced the 
formation of a crime control model where students’ rights are weakened, due process is 
minimized, and the movements of students are controlled (Lyons & Drew, 2006; Nolan 
& Anyon, 2004). The courts aid this process by granting school officials qualified 
immunity from liability when the application of zero-tolerance disciplinary punishments 
infringe upon the constitutional rights of students. Consider the following manifest 
content arising from the Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (2012) decision: 
School administrators must be permitted to react quickly and decisively to address 
a threat of physical violence against their students, without worrying that they will 
have to face years of litigation second-guessing their judgment as to whether the 
threat posed a real risk of substantial disturbance. (p. 470) 
The legal reasoning depicted in this passage from the Cuff decision unmistakably conveys 
the principles explained in the theoretical framework. Zero-tolerance policies permit 
school officials to shift disciplinary authority to the written policy itself, and the courts 
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grant them immunity by adhering to the strict enforcement of the policy. Thus, school 
officials can apply harsh disciplinary actions, which may infringe upon the constitutional 
rights of the students being accused of wrongdoing, and the courts will use qualified 
immunity as the neoliberal court mechanism to reinforce zero-tolerance social control 
efforts in schools. 
 As mentioned above, even when a court finds a violation of students’ 
constitutional rights, it is possible for school administrators to enjoy qualified immunity 
and be granted summary judgment without ever being held liable for their actions. For 
instance, contemplate the message expressed by the court in the Demers v. Leominster 
Sch. Dep’t (2003) decision: 
Even if the law is clearly established, an official is entitled to qualified immunity 
if at the time of the challenged actions, such official’s belief that his or her actions 
were lawful is objectively legally reasonable…A reasonable, though mistaken 
conclusion about the lawfulness of one’s conduct does not subject a governmental 
official to personal liability…there is limited case law on this issue of school 
violence in this Circuit, which lends further credence to conclude that this area of 
the law is unsettled. Therefore, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity. (pp. 207-208) 
A similar ruling was ordered in the Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist. (2005) decision 
where over twenty students were subjected to nude or partially nude strip searches 
because money had been reported missing by a student. Although the court found the 
searches to have violated the students’ Fourth Amendment rights because of the absence 
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of individualized suspicion, the school officials and the law enforcement officer involved 
still were granted qualified immunity. The court’s ruling is as follows:  
However, the teachers and officer were entitled to qualified immunity because the 
law at the time the searches were conducted did not clearly establish that the 
searches were unreasonable under the particular circumstances present in the 
case…Because the searches in this case did not violate clearly established law, the 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (pp. 598 & 608) 
The rulings in Beard and Demers suggest that the existing case law regarding strip 
searches of a large number of students, without individualized suspicion, has largely 
found that such searches are either constitutional or that the written statutes have not 
narrowed the procedure in which students can be searched enough so the courts may 
construe that the school officials should have known better. Hence, qualified immunity 
serves as another neoliberal court mechanism to reinforce the enforcement of zero-
tolerance policies in schools. 
 Disempowered Citizenship. The third emergent theme is disempowered 
citizenship. This theme reiterates three things mentioned in the theoretical framework, 
which school criminalization teaches students. Those three things are: (1) that students 
have no meaningful influence over their schools, (2) students have little recourse should 
the government have violated their rights, and (3) students have few rights to begin with 
(Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lyons & Drew, 2006). The 
neoliberal agenda, as applied to school criminalization efforts, endorses a “narrow public 
sphere” and a “docile citizenry” (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2011, p. 7). Therefore, 
enforcement of neoliberal social control efforts, via zero-tolerance policies, has 
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transformed the role of public schools to replicate a model of disempowered citizenship 
that is similar to the neoliberal labor dynamics, where students’ rights are weakened and 
their movements are controlled and scrutinized (Giroux, 2003; Lyons & Drew, 2006). 
 The manifest content that was discovered in the second step of the case law 
method revealed twenty-three instances in which disempowered citizenship emerged. For 
example, consider the following passage from the Northwestern Sch. Corp. v. Linke 
(2002) decision:  
The United States Supreme Court has taken the view that while public schools are 
state actors subject to constitutional oversight, the nature of a school’s role is 
custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could 
not be exercised over free adults…We find that students are entitled to less 
privacy at school than adults would enjoy in comparable situations. In any 
realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expectation 
of privacy than members of the population generally. (pp. 979-980) 
Such judicial reasoning clearly establishes how the courts acknowledge and agree with 
neoliberal principles suggesting that students are less worthy of the constitutional 
protections afforded to adults in similar circumstances, while outside of public schools. 
Indeed, the Doran v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. (2009) ruling also concluded that 
“Unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights to self-
determination—including the right to come and go at will” (p. 193). The legal language 
in the Doran decision also reflects the principles described in the neoliberal theoretical 
framework by plainly stating that the students’ rights are not only weakened but their 
movements are also in need of control.  
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 Furthermore, several of the court decisions in this investigation revealed judicial 
reasoning, which argues that “Given the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary 
sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, 
the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code” (Bethel Sch. Dist. 
v. Fraser, 1986, p. 686; Hammock ex rel. Hammock v. Keys, 2000, pp. 1230-1232; J.S. v. 
Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 2011, pp. 935-936; Morgan v. Snider High Sch., 2007, p. 21; 
Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ., 2005, p. 903). In addition, many of the rulings also opined 
that “the constitutional rights of students are not automatically coextensive with the rights 
of adults in other settings” (Anderson v. Milbank Sch. Dist. 25-4, 2000, p. 686; Bethel 
Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 1986, p. 682; Defabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009, p. 
474; Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t, 2003, p. 200; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
1988, pp. 266-267; J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 2011, p. 926; Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ., 
2005, p. 900). Another common attitude conveyed by the court decisions is that “the 
typical requirements of warrant and probable cause are relaxed when a school official 
conducts a search of a student” (Bundick v. Bay City Indep. Sch. Dist., 2001, p. 738; 
Commonwealth v. Lawrence L., 2003, pp. 880-882; Commonwealth v. Smith, 2008, pp. 
178-179; Doran v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist., 2009, p. 191; Hill v. Sharber, 2008, pp. 
676-677; In re K.K., 2012, p. 653; In re L.A., 2001, p. 885; Lausin v. Bishko, 2010, p. 
629; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985, p. 325; Pendleton v. Fassett, 2009, pp. 15-16; Sims v. 
Bracken County Sch. Dist., 2010, pp. 18-19; State v. Best, 2008, pp. 109-110; Vernonia 
Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 1995, p. 653). As one can see, the manifest content described above 
expresses the judicial attitude favoring the disempowered citizenship of public school 
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students, which yields significant theoretical import to the neoliberal theoretical 
framework. 
 Empowered Discretion of School Authorities.  The fourth theme to develop from 
the manifest content discerned in the jurisprudential intent is empowered discretion of 
school authorities. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, school criminalization 
efforts, in accordance with the neoliberal agenda, alters the role of teachers so that they 
may manage and classify students much like employees would be treated in a neoliberal 
economy (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Recall that the 
classification of students, via anticipatory labeling, allows teachers and school 
administrators to project perceived future social and structural realities onto their 
disaffected and disruptive students (Hirschfield, 2008). Sociologists argue that structural 
forces, like those relevant to neoliberal restructuring, “condition” and “constrain” 
individual perceptions and interactions with others (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; 
Hirschfield, 2008, p. 91).  
 Thus, the neoliberal agenda, especially in light of the infusion of economic 
accountability standards into public education, may influence school officials’ 
perceptions of students’ future prospects by linking social structure to the students’ 
educational and occupational aspirations and classroom effort (Hirschfield, 2008). As 
such, in order to meet competitive performance standards with other schools, teachers 
and school administrators are charged with the task of classification and socialization, 
which forces them to consciously and unconsciously prepare students for their rightful 
place in the social hierarchy by sorting future dropouts from those students who have the 
best chance of functioning in the neoliberal workplace environment (Bowditch, 1993; 
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Ferguson, 2000; Hirschfield, 2008). Moreover, the pressure to achieve neoliberal 
standards of accountability for underperforming schools further motivates educators to 
control and remove disaffected and disruptive students, who obstruct the socialization 
processes that promote the values and norms of a dominant economic class (Kupchik & 
Monahan, 2006; Shapiro, 1984). In order to achieve these neoliberal goals, teachers and 
school administrators must be empowered with wide discretionary authority to classify 
and remove those students who pose a threat to the pedagogical imperatives of the 
neoliberal agenda that seeks to reproduce the structure of capitalist society through the 
socialization of students in the values of the market place as preferred by the ruling class 
elites (Giroux, 2003; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Shapiro, 1984). 
 The courts play a role in acquiescing to and further enhancing the discretionary 
power of school officials by refusing to question or rule on improper or inappropriate 
disciplinary actions taken by school authorities, which may infringe upon the 
constitutional rights of students. There were numerous instances in which the 
jurisprudential intent revealed manifest content supporting the concept of empowered 
discretion of school authorities. For example, consider the following passage from the 
Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (2012) decision:  
Although plaintiffs seek to second-guess with hindsight the judgment of school 
administrators, that is not the role of the courts…It is not the role of the federal 
courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as 
lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. (pp. 469-470) 
By using such judicial logic, the courts legitimize neoliberal social control efforts in 
schools by emboldening school officials with more discretion in which to classify and 
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socialize students in accordance with the neoliberal pedagogical agenda. Numerous other 
court decisions argue that it is not the courts’ role to “second-guess” the judgment or “set 
aside the decisions of school administrators” (e.g., Brett N. v. Cmty Unit Sch. Dist. NO. 
303, 2009, pp. 8-11; Doe by & Through Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 1995, p. 10; Fuller v. 
Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61, 2000, pp. 821-822; Hammock ex rel. 
Hammock v. Keys, 2000, p. 1224; Morgan v. Snider High Sch., 2007, pp. 23-24; Piekosz-
Murphy v. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 2012, p. 961; Stafford Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 2009, p. 356; Tun v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 2004, p. 938; Vann v. 
Stewart, 2006, p. 890).  
 The ruling in the E.M. v. Briggs (1996) decision further articulates the concept of 
empowered discretion of school authorities as depicted in the theoretical framework. 
Consider the following passage: 
It should be here noted that the management, supervision and determinations of 
policy are the prerogative and responsibility of the school officials; and that the 
courts should be reluctant to enter therein…It is the policy of the law not to favor 
limitations on the powers of boards of education, but rather to give them a free 
hand to function within the sphere of their responsibilities…Section 1983 does 
not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in 
school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations. 
The system of public education that has evolved in this nation relies necessarily 
upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board 
members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction 
of errors in the exercise of that discretion (E.M. v. Briggs, 1996, p. 757). 
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The language used in the Briggs decision reinforces the theoretical concept of empowered 
discretion by clearly arguing that school officials deserve wider rather than more limited 
discretionary powers when it comes to enforcing school disciplinary actions. The courts’ 
reluctance to rule on alleged abuses of discretion by school officials serves to further 
empower school authorities to enforce zero-tolerance policies in order to classify and 
socialize students in accordance with the neoliberal agenda. Thus, by granting school 
authorities with empowered discretion, the courts engage in the reinforcement of 
neoliberal social controls in schools. 
 Preemptive Exclusion. The fifth emergent theme arising from the manifest content 
extracted by way of the jurisprudential intent of the relevant court decisions is preemptive 
exclusion. As stated in the theoretical framework, zero-tolerance policies attempt to deter 
the presence of weapons, drugs, and troublesome or disruptive behaviors that might 
inhibit the teachers’ roles in socializing the “compliant bodies” needed for the flexible 
labor force of the new neoliberal state (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Students who 
exhibit these forms of disruptive behaviors are stigmatized and labeled as “at-risk of 
failing,”  “unsalvageable,” and “bound for jail,” which mirrors the otherizing rhetoric of 
the original child-saving movement that sought to contain and control problematic youth 
because their behavior was not in accordance with the mainstream American values and 
norms (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; NAACP, 2005; Platt, 2009). Moreover, the tightening of 
school disciplinary practices attempts to mold students into compliant future employees 
who conform to the service-oriented needs of the neoliberal economy (Kupchik & 
Monahan, 2006; Hirschfield, 2008). Those students who disturb this socializing process 
are perceived to hinder the future prospects of other “promising” students who are 
263 
 
expected to be economically viable laborers and consumers in the neoliberal economy 
(Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). As mentioned in the theoretical 
framework, the labeling and categorizing of particular groups of students as “unworthy,” 
“unruly,” and “unsalvageable” (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; Wacquant, 2001, p. 108) is 
reminiscent of the child-saving movement of the 19th and 20th centuries that was harmful 
to poor, urban youth identified as delinquents and treated as dangerous (Platt, 2009).  
 By using zero tolerance exclusionary practices, school administrators and 
educators are able to focus on the best performing students and remove those students 
who threaten overall school performance, as well as undermine the controlled and 
disciplined school environment required for the didactic socialization efforts promoted 
under the neoliberal state to produce students who accommodate the needs of the 
restructured economy (Bowditch, 1993; Fuentes, 2003; Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; 
Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Toby, 1998). Therefore, school criminalization policies and 
practices enforced in the neoliberal state attempt to instill a “passive acquiescence to state 
and corporate power” among the student populations and their parents (Lyons & Drew, 
2006, p. 195). This goal is pursued by isolating and funneling those students, who disrupt 
this socialization process, out of school and onto a path leading to confinement and 
perpetual marginalization before they can even enter the labor force (Hall & Karanxha, 
2012). Thus, the new American educational apparatus assists in the criminalization of 
poor students, which aids in the establishment and maintenance of a criminal class that 
legitimates systems of inequality in modern capitalist societies, while flexible students 
who adapt or succumb easily to the labor instability, invasive monitoring, and 
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exploitative working conditions of the neoliberal state are rewarded (Kupchik & 
Monahan, 2006). 
 The theoretical framework also identifies the formation of a crime control model 
in public schools to reinforce a governing through crime initiative, which approaches 
problems faced by schools as criminal problems rather than social or counseling 
problems (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Simon, 2007). Under this governing through 
crime logic, disruptive students are recast as criminals and the criminal element 
threatening the schools must be identified and expelled in order to improve the prospects 
and performance of promising students, such as those who are flexible and compliant to 
the needs of the neoliberal economy (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Simon, 2007). The 
courts assist public schools in the process of isolating and funneling out those disruptive 
students who threaten the neoliberal agenda in education by ruling in favor of 
preemptive, exclusionary actions taken by school official regardless of alleged 
constitutional rights violations. 
 For example, contemplate the following passage from the Demers (2003) 
decision: 
On these facts, a reasonable interpretation of the law would allow a school official 
to prevent potential disorder or disruption to school safety, particularly in the 
wake of increased school violence across the country…At the time when school 
officials made their determination to emergency expel him, they had facts which 
might reasonably have led them to forecast a substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities…Michael’s suspension and subsequent 
expulsion were rationally related to the school’s interest in maintaining a safe 
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school environment, particularly in light of the apprehensive climate that existed 
at the time due to highly publicized incidents of school violence around the 
country. (pp. 203-206) 
The judicial reasoning employed in this court case reflects the theoretical principles put 
forth in the framework, which suggests that school officials are charged with the role of 
excluding students whose behavior may potentially cause disorder or disruption to the 
schools activities or overall operations.  
 In a similar opinion, the Defabio (2009) court embodied similar principles by 
ruling in the following manner: 
In this context, it is well settled that school officials do not have to wait for actual 
disruption from the speech before they act; instead, school officials have an 
affirmative duty to not only ameliorate the harmful effects of disruptions, but to 
prevent them from happening in the first place…Not only are school officials free 
to act before the actual disruption occurs, they are not required to predict 
disruption with absolute certainty to satisfy the Tinker standard…Moreover, 
forecasting disruption is unmistakably difficult to do. Thus, rather than requiring 
certainty of disruption, Tinker allows school officials to act and prevent the 
speech where they might reasonably portend disruption form the student 
expression at issue…Because of the special circumstances of the school 
environment, the level of disturbance required to justify official intervention is 
lower inside a public school than it is outside the school. The First Amendment 
does not deprive school administrators of the ability to rely upon their own 
considerable experience, expertise, and judgment in recognizing and diffusing the 
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potential for disruption and violence in public schools. Indeed, they are duty-
bound to do just that. That duty is particularly acute when threats of physical 
violence have already been made and actual violence could well erupt if the 
hostile situation is not promptly and emphatically controlled. (pp. 480-481) 
The language utilized by the court in the Defabio decision clearly supports the concept of 
preemptive exclusion. Moreover, the passage from Defabio urges that school officials are 
“duty-bound” to preemptively prevent disruption in public schools. Indeed, other court 
rulings also found that “school officials have a duty to prevent the occurrence of 
disturbances” (J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 2002, p. 662). 
 In addition to disruptive behaviors, the courts also take the opinion that school 
officials “need not tolerate speech that is inconsistent with its pedagogical mission, even 
though the government could not suppress that speech outside of the schoolhouse” 
(Anderson v. Milbank Sch. Dist. 25-4, 2000, p. 686; Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 1988, p. 
261; Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 2004, p. 615; S.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 
2004, p. 422). Thus, the courts’ also express their approval of the suppression of student 
expression that impedes the pedagogical concerns of schools attempting to instill youth 
with the neoliberal values of the ruling class, which was mentioned in the theoretical 
framework. The evidence discussed above reveals that preemptive exclusion is a 
neoliberal social control mechanism in which the courts legitimize suits brought against 
schools for allegedly violating students’ constitutional rights. 
Thematic Investigation 
 The thematic investigation, which was conducted as the third step of the case law 
method found that these five themes emerged 112 times across 80% (n = 60) of the court 
267 
 
decisions in the sample. The two most prominently employed themes reflective of the 
principles found in the theoretical framework were qualified immunity and empowered 
discretion of school authorities. These two themes were evidenced roughly 50% of the 
time. Thus, the results of this study suggest that qualified immunity and empowered 
discretion are the neoliberal court mechanisms utilized by courts the most in order to 
reinforce zero-tolerance social control efforts in public schools. As such, future research 
regarding judicial decision making in zero tolerance court cases should attempt to 
measure and assess aspects of these two theoretical concepts. Two other themes were 
evidenced approximately 35-40% of the time, and those are interest balancing and 
disempowered citizenship, respectfully. Likewise, with these theoretical concepts being 
referenced 4 out of 10 times, future research should seek to measure and evaluate these 
concepts further. Lastly, although only evidenced just below 20% of the time, the 
theoretical concept of preemptive exclusion should also be included in subsequent 
empirical investigations attempting to measure and identify the presence of neoliberal 
social controls in social institutions, such as education. The themes identified in this 
qualitative inquiry are transferable as neoliberal theoretical constructs that can be used in 
future studies investigating the application of neoliberal social control mechanisms in 
similar or other contexts. 
 The overall qualitative findings reflect the neoliberal principle, which embraces 
the rule of law and articulates that any conflict or opposition to neoliberal policies must 
be “mediated through the courts” (Harvey, 2005, p. 66). Thus, by finding that the courts 
predominantly rule in favor of upholding neoliberal social control mechanisms (e.g., 
zero-tolerance policies), this study has identified a way in which neoliberal contradictions 
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are legitimized in a representative democracy.  As such, the legitimacy crisis, embodied 
within the U.S. neoliberal democratic system (Habermas, 1975; Harvey, 2005; Shapiro, 
1984; Wolfe, 1977), is given validity through the precedent established through the rule 
of law determined by the court system. 
Quantitative Findings 
 There were five research hypotheses tested by conducting a series of one-way 
ANOVAs and chi-square analyses. Of these five hypotheses, the quantitative results 
found support for hypotheses two, three, four, and five. Specifically, for hypothesis two, 
the researcher found that schools with 50% or more minority students had a significantly 
higher average of total number of disciplinary actions compared to schools with less than 
5% minority students for all three waves (i.e., 2003-2004, 2005-2006, and 2007-2008) of 
data. Although the ANOVA results for hypothesis one yielded weak effect sizes, the 
plotted trend lines, over time, suggested a consistently steady or increasing level of total 
disciplinary actions taken against students attending school with the highest minority 
levels.  
 Similarly, the ANOVA results for hypothesis three revealed that schools with 
50% or more minority students had a significantly higher average of total removals 
without continued educational services compared to schools with less than 5% of 
minority students across all three waves of data. The effect sizes for the hypothesis three 
ANOVAs were also weak. When the trend lines were plotted, the pattern suggested a 
steady upward trend in total removals applied to students attending schools with the 
highest levels of minority students across the three waves. These findings reveal that the 
total disciplinary and removals without continued educational services are 
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disproportionately applied to schools with larger populations of minority students, which 
is consistent with the research findings mentioned in the empirical literature (Lawrence, 
2007; Reyes, 2006; Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Skiba et al., 2002; Sughrue, 2003). 
However, the 2005-2006 trend line was unexpectedly higher than hypothesized.  
 There may be a couple of reasons for why there was a spike in the total removals 
without continued educational services for the 2005-2006 wave of data. First of all, the 
No Child Left Behind Act did not really go into effect until 2003 (Kim et al, 2010). 
Therefore, the effects on disciplinary actions resulting from the increased accountability 
standards placed on underperforming schools may have resulted in more expulsions 
without continued educational services for the years closely following the 2003 
implementation in order to meet those heightened performance standards by removing 
students who cause disruptions and bring down standardized test scores. Another 
plausible explanation is that there were two mass school shootings in 2005 (i.e., Red 
Lake High School in Minnesota and Campbell County High School in Tennessee) and 
another two mass school shootings in 2006 (i.e., Pine Middle School in Nevada and 
Weston High School in Wisconsin), which caught media attention (Kyle & Thompson, 
2008). Thus, the elevated levels of fear and panic created by media coverage of these 
tragic events may have had an effect on the increased number of removals the 2005-2006 
school years. Indeed, an enhanced vigilant response from school administrators may have 
resulted in a greater use of harsh disciplinary action in attempts to prevent or deter more 
incidents of school violence. With these two phenomena working in tandem, it is feasible 
to expect a spike in the number of removals that those two years. 
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 The chi-square results for hypothesis four revealed that students who attended 
schools with greater than 50% minorities were more likely to live in areas with the 
highest levels of crime, while the majority of students who came from schools with less 
than 5% minorities were more likely to live in areas with the lowest levels of crime. 
These chi-square results were consistent for all three waves of data and the effect sizes 
were quite strong. When looking across the chi-square results for the three waves of data, 
it appears that the schools with the highest percentage of minorities were consistently 
more likely to have a majority of students residing in high-crime areas, such that the trend 
revealed a slightly increasing or steady percentage of students from high-crime areas 
attending schools with a 50% or greater minority student makeup. Likewise, over time, 
the schools with the lowest percentage of minority students were unvaryingly less likely 
to have a majority of students coming from high-crime areas. As such, the trend line 
suggested that there was a decrease in the percentage of students from high-crime areas 
attending schools with a less than 5% minority student makeup. These findings are 
similar to other research findings which acknowledge that minorities are more likely to 
reside in communities characterized by high levels of crime (Giroux, 2003; Hall & 
Karanxha, 2012; Hirschfield, 2008; Wacquant, 2001, 2009a, 2009b). 
 The ANOVA results for hypothesis five found there to be a significantly higher 
average of total removals without continued educational services for students coming 
from high-crime areas compared to students coming from areas with moderate or low 
levels of crime for all three waves of data. Although this relationship also yielded weak 
effect sizes, the trend line, when plotted over time, revealed an expected slight upward 
trend in total removals taken against students coming from high-crime areas. Similar to 
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the findings for hypothesis three, the 2005-2006 trend line was higher than expected. As 
mentioned before, this increase in removals may have been a result of moral panic caused 
by the four mass school shootings in those years or increased accountability efforts by 
school administrators to remove disaffected and disruptive students in hopes of 
improving overall school performance for the newly implemented No Child Left Behind 
Act.  
 These findings, combined with the findings from hypothesis three, suggest that 
students coming from high-crime neighborhoods and attending schools consisting of 50% 
or more minorities are more likely to receive exclusionary removals without continued 
educational services compared to students who come from low-crime neighborhoods and 
attend schools with less than 5% minority students. All of these findings are consistent 
with the prior empirical research (Christle et al., 2004; Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 
2003; Lawrence, 2007; Reyes, 2006; Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Skiba et al., 2002; 
Sughrue, 2003). 
 Overall, the ANOVA analyses conducted for hypothesis one did not yield 
support. The results suggested that the average usage of metal detectors and access 
control, by way of locked or monitored doorways, was higher for schools with the least 
amount of minority students. In regards to the average use of security cameras, only the 
2007-2008 data found that schools with the highest percentage of minority students were 
significantly more likely to use security cameras. The other two waves of data produce 
null findings. For the first two waves of data, significant results suggested that security 
personnel was more likely to be used in schools with the lowest percentage of minority 
students compared to schools with the highest percentage of minority students. The 2007-
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2008 data revealed opposite findings, which depicted schools with the highest percentage 
of minority students being more likely to use security personnel compared to schools 
with the lowest percentage of minority students. Thus, these findings, collectively, are 
inconclusive and should be treated as a rejection of the first hypothesis.  
 The fact that the results found metal detectors, access controls, and security 
personnel to be more likely implemented in schools with the smallest percentages of 
minority students is at first puzzling. Especially, since prior research has found that these 
enhanced security measures were more likely to appear in urban schools with higher 
percentages of minorities (Devine, 1996; DeVoe, Peter, Noonan, Snyder, & Baum, 2005; 
Skiba, 2000). However, research has also found that the use of drug sniffing dogs is more 
common in predominantly white, suburban and rural schools (DeVoe et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, research has acknowledged the growing number of middle class, suburban 
and rural schools instituting metal detectors, SROs, and security cameras (Kupchik & 
Monahan, 2006). The results of this study did reveal that security cameras and security 
personnel, in 2007 to 2008, were more likely to be placed in schools with the highest 
percentages of minority students, which does match the findings in previous research 
(Devine, 1996; DeVoe et al., 2005; Skiba, 2000; Noguera, 2003); however, the lack of a 
similar finding in the other two waves leads the researcher to reject the notion that this is 
a distinct trend. Therefore, one must ask why is it that security measures were more likely 
to be found in schools with the lowest percentages of minorities, when the opposite was 
expected. There are a few plausible explanations for this outcome. 
 First of all, currently there is a preoccupation with policing and punishment in 
contemporary society, especially among suburban homeowners who are eager to install 
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alarm systems, security cameras, build gated communities, and invest in private security 
patrols (Garland, 2001; Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Of course more 
affluent families and communities can better afford these surveillance and security 
technologies. It is only logical to deduce that parents living in more affluent areas possess 
the social, political, and economic capital to pressure local and state legislatures to either 
provide funding, or seek federal funding, that is necessary to build and install security 
programs and technologies in suburban schools, which are predominantly in low-crime 
areas. For example, the Safe Schools Act makes it clear that schools must build up 
community support for school security programs (Simon, 2007). Indeed, even the 
selection criteria governing funding unmistakably favors repeated financial awards to 
schools that are able to garner the highest levels of participation from parents and 
community residents for funded projects and activities focused on school crime and 
safety (Simon, 2007).  
 Thus, the implementation of security technologies is not only influenced by racial 
issues but also class-based dynamics. It can be assumed that parents living in 
impoverished, crime-stricken communities are less likely to possess the social, political, 
and economic capital to wield influence over funding for additional surveillance and 
security technologies in local schools. Those parents living in poor neighborhoods, with 
such capital, will more likely pursue funding for other resources (e.g., computers, books, 
lab equipment, etc.) considering that inner-city schools are perhaps the most underfunded 
for such resources (Hirschfield, 2008). Moreover, surveillance systems and security 
technologies, like computers, function as “symbols of progress” and prestige because 
they represent technological solutions to social problems (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006, p. 
274 
 
626). Thus, suburban, white parents, who believe they are sending their children to 
potentially dangerous schools, gain a sense of pride and control by pushing for 
surveillance technologies to make their children’s schools safer and more prestigious 
(Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Simon, 2007). 
 Another factor affecting the presence of security and surveillance technologies in 
white, suburban communities is that there is money to be made by private security 
companies in these locales (Casella, 2003b). The widespread adoption of security 
technologies in suburban schools may have to do with how these products are marketed 
to more affluent audiences (Casella, 2003b; Hirschfield, 2008). The media-driven, moral 
panic surrounding school violence primarily depicts school violence as an urban, 
minority problem that threatens to spill over into white suburbia (Beale, 2006; Burns & 
Crawford, 1999; Chiricos et al., 1997; Dorfman & Schiraldi, 1999; Soler, 2001). Thus, 
the racial and social threat hypotheses may have relevance in how companies, selling 
security technologies, are marketing their products and services to suburban communities 
(Casella, 2003b). The racial and social threat hypotheses suggest that white racism and 
white racialized fear of criminal victimization increases when it is perceived that African 
American and/or Hispanic populations are expanding and spreading into predominantly 
white communities (Welch, 2005, 2011). Thus, suburban parents may anticipate this 
threat, which is often fueled by media coverage (Beale, 2006), and exercise the neoliberal 
economic principles of self-discipline, consumer freedom, and individual productivity by 
choosing to endorse the funding of softer, surveillance approaches to school control that 
promise “greater order, efficiency and predictability in an increasingly complex, scary, 
and fragmented social world” (Casella, 2003b; Hirschfield, 2008, p. 84; Staples, 2000). In 
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accordance with the neoliberal educational agenda, Kupchik and Monahan (2006) argued 
that exposure of both poor and middle class students to penal rituals through increased 
surveillance and control helps to mold workers that “embody extreme flexible 
compliance to the vicissitudes of the marketplace” and “submit willingly to scrutiny and 
manipulation” (p. 627). Thus, the increasing introduction of surveillance and security 
technologies into all schools may be necessary to fulfill the demands of the neoliberal 
state. 
 These quantitative findings reveal support for the political economic dynamics 
detailed in the theoretical framework. Recall that neoliberal policies and practices are 
determined to return all responsibility to the individual, while severely reducing access to 
social welfare provisions, such as public education (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 
2009b). Indeed, it is argued that the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism in the American 
economy has exerted restrictions on the social programming that would otherwise seek to 
redistribute resources more equitably (Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Of course, the 
deregulation of the market, the privatization of state enterprises, and the reduction of the 
welfare state allows for marginal populations, representing the surplus labor force and 
underclass, to grow in numbers, especially among urban, minority youth (Harvey, 2005; 
Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). The growing numbers of 
impoverished, marginal populations creates a democratic threat to the elite who benefit 
from the current existing class structure. Thus, these marginal populations are deemed in 
need of coercive social control to subdue any collective action, including popular 
democratic social and political movements, which these marginal populations may 
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develop to overturn the neoliberal structure (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). 
After all, in a representative democracy, each person has a vote. 
 In regards to the neoliberal social controls applied in public school settings, the 
current study’s findings reveal that removals without continued educational services are 
predominantly utilized in schools where the majority of students are minorities and come 
from areas with high levels of crime. Expulsion without any continued educational 
provisions represents the neoliberal state’s retraction of social welfare. By denying 
students alternative educational services, in addition to expulsion, the neoliberal state 
increases the likelihood that these students will dropout and possibly penetrate the 
juvenile and/or criminal justice systems (Bullara, 1993; Felice, 1981; Fenning & Rose, 
2007; Fuentes, 2003; Giroux, 2003; Gordon et al., 2000; Hall & Karanxha, 2012; 
Hanson, 2005; Hirschfield, 2008; Pettit & Western, 2004; Sheley, 2000). Thus, by 
sending students, representing marginal populations, down the school-to-prison pipeline, 
state actors increase the likelihood that these youth will be disenfranchised, due to 
confinement, and that they will be denied opportunities to receive an education whereby 
they might develop the critical thinking skills necessary to question the fairness of 
existing class structure and organize for social change (Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 
2003; Hanson, 2005; Hirschfield, 2008; Kim et al., 2010; Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Skiba 
et al., 2003; Stader, 2006). Such outcomes are optimal to the powerful, who benefit from 
the structure of the neoliberal state, because these exclusionary practices promote a 
“docile citizenry,” while also benefiting the vested capitalist interests in the prison 
industrial complex (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011, p.7; Lynch, 2007, 
2010). These political economic motivations are easily disguised by using rhetoric that 
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focuses blame on the individual student for disruptive or violent behavior, rather than the 
structural, racial, and social inequalities made worse by the neoliberal restructuring of the 
U.S. economy (Harvey, 2005). 
Policy Implications 
 The previous empirical research has revealed that zero-tolerance policies are not 
succeeding in providing safer schools (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; 
Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Skiba & Knesting, 2001). In fact, recent research has also 
revealed that higher rates of suspensions and expulsions are associated with worsening 
school environments, increasing dropout rates, and poor school-wide academic 
achievement (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; 
Skiba & Rausch, 2006). The current study found that total disciplinary actions and 
removals without continued educational services are applied significantly more to schools 
with the highest percentage of minorities compared to schools with the lowest 
percentages of minorities, and that this trend is steady or increasing over time. This 
finding builds upon prior research that also found that exclusionary zero-tolerance 
policies are disproportionately applied to minority students, especially African Americans 
(Fenning & Rose, 2007; Lawrence, 2007; Reyes, 2006; Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Skiba et 
al., 2002; Sughrue, 2003).  
 In addition, this study’s qualitative investigation has found that the courts serve 
the role of legitimizing neoliberal social controls in schools through judicial decisions 
that rule in favor of the application of zero-tolerance policies by deciding that the 
schools’ interest in maintaining an orderly learning environment, free from disruption, 
outweighs the constitutional rights of students. Such an environment is desired in order 
278 
 
for the pedagogical message of the larger neoliberal agenda to shape students for the 
flexible, service-oriented workforce that awaits them. By providing legitimacy to this 
process, the courts make it possible for zero-tolerance policies to flourish. Thus, the 
precedent created from the majority of the legal decisions evaluated suggests that the 
constitutional rights of students are weakened by neoliberal social control efforts (i.e., 
zero-tolerance policies) and that the courts have empowered school officials with greater 
discretionary authority to employ, even preemptively, exclusionary disciplinary 
punishments without fear of liability if such actions actually violate the rights of students. 
 Given the findings of this study, as well as prior research, it can be argued that 
school-based zero tolerance policies are not effective in creating safer schools. Instead, 
zero-tolerance policies act as social control mechanisms of the neoliberal state that seek 
to target marginalized populations (especially minorities and the poor) for exclusion and 
subsequent confinement in order to manipulate the future labor force for the needs of the 
neoliberal economy. With these conclusions in mind, viable alternatives to zero-tolerance 
policies should be considered for adoption by schools and local and state legislatures.  
 In contrast to the ineffectiveness of zero-tolerance policies, as exhibited by 
previous empirical findings, several experimental and quasi-experimental program 
evaluations have identified numerous non-punitive approaches to school discipline, 
which have proved to have positive influences on student behavior and academic 
performance without severely punishing students for disruptive behavior by excluding 
them from attending school (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Greene, 2005). These 
effective, evidence-based programs will now be summarily described. 
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 Peer-Led Programs. Peer-led programs enlist student involvement in order to 
ensure and promote interventions that are in sync with student culture and foster student 
responsibility for violence prevention initiatives (Greene, 2005). Kenney and Watson’s 
(1998) “student problem solving” approach has shown promise. In this approach, 
students take part in the development, implementation, and assessment of circumscribed 
programs or strategies based on their acknowledgment and perception of school problems 
(Greene, 2005; Kenney & Watson, 1998). For example, students worked with school 
officials to increase the availability of preferred foods and reduce lunch lines, and 
reduced fights in the cafeteria (Greene, 2005; Kenney & Watson, 1998). Thus, these 
programs empower students with a voice to participate in developing ways to prevent 
violence or disruption in schools. 
 Restorative Justice Programs. Restorative justice is a form of mediated 
reconciliation, whereby a process of conflict resolution is established by engaging all 
injured parties in discussion and negotiation (Karp, Sweet, Kirshenbaum, & Bazemore, 
2004; Van Ness & Heetderks Strong, 2007; Zehr & Toews, 2004). Restorative justice 
programs seek to repair the harm done and address the reasons for the offense, while also 
promoting reconciliatory sanctions that are salubrious for the victim(s), offender(s), and 
other involved parties (Zehr, 2002). Some effective restorative justice programs include: 
(1) community conference models, (2) victim offender conferences (VOC), and (34) 
family group conferences (FGC). Several studies revealed that juveniles who successfully 
complete a family group conference are less likely to reoffend in a 2 year follow-up when 
compared to the control group (McGarrell, 2001; McGarrell & Hipple, 2007; McGarrell, 
Olivares, Crawford, & Kroovand, 2000; Rodriguez, 2005). Indeed, after New Zealand 
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revolutionized its juvenile justice system in 1989 to use restorative justice mediation 
programming, especially FGC, as the primary response to juvenile delinquency and 
crime, there has been a two-thirds decline in juvenile offending (Mulligan, 2009; Zehr, 
2002).  
 Given these findings, restorative justice programs are well-suited for addressing 
school-based infractions and crimes committed by students (Zehr, 2002). In response to 
the stigmatizing, exclusionary, and harmful effects of school-based zero-tolerance 
policies, restorative justice promotes reparative solutions that attempt to prevent the 
youthful transgressor from feeling “alienated, more damaged, disrespected, 
disempowered, less safe and less cooperative with society” (Arrigo et al., 2011; Braswell, 
Fuller, & Lozoff, 2001, p. 142; Sellers & Arrigo, 2009). Restorative justice approaches 
seek to prevent negative outcomes for juveniles by giving offender(s), victim(s), 
mediator(s), and the broader community a voice in a dialogue and negotiation that 
determines reparative resolutions that heal harm and do not retributively exclude (Arrigo 
et al., 2011; Karp et al., 2004; Sellers & Arrigo, 2009). In accordance with these aims, 
restorative justice presents the community, and society at large, the opportunity to correct 
underlying causes of youthful violence and criminality (Arrigo, et al., 2011; Van Ness & 
Heetdirks Strong, 2007). Thus, the reparative efforts could and should be social, 
economic, and environmental in nature (Arrigo et al., 2011; Tifft & Sullivan, 2005). 
 Psychosocial and Psychoeducational Programs. These programs provide 
teaching, counseling, coaching, and training to students in order to enhance their conflict 
resolution strategies and interpersonal skills (Greene, 2005). One particularly successful 
program, in this category, is the Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS) 
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program, which is curriculum-based and promotes self-control, emotional understanding, 
positive self-esteem, prosocial relationship building, and interpersonal problem solving 
(Greenberg, Kusche, & Mihalic, 1998; Greene, 2005). Evaluative studies of PATHS 
found statistically significant improvements in students’ prosocial problem-solving 
strategies and lower levels of aggressive behavior (Greenberg et al., 1998; Greene, 2005). 
These programs utilize a cognitive-behavioral approach that acknowledges 
developmental challenges of students and provides positive feedback rather than label 
such students as disruptive and problematic, while seeking to remove them via zero-
tolerance, because of the threat of disorder they potentially present to the school 
environment (Greene, 2005). 
 Character Education and Social-Emotional Learning Programs. These programs 
attempt to cultivate student’s character by teaching them skills to recognize and manage 
their emotions, aspire to achieve positive goals, exhibit caring and concern for others, 
maintain positive relationships, and make responsible decisions (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 
2011). The results from rigorous evaluative studies of character education and social-
learning programs have found that these programs have a significant positive influence 
on building social and emotional skills, adjusting problematic behavior, reducing 
aggressive behavior, and improving academic achievement (Berkowitz & Bier, 2005; 
Durlak & Weissberg, 2007; Payton et al., 2008). The What Works Clearinghouse, an 
initiative of the U.S. Department of Education’s Institute of Education Sciences, has 
identified six of these programs that have shown positive effects on adolescent behavior. 
They include the following: (1) Positive Action, (2) Connect with Kids, (3) Caring 
School Community, (4) Skills for Adolescence, (5) Too Good for Drugs, and (6) Too 
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Good for Violence (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). These programs promote prosocial 
character development, while utilizing an ethic of care that teaches students cooperation 
rather than competition (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). In addition, these programs 
reengage teachers in interactive teaching strategies, including mentoring, role-playing 
exercises, and group discussion that allow teachers to better understand the needs of their 
students (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). 
 Targeted Behavioral Supports for At-Risk Students. These programs provide 
targeted, rigorously evaluated behavioral supports for at-risk students exhibiting known 
risk factors (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). In these programs, there is typically a 
program leader who instructs students in daily or weekly exercises to develop social 
skills and help the students learn to listen, manage anger, resolve conflicts, and cope with 
stress (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). Randomized controlled trial or quasi-experimental 
program evaluations have shown that these programs significantly improve the behavior 
of at-risk students (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). For example, experimental evaluations 
found that students who completed the Reconnecting Youth program had lower rates of 
alcohol consumption, drug use, aggressive tendencies, and school dropout rates compared 
to students who did not participate (Eggert, Thompson, Herting, & Nicholas, 1995; 
Eggert, Thompson, Herting, Nicholas, & Dickers, 1994). Likewise, an experimental 
evaluation of the Cognitive-Behavioral Training Program for Behaviorally Disordered 
Adolescents program found that students assigned to the program displayed increased 
self-control and a decreased level of aggressive behavior compared to the control group 
(Etscheidt, 1991). These programs look beyond the behavior of disruptive students and 
acknowledge risk factors that may extend into the students’ homes and the surrounding 
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community (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). Indeed, these programs often involve family 
members in an effort to better understand the sources of a student’s negative or disruptive 
behavior (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). 
 School-Wide Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (SWPBIS). This 
prevention program is a multi-tiered approach to school discipline, which includes the 
following three tiers: (1) defining and teaching behavioral expectations, rewarding 
positive behavior, providing a continuum of possible consequences for problem 
behaviors, and collecting data for decision making purposes; (2) providing targeted 
interventions to at-risk students displaying early signs of behavior problems; and (3) 
implementing more intensive, individualized interventions for students with serious 
behavioral problems, which typically involve family or community members 
(Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). Two experimental evaluations of the PeaceBuilders 
program found that students who completed the program exhibited increased social skills 
and peaceful behavior and decreased levels of aggressive behavior (Flannery et al., 2003; 
Vazsonyi, Belliston, Flannery, 2004).  
 Programs that are geared toward school climate-oriented strategies promote a 
“communal” orientation and an “ethos of caring” consistent with the traditional roles 
schools performed prior to neoliberal restructuring (Greene, 2005, p.244). This 
programming also strives to establish trust and connectedness among students, teachers, 
parents, and administrators (Barrios et al., 2001; Fein et al., 2002; Greene, 2005; Resnick 
et al., 1997). Thus, these goals are in stark contrast to the aims of zero-tolerance policies, 
which tend to foster teacher disengagement and erode students’ trust (Brotherton, 1996; 
Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik, 2010). 
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 While all of these evidence-based programs may require additional staffing and 
financial resources, their non-punitive and preventative approaches show great promise in 
correcting the behavioral and emotional problems of disruptive students without 
excluding them from the educational process all together (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). 
In addition, the long-term costs that could be saved by preventing more children from 
entering the school-to-prison-pipeline by replacing zero-tolerance, deterrence-based 
punishments with some combination of these strategies could be substantially larger than 
it would cost to implement them. Of course, such changes would require popular public 
support to pressure policy makers to adopt these initiatives and abandon zero-tolerance 
policies. Such a task will not be easily fought or easily won, especially given the political, 
organizational, and structural barriers currently impeding any changes to the existing 
school criminalization efforts; however, political economic systems can evolve to meet 
the demands of an informed and engaged citizenry. 
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
 There are limitations to the present study, which need to be addressed in order to 
inform future research. First of all, the qualitative inquiry was limited to a textual and 
discourse analysis that derived jurisprudential intent from the plain meaning decisions 
expressed in the court cases, and then subjected the extracted jurisprudential intent to a 
second level of analysis whereby the legal language conveyed was categorized into 
emergent themes reflective of the applied neoliberal theoretical framework, which made 
apparent the political economic philosophy encoded in the case law. This qualitative 
investigation has laid the groundwork on which numerous potential future studies may 
build. In fact, the legal language identified in the themes can serve as the basis for a 
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codebook to be developed in which a quantitative content analysis can be conducted for 
both the current dataset and potentially other case law datasets deemed relevant to test the 
neoliberal theoretical framework advanced in this study.  
 In addition, the language of the jurisprudential intent can also be used to generate 
survey questions that attempt to measure the five neoliberal thematic constructs. The 
questions developed by use of the language conveyed in the judicial decision making can 
then be used to create scenarios, or vignettes, in a questionnaire to actually survey judges. 
For example, a vignette, depicting the disciplining of a student for a zero-tolerance 
infraction at school, could be manipulated in various factorial designs to ask judges how 
they would decide in such cases. Follow-up questions could discern why the judge ruled 
in such a manner. Additionally, follow-up questions could ask if he or she felt the school 
administrators were entitled to qualified immunity or if he or she believed that the 
school’s interests in maintaining an orderly and disciplined school environment 
outweighed the individual rights of the student in the scenario. Of course, any 
questionnaires will need to be piloted to evaluate reliability and validity of measures. 
 These questionnaires could also be modified and applied to school administrators, 
parents, students, and the public more generally to better understand if attitudes toward 
zero-tolerance policies in schools are changing. Moreover, surveys of these various 
groups may also ask questions regarding the appropriateness of and preference for 
alternative, non-punitive program instead of zero-tolerance punishments. There is vast 
opportunity for new research questions and hypotheses to be developed from this line of 
research. 
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 Next, there were many limitations to the quantitative analyses. First of all, the 
available SSOCS datasets were restricted in the variables made accessible for analyses. 
As such, the bivariate quantitative analyses conducted in this study were primarily 
descriptive and exploratory in nature. There are key restricted variables that the 
researcher would need to petition for, and even purchase the rights for the use of, in order 
to engage in more sophisticated modeling. One such variable is the percentage of students 
on free or reduced lunch. This variable is typically used as a proxy for social class. By 
obtaining unrestricted access to the three waves of SSOCS data, the researcher could 
construct indexes to better measure the socioeconomic makeup of the schools.  
 Another limitation, which has implications for the generalizability of the findings 
in this case, is that the variable measuring percentage of minority students is not mutually 
exclusive in how it is measured and it does not allow the researcher to decipher the exact 
percentages of various races or ethnicities (e.g., African American, Caucasian, Asian, 
American Indian, Hispanic etc.) making up those overall percentages. In order to 
understand the breakdown of the racial makeup of the schools surveyed, it may require 
that the schools, which were given anonymous numerical identifiers, be identified so that 
census tract data can be utilized to drill down and ascertain data by racial and ethnic 
groups for those schools. Other census tract data could also be used to gather information 
about the social class divisions in these schools. Funding from a grant may be necessary 
to accomplish these tasks. 
 If the unrestricted datasets can be secured and tied to census tract data, then 
several multivariate analyses may be conducted. For example, structural equation models 
(SEM) could be created to determine if school disciplinary policies have differing 
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impacts on schools with certain social class and racial makeups. Furthermore, SEM 
models could address what affect these policies have on reducing various types of school 
infractions and crimes. As for assessing trends over time, the unrestricted data may allow 
researchers to conduct latent class growth analysis and growth mixture modeling. This 
more sophisticated modeling may aid researchers in determining longitudinal change in 
how zero-tolerance policies and practices are used over time. 
 The findings from the suggested future research may potentially provide a body of 
empirical evidence to pressure lawmakers for removal of zero-tolerance policies in 
schools, as well as other social institutions and contexts. Moreover, future quantitative 
research is required to further test the applicability of the neoliberal theoretical 
framework advanced in this study.  Indeed, subsequent studies may not only build upon 
the theoretical framework, but also improve it.
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Appendix B: Court Case Synopses 
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding (2009)  
[This case is about the constitutionality of the strip search of a 13-year-old middle school 
student who was accused of possessing over-the-counter ibuprofen pills. While the search 
was deemed a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, school officials received 
qualified immunity.] 
K.M. v. School Board of Lee County Florida (2005) 
[This case is about a troubled student, suspected of having a diability, who made a threat 
of violence toward a teacher and was suspended and removed to an alternate school as a 
result. He was denied an IDEA due process hearing because he was not properly 
diagnosed as disabled; however, parents argue the school deliberately withheld his 
records to prevent such a diagnoses and the proper hearing he deserved. Court dismiss the 
parent’s claims and upheld the district court’s decision.]  
S.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ. (2003) 
[In this case, a 5-year-old was suspended after saying “I’m going to shoot you,” while 
playing cops and robbers on the school playground. The court decided in favor of the 
school’s zero tolerance policy because the threat of violence outweighed the student’s 
First Amendment rights. The school officials were granted qualified immunity.] 
Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. (2002) 
[In this case, a student, who distributed a pamphlet at school that contained poems, 
cartoons, and essays depicting racial, sexual, and violent activity, was referred to police, 
arrested, and strip searched pursuant to arrest. The court found school officials immune 
from liability and the search constitutional.] 
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Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch. (2001) 
[In this case, a 13-year-old found out that his friend had been suicidal and that she had 
inadvertently brought a knife to school in her binder. He took the binder from her and put 
it in his locker. School officials learned of the knife and suspended for violating a zero 
tolerance policy. The court ruled in favor of the school regardless of Ratner’s intentions 
to help his suicidal friend.] 
Seal v. Morgan (2000) 
[In this case, a high school student was found with a knife in the glove compartment of 
his car while on campus. He was subsequently expelled for violating the school’s zero 
tolerance policy. He did not know that the knife was in his car. The court ruled that by 
not taking into account the student’s state of mind, or intent, the district court mistakenly 
affirmed the School Board’s motion for summary judgment; however, the court granted 
immunity to school officials.] 
West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260 (2000) 
[In this case, a seventh grade student was suspended for drawing a confederate flag on a 
piece of paper during math class. The court upheld to district court’s decision, which 
found that the suspension did not violate his First Amendment rights because the image 
could have caused substantial disruption in the school.] 
Piekosz-Murphy v. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 230 (2012) 
[In this case, a 17-year-old student, who was an athlete, attended a party where alcohol 
was being consumed by minors. He did not participate in the drinking; however, his 
presence at the party and failure to report the party violated the school code of conduct 
and he was suspended from participating in any extracurricular and co-curricular 
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activities. The court dismissed his claim as without merit and upheld the school’s 
disciplinary actions.] 
Ottaviano v. Kings Park Cent. Sch. Dist. (2010) 
[In this case, a high school senior admitted to providing another student with alcohol, 
which was subsequently taken to a school function. As a result, she was suspended from 
participating in any extracurricular activities for a year in accordance with the school’s 
zero tolerance policy. The court upheld the school’s decision and denied the student’s 
claims.] 
Evans v. Bd. of Educ. Southwestern City Sch. Dist. (2010) 
[In this case, two 12-year-old girls claimed of being sexually harassed and physically 
assaulted on several occassions by a male student on the bus. One day a teacher saw one 
of the girls crying in the lunch room. When asked what was wrong, the girl told the 
teacher that the boy, who had been harassing her, forced her to perform felacio on him 
while on the bus. Both the girl and the boy were suspended for consensual sexual 
activities that disrupted school. The court found the school district was not culpable for 
the emotional distress the girl endured; however, the court found that Principal Smathers 
was not entitled to summary judgment for some of the plaintiffs claims and his motion 
for summary judgment was denied.] 
Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (2010) 
[In this case, a 10-year-old wrote violent themes on his astronaut drawing in class. He 
was suspended because of the potential threat the drawing posed the school’s. The court 
upheld the school’s decision to discipline the student and found no violation of his First 
Amendment rights.] 
316 
 
Lee v. Lenape Valley Reg’l Bd. of Educ. (2009) 
[In this case, a 14-year-old, bi-racial boy transferred to Newton High School where he 
was repeatedly harassed and called derogatory names. One day, E.L. was called a 
“nigger” by another student, and when the incident escalated the boys began fighting.  
Both students were suspended. After the incident, school officials called E.L.’s parents to 
meet with them. The school stated that they did not know what to do for E.L. and that he 
would need to be home instructed until an out of district placement could be found. The 
court found in favor of the student plaintiff because of evidence suggesting the school 
failed to follow their anti-discrimination policies and denied the defendant school 
officials their motion for summary judgment.] 
Hardie v. Churchill County Sch. Dist. (2009) 
[In this case, a pocket knife was found on the floor of the bus that was taking the high 
school students on a field trip. Hardie recognized that the knife was probably his and told 
the bus driver so. As a result, Hardie was expelled. The court upheld the school officials 
decision.] 
Doran v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. (2009) 
[In this case, students were told to leave their belonging in the classrooms as they were 
all escorted to the football field and kept there for 90 minutes, so police dogs could sniff 
their belonging. Students’ parents filed federal  and state claims against the school for 
violating the childrens’ Fourth Amendment rights. The court dismissed the federal claims 
finding no violation of the Fourth Amendment; however, the court remanded the state 
claims to state court for resolution.] 
Brett N. v. Cmty Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303 (2009) 
317 
 
[In this case, a high school student was physically attacked by another student and he 
fought back in self-defense. The student who fought in self-defense was suspended. The 
court upheld the suspension citing that maintaining a peaceful and orderly school 
environment was a legitimate government interest that outweighed the student’s right to 
defend himself.] 
Barnett v. Tipton County Bd. of Educ. (2009) 
[In this case, two high school students created a fake MySpace profile that parodied 
Assistant Principal LeFlore and made sexually suggestive comments about female 
students. Barnett was sent to an alternative school and Black received an in-school 
suspension. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action, because website created a 
disruption at school that outweighed the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the 
students.] 
Griffin v. Crossett Sch. Dist., Inc. (2008) 
[In this case, a 14-year-old, African American special needs student (Willie) brought a 
handgun to school and gave it to another student. During the same school year, a 9-year-
old Caucasian boy (Jacob), who was also a special needs student brought a gun to school. 
Both students received a Section 504 Evaluation and Manifestation Determination 
Conference to decide if their disabilities impaired their ability to understand the impact 
and consequences of their behavior. While Willie’s committee found that his disability 
did not affect his understanding of his behavior, Jacob’s committee found that his 
disability did impair is ability to understand the impact of his behavior. Thus, Willie was 
expelled and Jacob only received a 10 day suspension. The court upheld the school’s 
decisions and found that there was no case of discrimination and that the 504 committees 
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were not biased in their punishment of these students, who the plaintiffs argue are 
similarly situated.] 
Hill v. Sharber (2008) 
[In this case, the Sheriff’s Department conducted a sweep of the parking lots at Franklin 
High School with drug sniffing dogs. The drug sniffing dog alerted to the possibility that 
there might be drugs in Ky Hill’s (student at FHS) car. Hill was removed from class, 
informed of the positive alert, given his Miranda rights, and asked if he had drugs in the 
car. Hill was handcuffed while the car was searched, and the deputies found beer in the 
car. The Manifestation Meeting found that Hill’s behavior was not due to his disability. 
In accordance with the schools zero tolerance policy, Hill was placed in an alternative 
school and banned from participating in extracurricular activities. The court upheld the 
search and the disciplinary actions taken against Hill.] 
Simonian v. Fowler Unified Sch. Dist. (2008) 
[In this case, a high school student was called to his vehicle because a drug sniffing dog 
showed interest in his car. Jonathan gave consent for his car to be search and a pin-head 
size piece of marijuana was found. As a result, Jonathan was expelled for the suspicion of 
possessing marijuana. The court upheld his expulsion and assignment to an alternative 
school setting.] 
Morgan v. Snider High Sch. (2007) 
[In this case, a high school student drove two classmates to the homecoming dance at 
Snider High School. While Kevin was approaching the parking lot on the school campus, 
he noticed that one of the students in the car had a “bowl” and asked Kevin for 
permission to smoke marijuana in the car. Kevin refused, pulled on to the school’s 
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property, and promptly had the passenger exit his car. At the dance, the Assistant 
Principal detected the odor of marijuana on the boy who rode with Kevin. The boy 
informed the school officials that Kevin had driven him to the dance. Kevin’s consented 
to a search of his car and a marijuana seed and “siftings” were found in the back seat. 
Kevin was suspended from participating in any extracurricular activities for a year. The 
court upheld the school’s disciplinary action.] 
Roy v. Fulton County Sch. Dist. (2007) 
[In this case, a high school student’s MP3 player was stolen from his locker. The school 
officials question J.B., a white male, about the stolen electronics and J.B. told them that 
he and Mark (a black male) stole the MP3 player from another student’s locker and sold 
it. Mark was questioned about the theft and denied any involvement. Assistant Principal 
Groves decided to search Mark’s locker and found a dead cell phone. Mark later provided 
a statement that a friend gave him a MP3 player and asked him to sell it; however, he 
claimed he did not steal it and did not know it was stolen. Mark was suspended as a 
result. The court found the search to be constitutional and not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment; however, the court found Mark’s allegations of the violation of his equal 
protection rights to be sufficient and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss Mark’s 
equal protection claim.] 
Bogle-Assegai v. Bloomfield Bd. of Educ. (2006) 
[In this case, a high school girl pushed another high school boy and put him in a 
headlock. The boy did not fight back. The girl, as the sole aggressor, was charged with 
breach of the peace and assault and she was arrested. In addition, she was suspended and 
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later expelled. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action and found no violation of 
her due process or equal protection rights.] 
Langley v. Monroe County Sch. Dist. (2006) 
[In this case, a high school girl (Laura)car did not start and she was forced to drive her 
mother’s car to school instead. The Assistant Principal, Chad O’Brian, went to check 
parking decals in the parking lot and noticed that Laurs’s car did not have one. He looked 
inside the call and saw an open beer can. Laura denied having any knowledge of the beer 
and surmised that it had to belong to her mother since it was her mother’s car. She was 
suspended and later placed in an alternative school. The court ruled that there was enough 
evidence to present to a jury as to the mental anxiety and stress suffered by Laura as well 
as her substantive due process claims.] 
Vann v. Stewart (2006) 
[In this case, a student (Austin) was found in possession of a small pocketknife while at 
school. He was suspended for one calendar year in accordance with the school’s zero 
tolerance policy. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary actions and dismissed the 
student’s claims.] 
McKinley v. Lott (2005) 
[In this case, a teacher asked the student resource officer to escort a 16-year-old boy to 
the principal’s office because he smelled heavily of marijuana. When the principal asked 
the student if he had been smoking marijuana, the student replied yes but was under the 
impression that the principal was asking if he had ever smoke marijuana before and not 
on that particular day. The youth was arrested and transported to juvenile hall. Criminal 
charges were eventually dropped; however, the student was transferred to an alternative 
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school as a punishment. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary actions and dismissed 
the student’s claims.] 
Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ. (2005) 
[In this case, a school official took graham crackers from a student prior to an assembly. 
The student challenged the official and called him a vulgar name. He was suspended for 
10 days. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action, dismissed the student’s First 
Amendment rights claims, and found that he did not have a fundamental right to attend 
school.] 
Collins v. Prince William County Pub. Schs. (2004) 
[In this case, a high school student (Jeremy) replicated a science experiment where toilet 
bowl cleaner and aluminum foil were placed inside soda bottles to create bottle bombs. 
He and his friends detonated these bottle bombs in several locations  in the local 
neighborhoods, including near local schools. The high school expelled Jeremy even 
though the acts were committed off-campus. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary 
action and dismissed his constitutional protection claims.] 
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ. (2001) 
[In this case, a high school student wore a Jeff Foxworthy t-shirt which displayed the 
term “Redneck” and other language that the school officials felt violated the dress code 
and the policy regarding racial harassment and intimidation.  The student was suspended 
for insubordination because he violated the above mentioned policies. The court upheld 
the school’s disciplinary action under the Tinker substantial disruption standard; 
however, the court also ruled that the dress code and policy were overbroad and 
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constitutionally vague and as such, a case for irreparable injury for the student could be 
made.] 
Anderson v. Milbank Sch. Dist. (2000) 
[In this case, the student’s mother worked as a cook for the school and left a note for her 
in the principal’s office instructing her to take the bus home on that day. The student 
muttered to herself, “Shit.” The principal’s secretary heard her and reported her foul 
statement to the principal. The student received in-school suspension and a reduction in 
her grades for the class work she missed. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary 
action and dismissed the student’s First Amendment rights claims.] 
D.G. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 11 (2000) 
[In this case, an 11th grade student wrote a poem about her teacher expressing her 
frustration about being in her class. The poem was later found and she was suspended. 
The court found in favor of the student and held that once the administration gathered all 
the relevant facts, and the context of the poem was revealed, there was no basis to believe 
it was a threat. Thus, her poem was protected under the First Amendment and a 
preliminary injunction was granted.] 
Hammock ex rel. Hammock v. Keys (2000) 
[In this case, Virginia Hammock, a high school senior, was made aware that a drug sniff 
dog gave interest to her car. After a search of her vehicle, marijuana fragments were 
found in her vehicle, which was parked on school property. She was immediately 
suspended and subsequently expelled. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action 
and dismissed the student’s motion for a preliminary injunction.] 
Colvin ex rel. Colvin v. Lowndes County (2000) 
323 
 
[In this case, a 6th grade student (Jonathan), who had learning disabilities and handicaps 
was found with Swiss Army knife at school. The disciplinary hearing officer suspended 
him for a day, but the school board overruled the hearing officer’s recommendation and 
approved his expulsion from school. The court found in favor of the student and 
remanded the case with instructions to the defendant school board to reconsider the 
appropriate penalty.] 
James P. v. Lemahieu (2000) 
[In this case, a high school student (Robert) was suspended for drinking alcohol at his 
home before he attended the senior luau. The court found in favor of the student because 
there was no evidence that Robert possessed the alcohol while at the luau. Robert was 
granted injuctive relief and the disciplinary action was expunged from his record.] 
Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61 (2000) 
[In this case, six high school students were expelled for two years because they were 
involved in a violent fight, which was deemed gang-like activity, in the stands at a high 
school football game. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action and dismissed the 
students’ claims.] 
Doe by & Through Doe v. Board of Educ. (1995) 
[In this case, a 13-year-old, learning disabled high school student was allegedly found in 
possession of a pipe and a small amount of marijuana. He was suspended and 
subsequently expelled. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action and dismissed 
the student’s due process claims.] 
Jordan by Edwards v. O’Fallon Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 203 Bd. of Educ. (1999) 
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[In this case, a high school student suspended from participation in interscholastic 
athletics as punishment for violating the school’s zero-tolerance policy, which prohibited 
the student from being in an inebriated state at school. The court upheld the school’s 
disciplinary action and found that the student had no constitutionally protected interest in 
taking part in athletics even though he may have received an athletic scholarship.] 
Northwestern Sch. Corp. v. Linke (2002) 
[In this case, two students in the Northwestern School Corporation argued that the 
school’s random drug testing violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The court upheld 
the school’s testing program and ruled that the immediate governmental concerns at issue 
for safety outweighed students’ privacy rights.] 
In re L.A. (2001) 
[In this case, the Assistant Vice Principal Herrington, at Campus High School, received a 
tip from the school Crime Stoppers organizer that a 16-year-old boy (L.A.) had marijuana 
in the headband of his baseball cap. Herrington and a school security guard searched L.A. 
and found marijuana and Valium on his person. L.A. was referred to law enforcement 
and he was adjudicated as a juvenile offender and received out-of-home placement for 90 
days. The court upheld the adjudications and found no violation of L.A.’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.] 
Commonwealth v. Lawrence L. (2003) 
[In this case, the Vice Principal at Breed Middle School received a tip that there was 
going to be a problem among the student who wore blue bandanas after school. He went 
around talking to these students and one of them smelled like marijuana. He searched the 
student and found a folded piece of paper containing marijuana. The student was referred 
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to police, put in custody, and charged with two counts of marijuana possession. The court 
found the search to not be a violation of the student’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the 
student’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied.] 
Covington County v. G.W. (2000) 
[In this case, a teacher sent a note to Assistant Principal Thames, which informed him 
that a 17-year-old (G.W.) was drinking beer in the school parking lot. Thames and a 
school security guard went to G.W.’s truck and found empty beer cans in his truck bed. 
The principal requested G.W. open his vehicle and allow the officer to search his truck. 
They found more beer in a locked toolbox inside the truck. G.W. was immediately 
suspended and subsequently expelled. At a chancery court hearing, the chancellor 
overturned the school’s disciplinary action. The school district appealed, and the court 
upheld the disciplinary action and overturned the chancellor’s ruling.] 
Hinds County Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. R.B. (2007) 
[In this case, Principal Campbell was informed that one of the middle school students at 
Byram was selling drugs. He approached R.B. and searched his backpack. The search 
revealed that R.B. had a nail file device. Expulsion was recommended and the chancery 
court overturned the school district’s disciplinary action because it relied solely on a 
photocopy of the item that was being called a knife by school officials. The appellate 
court ruled that the decision by the school district was arbitrary and capricious and not 
supported by substantial evidence.] 
State v. Best (2010) 
[In this case, Assistant Principal Brandt received a report that a was suspected of being 
under the influence of drugs. This student told Brandt that another 18-year-old student 
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(Thomas) gave him the pill. Thomas Best denied any involvement, but Brandt’s search of 
Thomas turned up 3 white pills in his pants. Brandt searched his car too and found 
various drug-like substances and paraphernalia. Thomas was arrested and criminally 
charged. The court upheld the search by Brandt and dismissed Thomas’ Fourth 
Amendment claims.] 
In re K.K. (2011) 
[In this case, a high school principal received a tip from a police officer that a student 
(K.K.) might be dealing in heroin. The principal decided to search K.K.’s pants pockets 
and book bag, which revealed he did have drugs on his person. K.K. was referred to 
juvenile court and charged with two counts of delinquency. The court upheld the search, 
which was in accordance with the school’s zero tolerance policy and dismissed the 
student’s Fourth Amendment claims.] 
In the Interest of F.B. (1999) 
[In this case, a high school student went through a point of entry search upon entering 
school and a Swiss Army knife was found on his person. He was arrested and adjudicated 
as a delinquent in juvenile court. The court upheld the adjudication and dismissed the 
student’s Fourth Amendment claims.] 
In re Hinterlong (2003) 
[In this case, a high school senior (Hinterlong) was asked to allow Vice Principal Clark to 
search his car because they had received a tip that he had either alcohol or drugs in his 
vehicle. Hinterlong complied and the search yielded an open water bottle with a very 
small amount of alcohol in it. Hinterlong claimed that he was set up, but the school 
proceeded with expulsion. In municipal court, a jury acquitted Hinterlong and Hinterlong 
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filed suit against the school and to identify the person who gave the false tip to school 
officials. The appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Hinterlong’s motion to compel discovery. The appellate court directed the real parties in 
interest to submit an in camera affidavit of the student informant and to order disclosure 
of any information that the trial court deemed necessary to a fair determination of the 
disputed facts.] 
E.M. v. Briggs (1996) 
[In this case, 3 middle school students were found in possession of marijuana while on 
school. In accordance with the school’s zero tolerance policy, they were expelled. The 
court upheld the school’s disciplinary actions and dismissed the students’ complaints.] 
Cathe A. v. Doddridge County Bd. of Educ. (1997) 
[In this case, a high school student was found on the school bus with two knifes. He was 
suspended and subsequently expelled. The school offered to provide educational services 
at the student’s home; however, the parents were requested to pay for these continued 
services. The court upheld the disciplinary action of the school but found that the parents 
should not be required to pay for an at-home instructional program that was offered in 
lieu of regular school classes.] 
J.M. v. Webster County Bd. of Educ. (2000) 
[In this case, a 15-year-old, high school student (J.M.) misbehaved in class and was 
suspended for 2 days. When his father found out about his suspension, he became 
extremely upset at J.M. and told him that he was taking J.M. out of school and getting 
him a job at the lumber yard. When they returned home, J.M. accidentally hit the truck 
door on the family lawnmower. The father picked up an axe and threatened to kill J.M. if 
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he had done damage to the truck. While his father was in the yard, J.M. secured all of his 
father’s firearms by locking them in the gun cabinet and hiding the keys; however, J.M. 
discovered that he forgot to lockup a revolver and ammunition left on top of the gun 
cabinet. Not wanting his father to discover him with the gun, J.M. tucked in in his pants.  
J.M.’s father took J.M. to the school to get the paperwork so he could get him a job at the 
lumber yard, but everyone had already left for the day and only the football coach was 
there. The coach found J.M.’s father to be extremely agitated and asked him to go cool 
off for a while. When J.M. was alone with the coach he turned the revolver over to him to 
hide it from his father because he feared for his life. The coach took it from him and 
eventually turned it over to the principal. The principal suspended J.M. for a year and 
placed him in an alternative school for bringing the gun on campus. The court upheld the 
school’s disciplinary actions and dismissed the student’s case.] 
Goss v. Lopez (1975) 
[In this landmark 1975 case, high school student, who had been suspended for 
misconduct for up to 10 days without a hearing brought a class action suit against the 
school officials for violation of their due process rights. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
students procedural due process rights were violated and the students’ protected liberty 
interests in public education could not be taken away by suspension without the minimal 
procedural safeguards of notice and an opportunity to be heard, flexibly applied in a 
given situation.] 
Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist. (1969) 
[In this landmark 1969 case, two high school students and one junior high school student 
wore black armbands to their school to publicize their objection to the Vietnam War. The 
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students were suspended as a result because it violated the school dress code policy. The 
Supreme Court ruled that school officials’ actions violated the student’s First 
Amendment rights and reversed the lower court’s decision to uphold the school’s 
disciplinary actions.] 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier (1988) 
[In this landmark 1988 case, a high school principal censored the publication of the 
school newspaper because of the subject matter. The students brought action against the 
school for violating their First Amendment rights. The court found that there was no 
violation of the student’s First Amendment freedoms because public school is not the 
same as other public places and that school administrators should be able to determine the 
manner of speech appropriate for the school setting.] 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 
[In this landmark 1985 case, a teacher found a 14-year-old freshman smoking cigarettes 
in the restroom. The assistant vice principal searched the student’s purse and found 
cigarettes and rolling papers, and after a more thorough search found marijuana in the 
purse. The student was referred to juvenile court where she faced delinquency charges. 
The state supreme court found the search unreasonable and reversed the lower court’s 
decision. The Supreme Court deemed the search reasonable and not a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. As a result the evidence was found to be admissible.] 
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser (1986) 
[In this landmark 1986 case, a high school student delivered a speech that used a sexually 
explicit metaphor. The student was suspended as a result. The trial court and appellate 
court found for the student with the ruling that the punishment violated his First 
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Amendment rights. The Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ rulings, upheld the 
school’s disciplinary actions, and found no violation of the First Amendment.] 
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995) 
[In this landmark 1995 case, a seventh grade student and his parents refused to sign the 
mandatory drug testing forms and the student was denied participation in football. The 
parents filed suit for the violation of their son’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision to reverse and remand 
because the policy violated the student’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court found 
in favor of the school and ruled that students are not entitled to full Fourth Amendment 
rights and have a decreased expectation of privacy.] 
Binder v. Cold Spring Harbor Cent. Sch. Dist. (2010) 
[ In this case, Assistant Principal Browne was informed that a student smelled of 
marijuana. Browne asked the student (Binder) to empty his pockets and security guard 
searched Binder’s backpack even though Binder refused.  The search turned up marijuana 
in his backpack. Binder was suspended and later filed suit against the school for violating 
his Fourth Amendment rights. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action and 
dismiss the student’s claims.] 
C.H. v. Folks (2010) 
[In this case, a middle school student (C.H.) went into one of the bathroom stalls at 
school and the school custodian allegedly observed C.H. marking the inside of the stall 
door. The custodian was in the ceiling looking down on the stall. When C.H. exited the 
bathroom, the custodian stopped C.H. and put his hands in C.H.’s pockets. C.H. was 
arrested and charged with a felony, but the prosecutor declined to prosecute the case. 
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C.H. brought suit against the school officials for sexual harassment and violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights. The court dismissed all of C.H.’s claims except one. The court 
found that the pocket search and surveillance of C.H. in the restroom stall was a violation 
of his Fourth Amendment rights.] 
Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist. (2005) 
[In this case, a high school student in the second-hour gym class reported that her prom 
money had been stolen during the class. The principal was absent, so the acting principal, 
school teacher Charmaine Balsillie, was advised of the theft and she called the police. 
Four school officials searched all of the student’s backpacks in the gym and locker 
rooms. Two male teachers searched the 20 boys individually in the locker room shower 
by making them lower their pants and underpants and removing their shirts. The boys 
were not physically touched. Two female teachers searched 5 girls in the bathroom by 
having them pull up their shirts and pull down their pants while standing in a circle. None 
of the girls were touched. The money was never discovered. The students filed suit for 
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The court found the search of the students to 
be unreasonable because of the absence of individualized suspicion; however, the court 
granted the school officials qualified immunity because the law at the time the searches 
were conducted did not clearly establish that they were unreasonable under those 
particular circumstances. The court reversed the lower court decision and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the school officials.] 
Sims v. Bracken County Sch. Dist. (2010) 
[In this case, Kentucky State Police (KSP) conducted a random narcotics patrol of 
Bracken County High School with drug-sniffing canines. One of the dogs returned a 
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positive alert to one student’s jacket (Mercadez). The search of her jacket did not reveal 
any drugs. On a separate occasion, Mercadez was questioned about unsubstantiated 
reports that she was smoking marijuana on a school field trip. No marijuana was found; 
however, Mercadez had allow boys into her hotel room, which violated school policy and 
she received in-school suspension was stripped of her officer role in the Future Business 
Leaders of America. Later, another drug patrol was conducted and this time the dogs 
alerted to Mercadez’s brother’s (K.S.) locker. They found no drugs in his locker, but they 
did find cigarette rolling papers and he was suspended for 5 days because of that. The 
school conducted another patrol and this time K.S. was pulled from class and asked if he 
had drugs in his car, which he denied. The police searched his car and uncovered a 
chewed straw. They thoroughly searched his car and found nothing, but they construed 
the straw to be drug paraphernalia. K.S. did admit that marijuana had been smoked in the 
car by someone else a week prior. The KSP crime lab test found marijuana residue in the 
car and K.S. was suspended and expulsion proceedings were started. Ms. Sims, the 
mother of both Mercadez and K.S., filed claims that the discipline her children received 
violated their constitutional rights. The court found in favor of the school officials and 
dismissed the students’ case.] 
Lausin v. Bishko (2010) 
[In this case, a threatening message was found on the wall of the girl’s bathroom at 
Richmond Heights High School. After reviewing the video tape outside of the bathroom, 
school officials identified Gina Lausin as the primary suspect. Upon questioning, Gina 
denied writing the message. Gina’s locker was searched and a note containing racial slurs 
was found. Gina was taken to the police station, mirandized, and asked further question 
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in an interrogation room. Eventually, after about 20 minutes, she confessed to writing the 
threat and apologized. Gina was suspended and later expelled. Juvenile charges were also 
brought against Gina; however, charges were dropped when a handwriting analyst could 
not conclusively determine if Gina was the person who wrote the threat. Gina filed suit 
for violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled in favor of 
the school officials and dismissed the student’s claims.] 
Pendleton v. Fassett (2009) 
[In this case, a high school student (Pendleton) at Brown Street was subjected to a point 
of entry search. Pendleton was asked to lift her shirt and brassiere to expose her breasts 
and Officer Fisher touched her beneath her breasts. Pendleton also had to lower her pants 
and the officer ran her fingers through the waistline of her underwear. No contraband was 
found. The student filed a claim for the violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. The court found the search to be unreasonable given there was no 
individualized suspicion; however, the court gave the officials immunity and dismissed 
the student’s claim.] 
Wooleyhan v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist. (2011) 
[In this case, an 18-year-old, high school student (Wooleyhan) was talking with his 
girlfriend when a teacher (Jester) told them to go to class. They did not immediately go, 
so Jester separated the by placing her arms between them and pushing them apart. The 
teacher claimed that Wooleyhan elbowed her in the chest and Wooleyhan denied doing 
this. Wooleyhan was arrested as well as suspended. The hallway security did not capture 
Wooleyhan elbowing Jester. Wooleyhan was found not guilty of the criminal charges. 
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Wooleyhan filed suit against Jester and other school officials. The court dismissed 
Wooleyhan’s claims against all school officials except Jester.] 
Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd. (2004) 
[In this case, a 12-year-old (Andrew) took a drawing pad from his older brother’s (Adam) 
room, which had a drawing in it that Adam drew 2 years before in the privacy of his 
home. The drawing was of the school in a state of siege with missiles, a gas tanker, and 
armed persons. While on the bus, Andrew’s friend flipped through the drawing pad and 
found the picture. Andrew’s friend showed the bus driver and pad was turned over to 
Principal Wilson at the middle school. School officials at the high school were notified 
and Adam was immediately searched. They found a box cutter that he claimed he used at 
his after-school job at the local grocery store. Adam was expelled and placed in an 
alternative school. Adam eventually dropped out. Adam and Andrew’s mother brought 
suit against the school board and superintendent for violation of her son’s First, Fourth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court found that Adam’s drawing could 
not be considered a true threat; however, school officials were given qualified immunity 
and granted the school board summary judgment.] 
Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t. (2003) 
[In this case, a 15-year-old student (Demers), in the eighth grade, who had special needs 
was talking while in his English class. Demers was asked to leave and went to the 
classroom next door. The substitute math teacher in the other room asked Demers to draw 
a picture showing how he felt about being kicked out of school. He drew a picture of the 
school surrounded by explosives with students hanging out of the windows crying. The 
next day, Demers wrote a note with the phrases “I want to die” and “I hate life.” The 
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principal met with the student’s father and suspended him after the meeting. He was 
suspended for the rest of the school year and placed in an alternative school. The parents 
filed a suit for violation of their son’s First Amendment rights. The court found in favor 
of the school and dismissed the student’s claims.] 
Bundick v. Bay City Indep. Sch. Dist. (2001) 
[In this case, a drug sniffing dog alerted to a high school student’s (Bundick) truck. 
Bundick was summoned to his truck.  Upon searching the toolbox of the truck, police 
found a machete among the tools. Bundick was expelled as a result, and he filed suit for 
violation of his Fourth Amendment and privacy rights. The court found in favor of the 
school and dismissed the student’s claims.] 
Butler v. Rio Rancho Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ. (2003). 
[In this case, a high school student (Joshua) borrowed his brother’s car and drove to 
school. Joshua parked in the faculty parking lot without a permit. A security guard 
noticed the vehicle did not have a permit and upon looking into the car noticed the butt 
end of a knife sticking up between the passenger seat and the center console. The security 
guard also found a handgun and ammunition in the car, which all belonged to Joshua’s 
brother. Joshua was suspended for one school year. Joshua’s parent filed suit, and the 
district court found in favor of Joshua. However, the appellate court for the 10th Circuit 
found in favor of the school district and reversed and remanded the case.] 
DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist. (2009) 
[In this case, a Hispanic student at East Hampton High School was killed in an 
motorcycle accident. The following Monday was a day of mourning. A tenth grade 
student (Daniel) overheard someone say, “one down 40,000 to go,” and he repeated it by 
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whispering in a friend’s ear what he heard. Soon word spread that Daniel made the 
comment, and several Hispanic students became very upset and started yelling and 
threatening Daniel. Daniel was sent home, which he thought was for his safety; however, 
he learned that he was suspended. Daniel wanted an opportunity to tell his fellow 
students about the misunderstanding but was denied access to the school’s PA system or 
a school assembly. Daniel received threatening phone calls at his home. The 
superintendent found him guilty of making the comment and suspended him for the 
remainder of the year. The family filed suit. The New York State Education 
Commissioner overturned the superintendent’s decision and ordered the incident 
expunged from Daniel’s record. Upon appeal, the appellate court upheld the school’s 
disciplinary actions and dismissed Daniel’s claims that the school violated his First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.] 
Tun v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch. (2004) 
[In this case, a high school boy (Tun) and his other friends were showering at school after 
wrestling practice. Another student, who was a foreign exchange student, came into the 
shower and took photographs of them. He developed the film gave Tun the negatives. 
Tun was caught looking at the negatives while in photography class and the pictures were 
turned over to the principal. Tun was expelled for allowing another student to photograph 
him nude. Tun filed suit and the court found that Principal Whitticker and the expulsion 
hearing examiner, Judith Platz, were liable for violating Tun’s substantive due process 
rights. However, the court dismissed Tun’s claims against the school district, the 
photography teacher, the wrestling coach, Whitticker, and Platz for acting in their official 
capacities.] 
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T.T. v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. (2009) 
[In this case, employees at a dental office near Newport High School witnessed a person 
with a pipe smoking what they believed to be marijuana on their property. They 
contacted the school officials and identified the person as 10th grader, T.T., after looking 
at photos in the high school yearbook. T.T. was emergency expelled. T.T.’s mother filed 
suit; however, the court upheld the school’s disciplinary action and dismissed T.T.’s 
claims.] 
S.H. v. Rowland Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. (2005) 
[In this case, the Nogales High School band teacher was informed that his car had been 
“keyed.” A parent informed the teacher that a high school student (S.H.) had committed 
the vandalism with a knife. The campus police officer conducted a pat down of S.H. and 
searched his bookbag. The knife was found in S.H.’s bookbag. S.H. was suspended and 
later expelled. S.H. file suit against the school, but the court found in favor of the school.] 
Jones v. Long County Sch. Dist. (2012) 
[In this case, a middle school student (E.J.) was placed in an alternative STAR program 
for being insubordinate, disrespectful, and disruptive. E.J. was late to the first day of the 
program because his mother overslept. The assistant principal was angered by this an 
ordered E.J. to in-school suspension; however, E.J. did not go and hid in a bathroom 
instead. When E.J. was discovered he received out-of-school suspension for 3 days for 
not doing as he was instructed. E.J. had a dispute with two of the teachers in the STAR 
program for disruption and was suspended for another 5 days. E.J.’s mother tried to re-
enroll him after the suspension, but the principal informed her that he would not be re-
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enrolled until he completed 10 days in the STAR program. His mother filed suit against 
the school. The court found in favor of the school and dismissed the student’s claims.] 
J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (2011) 
[In this case, an eighth grade student (J.S.) created an internet profile, at her home, of her 
principal, which used adult language and sexually explicit content. J.S. was suspended 
because the school argued that her web profile disrupted the school’s operation severely. 
J.S. and her parents filed suit, and the court ruled in favor of J.S. for the violation of her 
First Amendment rights because there was no evidence to lead a reasonable person into 
thinking the profile would cause a substantial disruption. However, the court ruled that 
the district’s policies were not overbroad or void-for-vagueness, and that the district did 
not violate the parent’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.] 
Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist. (2006) 
[In this case, a ninth grade student (Rachel) was suspended for writing a violent story 
about shooting her math teacher in her notebook. Rachel’s parents filed suit against the 
school district for violating her First Amendment rights. The court found in favor of the 
school district and dismissed the student’s claims with prejudice.] 
Commonwealth v. Smith (2008) 
[In this case, a high school student was found in an unauthorized area of the school, and 
he was taken to an office to perform a search. The school administrator found a .380 
caliber handgun in his jacket. The student was arrested and criminally charged. The 
student moved to suppress the weapon because he alleged that his Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated. The court found the search to be constitutional.] 
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. (2002) 
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[In this case, an eighth grade student (J.S.) created a website containing derogatory 
content about his school principal and his math teacher on his home computer and posted 
it on the internet with a disclaimer. The student revealed the existence of the website to 
others and the school officials became aware of it. The principal believed the website 
badly disrupted the school. The school did not attempt to get J.S. any type of 
psychological evaluation and waited until the school year ended to punish him although 
he had taken it down after a couple of weeks. J.S. was first suspended and later expelled. 
J.S. filed suit for violation of his First Amendment rights. The court upheld the school 
district’s disciplinary action, finding that J.S.’s rights were not violated even though he 
conducted the speech off-campus.] 
RM v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One (2004) 
[In this case, R.M. and B.C. were caught selling marijuana to other students while on 
school grounds. Both students were expelled. The juvenile court found them guilty of 
delinquency, but ordered the school district to provide the students with continued 
educational services while they were expelled because the Wyoming constitution 
obligated them to provide free education. The appellate court upheld the school district’s 
disciplinary action and found that the school district did not have to provide educational 
services for students who had been expelled for bad conduct.] 
 
